

DELHI UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Cl. No. 127.1902 L25 A

Ac. No. 1E752 . Date of release for loan

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of 0.6 nP. will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.

PREFACE.

l documents relating to the war with Tippoo Sultaun, been laid before Parliament, or published by the East ipany, might be supposed to render any thing further subject superfluous. Under this impression, I hesitated, arrival from India, to send to the Press, the following upon which I had been engaged during the voyage: but appeared, that notwithstanding the publication of those ents, several points required explanation; erroneous opinions en formed; military operations had not been sufficiently led; and few particulars had been recorded of a siege, the st brilliant and important that ever was carried on in that arter of the globe.

For these reasons, and above all, as the work I proposed giving the Public, was begun under the auspices of the Marquis lesley, from whom I received every assistance and encouragement; and as the situations, in which I had been placed, through [redacted], afforded me opportunities of knowing,

intimately, the measures adopted and pursued
hope, that a faithful and impartial account, illus
and Plans, comprizing, in a connected form, eve
respecting the Origin and Conduct of a War, wh
with so much glory and advantage to the British n
be favourably received, although its publication, fro
delays, has been protracted to a later period than I
expect.

The following Narrative is partly the result of my o
vation, and in part composed from the most authentic r
It will be found to contain a considerable addition of new
but, as some parts of the subject have been anticipated, it
proper to state the circumstances which gave rise to the pu
tion; and to point out those advantages which it cannot f
possess, from the aid and patronage it received from the Mar
Wellesley.

Upon the disclosure of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile designs, h
Lordship transmitted to the Government of Fort St. George
certain queries relative to military operations in Mysore, and
directed, that the answers should be sent to him by an offic
capable of affording such further information as he might requ
It was my peculiar good fortune
I was then engaged in an investi

he gave me every encouragement to prosecute the work; and though it was with diffidence undertaken, yet I had the satisfaction to complete it during the passage from India.

On this occasion, my particular acknowledgments are due to the Honourable Henry Wellesley, for the very friendly and able assistance I received from him during the passage, in the communication of many curious and interesting anecdotes respecting the late Sultaun, which his official situation enabled him to collect at Seringapatam; and from his discernment, in removing whatever doubts had arisen in my mind, respecting the application and use of certain parts of the Governor-general's correspondence.

Since my return [illegible] knowledge my obligations to Sir Stephen [illegible] and Mr. Inglis the Chairmen, and to Mr. Scott the Deputy [illegible] the Court of Directors, for the liberal encouragement [illegible] have received through their kindness and attention. [illegible]tlemen, I am peculiarly indebted for access to whatever [illegible] had occasion to refer: which have enabled me to elucidate various points, and to bring up my Narrative to the latest period.

Such are the advantages I have had in the prosecution of this work. I am aware, however, it may be found to have its imperfections; yet I trust, from my inexperience in literary composition,

it will be received with indulgence. Whatever may be its fate, one consolation I shall always feel; that I have spared no labour to render it as faithful and impartial a record as can possibly be given, of all those transactions which led to the destruction of Tippoo Sultaun's power, and to the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

A general View of the Dangers to which the British Possessions have been constantly exposed since the Usurpation of Hyder Alli —between June and September, 1798, *menaced by a Combination of the most serious Dangers.—Malartic's Proclamation.—Tippoo Sultaun's Embassy to the Isle of France—its Tendency.—Authenticity of the Proclamation doubted—confirmed.—French Force lands at Mangalore.—The Governor-general orders the Armies of Coromandel and Malabar to assemble—his Measures for improving our defensive Alliances.* - - page 1

CHAPTER II.

The Condition of our Alliances favourable to the Success of French Intrigue.—French Faction at Hyderabad.—Raymond's Corps threatens the Nizam's Independence—renders his Highness's Alliance with the Company of no Advantage, and even dangerous.—The Governor-general negotiates for the Augmentation of the British Force at Hyderabad, and for the Dismission of the French Officers serving with the Nizam.—The Nizam's annual Subsidy increased.—A Detachment assembles at Guntoor—arrives at Hyderabad.—French Force disarmed—Advantages from this important Measure. - - - - p. 20

CHAPTER III.

The Governor-general endeavours to improve the Marhatta Alliance.—Accounts received of the French in Egypt—Precautions taken—evident Connexion between the French in Egypt and Tippoo Sultaun.—Orders for preparing and advancing a Battering Train to the Frontier of the Carnatic.—Volunteers sent from Bengal to Madras.—Large Supplies to be collected in Malabar.—Accounts received of Lord Nelson's Victory.—A favourable Period to negotiate with Tippoo Sultaun.—The Governor-general writes to the Sultaun—his Lordship's Expectations—his Arrival at Fort St. George—he receives a Letter from the Sultaun—again writes to the Sultaun, and endeavours to ascertain his Views—receives a Letter from the Sultaun. - - - p. 27

CHAPTER IV.

The Governor-general's Efforts to advance the Military Preparations.—Public Spirit of the Settlement of Fort St. George.—Loan to Government.—Uncertainty respecting the French in Egypt.—Tippoo Sultaun's evasive Conduct.—The Governor-general defeats the Object of the Sultaun's Silence, by ordering the Armies to enter Mysore.—A Letter from the Sultaun.—His Hunting Excursion.—His Embassy to the Directory of France.—The Governor-general's Reply to Tippoo Sultaun. - .. - p. 34

CHAPTER V.

Reflections on the Governor-general's Measures.—Admirable Condition of the Armies of Coromandel and Malabar.—The Governor-

general's Attention to all Branches of the Equipment.—Advantages expected from the Issue of the War.—Tippoo Sultaun's Power created a constant Alarm.—His Engagements with the French dangerous to the British Interests.—Moderation of the British Government towards Tippoo Sultaun. - p. 40

CHAPTER VI.

Observations.—Plan of the Campaign.—The Army of Bombay ascends the Poodicherrum Ghaut.—The Army of Madras assembles at Vellore—marches to the Barramaul—is joined by the Nizam's Contingent.—The Honourable Colonel Wellesley appointed to command the British Forces serving with the Nizam.—Lieutenant-general Harris advances to Ryacotah—publishes the Governor-general's Declaration—commences Hostilities—and encamps at Kelamungalum.—Strength and Equipment of the Army of Madras—of Bombay—of Lieutenant-colonels Brown's and Read's Detachments.—Cordial Zeal of the Nizam.—Expectations from the Marhattas—and of the speedy and prosperous Issue of the War. p. 47

CHAPTER VII.

Advantageous Position of the Army at Kelamungalum.—Reasons which induced General Harris to prefer the Route by Talgautporam and Cankanelli.—The Army marches.—Attempts of the Enemy's Cavalry to destroy Forage, ineffectual.—Difficulties on the March, although Forage and Water in abundance.—Intelligence of Tippoo Sultaun's Attack upon General Stuart's Out-posts.—Battle of Mallavelly.—March to Sosilay, unexpected by the Enemy.—The Army crosses the Cauvery—encamps before Seringapatam—strong and advantageous Position of the Encampment. - p. 59

CHAPTER VIII.

Attack of the Enemy's advanced Posts—a second Attack of these Posts.—General Floyd marches to Periapatam—is followed by the whole of the Enemy's Cavalry.—Preparations for the Siege.—Letter from Tippoo Sultaun—General Harris's Reply.—Operations of the Enemy.—South Face of the Fort described—West Face.—Junction of Generals Floyd and Stuart.—Enemy's Entrenchment.—Bombay Army takes up a Position on the North Side of the Cauvery.—Plan of the Attack.—Unexpected Deficiency in the Grain Department. - - - - p. 89

CHAPTER IX.

Attack of the Enemy's Post at Agrarum—and at the Nullah called "Macdonald's Post."—Battery on the North Side of the River.—General Floyd marches towards Covriporam.—Attack of the Entrenchment at the Powder Mill—Battery at the Mill—Enfilading Battery.—Bombay Out-posts attacked by the Enemy.—A Letter from the Sultaun—General Harris's Reply.—Batteries open against the Fort, and further Operations.—Attack of the Enemy's Entrenchments.—Wallace's Post.—Skelly's Post.—A Letter from the Sultaun—General Harris's Answer.—Breaching Batteries.—Enfilading Fire increased.—Howitzer Battery.—Preparations for the Assault.—General Baird commands the storming Party.—The Breach stormed, and Seringapatam taken—the Palace surrenders—Tippoo Sultaun killed.—His Family, and the Families of his principal Chiefs, secured.—Loss during the Siege.—Strength of the Garrison of Seringapatam.—Ordnance, Stores, Treasure, and Jewels captured. - - - - p. 101

CHAPTER X.

Surrender of Abdul Khalik.—Funeral of Tippoo Sultaun—his Character—some Anecdotes of—his daily Occupations—his Conduct during the Siege.—Astrologers apprize the Sultaun of an inauspicious Day.—His Oblation, and Ceremony, to avert Misfortunes—his Conduct on the 4th of May—his Murder of European Prisoners during the Siege.—Colonel Wellesley appointed to command Seringapatam.—Good effects of his Exertions to restore Tranquillity and Order. - - - - p. 146

CHAPTER XI.

Description of Seringapatam—Improvements since 1792.*—Retrospect to the Operations of the Siege.—The Completion of the Inner Rampart could not have prevented the Success of the Siege.—Scheme for attacking the second Wall without any Addition to the Batteries.—Remarks upon the Rise of the River Cauvery.—The Defeats of Sedasier and Mallavelly, and the improved Condition of our Cavalry, the Causes of the Sultaun's Inactivity.—To the Vigilance and Energy of the Government in India, is to be ascribed the Success of the War.* - - - p. 169

CHAPTER XII.

The Library of Tippoo Sultaun—Valuable original State Papers found in the Palace, relating to Negotiations with the French—with the Court of Cabul—with the Ottoman Court—with Scindeah—Intrigues at Hyderabad.—Correspondence with secret Agents at Delhi—and in the Company's Possessions.—Memoranda in the Hand-writing of Tippoo Sultaun.—An Instance of the Sultaun's

Barbarity under his own Hand.—Tippoo Sultaun's Dreams, written by himself. - - - - - p. 179

CHAPTER XIII.

Alli Reza is sent to General Harris by Cummur-ud-Dien Khan.—Futteh Hyder, Cummur-ud-Dien Khan, and Purneah, surrender themselves.—The Sultaun's Army is disbanded.—Stable Horses, Elephants, Camels, and Gun Bullocks, delivered up.—Operations of the Detachments under Lieutenant-colonels Brown and Read—they ascend the Covriporam Pass—join General Floyd—and advance to Seringapatam.—Strength of the allied Armies at this Period.—The Bombay Army marches to Canara.—General Harris's Measures for taking Possession of this Province.—Favourable Disposition of the Inhabitants to submit to the British Government. p. 198

CHAPTER XIV.

The Governor-general frames a Settlement of the conquered Countries—an Abstract of its Principles.—His Lordship's Decision on the Establishment of a central and separate Government in Mysore.—He determines the Rule of Distribution of Shares to the Company, the Nizam, the Marhattahs, and to the Government of Mysore.—His Attention to the Establishment of a strong Frontier of Hill Forts, &c.—His Arguments for and against the Family of the Mysore Rajahs and the Sultaun's Heir.—His Lordship prefers the Descendant of the Rajahs of Mysore—provides for the Families of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun—for the Mahomedan Chiefs and Officers of the Sultaun—and for the Families of those who had fallen in the Course of the War.—Appoints a Commission for the Affairs of Mysore. - - - - p. 206

CHAPTER XV.

The Commissioners assemble at Seringapatam—their Proceedings—Cummur-ud-Dien Khan retires to Gurrumconda.—The four elder Sons of the Sultaun, with their Families, removed to the Carnatic. p. 222

CHAPTER XVI.

Origin of the Kingdom of Mysore.—Lineal Descent of the present Rajah, and a short Account of all the Rajahs of Mysore.—The present Mysore Family—Establishment allowed them by Tippoo Sultaun.—A lineal Descendant of the Delaways—His Establishment allowed by the Sultaun.—The Commissioners visit the young Rajah—Gratitude of his Family.—The Rajah is placed on the Musnud—Purneah appointed Dewan to the Rajah—and Lieutenant-colonel Close, Resident of Mysore. - p. 229

CHAPTER XVII.

Partition Treaty.—Subsidiary Treaty between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.—Extensive Powers reserved to the Company—Advantages expected from this Arrangement.—Diligence and Ability of the Commissioners.—Collectors of Revenue appointed to the newly acquired Districts.—New Frontier Forts garrisoned by British Troops.—Dhoondia, a Partizan, occasions Disturbances—is pursued by Detachments under Colonels Stevenson and Dalrymple—and retires within the Marhatta Territory.—Lieutenant-colonel Wiseman takes Possesion of Mangalore.—The Conduct of the Marhattas not likely to interrupt the Settlement of Mysore. - - - - - - - - p. 242

CHAPTER XVIII.

A general View of the Advantages resulting to the British Interests from the Conquest of Mysore.—Great Increase of the East India Company's annual Resources, within Twelve Months after the Marquis Wellesley took Charge of the Supreme Government of India. - - - - - - p. 250

APPENDIX.

No.

I. *Proclamation at the Isle of France.* - - page i

II. *Malartic's Letter to Tippoo Sultaun's Ambassadors; dated 27th February,* 1798. - - - - - p. iv

III. *Narrative of the Proceedings of Tippoo Sultaun's Ambassadors.* - - - - - - p. vi

IV. *The Governor-general to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 14th June,* 1798. - - - - - - p. xxi

V. *Tippoo Sultaun to Sir John Shore; received 26th April,* 1798. p. xxiv

Ditto — ditto; received 26th April, - - ib.

VI. *Extract of a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to the Governor-general in Council of Bengal; dated 18th of June,* 1798. - - - p. xxvi

Copy of a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Governments in India; dated 26th November, 1798. - - - - - - p. xxix

No.
VII. *Letter from Bonaparte to Tippoo Saib; dated Head Quarters at Cairo, 7th Pluviose, 7th Year of the Republic.* p. xxxi
Bonaparte to the Sheriff of Mecca; received at Judda the 17th February, 1798. - - - p. xxxii
VIII. *The Governor-general to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 8th November,* 1798. - - - - p. xxxiii
IX. *Ditto — ditto; dated 10th December,* 1798. p. xxxvi
X. *Tippoo Sultaun to the Governor-general; received 15th December,* 1798. - - - - p. xxxvii
Ditto — ditto; received 25th December, 1798. p. xxxviii
XI. *The Governor-general to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 9th January,* 1799. - - - - - p. xli
XII. *Tippoo Sultaun to the Governor-general; received 11th January,* 1799. - - - - p. xlix
XIII. *Sircar Coudadad to the Executive Directory; dated 20th July,* 1798. - - - - ib.
Note of the Proposals to be made by Tippoo Sultaun's Embassadors to the Executive Directory at Paris. - p. li
To the French Republic, One and Indivisible. - p. liv
Letter of Credit from the Sircar Coudadad for Citizen Dubuc. ib.
Letter from Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun; dated Tranquebar, 16th December, 1798. - - - p. lv.
Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to M. Dubuc; dated 2d January, 1799. - - - - - p. lix
XIV. *From Tippoo Sultaun to the Governor-general; received 13th February,* 1799. - - - p. lx
XV. *The Governor-general to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 22d February,* 1799. - - - - - p. lxi
XVI. *Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in Council, 22d February,* 1799. - p. lxiii

No.
XVII. *General Return of the Troops of Bombay assembled at Cananore, 11th February, 1799.* - - p. lix
XVIII. *Abstract Return of the Troops that marched into Mysore from the Coromandel Coast, according to the Returns for February, 1799.* - - p. lxx
Abstract Return of the Detachment serving with the Nizam. p. lxxii
General Abstract of the Army under General Harris. ib.
Abstract State of the Departments of the Army at Kelamungalum, 9th March, 1799. - - p. lxxiii
XIX. *Rice and Gram, collected in the Coorga Country, for the use of the Army.* - - - p. lxxiv
XX. *Report of Supplies furnished by means of Lieutenant-colonel Read, and his Assistants.* - - p. lxxv
XXI. *Letter from the Coorga Rajah to the Governor-general, describing the Defeat of Tippoo Sultaun's troops at Sedaseer on the 6th of March, 1799.* - p. lxxvi
XXII. *Translation of a Memorandum in the Hand-writing of the late Tippoo Sultaun, recording his* Victory *over the English on the 6th of March, 1799, and the Names of the Chiefs who were killed and wounded on that Day.* p. lxxx
XXIII. *Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris; received 9th April, 1799.* - - - p. lxxxi
XXIV. *Letter from General Harris to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 10th April, 1799.* - - - - ib.
XXV. *Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris; received 20th April, 1799.* - - - p. lxxxii
XXVI. *General Harris to Tippoo Sultaun, with a Draft of Preliminaries.* - - - - ib.

No.
XXVII. *Draft of Preliminaries, as sent to General Harris by the Governor-general.* - - p. lxxxvii
XXVIII. *Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris; received 28th April,* 1799. - - - p. xc
XXIX. *Letter from General Harris to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 28th April,* 1799. - - - ib.
XXX. *Return of the Strength and Disposition of Tippoo Sultaun's Forces on the 4th of May,* 1799. - p. xcii
XXXI. *List of Principal Officers killed and wounded in the Service of Tippoo Sultaun, from the 6th of March to the 4th of May,* 1799. - - p. xciv
XXXII. *General Orders by Government; dated Fort St. George, 24th May,* 1799, *containing the Governor-general's and the Commander in Chief's thanks to the Staff Officers of the Army.* - - - - ib.
XXXIII. *Several Particulars relating to the Conduct of Tippoo Sultaun on the 4th of May,* 1799. - p. ci
XXXIV. *Address from the Inhabitants of Fort St. George to the Governor-general, and his Lordship's Answer.* p. civ
XXXV. *Account of an Apparition communicated to Tippoo Sultaun, extracted from a Manuscript found in the Palace.* p. cviii
Translations of Six of Tippoo Sultaun's Dreams, from a Manuscript in his own Hand-writing - p. cix
Translations from Tippoo Sultaun's Pocket-book. p. cxiv
XXXVI. *Return of Draught and Carriage Cattle received from the Mysore Sircar, 14th June,* 1799. - p. cxv
XXXVII. *Return of the Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant-colonel Brown.* - - cxvi

No.
XXXVIII. *Return of the Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant-colonel Read.* - - p. cxvii
XXXIX. *Report of the Brinjarries engaged by Lieutenant-colonel Read.* - - - - p. cxviii
XL. *Abstract, shewing the Strength of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Harris, at various Periods of the Campaign; with an Abstract of Ordnance and principal Stores conveyed with the Army, and remaining at the Conclusion of the Siege of Seringapatam.* - - - p. cxix
*General Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, during the Siege of Seringapatam.** - p. cxxi
XLI. *Letter from Ripaud to the Citizen Sultaun Tippoo; dated 23d of May, 1797, shewing that M. Raymond, Commander of the French Army at Hyderabad, had opened a Correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun.* p. cxxiv
XLII. *Major Allan's Account of his Interview with the Princes in the Palace of Seringapatam, and of finding the Body of the late Tippoo Sultaun.* - cxxvii
XLIII. *Commission for Mysore.* - - cxxxii
XLIV. *Instructions to the Commissions for the Affairs of Mysore.* p. cxxxv
XLV. *Partition Treaty of Mysore.* - - p. cxl
XLVI. *Memorial Explanatory of the Partition Treaty.* p. clv
XLVII. *Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam.* - p. clviii

* This being the only return of the killed, wounded, and missing, sent to England, I have not been able to state in my Narrative, the particulars of the loss sustained in the various assaults upon the enemy's posts during the siege.

No.
XLVIII. *Memorial Explanatory of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam.* - - - p. clxvi
XLIX. *Letter from Captain Macleod to the Mysore Commissioners, accompanying a Statement of Tippoo Sultaun's Revenue.* - - - - p. clxviii
From Captain Macleod to General Harris, accompanying an Abstract of Jummabundy. - - p. clxx
Captain Macleod's Memoranda of the Commerce of Mysore. p. clxxi

DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.

Portrait of Tippoo Sultaun, to face the Title-page.

Order of Battle of the Army commanded by General Harris to face page 55

View of the N. W. Front of Seringapatam - - - 123

Plan of the Attack upon the North-west Angle of Seringapatam - 144

Sketch of the Environs of Seringapatam - - - 169

Map of the Dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun - - 248

VIEW OF THE ORIGIN, &c.

CHAPTER I.

A general View of the Dangers to which the British Possessions have been constantly exposed since the Usurpation of Hyder Alli —between June and September, 1798, menaced by a Combination of the most serious Dangers.—Malartic's Proclamation.—Tippoo Sultaun's Embassy to the Isle of France — its Tendency.—Authenticity of the Proclamation doubted—confirmed.—French Force lands at Mangalore.—The Governor-general orders the Armies of Coromandel and Malabar to assemble—his Measures for improving our defensive Alliances.

SINCE the first war with Hyder Alli, the tranquillity of the British possessions on the coast of Coromandel has been continually menaced by the power of Mysore. Even in the intervals of peace, which have succeeded to the several wars in which the East India Company has been engaged with Hyder Alli, and Tippoo Sultaun, our security in the Carnatic has ever been precarious. During the cessation of actual hostilities, the designs of the sovereign of Mysore have still continued uniformly hostile; and his means of executing them have always remained considerable, while the degrees of our safety have fluctuated with the state of

our military establishments, and preparations, and with the distribution of our force.

The baneful effects of this perpetual state of uncertainty and solicitude, have been felt not only in the decay of agriculture, and of the arts of peaceful industry on the coast of Coromandel, and in the rebellious spirit of certain descriptions of the natives on that coast, and on the coast of Malabar, but occasionally throughout all India, in the diminution of the British influence and consideration at foreign courts; in the rising hopes of the turbulent and disaffected; and in the decline of public and private credit, shaken by repeated rumours of war, and by the constant necessity of guarding against surprise from the sudden aggression of an enemy whom no clemency nor moderation could conciliate, and no faith could bind.

The reduction of Tippoo Sultaun's power and resources, effected by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, had weakened, but not extinguished, the cause of these complicated evils. Soon after the conclusion of peace, this cause and its effects appear to have recovered a considerable degree of strength. In the year 1796, the intrigues and military movements of Tippoo Sultaun compelled the Government-general to assemble the army on the coast of Coromandel; and in the autumn of 1797, such apprehensions were entertained of his designs and power, as induced Lord Hobart, Governor of Fort St. George, to take upon himself the high responsibility of relinquishing an expedition, ably planned; and even after the requisite preparations, which had been carried on with uncommon zeal, vigor, and activity, had been completed.

Judicious indeed, and provident, was the policy which dictated the relinquishment of that enterprise; since subsequent discoveries and events have manifested the great probability, if not absolute certainty, that the departure of the large force destined for Manilla, would have proved a signal to the watchful vengeance of Tippoo Sultaun, to invade the Carnatic, even without waiting for the aid of a French force, the assistance of which might not perhaps have appeared to him necessary during the absence of so considerable a portion of our army.

But the apprehensions of the designs and movements of the power of Mysore, had never perhaps been more anxiously, nor more justly, entertained, than between the months of June and September, 1798. It cannot be denied, that during that period the British interests in India were menaced by a combination of the most serious dangers. The anxiety hitherto entertained with regard to the designs of Tippoo Sultaun, was now confirmed by a certain knowledge of his having actually proposed to the French, projects of the most extensive hostility against the British possessions in India. The alarm, as well as the danger, were considerably aggravated by the formidable preparations of the French in the Mediterranean; by the apparent desperate state of our alliances in the Decan; by the peculiar situation of the court of Hydrabad, subjected to the will of a powerful French army and faction; by the menacing declarations and probable views of Zemaun Shah; by the distribution of the army of Fort St. George, throughout various posts in the Carnatic, the island of Ceylon, and the Eastern islands recently captured from the Dutch; and above all, by the general persuasion that an early attempt to assemble or to move that army would serve only as a provocation

to the enemy to invade and desolate the Carnatic, without furnishing the means of repelling the invader. This alarm and despondency originated in a Proclamation* issued by the Governor-general of the Isle of France, which reached Bengal early in June, 1798; and the apprehensions entertained from the designs of Tippoo Sultaun were certainly, at that period, considerably increased by the bold and decided measures of preparation and defence which the Marquis Wellesley judged proper to adopt a very few weeks after he had taken charge of the supreme government of India.

This proclamation, which made its first appearance at Calcutta, in a newspaper, on the 8th of June, states, that an Embassy had arrived at the Isle of France with letters from Tippoo Sultaun, addressed not only to the Government of that Island, but to the Executive Directory of France, proposing to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the French; to subsidize, and supply, whatever troops the French might furnish to the Sultaun; and to commence against the British power in India, a war of aggression, for which the Sultaun is declared to be fully prepared, awaiting with anxiety the moment when the succour of France shall enable him to satisfy his ardent desire of expelling the British nation from India. The proclamation concludes by offering encouragement to the subjects of France to enter into the service of Tippoo Sultaun, on terms to be fixed with his ambassadors then on the spot.

Although the Governor-general was inclined, in the first instance, to doubt the authenticity of this extraordinary publication, he thought it advisable to transmit a copy of it on the 9th

* Proclamation, Appendix, I.

of June to Lieutenant-general Harris, then Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander in Chief on the coast of Coromandel, informing him, that if the proclamation should prove authentic, it must lead to a serious discussion with Tippoo Sultaun; and directing Lieutenant-general Harris to consider, without delay, the means of assembling the army on the coast of Coromandel, if necessity should unfortunately require such a precaution.

On the 18th of June, 1798, his Lordship received a regular authentication of the proclamation, from the Cape of Good Hope, in a letter from the Earl of Macartney, dated the 28th of March; and at the same time, several persons arrived at Calcutta, who had been present in the Isle of France at the time the proclamation was issued.

By a strict examination of the most respectable of those persons, the Governor-general was enabled to obtain an authentic and accurate statement of all the material circumstances attending the publication of the proclamation at the Isle of France, the substance of which was, that Tippoo Sultaun had dispatched two ambassadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived at Port Nord Ouest, in that island, towards the close of the month of January, 1798: that the ambassadors were received publicly, and formally, by the French Government, with every mark of distinction and respect; and that they were entertained at the public expence during their continuance on the island.

Previous to the arrival of the ambassadors on the island, no

idea existed there,* of any aid to be furnished to Tippoo Sultaun by the French, nor of any prospect of a war between that Prince and the Company; but within two days after the arrival of the ambassadors, the proclamation in question was fixed up in the most public places, and circulated through the town of Port Nord Ouest.

The ambassadors, far from protesting against the matter or style of the proclamation, held without reserve, in the most public manner, the same language which it contains with respect to the war to be commenced against the British possessions in India; and they even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distributed by their agents at the place of their residence.

The ambassadors were present when the French Government proceeded to act under the proclamation; and the ambassadors aided and assisted the execution of the proclamation, by making promises in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of inducing recruits to inlist in his service.

The ambassadors proposed to levy men to any practicable extent, stating their powers to be unlimited with respect to the force to be raised in the name of Tippoo Sultaun. They entered into certain stipulations and engagements in the name of the Sultaun, according to the tenor of the last paragraph of the proclamation, with several Frenchmen and others; particularly with M. Dubuc, whom the ambassadors engaged in the service of their Sovereign,

* Vide Appendix, II. Monsieur Malartic's Letter to Tippoo Sultaun's Ambassadors.

for the express purpose of assisting in the war to be immediately commenced against the British power in India.

The proclamation, therefore, originated in the arrival of Tippoo's ambassadors at the Isle of France. It was distributed by their agents; it was avowed in every part by their own public declarations; and finally, it was executed according to its tenor, by their personal assistance and co-operation.

On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassadors embarked, at Port Nord Ouest, on board the French frigate La Preneuse, together with the force thus raised in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, amounting to about one hundred men, including several officers, the chiefs of whom were Messieurs Dubuc and Chapuy.

Such was the substance of the evidence, obtained from the persons who were present in the Isle of France, during the residence of Tippoo's ambassadors. From other authentic sources the sequel of these transactions was ascertained.*

The French frigate, La Preneuse, with the Sultaun's ambassadors and the French troops levied for his service, arrived at Mangalore on the 26th of April, 1798.

An opportunity now occurred of ascertaining beyond the possibility of doubt, whether the acts of the Sultaun's ambassadors in the Isle of France were conformable to the instructions of their

* Narrative of the Proceedings of the Ambassadors at the Isle of France, Appendix, III.

Sovereign: for although the presumption was already sufficiently powerful, that the ambassadors would not have ventured to transgress the limits of their commission in a matter of such momentous importance, as the conclusion of offensive engagements with the French against the English East India Company, it yet remained a question whether Tippoo Sultaun would venture openly to avow proceedings which could not fail to expose him to the just resentment of the British Government.

This question was immediately solved: for the Sultaun without hesitation permitted the French force to land publicly at Mangalore; and, far from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of the conduct of the embassy in any part of the negotiation, he formally received his ambassadors, and the officers and principal persons in their suite, with public and extraordinary marks of honour and distinction: and, finally, he admitted the greater part of the French force, raised for the express purpose of making war upon the East India Company, into his service.

By this public and unequivocal sanction, he must be considered, not only to have personally ratified the engagements contained in the proclamation of the Governor-general of the Isle of France, but to have taken the preliminary measures for accomplishing the design which the ambassadors had avowed in his name.

Tippoo Sultaun, therefore, having actually concluded offensive and defensive engagements with the French against the East India Company; having collected, by the aid of the French, a force openly destined to carry those engagements into effect; having applied to the Executive Directory of France for a more powerful

force, destined to the same end; having signified through his public ambassadors to the enemy, that his preparations for war, as far as depended on himself, were actually complete; having avowed the object of those preparations to be the subversion of the British empire in India; and, finally, having declared the delay of the meditated blow to proceed from no other cause, than his expectation of receiving further aid from the enemy; the Governor-general did not hesitate to pronounce, that the Sultaun had flagrantly violated the treaties of peace subsisting between him and the Honourable Company, and that he had committed an act of direct hostility and aggression against the British Government in India.

To confirm the conclusions necessarily resulting from the facts already stated, his Lordship received undoubted information that Tippoo Sultaun had, for some time past, been employed in military preparations conformably to the hostile spirit of his engagements with the enemy; that the greater part of his army was actually in a state of equipment for the field, and that a large portion of it was then encamped under his personal command.

It would be superfluous to observe that no provocation had been offered by any of the governments in India, to justify, or to palliate, any act of hostility, or even any emotion of jealousy, or suspicion, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun: but it is necessary to remark, in this place, that, at the very moment of receiving the authentic copy of the proclamation issued in the Isle of France, the Governor-general had ordered the disputed district of Wynaad to be delivered to the Sultaun, after a public acknowledgment of the justice of his claim to that possession; and his Lordship proposed to

open an amicable negotiation for the purpose of adjusting his recent claims to a part of the district of Coorga, on similar principles of equity, according to the tenor of the seventh article of the treaty of Seringapatam.*

The Sultaun himself had not attempted to allege even the pretext of a grievance against the British Government. In his letters to Sir John Shore, written a short time before the return of the Mysorean ambassadors from the Isle of France, and received at Fort William on the 26th of April, 1798, the day on which the French force landed at Mangalore, Tippoo Sultaun declares, "*that his friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard to truth and* "*justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and con-* "*cord between the two nations:*" and he signifies his desire that Sir John Shore would impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between the two states.†

This is not the language of hostility, nor even of discontent. From what disposition in the friendly heart of the Sultaun these amicable professions have proceeded, how they are connected with a regard to truth and justice, or calculated to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord, and to impress the Marquis Wellesley with a sense of the firmness of the Sultaun's friendship, can now be easily determined, since it is proved that these letters were written at the very crisis when he was in anxious expectation of the hourly arrival of that military succour, which he had ear-

* Lord Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 14th June, 1798. Appendix, IV.

† Two letters from Tippoo Sultaun to Sir John Shore, received 26th April, 1798. Appendix, V.

nestly solicited from the enemy, for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company's possessions.

That Tippoo Sultaun had not then received the effectual succour which he had solicited from the French, might have been ascribed either to the distracted state of the government of the Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils: but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, were to be estimated by the magnitude of the force which he had actually obtained; for it was now proved, that his demands of military assistance were unlimited, that they were addressed not merely to the government of the Mauritius, but to the Executive Directory of France; and it was impossible to foresee, how soon, either by some revolution in the government of the Mauritius, or by direct intercourse with France, those demands might be satisfied to the full extent of his acknowledged expectations.

Under all these circumstances, it appeared to the Governor-general, that an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, was demanded by the soundest maxims both of justice and policy.

The act of Tippoo Sultaun's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and followed by the admission of a French force into his army, was equivalent to a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war. But while his hostile purpose had been clearly manifested, the immediate means of accomplishing it had happily disappointed the ardour of his hopes.

The inconsiderable amount of the aid which he had already received from the French, while it could not be construed as a limitation of a just right to vindicate the public safety, afforded a strong argument of policy in favour of attacking this desperate, implacable, and treacherous enemy, before he could either complete the improvements of his own army, under the French officers whom he had already admitted into his service, or could receive a further accession of strength, under the progressive operation of his alliance with France.

In the moment of his comparative weakness, of his disappointment, and probable dejection, the principles of justifiable self-defence, and of prudential precaution, required that such an instantaneous blow should be given to his power and resources, as should preclude the possibility of his deriving any substantial advantage from the aid of France, whenever it might reach his dominions.

Such was the tenor of the Governor-general's opinions, so early as the 20th of June, 1798.* Although at that early period it could not be ascertained from what quarter the French would attempt to assist the Sultaun, his Lordship recorded in council his conviction that some attempt to assist him would be among the earliest of their operations. The conclusion of peace upon the continent of Europe, the weak state of our allies in India, particu-

* It is a remarkable coincidence, that, at the very moment his Majesty's Ministers and the Court of Directors were employed in framing instructions for the Government of India, in consequence of the French armament in the Mediterranean, and the proclamation issued at Mauritius, that the Marquis Wellesley should have anticipated those instructions, even in the minutest circumstances. Vide Appendix, VI.

larly the Nizam, (whose councils and army were at that period subjected to the overbearing influence of a powerful French faction) might appear, both to Tippoo and to France, to offer a favourable crisis for the attack of the British possessions in India. The disposition of the French Government to attempt such an enterprise has never been disguised; and although, at that time, positive proof had not been obtained that any formal or regular correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Executive Directory of France had existed previous to the embassy, and letters which arrived at the Mauritius in January, 1798, yet the nature of that transaction afforded a strong presumption that a previous intercourse of the same hostile character had taken place. This presumption was further corroborated by a certain knowledge, that for some time past various emissaries of France had reached the councils of Tippoo Sultaun; and that, through their representations, he had been taught to entertain a confident expectation of speedy and effectual support.

Even admitting that this expectation was likely to be frustrated, either by a failure of assistance on the part of France, or by the vigilance and superior power of his Majesty's fleets, still our security would have been precarious. The Governor-general, at that period, had received certain intelligence that Tippoo Sultaun had dispatched an embassy to Zemaun Shah, the object of which was, to encourage that prince in the prosecution of his long threatened invasion of Hindostan; and the whole tenor of his Lordship's advices from the north-western countries of Hindostan led him to believe that Zemaun Shah would cross the Attock, and would endeavour to pursue his avowed project of invasion in the course of the ensuing season: and it was not improbable, that his

approach, which must necessarily engage the attention of the army in Bengal, might be the signal to Tippoo Sultaun for an irruption into the Carnatic. In addition to these considerations, it appeared not unlikely that the impetuosity of Tippoo Sultaun's temper, exasperated by the assiduous and unremitting instigations of the emissaries of France, might break forth into hostilities, without waiting for the actual movement of any Indian or European ally. His late embassy to the Isle of France had sufficiently manifested a disposition capable of pursuing its favourite object of vengeance against the British nation with more zeal than discretion; and the distribution of the army on the coast of Coromandel, in the month of June, 1798, offered but too strong a temptation to the enterprise of so faithless and active an enemy. Under such circumstances it would have been an unmanly and weak policy, to have confided the safety of the Carnatic to the precarious forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun; or to have left him any longer in the undisturbed possession of the powerful advantage of being able to choose, according to his convenience, the time and mode of the attack which he had openly menaced.

The Governor-general, therefore, being decidedly of opinion, that it was necessary to assemble the armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar without delay, issued his final orders for this purpose, on the 20th of June, 1798.

To assemble the army on both coasts was an indispensable precaution, which his Lordship could not have been justified in omitting, from the moment he was apprised of Tippoo Sultaun's offensive engagements with the French, and of the landing of a French force at Mangalore; and, if circumstances had been

favourable for such an attempt, it was his fixed determination to have attacked the Sultaun instantly, for the purpose of defeating his hostile preparations, and of anticipating their declared object. His Lordship was concerned, however, to learn, from persons most conversant in military details at Fort St. George, that, notwithstanding the distinguished discipline of the army on the coast of Coromandel, and the eminent valour, activity, and skill, of its officers, its dispersed state, joined to certain radical defects in its establishments, would render the assembling a force, equal to offensive movements against Tippoo Sultaun, a much more tedious and difficult operation than he had apprehended.

The necessarily dispersed state of the troops would have been of less importance but for those radical defects, which have in a certain degree at all times existed. These proceed from a system of economy which precludes the expence of establishing depôts of grain in different parts of our possessions, and of maintaining a fixed establishment of draught and carriage cattle; without which no portion of the Madras army, however amply it might have been supplied with every other requisite for field operation, was in a condition to act with promptitude and effect.

It is true, that during the administration of Sir Archibald Campbell those defects were partly and partially removed, by a small proportion of cattle, not exceeding three thousand, being at that period attached to the military establishment; but having been found expensive, and inadequate to the purpose, it was discontinued at the peace of 1792.

Subsequently, however, in 1793, during Sir Charles Oakeley's

administration, when those defects existed exactly in the same degree as in the month of June, 1798, it does not appear that they retarded the expedition against Pondicherry, but that with early exertions, and ample advances of money, the provision of cattle kept pace with the other necessary preparations; since, at that time, a very considerable army was not only assembled, but all the guns, stores, and provisions, necessary for the siege were carried, and deposited in camp before that place, precisely in two months from the date of the resolution of Government to attack it.

The difficulty of assembling and moving the army on the coast of Coromandel, as had been represented to the Governor-general, naturally impressed his Lordship with a serious alarm of the defenceless and perilous state of the Carnatic, in that arduous conjuncture. But in proportion to the apparent pressure of that difficulty, he felt the necessity of an instantaneous and active exertion; for whether the army, when assembled, was to anticipate, or to await the attack of Tippoo Sultaun, it appeared an equally indispensable measure of precaution to resume, without delay, the power of meeting that vindictive and restless prince in the field. The Governor-general was not therefore discouraged by those opinions, (which subsequent events have also proved to be erroneous) from insisting on the immediate execution of his orders, and, adverting to the fatal consequences, which had formerly been experienced in the Carnatic, by neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of hostile equipments in Mysore, his Lordship resolved to intrust the protection of the British possessions on the coast of Coromandel to no other security, than a complete and early state of preparation for war.

At Bombay, the Governor-general's orders for assembling the army were executed with great promptitude and alacrity, accompanied by those united and zealous efforts which the exigency of the crisis demanded, from every branch of the civil and military service.

The causes which unavoidably obstructed the assembling of the Carnatic army, having compelled the Governor-general to relinquish his first intention of striking an immediate blow against the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun, his Lordship applied himself to the formation of such a permanent system of preparation and defence, as, while it tended to restore to the Government of Fort St. George, with all practicable dispatch, the power of repelling any act of aggression on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, might ultimately enable him to demand, both a just indemnification for the expence which the Sultaun's violation of treaty had occasioned, and a reasonable security against the consequences of his recent alliance with the enemy.

With this view, whilst the army was assembling on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, the Governor-general's attention was directed to strengthen and improve the defensive alliances, concluded between the East India Company and their Highnesses the Nizam and Paishwah, under the treaties of Paungul, Poonah, and Seringapatam, for the purpose of establishing a barrier against the ambition and revenge of Tippoo Sultaun.

The state of these alliances afforded abundant matter of painful anxiety. The Governor-general found, on his arrival in India, both the Paishwah and the Nizam, (whose respective power it

was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to maintain in such a state of efficiency as might render them useful allies in the event of a war with Mysore,) reduced to the lowest condition of weakness and depression; the former by the intrusion of Dowlet Row Scindeah, and the latter, by the threatened hostilities of the same chieftain, and by the establishment of a numerous and active French faction in the centre of the Decan. And while the internal convulsions of each state had diminished the resources of both, their co-operation against Tippoo Sultaun had become impracticable, by the progress of their mutual animosities and dissensions.

In this scene of general confusion, the power of Tippoo Sultaun alone, which it had been the policy of all our treaties and alliances to reduce, had remained, if not augmented and improved, at least undisturbed and unimpaired.

The final result to the British Government appeared to be, first, the entire loss of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, by the utter inability of our allies to fulfil their defensive engagements with the Company; and secondly, the establishment of a French army of fourteen thousand men in the dominions of one of our allies, in the vicinity of the territories of our irreconcileable enemy, and on the confines of the Carnatic, and of the northern Circars.

In this state of our political relations, the Company was exposed, without the aid of a single ally, to the hazard of a contest with the united force of Tippoo Sultaun and the French. And the danger with which the Nizam and the Paishwah were threatened by the impending storm, exceeded that which menaced the

British possessions, in the same proportion as the distractions and weakness of the Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad rendered them less able than the Company to counteract the machinations, or to repel the assault of the enemy. It is true, that Tippoo Sultaun's views, against the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, were ostensibly limited to the recovery of the cessions made by him to those powers in 1792: but it cannot be doubted that his ambition and rapacity would have augmented with the progress of his victories, and his revenge was not of a temper to be mitigated by success.

CHAPTER II.

The Condition of our Alliances favourable to the Success of French Intrigue.—French Faction at Hyderabad.—Raymond's Corps threatens the Nizam's Independence—renders his Highness's Alliance with the Company of no Advantage, and even dangerous.—The Governor-general negotiates for the Augmentation of the British Force at Hyderabad, and for the Dismission of the French Officers serving with the Nizam.—The Nizam's annual Subsidy increased.—A Detachment assemble at Guntoor—arrive at Hyderabad.—French Force disarmed—Advantages from this important Measure.

At the time M. Malartic's proclamation appeared in Bengal, it happened that the condition of the several native powers in India, both with relation to each other and to the British interests, was far more favourable to the success of French intrigue than it had been at any period since the peace of Seringapatam. The French faction at Hyderabad had risen to a dangerous height. Scindeah had lately placed de Boigne's corps in the hands of Frenchmen. Tippoo had manifested a disposition to admit French officers and privates, to an unlimited extent, into his service; and the distractions in the Marhatta empire, and the policy of the several actors in that intricate scene of reciprocal mistrust, and irreconcileable interests, left little hope of deriving any advantage whatever from their alliance in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The danger, however, the most to be apprehended was from the French party at Hyderabad. The corps, commanded by French officers, in the service of the Nizam, which, during the last war with Mysore, amounted to no more than fifteen hundred men, was at that period so defective, in point of discipline, as to be rather an object of contempt than of jealousy to the governments in India; it had gradually augmented its numbers, and improved its discipline under the command of the late Monsieur Raymond, until the period of the Marquis Wellesley's arrival in India, when it had nearly reached the number of fourteen thousand men; and had attained a degree of discipline superior in every respect to that of any native infantry in India, excepting the sepoys entertained in the Company's service.

This corps formed the largest, and most efficient branch of the military establishment of his Highness, and the French officers had acquired a considerable ascendancy in his dominions and councils, and had manifested, on several occasions, the symptoms of a disposition so arrogant, overbearing, and adventurous, as to excite alarm in the minds of his Highness, and of his ministers.

Although his Highness had entered into no engagement, nor obligation, by which he could not have been warranted, by every principle of justice and policy, in dismissing those officers from his service, at a moment when their continuance at Hyderabad threatened the independence, if not the existence, of his Highness's throne; yet the Nizam and his ministers confessed their inability to check the growth of a power of which they acknowledged the dangerous influence, and dreaded the destructive effect.

The principles of the French officers, commanding this army, were avowedly the same with those of the persons who, for some time past, have exercised the powers of government in France; and their enmity to the British interests was declared on all occasions. Whilst this army, commanded by Frenchmen of such principles and views, and of such uncontrolled power, remained in the service of the Nizam, his Highness's alliance must have proved a source rather of danger than of advantage to the Company, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun; and that danger would have been greatly aggravated by any co-operation afforded to Tippoo from France. Various and collateral were the effects, which the existence of a numerous armed French party in the centre of the Decan must have produced, upon the whole frame of our political interests in India, whether in time of war or of peace. Under these circumstances, the expulsion of the French party, from the court of Hyderabad, appeared to the Governor-general to be a necessary part of that system of precaution and defence, by which his Lordship hoped to be enabled either to encounter the pressure of war, or to secure the advantages of peace.

With these views, on the 8th of July, the Governor-general instructed Captain Kirkpatrick, the acting Resident at Hyderabad, to open a negotiation with his Highness the Nizam, proposing an addition to the British detachment serving at Hyderabad, and stipulating for the dismission of the corps commanded by French officers in his Highness's service.

A new subsidiary treaty founded on this basis, and embracing other collateral arrangements, particularly such conditions as

seemed necessary for the removal of all causes of jealousy, and for the restoration of union and concord between our two allies, the Paishwah and the Nizam, was signed by his Highness at Hyderabad, on the 1st of September, and ratified by the Governor-general in council at Fort William, on the 18th of the same month.

By this treaty an increase is made in the British subsidiary force serving with his Highness, of four thousand and four hundred men; and an increase in the annual subsidy paid by his Highness of about nineteen lacks of rupees: the former subsidy having been 53,713 Arcot rupees per mensem, and the subsidy under the new treaty being 2,01,425 Arcot rupees per mensem, or 24,17,100 Arcot rupees per annum.

The substance of this treaty was communicated to the Paishwah both previously and subsequently to its conclusion, and at both periods he expressed his entire approbation of the nature and tendency of the new engagements, as well in their operation upon the interests of the Marhatta empire, as upon those of the Nizam.

On the 13th of July the Governor-general sent orders to the Government of Fort St. George, to assemble such a force in the Guntoor Circar as might enable him to fulfil the subsidiary engagements of the Company, under the new treaty, at the earliest possible period, subsequent to its conclusion. This measure was executed with the utmost degree of promptitude and alacrity by Lieutenant-general Harris, (at that time uniting in his person the offices of Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander in Chief,)

to whose zeal, public spirit, and prompt obedience, the Governor-general on this and many other occasions bore public testimony.

The British detachment was placed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Roberts. It reached Hyderabad on the 10th of October, and on the 22d of the same month, under the orders of his Highness the Nizam, and with the co-operation of a body of his cavalry, it surrounded the camp of the French army, disarmed all the sepoys, and secured the persons of all the French officers then in camp. This operation was happily effected without bloodshed, and without contest. A mutiny having broken out in the French camp on the preceding day, and the sepoys having imprisoned their officers, the Resident at Hyderabad, and Lieutenant-colonel Roberts, with the consent of the Nizam, judiciously availed themselves of this favourable opportunity to execute the important measure entrusted to him, without difficulty or danger.

The amount of the French force disarmed on this occasion was about eleven thousand men. The remainder of the corps having been sent on detachments, at some distance from Hyderabad, was soon afterwards secured and disbanded.

The French officers were treated with every practicable degree of attention and humanity. At the period of their arrest by our troops, their persons were in confinement, and their lives in danger from the mutiny prevailing in their camp; and the greatest difficulty which Colonel Roberts encountered was that of rescuing the imprisoned officers from the violence of their own sepoys. Particular care was taken to save the property of the officers for their use, as well as to obtain for them such arrears

of pay and allowances as were due to them from his Highness. Captain Kirkpatrick, the acting Resident, was completely successful in effecting both these desirable objects. The French officers were sent to Bengal on board the Bombay frigate, which had been previously stationed at Masulipatam for their accommodation; and on their arrival at Calcutta, they were received with the consideration due to their respective ranks, and allowed every indulgence compatible with the security of their persons.

The success of this enterprise was at that moment a circumstance of peculiar good fortune, since it secured to us whatever benefits might be derived from the cordial co-operation of the Nizam in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun. How far his Lordship's hopes were fulfilled, will be seen in the course of this narrative. The entire subversion of the French influence was certainly a very important benefit, at a moment when the adventurous and enterprising spirit of that nation was directed to the object of raising an empire in India on the ruin of the British power.

The subsidiary force stationed with his Highness the Nizam, while it tends to cement the connexion between the Company and that Prince, and render him a more useful and efficient ally, must operate at all times as an effectual protection to our possessions in the Northern Circars: and the total removal of the French force from the Decan, under all circumstances, is an event from which additional security may be expected, not only to the British possessions on the peninsula, but to the general tranquillity of India.

Among the officers concerned in the execution of the Governor-

general's orders on this occasion, his Lordship was extremely satisfied with the zealous co-operation of Lieutenant-general Harris. To the zeal, address, discretion, and firmness of Captain James Kirkpatrick, who was in the situation of acting Resident, his Lordship attributed the early success of the negociation entrusted to his management, and took occasion to manifest his sense of Captain Kirkpatrick's merits, by appointing him Resident at the court of the Nizam, upon the resignation of his brother Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick.

To the ability and temper of Lieutenant-colonel Roberts, aided by the zeal and activity of Captain John Malcolm, acting under the judicious instructions of the Resident, the Marquis Wellesley ascribed the complete and satisfactory execution of the articles of the treaty relating to the dismission of the French army; and Colonel Roberts's conciliatory and humane conduct towards the officers deserved the highest commendation.

CHAPTER III.

The Governor-general endeavours to improve the Marhatta Alliance.—Accounts received of the French in Egypt.—Precautions taken—evident Connexion between the French in Egypt and Tippoo Sultaun.—Orders for preparing and advancing a Battering Train to the Frontier of the Carnatic.—Volunteers sent from Bengal to Madras.—Large Supplies to be collected in Malabar.—Accounts received of Lord Nelson's Victory.—A favourable Period to negotiate with Tippoo Sultaun.—The Governor-general writes to the Sultaun—his Lordship's Expectations—his Arrival at Fort St. George—he receives a Letter from the Sultaun—again writes to the Sultaun, and endeavours to ascertain his Views—receives a Letter from the Sultaun.

DURING these important transactions at Hyderabad, the Governor-general's endeavours were employed with equal assiduity, to give vigour and effect to the treaties subsisting with his Highness the Paishwah. The return of Nana Furnavese to the administration, afforded for some time a just expectation that our alliance with the Marhattas would speedily be restored with additional vigour and advantage: but the increasing distractions of the Marhatta empire unfortunately frustrated the wise counsels of that experienced and able statesman, and disappointed his Lordship's views at the court of Poonah. He had, however, the satisfaction to ascertain, that the disposition of that court, under the administration of Nana, continued perfectly favourable to the British interests:

and he had reason to expect that want of power would be the sole cause of its inaction in the event of a rupture with Tippoo Sultaun.

Towards the commencement of the month of August 1798, accounts were received in Bengal of the preparations which had been making by the French in the Mediterranean. Various circumstances attending the equipment of that armament gave reason to apprehend that at least a part of it might be destined for an expedition to India; although it was not believed that the attempt would be made through Egypt. Under these impressions, the Governor-general took the earliest opportunity of directing the attention of Rear Admiral Rainier to the coast of Malabar; and at the same time his Lordship proposed to strengthen his Majesty's squadron in India, according to any arrangement which his Excellency might suggest, and issued orders to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to attend to his Excellency's communications on this important subject. His Lordship had the satisfaction to find that Admiral Rainier, with that zeal for the public service, which has at all times distinguished his conduct, acceded without hesitation to the proposition which was suggested with respect to the defence of the coast of Malabar, although his Excellency's original intention had been to proceed in the first instance to the straits of Malacca.

The first authentic information of the invasion of Egypt by the French, and of the progress of their arms in that country, was received at Fort William on the 18th of October. At that period there appeared to be an evident connexion of the invasion of Egypt, with the joint designs of the French and of Tippoo Sultaun against the British power in India. What was at that

time conjecture has been since confirmed by two intercepted letters from Bonaparte; the one to Tippoo Sultaun, and the other to the Sheriffe of Mecca.* It would be superfluous to enter into any detailed reasoning for the purpose of demonstrating the security which at that period of time would have resulted to the British interests in India, if the original intention of anticipating the hostile projects of Tippoo Sultaun could have been carried into immediate effect, according to the anxious wish of the Governor-general. The necessity, however, of either compelling the Sultaun to detach himself from the interests of France, or of depriving him of the power of co-operating with the French, if they should be enabled to reach India, now became too evident to admit of any doubt. It was well known that no negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun could be successful, unless accompanied by such a disposition of our force as should alarm him for the safety of his capital; and that no military operation was likely to compel him to consent to any considerable reduction of his power, unless directed immediately to the siege of that city.

For these reasons, on the 20th of October 1798, the Governor-general gave peremptory orders to the Government of Fort St. George, for completing the equipment of their battering train, and for advancing it with all practicable dispatch to the most eligible situation on the frontier of the Carnatic, with a view of proceeding towards Seringapatam, at the earliest possible period, if such a movement into Mysore should become necessary. At the same time his Lordship signified to the Government of Fort St. George, his intention of reinforcing their army with three thousand

* Appendix, VII.

volunteers from the native infantry on the establishment of Bengal, who had offered their services with the utmost alacrity and zeal.

To the Government of Bombay the Governor-general issued further orders for the collection of their troops, as well as of the largest possible supplies on the coast of Malabar.

Such were the measures pursued by the Marquis Wellesley previous to his having received intelligence of the brilliant and glorious victory gained by his Majesty's squadron under the command of Lord Nelson: but being still uncertain of the fate of the French army in Egypt, and ignorant whether an additional force might not have been intended to co-operate with it in India, by the ordinary passage round the Cape of Good Hope, his Lordship did not relax any part of the naval or military preparations which had already been commenced. The latter were indeed in considerable forwardness; and the total subversion of the French faction at Hyderabad, combined with the important intelligence of Lord Nelson's victory, which reached Calcutta on the 31st of October, were circumstances which had improved the aspect of our affairs so much since the month of June, that the Governor-general deemed the opportunity now favourable for opening a negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun.

A circumstantial detail of the conduct of that Prince had been already communicated to the allies, the Nizam and the Paishwah, from whom the most unequivocal assurances had been received of their entire concurrence in the sentiments and views of the British Government, as well as of their determination to support

his Lordship's just claims of satisfaction for the infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam.

On the 8th of November, therefore, the Governor-general addressed a letter to Tippoo Sultaun,* in which he carefully avoided every hostile expression; merely apprizing the Sultaun of his knowledge of the nature of his intercourse with the French nation, and proposing to him to receive Major Doveton, on the part of the allies, for the purpose of proceeding to an amicable arrangement of all subsisting differences.

His Lordship's expectation was, that the necessary impression of the success of his Majesty's fleet against the French in Egypt; the revival of our defensive alliance with the Nizam; the destruction of the French influence at Hyderabad, and the establishment of so respectable a British force in that quarter; the declared disposition of the Paishwah to fulfil his defensive engagements to the utmost extent of his power; the presence of his Majesty's squadron on the coast of Malabar, reinforced by such of the honourable Company's ships, as had been equipped for the purpose; and lastly, the progress of our military preparations on both coasts,—might have induced the Sultaun to accede to proposals for opening the channels of pacific negotiation; and under these circumstances his Lordship hoped that the terror of the British arms might have rendered their actual employment unnecessary.

With such expectations, the Governor-general resolved to proceed to Fort St. George, for the purpose of conducting the expected

* Appendix, VIII.

negotiation with the Sultaun, which he flattered himself his presence on the coast of Coromandel might enable him to bring to an issue, before the season should be so far advanced as to relieve Tippoo Sultaun from those alarms for the safety of his capital, on which was founded the sole hope of obtaining any satisfactory adjustment.

His Lordship, on the 10th of December, addressed a letter to the Sultaun,* informing him of his intention to proceed to Fort St. George, and again urging him to receive Major Doveton: and on the 25th of December, he embarked on board his Majesty's ship La Sybille, commanded by Captain Cooke, and arrived at Fort St. George on the 31st of the same month.

The corps of native volunteers from Bengal had landed a few days before in perfect safety, and in the highest spirits; and soon after a detachment of artillery arrived from Fort William, under the command of Colonel Montague.

Upon his Lordship's arrival at Fort St. George, a letter from Tippoo Sultaun † was delivered to him, which had been received there on the 25th of December. In this letter, the prevarication and falsehood which mark the Sultaun's statement of his late intercourse with the French, are very obvious, as well as the evasion by which he eludes the moderate and amicable proposition of the allies for opening a negotiation.

To this letter from the Sultaun, the Governor-general returned an answer, dated the 9th of January, 1799, ‡ in which he renewed

* Appendix, IX. † Appendix, X. ‡ Appendix, XI.

the proposition of opening a negotiation; and urged the Sultaun not to delay his reply beyond the period of one day after the letter should reach him; intimating that dangerous consequences might result from a longer delay.

The advanced period of the season absolutely required that the Sultaun's views should be ascertained within a short time: the proposition in his Lordship's letter contained nothing derogatory to the honour or dignity of the Sultaun; it was now urged for the third time without variation; and it related simply, and distinctly, to the admission of an ambassador for the purpose of opening a negotiation. To demand an immediate answer to a proposition of such a nature, could not therefore be deemed either offensive or unreasonable.

Subsequently to the dispatch of the letter of the 9th of January, the Governor-general received the Sultaun's reply * to his letter of the 10th of December, dispatched from Fort William. The Sultaun's silence in this letter, with respect to the admission of Major Doveton, afforded an additional proof of his disposition to evade the pacific advances of the allies.

Appendix, XII.

CHAPTER IV.

The Governor-general's Efforts to advance the Military Preparations.—Public Spirit of the Settlement of Fort St. George.—Loan to Government.—Uncertainty respecting the French in Egypt.—Tippoo Sultaun's evasive Conduct.—The Governor-general defeats the Object of the Sultaun's Silence, by ordering the Armies to enter Mysore.—A Letter from the Sultaun.—His Hunting Excursion.—His Embassy to the Directory of France.—The Governor-general's Reply to Tippoo Sultaun.

FROM the moment the Marquis Wellesley arrived at Fort St. George, he employed every effort to advance the military preparations in the Carnatic, which had already made a considerable progress during the months of November and December. As a more full disclosure of the Sultaun's views and intrigues had evinced the necessity of those preparations, the alarm which they at first occasioned had now entirely subsided. The firmness and decision displayed by the Governor-general in adhering to his own manly policy, and the brilliant success which had so recently crowned the vigorous measures he adopted for destroying the French faction at Hyderabad, were now viewed with admiration, and seemed to inspire a general confidence, and a happy presage of future success. All the inhabitants of Fort St. George, and every officer, civil and military, appeared to be animated by an unanimous determination to discharge their respective duties, with a degree of cheerfulness and ardour, correspondent to the exigency and importance of the

occasion. The zeal, alacrity, and public spirit of the bankers and commercial agents at Madras, as well as of the most respectable of the civil servants at this settlement, enabled his Lordship, within a few weeks, to raise a large sum of money, by loan, for the public service. Previous to his departure from Bengal, he had remitted twenty lacks of rupees in specie, for the use of the Presidency of Fort St. George. He now dispatched the Sybille frigate to Calcutta for a further supply; and the extraordinary exertion of his Excellency Sir Alured Clarke, (the Vice-President in Council), assisted by the diligence and ability of Mr. Thomas Myers, the Accountant-general of Bengal, furnished his Lordship with an additional aid of twenty lacks, within so short a time, that the movements of the army were not delayed for an instant on account of a deficiency of treasure.* Lieutenant-general Harris was provided with a sufficient supply of specie to maintain his army in the field until the month of May.

The silence of Tippoo Sultaun for a considerable time after the receipt of the letter of the 9th of January, could have proceeded from no other motive than a wish to gain time, until the season should be so far advanced as to render the capture of Seringapatam impracticable before the setting in of the rains.†

* The zeal, spirit, and energy, displayed by Governor Brooke at St. Helena, on receiving intelligence of a probable rupture with Tippoo Sultaun, and his exertions to aid the public service, under the apparent exigency, by sending to India a considerable sum raised in that island, reflect the greatest honour on his attachment to the interests of the Company, and of the nation. His zealous endeavours on that occasion received the warmest approbation and thanks of the Government in India.

† The south-west monsoon, or the rainy season, on the coast of Malabar, prevails from June until September; during which period the swoln state of the

Mean while, the advices from Bussorah, Bagdad, Constantinople, and Bombay, were of so uncertain a nature, as to leave considerable doubt, with respect to the condition of the French army in Egypt; the only safe conclusion which could be drawn from those advices, being, that the French still maintained the possession of that country, with a large army.

No intelligence had been received from the Red Sea respecting the arrival of any of his Majesty's ships on that station; nor was it ascertained, with any degree of accuracy, what means the French might either have provided, or might find on the spot, to enable them to reach the Sultaun's dominions.

In addition to these circumstances, the Marquis Wellesley knew, that, while Tippoo Sultaun had declined to receive an ambassador from the honourable Company, and had omitted to answer his Lordship's late letters, he had dispatched native vaqueels from Seringapatam, who, together with Monsieur Dubuc, one of the leaders of the French force raised in the Isle of France, under M. Malartic's proclamation, were on the point of embarking at Tranquebar,* with an avowed mission from the Sultaun to the Executive Directory of France.

Cauvery renders operations against the fortress of Seringapatam almost impracticable. Sometimes, indeed, before the monsoon actually sets in, there are thunder storms which affect the river for a few days. These happened in the middle of May, 1791, and somewhat earlier in 1799. In both cases, however, the weather immediately cleared up, and continued fair for several weeks afterwards.

* Appendix, XIII. Tippoo Sultaun to the French Directory, with articles to be proposed by his ambassadors as the basis of an alliance against the Company, dated the 20th of July, 1798. Credentials, and letter of credit to M. Dubuc. M. Dubuc's letter to Tippoo Sultaun. The Sultaun's letter to M. Dubuc: and M. Ripaud to Tippoo Sultaun.

As no answer from the Sultaun to the letter of the 9th of January had been received on the 3d of February, although the communication between Seringapatam and Fort St. George does not require, at the most, a longer time than eight, and is sometimes effected in four days, the Governor-general now determined to defeat the evident object of the Sultaun's silence, and to take advantage of the actual superiority of our force, and of the present season, before the French could effect a junction, by commencing hostilities without delay. And from this period he resolved to suspend all negotiations, until the united forces of the Company, and of their allies, should have made such an impression on the territories of Mysore, as might give full force to our just representations.

With these views, on the 3d of February, 1799, the Governor-general directed Lieutenant-general Harris to enter the territory of Mysore, with the army assembled under his command; and on the same day, his Lordship issued orders to Lieutenant-general Stuart to be prepared to co-operate from Malabar; and signified to Rear-Admiral Rainier, and to the several allies of the Company, that he now considered the British Government in India to be at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

At length, on the 13th of February, the long expected letter* from the Sultaun arrived; acknowledging the receipt of his Lordship's two friendly letters, and informing him, that, "*being frequently disposed to make excursions, and hunt, he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion,*" and desiring that his Lordship would "*dispatch Major Doveton, slightly attended, (or unattended).*"

* Appendix, XIV. Letter from Tippoo Sultaun.

But the season for negotiation, through the pacific channels, so often offered, was now elapsed. After mature deliberation, on the grounds already stated, the Governor-general directed the advance of the army into the territory of the Sultaun, and signified to the allies his determination to proceed to hostilities. To have delayed the advance of the army would at once have thrown the advantages which we possessed into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, and have rendered the siege of his capital impracticable during that season. On the other hand, an embassy, combined with the hostile irruption of our army into Mysore, would have been liable to the imputation of insincerity towards Tippoo Sultaun; and, while it bore the appearance of indecision in the eyes of the allies, would have promoted, and perhaps warranted, a similar degree of instability in their councils and operations.

The design of this tardy, reluctant, and insidious assent to the admission of an embassy from the British Government, could be considered in no other light, than that of a new artifice for the purpose of gaining time, until a change of circumstances, and of season, might enable the Sultaun to avail himself of the assistance of France. This conclusion was at that period confirmed by the knowledge of the actual embarkation of M. Dubuc, and two native vaqueels, on an embassy from Tippoo to the Executive Directory of France, an event which took place at Tranquebar, on the 7th of February, 1799.

The Governor-general, therefore, replied to the letter of Tippoo Sultaun,* on the 22d of February, and declared Lieutenant-gene-

* Appendix, XV. Lord Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun.

ral Harris to be the only person now authorized by his Lordship to receive, and to answer, whatever communications the Sultaun might think fit to make, with a view to the restoration of peace, on such conditions as might appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to their common security. This letter the Governor-general directed Lieutenant-general Harris to forward to the Sultaun, on the day on which the army under his command should pass the frontier; and at the same time, to issue his Lordship's declaration,* in the name of the allies.

Appendix, XVI. Declaration of the Governor-general.

CHAPTER V.

Reflections on the Governor-general's Measures.—Admirable Condition of the Armies of Coromandel and Malabar.—The Governor-general's Attention to all Branches of the Equipment.—Advantages expected from the Issue of the War.—Tippoo Sultaun's Power created a constant Alarm.—His Engagements with the French dangerous to the British Interests.—Moderation of the British Government towards Tippoo Sultaun.

HAVING thus given, according to the order of dates, a detailed relation of events which led to the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and having endeavoured to explain the motives and objects of the Governor-general in every stage of this important transaction, I shall now add such reflections as arise, from a review of his Lordship's past measures, and from the prospect, at that period, of their ultimate consequences, and permanent effects.

From the first disclosure of the nature and object of Tippoo Sultaun's embassy to the Isle of France, every principle of justice and policy demanded from the Governor-general, that an instantaneous effort should be made to reduce his power and resources, before he could avail himself of the advantages of the alliance which he had concluded. The defect of means was the sole consideration which prevented the Marquis Wellesley from making that effort at the early period when its success would have

placed the security of our possessions on a foundation, which the invasion of India by a French force could not have impaired; for without the aid of some native power, it is scarcely possible that the French should ever make any permanent impression on the British Empire in India; and no native power, excepting Tippoo Sultaun, was at that period so infatuated as to be disposed to assist, or to receive a French army.

The progress of events subsequent to the Governor-general's orders of the 20th of June, 1798, has not only confirmed the principles of justice and policy by which an attack upon the Sultaun was at that time demanded; but has manifested that the designs of France, as well as of the Sultaun, were of a much more extensive and formidable nature, than any which have ever been projected against the British Empire in India, since the hour of its first foundation.

While the magnitude and danger of these designs were gradually disclosed, it afforded the highest degree of satisfaction to the Governor-general, to find that his means of averting them were augmenting in a proportion nearly equal, by the success of the negotiations at Hyderabad, and by the progress of the military preparations which his Lordship had ordered throughout our possessions in India.

At the commencement of the month of February, the crisis arrived in which the Governor-general was called upon to form his ultimate decision on the important question at issue with Tippoo Sultaun, and to determine the final result of the whole system of those measures which his Lordship had adopted.

On the one hand, the apparent establishment of the French army in Egypt, and the uncertainty of the state of our naval power in the Red Sea, rendered the danger still urgent from that quarter; whilst Tippoo Sultaun's repeated evasions of every proposal for negotiation, combined with his embassy to the Executive Directory of France, under the conduct of M. Dubuc, appeared to preclude all hope of detaching the Sultaun from his recent alliance with the enemy. On the other hand, the Governor-general now possessed ample means of frustrating the most dangerous efforts of that alliance, by a seasonable application of the powerful force which the treachery and aggression of the Sultaun had compelled him to collect at a heavy expence to the finances of the East India Company.

In this state of affairs, his Lordship's orders of the 3d of February, to commence hostilities against the Sultaun, will surely not be deemed premature; neither would he have been justified, on the 13th of that month, upon receiving the Sultaun's letter, in recalling those orders, for the purpose of admitting, at that late period, a negotiation which would have enabled Tippoo Sultaun to defeat every object of the armament of the allies for that season, and might have afforded him ample time to reap the full benefit of his connection with France, before the season for besieging his capital should return.

In deciding these important questions, it is necessary to consider, what degree of reliance could have been placed on the sincerity of the Sultaun's disposition to conclude an amicable adjustment with our Government, at the very moment he had actually dispatched, on an embassy to the Executive Directory of France, one

of the commanders of the French troops raised in the Mauritius, and admitted into his service for the express purpose of waging war against the British possessions in India.

At this period, the admirable condition of the armies on both coasts, and the unequalled perfection of their equipment in every department, added to the acquired knowledge and experience of two campaigns against the capital of Mysore, which now pointed out every requisite precaution and arrangement, were advantages which inspired an extraordinary degree of spirit and animation, and gave the fullest confidence that the issue of the war would be speedy and prosperous.

The Marquis Wellesley, who had hitherto entered minutely into every branch of the equipment of the army, now endeavoured with equal solicitude to ascertain the probable operations and occurrences of the campaign. Every route, from the proposed point of rendezvous in the Barramaul to Seringapatam, was separately and maturely considered. For this purpose, anticipated journals for the different routes were drawn up, exhibiting the probable daily marches and encampments of the grand army; and the movements and signals that were concerted for bringing on, with safety, the Bombay army to the siege of Seringapatam: and it was by thus previously investigating every measure which regarded the campaign, that nothing was forgotten nor omitted, that could tend to insure the success of the grand and important enterprise now in contemplation.

Possessing all those advantages, a war, so just in its outset, which was once so much dreaded, on account of the scattered

state of the army, and the want of depôts, and of draught and carriage cattle, was now most eagerly desired; since it opened a fair prospect of terminating with glory and advantage to the British arms; and of obtaining, at least, a considerable reduction of the Sultaun's resources and power; whereby our settlements on the peninsula might in future be effectually freed from that constant alarm and apprehension to which they had been exposed ever since the usurpation of Mysore.

The policy of the treaty of Seringapatam certainly was not to maintain Tippoo Sultaun's power in such a state, as might leave him a constant object of alarm to the Company. That he has been justly so considered for some years past, cannot be doubted by any person acquainted with our affairs in India. This was the second crisis within the last three years, in which the Government-general had thought it necessary to assemble the army on the coast of Coromandel, for the sole purpose of checking his motions; and on one occasion, as already noticed, the apprehension which was entertained of his hostile designs, obstructed the operations of Government against our European enemies in India, during the course of the present war.

The continuance of Tippoo Sultaun's power upon so formidable a scale, must have proved to the Company a perpetual source of solicitude, expence, and hazard. But the engagements which he had contracted with the French, the public proofs which he had given of his eagerness to receive in Mysore as large a force as they could furnish, combined with the prodigious magnitude of their preparation, and the rapid progress of their army in Egypt, evidently directed to the destruction of the British power in India,

form new and prominent features in our political situation in that quarter of the world.

Admitting, in its full extent, the wisdom of that policy which dictated the preservation of Tippoo Sultaun's power at the close of the last war with Mysore, the spirit of our councils must be necessarily accommodated to the variation of circumstances, and to the actual position, character, and views of our enemies.

In such a conjuncture of affairs, no object could have been deemed so urgent, or so necessary to the safety of our possessions, as the effectual reduction of the only declared ally of France that existed among the native powers of India.

If Tippoo Sultaun had been disposed to content himself with the quiet possession of his remaining territory; if he could have been brought to a sense of his own peril, in forming a connection with the French; the representations addressed to him by the Governor-general would have produced an early and salutary impression. Whatever speculative opinions might have been entertained with respect to his interest, views, or power, the justice and moderation of the British Government would never have disturbed his tranquillity. But he resolved to attempt the recovery of his lost dominions, at the hazard of those which he still retained. In the ardor of this passionate pursuit, he overlooked, not only the certain destruction of his own independence, (which would have been the inevitable consequence, even of the most prosperous success of any alliance with France,) but also the predominant influence of the English East India Company, and the vigilance of its Governments, which would probably detect his treachery, and turn

against his own empire the ruin which he had meditated against theirs.

The secrecy of his councils, the promptitude of his resources, his constant and active state of equipment for war, together with the facility of his intercourse with the French, through his remaining territories on the coast of Malabar, formed the most dangerous circumstances of his power and dominion, and constituted his principal means of offence.

From the success which was expected to attend our arms in the approaching contest with Tippoo Sultaun, a firm confidence was entertained that those dangers would either be wholly averted, or so considerably diminished, as to afford to the Governments in India, the prospect of durable security and genuine peace.

CHAPTER VI.

Observations.—Plan of the Campaign.—The Army of Bombay ascends the Poodicherrum Ghaut.—The Army of Madras assembles at Vellore—marches to the Barramaul—is joined by the Nizam's Contingent.—The Honourable Colonel Wellesley appointed to command the British Forces serving with the Nizam.—Lieutenant-general Harris advances to Ryacotah—publishes the Governor-general's Declaration—commences Hostilities—and encamps at Kelamungalum.—Strength and Equipment of the Army of Madras —of Bombay—of Lieutenant-colonels Brown's and Read's Detachments.—Cordial Zeal of the Nizam.—Expectations from the Marhattas—and of the speedy and prosperous Issue of the War.

THE victories of the Marquis Cornwallis had greatly facilitated any future plan of operation against the power of Tippoo Sultaun. By diminishing his resources, and increasing our own, they had produced a twofold effect; and the extension of our frontier, by the possession of the Barramaul and Salem districts, and a thorough knowledge of the defences of Seringapatam, and of the routes leading to that city, were considered at that moment as inestimable advantages.

Experience, in the campaigns of 1791 and 1792, had shewn, that the loss of the Coimbatore and Dindigul districts of Bangalore,

of part of the province of Malabar, and of many of the principal hill forts in Mysore, produced no salutary effect on the Sultaun's mind; and that he had manifested no serious disposition for peace, until he became alarmed for the safety of his capital. The reduction, therefore, of the fortress of Seringapatam was evidently a primary consideration; and the urgency of our affairs, in the month of June 1798, required that it should be, if possible, the immediate object of the campaign. This opinion the Governor-general recorded, in council, so early as the 20th of that month.

His Lordship, however, was disappointed in the hopes he had entertained that the Madras army might be in readiness to take the field at a short notice. The answers to certain queries which he had sent to the Government of Fort St. George, relating to this subject, were, at first, extremely discouraging. But impressed, as his Lordship was, with a conviction that the safety of our possessions on the peninsula demanded that the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay should be placed in an active and early state of preparation for war; he issued orders, on the 20th of June, to equip the armies for field service, with all expedition. At the same time, his Lordship directed that arrangements should be made for speedily preparing the battering train at Madras, in case it should be found practicable to undertake the siege of Seringapatam before the season was too far advanced.

Subsequent events will shew, that these prompt and judicious measures, may justly be considered the main source of all those eminent advantages which are derived from the late glorious success in India.

The Government of Fort St. George were soon convinced, by the rapid progress of their military preparations, proceeding from their indefatigable and zealous exertions, that the equipment of the army for defensive operations would be completed in a far shorter time than they at first imagined; and that even for offensive war against the Sultaun, a battering train, and equipment, might be prepared to act with effect before the setting in of the rains on the coast of Malabar.

In this place it is proper to remark, that although the Governor-general deemed it his duty, at that period, to call the armies into the field, in every part of India, his Lordship's views and expectations were all directed to the preservation of peace; which there was no other prospect of securing, than by a state of forward preparation for war. His unremitting efforts were at the same time exerted to confine the expences of the Company within the most narrow limits, and to raise their commercial investment to the highest scale, compatible with the indispensable necessity of providing for the security of their possessions.

In the execution of the orders for assembling the Malabar army, Marquis Wellesley was much indebted to the zeal and diligence of Mr. Duncan and General Stuart. The vigilance and firmness displayed by the Government of Bombay on the first intelligence of the progress of the French arms in Egypt, obtained his Lordship's public and cordial approbation.

It was also a peculiar satisfaction to have received the most ready and honourable support in the preparations for the defence of the Carnatic, from Lord Clive, in whose anxious solicitude for the

prosperity of the general administration of the Company's affairs, as well as in his assiduous attention to the duties of his own station, the Governor-general reposed the most implicit confidence; and justly expected to derive from this source, considerable benefits in the important task of preserving and improving the interests, committed to their joint charge.

The negotiations at Hyderabad had kept pace with the rapid improvement of our military posture in the Carnatic; and were directed with such profound caution and secrecy, that the real object of sending a detachment from Guntoor to that city, was not even known to the Government of Fort St. George. The Nizam's advanced age and precarious health, warranted a conjecture, that the sole motive of having so large a force in the vicinity of Hyderabad, could be no other, than to secure the succession, and to prevent the interference of French influence, in the event of his Highness's death.

No one suspected so grand and so masterly a stroke, as the total annihilation of the French faction at Hyderabad. It is easier, therefore, to imagine, than to describe, the joy and satisfaction which the intelligence of this important event excited, when it reached Calcutta and Madras. Unbounded praises were bestowed on the bold and judicious policy which dictated the measure; and the ability which directed it in all its stages was viewed with sentiments of admiration and respect. In its consequences to the British interests in India, it was considered, at this juncture, an achievement of the very first importance. The dangers which it effectually removed, it must be confessed, were of the most urgent kind, since the very existence of so formidable a French faction in

the heart of the Decan would have rendered a contest with Tippoo Sultaun, which appeared inevitable, extremely precarious, and even hazardous. Its removal not only restored the efficiency of the Nizam's alliance, and secured his zealous and cordial assistance, but, at the same time, placed in a most advantageous position, a detachment of above six thousand of the Company's troops, menacing the northern frontier of Mysore, and in readiness to co-operate with the Carnatic army.

Such were the advantages which the Governor-general expected from the measures he had adopted; and, as he received daily accounts of the transactions at Hyderabad, he soon foresaw that the issue would prove successful; and that its immediate effect would enable him to proceed with less caution in his preparations to attack the Sultaun. In order, therefore, that no time might be lost, on the 20th of October, his Lordship sent orders to the Government of Madras, to complete the battering train, and to collect a sufficient number of cattle for all the departments of the army; to establish depôts of provisions towards the Sultaun's frontier; to enter into engagements with the Brinjarries (or dealers in grain) for the supply and carriage of that article; and, in short, to make the most vigorous preparations of every kind for the siege of Seringapatam; which, after the most careful and deliberate attention, his Lordship was at that time fully convinced might be undertaken, with a certainty of success, during the present season, if the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun should compel him to commence hostilities.

In addition to the arrangements for the supplies of grain, at Madras, it was resolved to send a large quantity from Bengal to

Tellicherry; and the Rajah of Coorga, with whom Captain Mahony was appointed Resident, had undertaken to collect, in his own territories, an abundant supply of cattle and grain.

At the same time, Major Bannerman was appointed Resident at Travancore, and instructed to stimulate the Rajah to prepare troops for any eventual service, and to give every encouragement to Brinjarries and Bazarmen to join the Bombay army; to restrain the Rajah from committing premature hostilities; to urge him to dismiss from his service and dominions all French and other foreigners; and to inform him, that, if he desired it, our Government would replace them with British subjects.

The general plan of the campaign was to assemble at Vellore the grand, or principal army, which was to be joined, as soon as possible, by the whole of the detachment from Hyderabad, accompanied by a large body of the Nizam's horse, and some infantry. The Bombay army was to assemble at Cannanore, to advance, and take post at Sedaseer. A considerable force in the southern districts of the Carnatic, and in the Barramaul, was destined to cooperate with the grand army; and, at this period, there was some reason to expect that the Marhattas, who had received a detachment from Bombay, would have advanced to the siege of Seringapatam.

The army of Bombay,* consisting of 6420 fighting men, of whom 1617 were Europeans, under the command of Lieutenant-general James Stuart, marched from Cannanore on the 21st of February, arrived at the head of the Poodicherrum Gaut on the 25th of the

* Appendix, XVII. General return of the army under the command of Lieutenant-general James Stuart.

same month, and took post at Sedapoor and Sedaseer on the 2d of March, for the protection of large supplies of grain and other articles, which had been collected at Verajunderpet, in the district of Coorga. The Bombay troops were ordered to occupy those positions until the approach of the Madras army towards Seringapatam, when the junction of both armies might be effected, according to the plan, which had been previously concerted.

The army of Madras, under the command of Lieutenant-general George Harris, had assembled at Vellore in the month of January; but, owing to delays which were unavoidable in providing so large an equipment, it did not make its first movement towards Mysore until the 11th of February. On the 28th of the same month it encamped at Carimungalum. The Nizam's contingent, consisting of above 6000 of the Company's troops subsidized by his Highness; about the same number of his own infantry, including a proportion of Peron's, the late French corps, now commanded by British officers; and a large body of cavalry had joined the army on the 18th. This force, under the general command of Meer Allum Behauder, had marched from Hyderabad at the time appointed, and by the route determined on, by the Governor-general; and actually arrived in the vicinity of Chittoor, in a state of preparation for the field, before General Harris was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore. This early proof of the beneficial effects which the Company derived from the recent improvement of the alliance with the court of Hyderabad, was viewed by the Governor-general with the greatest satisfaction.

The sepoys of the late French corps, were taller and stouter, in general, than those in the Company's battalions on the coast.

With a view of rendering them as efficient as possible, and of deriving the utmost advantage from their services, they were arranged into battalions commanded by British officers, and the whole placed under the command of Captain John Malcolm, whose zeal and ability, added to a perfect knowledge of their language and customs, rendered him peculiarly qualified for this situation. To Captain Malcolm's command were attached two troops of native cavalry, clothed, accoutred, and disciplined in the same manner as the Company's regiments. These troops were placed under Captain Walker, an active officer, from whose example it was expected, that the Nizam's cavalry would become more useful than if left to the direction of native commanders.

In order to give the whole force with Meer Allum Behauder the utmost respectability, and to render it equal to any service in which it might be employed, the Commander in Chief deemed it proper to strengthen the Company's battalions serving with it, under the command of Colonel Roberts, with one of his Majesty's regiments; and, as that officer had expressed a wish to be relieved from his command, his Majesty's 33d regiment was appointed to join the Nizam's contingent; and the general command of the British force serving with his Highness's troops was given to the Honourable Colonel Wellesley. This arrangement, which was highly pleasing to Meer Allum, added greatly to the confidence of his troops, and could not fail to render them essentially useful. However, as Colonel Wellesley's command was only temporary, and the services of Lieutenant-colonel James Dalrymple, with that detachment, had merited every attention; the Commander in Chief considered him as succeeding to Colonel Roberts in the command of the subsidiary force, although at that period, whilst acting with his

Majesty's 33d regiment, he became necessarily subordinate to Colonel Wellesley.

The Carnatic, or grand army, being now in full force at Carimungalum, proceeded by the route of Palicode and Suntamarinelly to Ryacotah, where it encamped on the 4th of March, near the frontier of Tippoo Sultaun's territories.

Next day, Lieutenant-general Harris forwarded the Governor-general's letter to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 22d of February,* published his Lordship's declaration in the name of the allies,† and commenced hostilities by sending a detachment against the hill forts of Neeldurgum and Anchitty. This detachment, under the command of Major John Cuppage, met with no resistance in occupying these posts; the former had been dismantled and abandoned by the enemy, and the latter surrendered.

On the 7th of March, Oodeadurgum surrendered to Lieutenant-colonel Oliver; and the day after, another hill fort, called Ruttengheri, was taken possession of, after a slight resistance, by a detachment under the command of Captain Urton. On the 9th of March, the whole army, which had moved in several columns, were assembled at Kelamungalum.

This army, under the command of Lieutenant-general Harris, which consisted of 30,959 fighting men,‡ (exclusive of 6000 of the Nizam's cavalry,) was, unquestionably, most completely equipped,

* Appendix, XV. † Appendix, XVI.

‡ Appendix, XVIII. Abstract return of the army under the command of Lieutenant-general Harris.

and most amply and liberally supplied; and as well appointed, as perfect in point of discipline, and as fortunate in the acknowledged experience and ability of its officers in every department, as any that ever took the field in India. It comprised a more numerous and better appointed corps of cavalry, than any European power in India ever brought into action. The army on the coast of Malabar, under Lieutenant-general Stuart, was in an equally efficient state; and the command on that coast could not have been placed in abler hands. All the departments relating to supplies* from that quarter, promised to afford the most effectual assistance. The detachment intended to co-operate from the southward was placed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Brown; and that from the Barramaul, under Lieutenant-colonel Read, who, with distinguished zeal and ability, had already contributed the fruits of his experience in the collection of supplies;† and every measure had been taken to secure the earliest benefits from his exertions. The appearance on Tippoo's coast of Admiral Rainier's fleet, which was at this time reinforced by the Earl Howe and Princess Charlotte Indiamen, could not fail to aid the operations of the army, by discouraging the Sultaun's hopes of succour from the French.

With regard to the allies, the Nizam's force appeared in the field much earlier than in the last contest with the Sultaun; and the cordial zeal of the court of Hyderabad, which was at that period so questionable, now admitted of no doubt. The Marhattas had accepted a detachment from Bombay, and there was

* Appendix, XIX. Account of rice, &c. collected in the Coorga country.

† Appendix, XX. Report of supplies furnished by Lieutenant-colonel Read.

every reason to expect that the Paishwah would have made a considerable effort to assist us with a large body of cavalry.

Lieutenant-general Harris was invested with powers fully adequate to the management of these numerous advantages. He was surrounded by a staff appointed in the most liberal manner, and uniting every species of knowledge which could tend to give additional force to his own experience and zeal. The object of his operations was single, distinct, and definite; and the means of attaining it, had been the continual study of himself, and of those acting under his orders. The enemy's country, the nature of his resources, the strength of his defences, and the character of his force, were subjects perfectly familiar to the whole of his staff, and to most of his principal officers. The Sultaun was not likely to make a movement which they would not anticipate; nor was any contingency likely to arise, against which they would not have provided. On the other hand, it was supposed that Tippoo Sultaun's army had suffered essentially both in numbers and discipline since the last war: his finances were in disorder, his councils were perplexed by discordant opinions, and his spirits dejected and broken by the disappointment of his hopes of French assistance, by the retreat of Zemaun Shah, by the failure of his intrigues at the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and by the unexampled vigour, alacrity, and extent of our military preparations.

General Harris therefore possessed every advantage which the most sanguine mind could expect, or the most anxious could desire. With the strength of his army, the cordiality of the allies, the comparative weakness and dejection of the enemy, were com-

bined the efficiency of his own powers, the support of the Government under which he was to act, the ability of the councils which he might command, and the unity and simplicity of the object which he was directed to pursue.

Under such circumstances it was not presumption to expect the most decisive success. With a full confidence that General Harris would make a just use of the unprecedented advantages of his situation, and conduct the army with a degree of vigour and alacrity, proportioned to that with which it had been equipped, the Governor-general did not entertain the smallest doubt, that, under Providence, the issue of the expedition would be as speedy and prosperous, as the means were abundant and unexampled.

CHAPTER VII.

Advantageous Position of the Army at Kelamungalum.—Reasons which induced General Harris to prefer the Route by Talgautporam and Cankanelli.—The Army marches.—Attempts of the Enemy's Cavalry to destroy Forage ineffectual.—Difficulties on the March, although Forage and Water in abundance.—Intelligence of Tippoo Sultaun's Attack upon General Stuart's Out-posts.—Battle of Mallavelly.—March to Sosilay, unexpected by the Enemy.—The Army crosses the Cauvery—encamps before Seringapatam—strong and advantageous Position of the Encampment.

THE position at Kelamungalum possessed several advantages. It was the nearest within our own territory to the capital of Mysore, the most convenient, of any which could have been occupied previous to the advance of the army; and being contiguous to Ryacotah, the departments of grain and provisions could be completed to the largest possible quantity which they had the means of carrying. The encampment was conveniently situated for water, and although the enemy's horse had made their appearance on the 7th of March, and had been busily employed in burning forage, yet a sufficient quantity was secured by the vigilance and activity of our cavalry.

It was indeed a satisfaction to observe that this indispensable article was in much greater abundance than we had reason to

expect. This year's crop, we were informed, had been uncommonly productive; and, although the rains had almost failed in the Carnatic, it was evident, from the quantity of water which remained in all the reservoirs, as far as could be seen to the westward, that the rains had been very plentiful in this part of the peninsula.

According to our intelligence, the Sultaun's army was at this period encamped in the vicinity of Maddoor. A party of 1500 horse had been detached to Ossoor, to watch the motions of the army, and to burn forage; but as there were three separate routes by which an army might march from Kelamungalum to Seringapatam, it was not difficult to conceal our first intended movements from the enemy; nor could he ascertain, for some days, whether General Harris meant to establish a post at Bangalore, as in the last war, previous to advancing to the siege of Seringapatam. This concealment was productive of the most essential advantages.

The first of the routes by which the army might have marched to Seringapatam is by Tahlee, Murlawady, and Cankanelli, which is considerably the shortest in distance; but it was objectionable, as the pass of Tahlee had never been examined, and it appeared that, besides the uncertainty of finding it passable for heavy guns, the probable time it would require to explore, and to repair it, would more than counterbalance the advantage which might be gained in the distance.

The second route is by Anicul, Talgautporam, and Cankanelli, which had been minutely surveyed, and was therefore well known to us, having been marched by the Marquis Cornwallis's army in May 1791.

The third route, which is by Anicul, Talgautporam, and Chenapatam, had likewise been surveyed, but the circumstance of Tippoo's army being supposed at this time encamped near Chenapatam, made it also objectionable.

The route by Talgautporam to Cankanelli appeared to be less suspected, and the march of the army direct to Talgautporam was a movement which seemed well calculated to deceive the enemy, by inducing him to suppose, that Bangalore was the first object; for although dismantled, it was still capable of being made a post. No distress was to be apprehended on any part of this route, since there were small rivers which would afford supplies of water. For these reasons, the Commander in Chief, after mature deliberation, determined to advance to Seringapatam by the route of Talgautporam and Cankanelli.

On the 10th of March, at day-break, the army moved by the right from Kelamungalum. The cavalry were in advance, the baggage on the right, and the Nizam's contingent, which had marched by the left, moved parallel, at some distance, on the right flank of the army: a strong rear-guard protected the interval between the columns. By this order of march, the whole of the baggage, being between two columns, was well secured. Parties of the enemy's horse were in all directions, and were active in burning the forage and destroying the villages; they charged a company of sepoys belonging to the rear-guard of the Nizam's contingent; of whom twenty were killed upon the spot, Lieutenant Reynolds and thirty-six were wounded, and the remaining nine were missing.

The face of the country being uneven, and in some parts rug-

ged, occasioned a tedious march. The rear guard did not arrive until it was dark. Many carts with stores and baggage were left on the road. The army took up a position at Callacondapilly, where it was obliged to halt on the 11th, as a quantity of the public stores had not at that time arrived in camp.

On the 12th the army again marched, and encamped two miles south-east of Jiggeny. Just as it moved off at day-break, parties of the enemy's horse appeared in front, setting fire to forage, which had been previously collected in stacks, on the outside of the villages. The inhabitants of some of these villages remained, to whom safeguards were sent, and protection given. On our right, we left the village of Anicul, which is large and pleasantly situated, and is protected by a good mud fort. Around it are several tanks with plenty of water; and the soil being excellent, there were luxuriant rice fields, gardens, and rich plantations of sugar-cane. The inhabitants had quitted this village, wherein remained a large quantity of forage. No attempt was made by the enemy to burn it, nor had the army hitherto experienced any want of that article, although constantly harassed by numerous bodies of horse.

The face of the country over which the army had marched, like many parts of Mysore, is undulated; across the intermediate low grounds are embankments, at the distance of every mile or two, to retain water for the purposes of cultivation. They form a connected chain of reservoirs, so that if one were cut, or destroyed, the water would only run off to the next. These embankments being faced with large stones, are of prodigious strength, and it would consequently prove a most laborious task, to destroy them in such a manner, as effectually to prevent an

army from getting supplies of water. On this part of the route it was scarcely practicable, but where reservoirs are not thus situated, as is the case towards Cankanelli, the General was aware that the embankments might be destroyed; a circumstance which could be of no material consequence, since he knew that the branches of the Cankanelli river, a few miles to the westward of the proposed route, would furnish a supply.

After leaving the village of Anicul, a considerable body of the enemy's horse appeared, which were soon dispersed by a few discharges from the horse artillery.

Hitherto the army had marched from its right flank; but as its next movement was to be from the left, the position was taken up accordingly; that is, the cavalry were placed on the left of the encampment, and the battering train covered by a battalion *en potence,* on the left of the infantry.

Orders were issued for the army to march on the morning of the 13th, but at a late hour, on the 12th, a considerable quantity of powder, shot, and stores, not being arrived in camp, these orders were countermanded.

On the 14th the army marched by the left, and encamped, within sight of Bangalore, near the village of Cuttagerapettah. Upon arriving at this encampment, about 4000 of the enemy's best horse appeared in several compact bodies. They approached our cavalry, and the advanced guard, which were drawn up to receive them; but after a few shot from our field pieces, they drew off towards Bangalore.

The numerous fires round Bangalore, and even within the pettah or suburb, plainly indicated that the enemy were deceived in regard to our next movement, which they seemed to expect in that direction. The enemy's cavalry was accompanied by a small party of infantry, which proceeded to Kingery, and the whole, according to the intelligence of spies, were under the command of Purneah.* At this time reports prevailed that the Sultaun had attacked General Stuart at Periapatam, and had been repulsed with very considerable loss.

The army halted on the 15th; many fires towards Bangalore still evinced that the enemy expected a visit in that quarter.

On the 16th the army marched by the left, and proceeded nearly westward, until it came to the village of Talgautporam, which is situated on the high road leading from Bangalore to Cankanelli. This route, determined on at Kelamungalum, appeared to have been totally unsuspected. The party of horse, which had moved towards Bangalore, continued to burn forage; and, as they yet had not made the least effort to destroy it upon the Cankanelli route, it may be presumed, that the enemy supposed a post would have been established at Bangalore, and a plan of

* Purneah, for many years, held employments of trust under Hyder Alli. Of late he has been at the head of the revenue department; and was the only Hindoo who remained in an office of high responsibility under Tippoo Sultaun.

He joins to art, prudence and perseverance; and possesses an uncommon degree of quick penetration and fertility in resource. He is seemingly steady to no principle but self-interest; yet from his experience and knowledge, it is supposed he will prove a valuable instrument in our hands.

operation pursued, similar to that which was adopted in the last war.

Soon after leaving Talgautporam, the country becomes uneven, with many jungles. All the villages in this day's route, although abandoned, were full of forage. The right wing of the army, and the park of artillery, took up a position in the north side of a small pass near Cagliporam. At this village, where the country is open and pleasant, the cavalry and the left wing encamped.

The enemy's horse, which we saw on the 15th, hung upon our rear. At times they came very close, and seemed to threaten a charge; but being kept in check by General Floyd, with four regiments of cavalry, some infantry, and guns, after a few discharges, they drew off to a greater distance.

On the 17th the army marched by the left through a delightful valley, skirted by low hills, covered with wood, and so narrow and confined that it was difficult for the enemy to get round in our front, and almost impossible to act with safety in any situation. This valley extends from Cagliporam to Cankanelli, where it terminates, and thence the road continues through thickets, almost the whole distance to Sultaunpettah. The march of the army by this route, had the advantage of considerable security against a numerous body of cavalry; which might have retarded its movements, had it proceeded by any other route, and particularly by Chenapatam. But, notwithstanding this advantage, and the abundance of forage and water obtained on the march, our progress was extremely slow; and the loss of powder, shot,

and other military stores, had already been so considerable, as to excite some degree of alarm at this early period of the campaign. These evils were supposed to have originated in a spirit of opposition amongst the principal natives employed in the bullock departments, who were inimical to a system of œconomy, newly adopted, and likely to infringe upon their usual emoluments.

Further unfavourable reports from the ordnance department, proceeding from the same causes, obliged the army to halt on the 18th. Some arrangements had been made, which proved ineffectual. Major Dallas, agent for the supply of draught and carriage bullocks, now attached himself to the battering train, with a view to remove those obstacles which had hitherto retarded the progress of the army; and sanguine hopes were entertained that very essential benefits would soon result from his acknowledged zeal and activity.

This day some of Tippoo's horsemen were taken by Captain Walker's party. Their accounts confirmed the reports which had for some days prevailed, regarding the Sultaun's attack upon General Stuart. We now learnt that it was confined to the out-posts, and that the enemy had been repulsed with great slaughter.

On the 19th the left wing and the cavalry marched about five miles, and encamped at Arravully. A small party of the enemy's horse at length got round in our front, and burnt some forage; enough however remained to supply the cattle of the army for several days. Here the country being much more open, Mud-

warry, Ramgiry, Sawindroog, and other hill forts, were insight. This encampment was amply supplied with water, and possessed every other advantage.

The village of Arravully is large, and protected by a mud fort. It has a deep ditch full of thorns, and as the walls are high, and flanked with bastions, it might easily be made capable of considerable defence against a native army.

Intelligence was received this day, that the Sultaun's army had advanced to Allagoor, a village near Sultaunpettah.

On the 20th, the left wing and the cavalry encamped close to a pass about seven miles north from Cankanelli; the right wing advanced to Arravully, and Colonel Wellesley's division took up its ground at some distance in the rear.

Some forage on the western side of the Arcaweti river was secured by the cavalry: but we had reason to apprehend that our cattle would not fare so well at this encampment, as they had hitherto done. That the progress of the army had been so slow, did not proceed from any alteration in the state of the cattle; forage had been in greater abundance than could have been expected: neither could it proceed from the nature of the country, nor the defiles, nor the roads, since it is a fact that the Marquis Cornwallis's army, with a battering train, in May 1791, after having been two months in the enemy's country, marched, in *two* days, on this very route, more than General Harris was able to perform with every possible exertion in *five*. It is evident therefore

that the delay was occasioned solely by the cause which has been already assigned.

On the 21st of March, the army encamped at Cankanelli. Since the 16th, when the country became close and confined by hills and woods, the army had marched, and encamped, in three divisions; that is, the cavalry and left wing were in advance, the right wing in the centre, and the division commanded by Colonel Wellesley in the rear. This arrangement became necessary on account of several defiles, which it would have been impossible to pass in one day with so numerous an army, (including cattle and followers,) if the whole had marched at the same time: but as it was now ascertained that Tippoo Sultaun had approached within fifteen miles, the Commander in Chief judged it proper to make an alteration in the order of march and encampment. The several columns were therefore united; the whole army, with the battering train, took up its position at Cankanelli, and Colonel Wellesley, with the Nizam's contingent, encamped at a little distance in the rear.

The Arcaweti river, on the banks of which the army encamped, is forty-five yards wide. At this season it had a very small stream in it, but below the fort of Cankanelli, there are some deep places of stagnant water, sufficient to water the largest armies. Notwithstanding the apparent activity of the Sultaun's horse in burning forage, a large quantity was secured in the villages a few miles eastward of Cankanelli.

It was intended that the army should have halted at this place, but Major Allan, the Deputy Quarter-master General, and Captain

Orr of the guides, having reconnoitred in the afternoon of the 21st, discovered two tanks at Achel, where a small party of the enemy's horse had halted. To secure these tanks, which were conveniently situated to break the long march from Cankanelli to Sultaunpettah, General Harris resolved to detach a brigade and a regiment of native cavalry, at ten o'clock at night; and to follow, the next morning at day-break, with the right wing and the rest of the cavalry.

The 5th brigade, under the command of Colonel Roberts, and Major Macalister's regiment of cavalry, conducted by Major Allan and Captain Orr, marched from camp at the hour appointed, and, at three in the morning, came up with two of the enemy's videttes, who had been posted in the road, belonging to a party of about three hundred horse. These gave the alarm, which enabled the whole, excepting two horsemen, to make their escape. However, the object was attained by securing the tanks, which the enemy had begun to destroy.

These tanks were favourably situated in an open space, where General Harris, with the right wing of the army, and five regiments of cavalry, encamped on the 22d. The left wing, and a regiment of cavalry, remained at Cankanelli, for the protection of the battering train, and the Nizam's contingent advanced to Cankanelli.

On the 23d, the right wing and the cavalry marched from Achel, and encamped at Sultaunpettah. The left wing, and the battering train, advanced to Achel, and Colonel Wellesley, with the contingent, marched from Cankanelli, and encamped, in front of the army, at the village of Allagoor.

Early in the morning, as the advance guard approached Sultaunpettah, a cloud of dust to the westward evidently denoted that the army of Tippoo Sultaun was then in motion. It afterwards appeared, that it had quitted its position on the western bank of the Maddoor river, and encamped at Mallavelly.

On the 24th of March, the right wing and the cavalry moved at day-break: the former took up a position upon the west bank of the Maddoor, on the same ground which the Sultaun's army had occupied for five days. Our cavalry encamped on the eastern bank of the river. It was expected, from the intelligence which had been received, some days before, that the Sultaun would have disputed the passage of the Maddoor river; and such appeared to have been his intention, as Syed Goffar,* with 3000 infantry, 1000 horse, and ten guns, had been posted on the heights a little to the eastward of the river, but was ordered to fall back upon our approach. It is unaccountable that the Sultaun did not attempt to oppose the army at this place, as the ground which he might have chosen is uncommonly strong. The heights occupied by Syed Goffar entirely commanded the road to which our column of march was necessarily confined, on account of a number of deep and impassable ravines.

At this encampment, General Harris received the first certain accounts of Tippoo Sultaun's attack upon the Bombay army. In

* Syed Goffar was formerly a Subedar in the native cavalry of the Nabob of Arcot; and afterwards commandant of a revenue corps in the Company's service; in which station he was taken prisoner by Tippoo Sultaun in 1782. Some time afterwards, he was prevailed upon to enter into the service of the Sultaun, to whom he was much attached, and always proved himself a brave and faithful adherent.

the course of the day two sepoys, after remaining some time in the Sultaun's camp, arrived with letters from General Stuart, one dated the 10th, and the other the 17th of March, informing General Harris, that he had repeatedly written to him regarding the attack which Tippoo had made upon his advanced posts. These letters were at that period very acceptable, as they entirely removed the doubts and anxiety occasioned by reports which had been industriously circulated in the enemy's camp, that General Stuart had been forced to quit his position. The fact now appeared, that the Sultaun had totally failed in his attempt, and suffered a very considerable loss.

It has been already remarked, that Tippoo Sultaun, at the time Lieutenant-general Harris entered Mysore, was supposed to be encamped in the vicinity of Maddoor, and to be preparing to move towards Bangalore for the purpose of opposing the Madras army, in the event of its actually passing the frontier. But it was now ascertained, that, although the Sultaun had affected a disposition to admit an embassy from the British Government, he had probably no other view than to conceal the design he had formed of striking an early blow against the army of Bombay: for, without allowing the Governor-general the same time to answer his last letter, which he had taken for replying to those addressed to him, and without waiting to hear of the actual commencement of hostilities on the part of the British Government, he came to the resolution of attacking the army of Bombay, then assembled beyond the line of his frontier, in the district of Coorga.*

* Tippoo Sultaun was strongly addicted to superstition: it is difficult to account for his actions; but as we have it under his own hand that he was about this period

For this purpose, taking with him the flower of his army, he marched from his camp, near Chenapatam, on the 28th of February, (at which time General Harris was encamped at Carimungalum in the Barramaul,) and moving rapidly in the direction of Periapatam, arrived there on the morning of the 5th of March, being the same day on which General Harris entered Mysore on the eastern frontier.

On the 6th of March, Tippoo Sultaun passed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the army of Bombay, the total strength of which did not much exceed 6000 fighting men. This attack, though sustained by a body not exceeding 2000 men, was repulsed, and the enemy thrown into great disorder, before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. The following is the General's official account of this brilliant and important action, in a letter to the Governor-general, dated the 8th of March 1799.

under the influence of "*a most auspicious omen*," it is not impossible that this notion may have had some effect upon his actions.

The following is a translation from the Persian, in his own hand-writing.

"On Thursday the 10th of Razy, at night, the sun being in the sign of Dulloo "(i. e. Aquarius), at about 12 o'clock, such a quantity of rain fell, that the earth "became perfectly wet; and in the evening of that night, an order had been given "for beating the drums three gurries before day-break. Accordingly, midnight being "passed, and three gurries of the night remaining, the signal drum for departure "was beat.

"By the favour of God, and the assistance of the Almighty, we departed on "Friday, and on the 11th of the month Razy, our suite entered the tents, in the "year 1226 from the birth of Mahomed; corresponding with the 9th of Ramzan, "1213 Hegira, (or 15th of February 1799); *and the circumstance of its raining "is a most auspicious omen.*"

" On the 2d instant, the right brigade, consisting of three native battalions, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Montresor, took up their ground at Sedaseer, the boundary of the Coorga country, and about seven miles distant from Periapatam ; the main body of the army remaining at Sedapoor,' and Ahmootinar, the first eight miles, and the latter twelve, from the advanced position.

" It may be necessary to inform your Lordship, that I was in some measure compelled, from the nature of the country, which is every where covered with thick jungles, to place the army in several divisions; but I had a farther view in occupying the post at Sedaseer, in order to preserve a more ready communication with General Harris.

" In the course of the 5th, an extensive encampment was unexpectedly observed to be forming on this side of the fort of Periapatam. This circumstance was discovered at ten o'clock in the forenoon, as the enemy were taking up their ground, by a party of observation on the summit of the high hill of Sedaseer, which commands a view of the Mysore almost to the environs of Seringapatam. Before the evening, this encampment assumed a very formidable appearance, and covered a great extent of ground : we were able to count from three to four hundred tents; amongst the number, some of large dimensions were distinguished, and particularly one of *green colour*, which seemed to denote the presence of the Sultaun. However much the probability of this circumstance might be strengthened by the respectable appearance of the encampment, it was contradicted by the evidence of two hircarrahs, who had recently arrived from Seringapatam. These men generally re-

ported, that Tippoo had marched with all his forces on the 20th ultimo, to oppose the progress of the Madras army; and that the Binky Nabob commanded the only force in the field that remained in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. This force was represented to be encamped at Carniambaddy, and to consist of 5000 Piaddas, or irregular infantry, who were said to be intended as a covering party to 7000 Brinjarries, and directed to bring as much provisions, as they could collect about Periapatam, to the capital.

" In this state of uncertainty, I thought it prudent to reinforce Lieutenant-colonel Montresor's brigade, with an additional battalion of sepoys, and waited for more correct intelligence, which I expected hourly, to act with the whole of my forces, as affairs might render necessary. On the morning of the 6th, Major-general Hartley went forward to reconnoitre, and at break of day, from the hill of observation, the whole of the enemy's army was discovered to be in motion; but their movements were so well concealed by the woodiness of the country, and the haziness of the atmosphere, that it was impossible to ascertain their object, nor, in fact, was this discovered, until they had penetrated a considerable way into the jungle, and commenced an attack upon our line, which happened between the hours of nine and ten.

" The enemy pierced through the jungles with such secrecy and expedition, that they attacked the rear and front of our line almost at the same instant. This dispatch prevented more than three of our corps being engaged, as the fourth, which was posted two miles and a half in the rear, was unable to form a junction from the enemy having cut in between them and Sedapoor. The communication was effectually obstructed by a column, which, according

to the reports of our prisoners, consisted of upwards of 5000 men, under the command of Baber Jung.

" Fortunately, before the enemy had accomplished their purpose, Major-general Hartley had time to apprize me of their attack, and remained himself to give any assistance that might be necessary. The best position was assumed for repulsing the enemy, and the corps defended themselves with so much resolution, that the Sultaun's troops were unable to make any impression. The brigade was on every side completely surrounded, and had to contend against a vast disparity of numbers.

" As soon as I received intelligence of the situation of the right brigade, I marched to their assistance with the two flank companies of his Majesty's 75th regiment, and the whole of the 77th. I arrived about half past two, in the sight of the division of the enemy, who had penetrated into the rear, and possessed themselves of the great road leading to Sedaseer. The engagement lasted nearly half an hour, when, after a smart fire of musquetry on both sides, the enemy were completely routed, and fled with precipitation through the jungles, to regain their column, which still continued the attack in front. At twenty minutes past three, the enemy retreated in all directions.

" For this decisive, and, I hope, your Lordship will allow, brilliant success, (considering the small number of troops who engaged, under very great disadvantage, probably the flower of Tippoo Sultaun's army,) I feel myself peculiarly indebted to the judicious dispositions for the defence made by General Hartley. He embraced the opportunity of observing the motions of the enemy from

the hill I have before mentioned, and was enabled to advise Lieutenant-colonel Montresor of the best method for defeating them. I beg leave also to inform your Lordship, that my best thanks are due to Lieutenant-colonel Montresor for his very active exertions, and to the officers and men, including the artillery of his brigade, for their gallant and steady behaviour throughout the whole of this arduous affair. Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop, and the European division under his command, are likewise entitled to my particular approbation, for their spirited conduct, which finally routed the enemy.

"Our loss on this occasion is far less than could reasonably have been expected; and I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a return of this circumstance.

"It was impossible to ascertain the exact loss sustained by the enemy, but it must have been heavy, as in the course of so long an action, they were often exposed in crowds to the fire of grape shot, and vollies of musquetry; several men of distinction were killed, and some wounded officers have been made prisoners.

"Since the action of the 6th, the enemy have continued in their camp at Periapatam; nor have I any intelligence either of the Sultaun's designs, or of the motives which induced him to undertake his present enterprize. It is not likely that he will remain longer in this neighbourhood than after he receives intelligence of General Harris having entered Mysore."*

* Appendix, XXI. The Rajah of Coorga's interesting account of this battle.—Appendix, XXII. Tippoo Sultaun's memorandum, in his own writing, on the same occasion.

After this signal defeat, Tippoo Sultaun retreated precipitately to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th of March, without making any further attempt to molest the army of Bombay. The loss sustained by Tippoo's army was 1500 killed and wounded; that sustained by the army of Bombay amounted to 29 killed, 98 wounded, and 16 missing.

It has since been ascertained that Tippoo Sultaun's force on this occasion, consisted of 11,800 of his best troops, and that they were divided into four columns: the right column, commanded by Syed Ghoffar, of 3000; the centre, by the Binky Nabob, of 1800; the left, by Bubber Jung, of 3000; and the reserve, commanded by the Sultaun in person, consisted of 4000 men.

Adverting to the great disproportion of numbers, and to other circumstances of disadvantage, the gallantry and success of the army of Bombay, on the 6th of March, will appear to have seldom been equalled, and never surpassed; and the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant-general Stuart, and of Major-general Hartley, as well as of Lieutenant-colonels Montresor and Dunlop, was justly entitled to the highest commendations.

The Sultaun's army having quitted Periapatam, arrived at Seringapatam on the 14th of March, and immediately moved from thence to meet Lieutenant-general Harris and the army of Madras, to whose operations we now return.

The right wing of the Madras army, the cavalry, and the Nizam's contingent, halted on the 25th of March, when they

were joined by the left wing and the battering train; and on the 26th, the whole moved, in compact order, and encamped five miles east of Mallavelly.

Our spies, who had returned from the enemy's camp, confidently asserted, that the Sultaun had declared his intention of attacking the English "*so soon as they ventured out of the jungles*;" and his having waited some days, encamped on the banks of Maddoor river, seemed to confirm the truth of these reports.

When the army, on the 26th, took up its ground, which was open, and in some parts so commanding that the whole encampment could be seen from one point of view, the enemy's advanced parties, amongst which were some elephants, appeared upon a distant ridge. Hence, after viewing the position of our encampment for a considerable time, they retired. In the evening fourteen or fifteen guns were distinctly seen in motion: these circumstances seemed to indicate that the Sultaun meant to fulfil his intention of risking a battle.

At day-break on the 27th, the army marched from its left flank, on the great road leading to Mallavelly; whilst Colonel Wellesley's division, with the Nizam's contingent, moved parallel to it at some distance on the left, covering the baggage, and in readiness to act as circumstances should require.

Five regiments of cavalry, with the piquets of the army, formed the advance, under Major-general Floyd; which, having approached within a mile of the village of Mallavelly, halted, upon discovering a numerous body of the enemy's cavalry on the right

flank, and their infantry remaining on the heights beyond Mallavelly.

It was evidently the Sultaun's army. Whilst his position was reconnoitred, some guns were seen moving towards the right of his line, as if intended to occupy a ridge which flanked the low ground on the eastern side of the village: from this circumstance it was expected that these guns would be opened upon our line as it crossed the low ground. To defeat this plan, a disposition was immediately formed to attack the enemy.

The five regiments of cavalry were ordered to form on the left of the road, and to support Colonel Wellesley's division, which was directed to attack the enemy's right flank, whilst the piquets, under Colonel Sherbrooke, supported by the right wing of the army, under Major-general Bridges, were to penetrate through the village of Mallavelly, towards the centre of the enemy's line; and Major-general Popham, with the left wing and the rear-guard, was to remain at the fort and village of Mallavelly, for the protection of the battering train, and the baggage of the army.

As soon as the enemy perceived Colonel Wellesley's division in motion, their guns were drawn off to a ridge beyond that which they at first occupied. Here their main body of infantry drew up, but at so great a distance, that it was imagined they were about to retire. General Harris, who had led the piquets and the right wing in person, arrived at the fort of Mallavelly; and Lieutenant-colonel Richardson, the Quarter-master General, having advanced to reconnoitre the ground on the western side of the fort, now waited for instructions. As the enemy remained at so great a

distance, the General directed him to mark out the new encampment: and he proceeded for this purpose, supported by the piquets under Colonel Sherbrooke, which were now reinforced by his Majesty's 25th light dragoons, and the second regiment of native cavalry; but scarcely was the new ground marked out, when twelve or fourteen guns opened from different parts of the enemy's line at the distance of two thousand yards. They soon got the range, and did some execution. After the encampment had been marked out, Colonel Sherbrooke pushed forward to a village in front of the enemy's left, from which he drove off a party of their horse and rocket-men. Here the 25th dragoons, under the command of Colonel Cotton, maintained their position, and kept in check a body of the enemy's horse, which hovered on our right flank. The piquets being now the most advanced towards the enemy, were considerably annoyed by the cannonade and rockets. Colonel Sherbrooke had judiciously posted them with his right to the village, and the cannonade still continuing, the 5th or leading brigade, under Colonel Roberts, was ordered to advance and form upon his left; the 1st or European brigade, under Major-general Baird, to form on the left of the 5th, and the 3d on that of the 1st.

In the mean while, the division under Colonel Wellesley, advanced, *en echellon* of battalions, supported by Major-general Floyd with the three remaining regiments of cavalry.

The line thus formed moved slowly, to give time for the whole to act together. The enemy's cannonade was answered by such of the field pieces as could be brought up, and the action soon became general along the whole front. It was, however, of short

duration; for although some corps of the enemy's infantry and horse exhibited the strongest proofs of courage, it was impossible to withstand the determined valour and steadiness of our troops.

A column of the enemy, consisting of about two thousand men, moved forward in excellent order towards his Majesty's 33d regiment: this corps reserving its fire with the utmost steadiness, received that of the enemy at the distance of sixty yards, and continuing to advance, the column gave way, and was thrown into disorder. At this instant General Floyd making a rapid charge, completed the rout, with great slaughter.

The whole of our line now advanced upon the enemy's first line, which was soon compelled to retire with its guns to the next height, where their second line was formed. They were at this time almost beyond the reach of our guns, and the cannonade, which lasted three hours, having, on account of the distance, ceased on both sides, the enemy retreated. As no advantage could be derived from a pursuit, General Harris ordered the troops to return to the encampment at Mallavelly.

Our loss was inconsiderable; three officers were wounded; six Europeans killed, and thirty-four wounded; one native killed, sixteen wounded, and six missing; twelve horses killed, thirty-three wounded, and three missing. The enemy appeared to have suffered severely, but as they carried off their wounded, and even their dead, during the action, it was impossible, at the time, to judge with any accuracy to what extent. It has since been ascertained that their loss amounted to one thousand, killed and

wounded. Of the column which was charged by General Floyd, and which appeared to have sustained so great a loss, only two hundred and thirty remained on the field after the action was over

Some of the prisoners asserted, that the infantry were driven on by the horse, and ordered to attack the Europeans: that they did so is certain; and the firmness of those corps which opposed his Majesty's 33d regiment, as well as the gallantry of a party of horse, that charged the European brigade, was perhaps never exceeded by the Sultaun's troops on any former occasion. These daring efforts of the enemy, having proved so ineffectual in both instances, added to the disgrace lately suffered in the attack of General Stuart's out-posts, appeared from subsequent events to have made a deep impression upon the Sultaun's mind.

After this battle, the army moved, on the 28th of March, to a position four miles S. W. from Mallavelly, in order that it might be within an easy march of Sosilay, where there is a very easy ford, by which General Harris had previously determined to cross the Cauvery. This movement appeared to have been totally unsuspected by the enemy, and the position was well calculated to impress them with an idea that the next march would have been upon the high road to Seringapatam.

In consequence of General Harris's determination to cross the Cauvery at this ford, Major Allan, the Deputy Quarter-master General, was sent with the piquets of the cavalry (about three hundred men) to explore the country as far as the river; and having returned at night, and made a favourable report, the army marched on the 29th at day-break.

The enemy appeared to have been equally deceived by this, as by the Cankanelli route. All the villages in this day's march, although abandoned by the inhabitants, were filled with forage, of which there were also many stacks in the open fields. The country was open and delightful; the soil rich and fertile; neither fires nor the enemy's horse in sight; in short, the whole scene was a pleasing contrast to that, which, for some time before, we had been accustomed. But, on approaching the fort of Sosilay, we saw many thousands of the wretched inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, who had taken refuge with their cattle and property under its walls. The first object of the officers who were in advance, was to conciliate their minds, and to afford them every possible protection. They had raised small temporary huts around the fort; and in the ditch, which was dry, had collected twelve or fifteen thousand head of cattle, besides a great number of sheep and goats. There was also in the fort a considerable quantity of grain of different kinds. Many advantages were derived from this movement, since it enabled the army to take up its position before Seringapatam, with full bazars, and an ample supply of cattle and sheep.

The right wing of the army, the cavalry, and Colonel Wellesley's division, encamped on the north side of the Cauvery, and the left wing crossed the river at a very easy ford.

This unexpected movement, no doubt, disconcerted any plans which might have been formed for opposing the army, upon a supposition that it would advance by Arakery. Besides the immediate acquisition of cattle, forage, and grain, derived from this movement, the position on the south side of the river was

highly judicious, and secured other advantages. It certainly facilitated the junction with the army of Bombay; and enabled General Harris, by confining his operations to the south side of the Cauvery, to draw his supplies from the abundant magazines which had been formed in the Coorga country, and to secure the approach of the convoys from the southern districts and the Barramaul. It also promised to open to our army, if events had rendered it necessary, that extensive range of forage, situated to the southward of Seringapatam, which Tippoo Sultaun had reserved for the consumption of his own army.

General Harris halted on the 30th of March until two o'clock in the afternoon, when the tents were struck, and the remainder of the army crossed to the south side of the river, excepting a native battalion, which was left to cover the rear, and to afford protection to the inhabitants of Sosilay. The Cauvery is at this place three hundred yards broad, with a sandy bottom, and a fine clear stream, about three feet deep.

Intelligence was received, from Tippoo's camp, that his army marched to Arakery on the morning of the 30th, and that his troops had lain on their arms every night since the battle of the 27th.

On the 31st of March the army halted, in order to refresh the troops, as well as to enable the followers and others to get supplies of grain from Sosilay. By our intelligence this day, it appeared, that the Sultaun's infantry and guns had been sent to Seringapatam, and that he himself, with all his cavalry, had crossed to the south side of the river.

On the 1st of April, the army marched by the right, and encamped close to the Cauvery, at the distance of thirteen miles from Seringapatam. Although the enemy's horse appeared in our front the whole of this day's march, they were not active in burning the villages, nor did they set fire to many stacks of forage which were in the open fields.

On the 2d, the army marched by the left; but, as the Nizam's horse neglected to occupy the position pointed out to them, and encamped in front of our right wing, we were compelled to halt nearly four hours, in order that they might pass with their baggage in front of our advance, so as to gain their proper position on our left flank. By this unfortunate circumstance, the best part of the day was lost; and the army found itself under the necessity of taking up its ground only three miles in front of the last encampment.

The enemy's cavalry, which were seen the day before, appeared again in our front. They drew up in regular order, at the distance of about two miles, parallel to our line. Whilst the army was taking up its ground, a person, seemingly of distinction, and afterwards ascertained to be Tippoo Sultaun, reconnoitred for several hours from a hill in front.

On the 3d, the army marched by the left. Colonel Wellesley's division, keeping on the right, moved along the bank of the river, and the whole encamped upon the high road at the distance of five miles from Seringapatam. Tippoo's cavalry again kept in our front.

From the heights we had a distinct view of the whole island and

city of Seringapatam. The pettah of Shar Ganjam was completely destroyed, together with all the houses adjoining a line of entrenchment on the east face of the fort, which had been lately constructed; and the enemy's infantry were encamped behind these new works. Thus the Sultaun appeared to have been prepared for the attack from the eastward. No alterations had been made to the Carigut-hill, and the old defences on the eastern part of the island had been suffered to decay.

On the 4th, reconnoitring from a more advanced situation, it was evident, from the position which Tippoo Sultaun had taken up, with his infantry close under the east and south faces of the fort of Seringapatam, and from his having destroyed and abandoned all the pettahs on the eastern part of the island, that he expected an assault upon the island, and that a plan of operations, similar to that of 1792, would have been adopted. His new lines were constructed with better judgment than his advanced redoubts at that period; which being too distant, could not be supported by the guns of the fort. These new works, were within six or seven hundred yards of the walls; they extended from the Dowlet Baug, and embraced the Periapatam bridge: they might have been taken, but not easily maintained, as they were powerfully commanded by the guns of the fort.

The army, on the morning of the 4th, marched by the left, keeping on the high grounds about four miles from the fort of Seringapatam. The Sultaun had a full view of the whole of our line as it passed. Although his horse had appeared in front, and on our right, we were suffered to pass without the least molestation. At this time the Sultaun appeared to feel the difficulty of

his situation. By reports from his camp, we learnt that he was extremely dejected and undetermined; that plans of defence had been suddenly formed, and as suddenly abandoned; that the day on which he reconnoitred from the hill, he made a disposition for opposing our march, by cannonading from the high grounds, which we had to pass, and with this view had ordered, in addition to his cavalry, sixteen or eighteen thousand infantry, with twenty guns, to cross the river. The nature of the country was highly favourable for such a plan; and it is probable, that he was deterred from putting it in execution by the recollection of the superiority of our troops, which he had recently experienced; and in some degree also from an apprehension of our cavalry in their improved condition.

A number of rocket-men having assembled in a tope, or grove, in front of our advanced piquets, apparently for the purpose of annoying our next march, General Baird, with the flank companies of his brigade, and part of the 74th regiment, was detached at eleven o'clock at night to surprise them; but they had quitted the tope. General Baird, however, in returning to camp, fell in with a piquet of the enemy's horse, which he dispered, after killing a few men and taking some horses.

On the 5th of April, the army marched by the left, keeping under the ridges to the south and westward of Sultaunpettah, in order to avoid the topes, which afforded cover for the enemy's rocket-men, and from whence a number of rockets were thrown without effect. After a short march, the army took up its ground opposite the west face of the fort of Seringapatam, at the distance of three thousand five hundred yards. The left of the line was placed near

the river Cauvery; on the right was encamped, *en potence*, the Nizam's contingent; and in the rear of both were the cavalry and the Nizam's horse facing the westward. In their front was a chain of advanced posts, on high ground, occupied, chiefly, by the Nizam's infantry, commanded by British officers.

This position of the army before Seringapatam was uncommonly strong; fronting the east, the right of the camp was on high commanding ground, whence it gradually descended to the left flank, which was doubly secured by an aqueduct, and by the river Cauvery.

This aqueduct, which issues from a dam across the Cauvery, at Kanambaddy, amply supplied the camp with the finest water. Its winding course, in many places, served as a strong entrenchment; and several deep ravines, intersecting the rear of the camp, rendered it utterly impenetrable for the enemy's cavalry.

Besides these immediate advantages of security and strength, there were others of much greater importance to the operations which were now to be undertaken. Five large topes, of cocoa, areka, bamboo, and other trees, furnished within the camp, an abundant stock of materials for the siege, which was an advantage that no other situation near Seringapatam could have afforded. We knew also from experience, that the front of this admirable encampment would be equally protected with the flanks and rear, when we had once established our advanced posts; which, in the first instance, would be nearly the same as those occupied by Sir Robert Abercrombie in the former war.

CHAPTER VIII.

Attack of the Enemy's advanced Posts—a second Attack of these Posts.—General Floyd marches to Periapatam—is followed by the whole of the Enemy's Cavalry.—Preparations for the Siege.—Letter from Tippoo Sultaun—General Harris's Reply.—Operations of the Enemy.—South Face of the Fort described—West Face.—Junction of Generals Floyd and Stuart.—Enemy's Entrenchment.—Bombay Army takes up a Position on the North Side of the Cauvery.—Plan of the Attack.—Unexpected Deficiency in the Grain Department.

From the left of the position which has been described, the aqueduct, already mentioned, takes an easterly direction, till it approaches within seventeen hundred yards of the fort; where it winds off to the right towards the Sultaunpettah tope. This aqueduct is fifteen yards wide, and six feet deep, with a high bank towards the town. There were also several ruined villages, and rocky eminences, in front, which afforded cover for the enemy's infantry and rocket-men, so near to the camp, that many of the rockets, thrown from these places, fell amongst the tents. It became therefore indispensable, to the quiet and security of the camp, to dispossess the enemy of these posts without loss of time. For this purpose, on the evening of the 5th of April, his Majesty's 12th regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, with their guns, under the command of Colonel Shawe, and another division, consisting of

his Majesty's 33d regiment, and the 2d Bengal regiment, under Colonel Wellesley, were ordered to be in readiness at sunset; and whilst the former was to attack the posts at the aqueduct, the latter was to make a diversion, by scouring the Sultaunpettah tope.

Both divisions marched a little after sunset. The obscurity of the night was very unfavourable to their advance: Colonel Shawe, however, seized a ruined village, within forty yards of the aqueduct, which secured his troops against the musquetry of the enemy, who still retained possession of the embankment. Colonel Wellesley, advancing about the same time, to attack the Sultaunpettah tope, was, upon entering it, assailed on every side by a hot fire of musquetry and rockets. This circumstance, joined to the extreme darkness of the night, the uncertainty of the enemy's position, and the badness of the ground, induced him to confine his operation to the object of causing a diversion, and to postpone the attack of the enemy's post, until a more favourable opportunity should offer.

Finding that the village occupied by Colonel Shawe was very much annoyed by the enemy's musquetry, from the aqueduct, within forty yards, to which the enemy had sent a reinforcement, and that the possession of the tope of Sultaunpettah was absolutely necessary, to secure the camp against the annoyance of the enemy's rockets, as well as to support Colonel Shawe's post, General Harris made a disposition, on the morning of the 6th, to drive the enemy from their whole line of out-posts, which extended from the river Cauvery to the Sultaunpettah tope; and, with this view, he ordered that three attacks should be made at the same instant, under cover of several guns that were previously posted for the purpose.

Colonel Wellesley again commanded the attack on the Sultaun-pettah tope, which was intended to take place about nine o'clock. Colonel Shawe was to advance, at the same time, from the ruined village which he occupied, and to dislodge the enemy from the aqueduct; and Colonel Wallace, with the grenadiers of the 74th, and two companies of sepoys, was to attack a village on the enemy's right flank.

Colonel Wellesley, with the Scotch brigade, two battalions of sepoys, and four guns, advanced to the attack of the tope; from which the enemy fired under cover of the bank of the aqueduct. Their fire was returned by a few discharges of grape from the field pieces; and, as the corps moved on, parties were detached to take the enemy in flank, which soon threw them into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipitation.

Precisely at the same moment, Colonel Shawe, quitting the ruined village, rushed upon the enemy, and drove them from that part of the aqueduct, from which he had been so much annoyed during the night; and Colonel Wallace having succeeded at the same time in dispossessing them of the village on their right flank, which commanded a considerable part of the aqueduct, the whole of this advanced line of posts was quickly evacuated by the enemy, and immediately occupied by our troops.

The brilliant success of these attacks, which had been ably planned and gallantly executed, now secured a strong, connected line of posts, extending from the river to the village of Sultaun-pettah, a distance of about two miles; and was, in fact, a line of

contravallation, formed principally by the aqueduct, at a convenient distance from the fort, and from the encampment of the army.

At day-break on the 6th, Major-general Floyd, with four regiments of cavalry, and the left wing of the army, excepting the regiment de Meuron, marched towards Periapatam, to form a junction with the Bombay army.

For the more effectual support of the advanced posts now occupied, a small alteration was made, in the position of the right of the encampment, on the morning of the 7th, when the army took up its final position for the siege.

On the evening of this day the enemy were employed in making an entrenchment at the ruins of a powder mill, which is situated near the south bank of the Cauvery, and at the distance of seven hundred and fifty yards from the N. W. angle bastion of the fort. The whole of the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Cummer ud dien Khan, marched from the island this morning upon the high road to Periapatam.

On the 8th, half the bamboo Coolies and tent Lascars of the army, with all the native and European pioneers, were placed under the orders of Colonel Gent, the senior engineer, to be employed in preparing materials for the siege.

On the 9th, the posts occupied by our troops were thus denominated: the main out-post in front was called "*Shawe's Post:*" that in the bank of the aqueduct, on the right of Shawe's, where two

twelve pounders were stationed, "*The Twelve Pounder Battery:*" at the village of Sultaunpettah, "*The Post of Sultaunpettah:*" and that to the left of the village, near the burying ground, "*The Post in front of the Engineers' Tope.*" An European regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, occupied Shawe's post; from which a native company was detached to the twelve pounder battery. A company of Europeans, and five hundred native infantry from the Nizam's contingent, occupied the village of Sultaunpettah: and a company of Europeans from the detail of Shawe's post, and four hundred natives from the Nizam's contingent, were stationed at the post in front of the engineers' tope.

The field officer of the day had the command of the advanced piquets of the army, and the general officer of the day had the immediate command of Shawe's, and a general control over all the other advanced posts.

On the 9th, General Harris received a letter from Tippoo Sultaun,* in which he declared, "That he had adhered firmly to treaties, and demanded the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and of the occurrence of hostilities." To this letter General Harris briefly replied,† by referring the Sultaun for an explanation of the advance of the English and allied armies, and of the commencement of hostilities, to the several letters which the Marquis Wellesley had addressed to the Sultaun on the subject.

On the 10th, the enemy were busy, as they had been for some

* Appendix, XXIII. † Appendix, XXIV.

days before, in completing their lines upon the island; and many thousand workmen were employed at a new entrenchment on the west bank of the river. These works, and the opening of new embrazures in various parts of the south face of the fort, clearly evinced, that the attack was expected against the south-west angle.

Viewing the south face of the fort from the post at Sultaun-pettah, it seemed to be very strong, and particularly towards the south-west angle. Here were several walls, so complicated in appearance, that it was impossible, at that distance, to ascertain the nature of them.

An attack against this point must have been carried on under many disadvantages. In the first instance, it would have required an assault upon the enemy's strong entrenchment on the island; and that we should maintain possession of at least a part of it. On the left, our approaches and batteries would have been flanked by a powerful fire, not only from the cavaliers and bastions, but even from the curtains of the south-west part of the fort: nor would they have been less exposed, on the right, to the high and commanding works which cover the south-east angle, and to the long projecting flanks upon the south face. Added to these unfavourable circumstances, an enfilading fire could not have been conveniently established to support the attack; and the inner walls, against which it must necessarily have been carried on, being covered by the outer, were so much concealed from view, that they could not have been effectually breached from the western bank of the river. These formed all together a chain of insuperable obstacles to any attempt on that side.

The north-west angle of the fort, since the year 1792, had been strengthened chiefly by a brick bastion, of European construction, upon the angular point. This bastion added two guns to the flanking defences of the north and west faces; three, to the direct fire of each of those faces; and two, (the saliant angle being cut off) upon the line of the capital of the bastion; yet this work was not of sufficient importance to cure the radical defect in the construction of this part of the fort.

The defect, to which I allude, arises from a line nearly five hundred yards in length, having only three guns, which could be said to flank it, and being exposed to a destructive enfilading fire from the north side of the river, at the distance of less than one thousand yards. In addition to these disadvantages, the walls were totally exposed to breaching batteries from the westward; circumstances alone sufficient to render this part extremely weak, even if the passage across the bed of the river had been rather difficult; but more particularly so, when this did not appear to be the case, since persons on foot, and even cattle, had already been seen to cross the river at the ruins of the Delhi bridge, which left no doubt of getting, by that passage, at any breach, near the north-west angle.

There was also reason to suppose, though it could not at this time be sufficiently ascertained, that the bed of the river was equally accessible from the western bank. Independent of this consideration, however, the arguments in favour of an attack on the N. W. angle were so conclusive, that the Commander in Chief did not hesitate in deciding upon it.

This day the pioneers, and a battalion of sepoys, with half the

bamboo Coolies and Lascars of the army, began to prepare materials for the siege. Two twelve pounders were placed in Shawe's post, to bear upon the enemy's entrenchment at the powder mill, which seemed to have been completed, as their working parties were at this time discontinued.

A strong working party from the Nizam's contingent was employed in fortifying the village of Sultaunpettah, in order the more effectually to secure the right of the advanced posts, which, from its vicinity to the island, lay open to the enemy's sallies across the Periapatam bridge, or the Chendagall Ford.

On the 11th, a twelve pounder battery in Shawe's post was completed. The working parties were employed, as the day before, making up materials and strengthening the village of Sultaunpettah.

The enemy's entrenchment upon the island being finished, their infantry was this day encamped within it. Scarcely any firing took place on either side.

On the 12th, not a gun was fired from, or against, the fort; nor until the 13th, at three o'clock in the afternoon, when, suddenly, a heavy cannonade commenced; which continued, without intermission, until a little after sunset. The enemy's shot were chiefly directed to the engineers' tope, and to head quarters. Several fell within our encampment; and one particularly reached the Commander in Chief's tent, which was distant three thousand five hundred yards from the nearest part of the fort, and above four thousand three hundred from the cavalier, whence it was fired.

At half past seven this evening, General Floyd's signal guns* were distinctly heard, by which it was known that he was encamped within two marches of Seringapatam.

On the morning of the 14th, the Commander in Chief, accompanied by two regiments of cavalry, went towards Cannambaddy, in expectation of meeting General Floyd with the Bombay army; it was not, however, until late in the afternoon, that Generals Floyd and Stuart arrived, and took up their ground in the rear of our encampment. During their march from Periapatam, the whole of the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Cummer ud Dien, with some irregular infantry, which had followed General Floyd, on the morning of the 7th, attended them closely, but without being able to make the slightest impression.

Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his command, had been so assiduous in the preparation of materials, that in six days there was a sufficiency for the proposed batteries; and he reported himself in readiness to commence the siege.

On the morning of the 15th, the enemy had completed their lines of entrenchment on the western bank of the river, opposite to the west face of the fort. On the right of this entrenchment, near the Cauvery, there was an unfinished redoubt, and before the

* *Time*, and *number* of guns, formed the principle of our signals: for example, three guns at half past seven, denoted a position two marches from Seringapatam: two guns at eight, might have denoted any other communication; and in this manner may detachments, or armies, on some occasions, communicate intelligence, which might by messengers be impracticable. To ascertain that the signal of the Bombay army was understood, it was agreed to fire the same number of guns, in our camp, ten minutes afterwards.

south-west angle of the fort, a circular work of three embrasures facing Shawe's Post. This part of the entrenchment had many serpentine windings. These were the only projections throughout the whole of the entrenchment, from the right to the Periapatam bridge.

On the morning of the 16th, the Bombay army, consisting of three regiments of European, and six battalions of native infantry, with three companies of artillery, and a proportion of field pieces, crossed the Cauvery at a ford on the left of the encampment, which being a rough bed of rock, was rather a difficult passage for the field pieces. General Stuart took up a very strong position. Fronting the eastward, his right flank was towards the ford; his left, on higher ground, was covered by an aqueduct, and well secured in front by a hill, which formed an excellent advanced post; and the rear of this encampment, being intersected by several deep ravines, was perfectly safe against any attempts of the enemy's cavalry.

From the hill abovementioned, which was near the Eedgah redoubt,* we had a perfect and most satisfactory view of the bed of the river, opposite to the intended point of attack: in this part there appeared to be no obstacle to the passage of troops; there was scarcely any water in the river, and its bed was a bare rock.

Whilst we reconnoitred, several persons walked entirely across it; a circumstance, which, combined with its appearance, inspired the firmest confidence of success. For in forming the

* Attacked and taken by General Medows in 1792.

plan of attack upon the west face of the fort, it became necessary to consider the practicability of crossing the river, after the defences were taken off, under a powerful enfilading fire of cannon, at two different places; the one at the Delhi ford from the north, and the other, opposite the west face, from the south side of the river. Of the first, no doubt was entertained, from the circumstance I have noticed, that men and cattle had frequently been seen to cross it; but of the other, we were uncertain. The report of natives, which was, indeed, extremely favourable, was now, for the first time, confirmed by observation.

The practicability of this passage, was of the utmost importance; since it enabled us to confine our works, except the enfilading battery, entirely to the south side of the river. By this advantage, much time was saved, as the attack by the Delhi ford would have required additional approaches, and an additional battery of eight guns, to silence the defences of the north face.

Major-general Floyd, who had been detached with five regiments of cavalry and the left wing of the army, to cover a party of Brinjarries sent out on the 15th, at night, to collect cattle and sheep, returned. The Brinjarries had been very successful in the vicinity of Mysore, whence they brought a considerable supply of cattle as well as of grain. General Floyd now encamped about three miles from the army, preparatory to his movement towards the Covriporam Pass, by which route the detachments of Lieutenant-colonels Brown and Read were to advance, with the supplies of grain which had been collected by Colonel Read. These supplies were at this time looked for with extreme solicitude, as on them seemed to depend the success of the campaign; for on the 16th of

April, it was discovered, upon measuring the bags which contained the rice, in order to ascertain the exact quantity remaining in camp, that our stock was much diminished, and that there was only sufficient remaining for eighteen days consumption for the fighting men of the army. The cause of this alarming and unexpected deficiency had not been satisfactorily explained; but such was the actual pressure of our situation at the moment we were about to commence the siege. Happily, from this alarm the Commander in Chief was soon afterwards effectually relieved, by a tender for the public service, of twelve hundred bullock loads of rice. This supply, and some other private stock in camp, being secured, and added to the public department, made the total quantity sufficient for the subsistence of the fighting men, until the 20th of May; long before which time the convoy from the Barramaul was expected to arrive, and the siege of Seringapatam to be brought to a final issue.

CHAPTER IX.

Attack of the Enemy's Post at Agrarum—and at the Nullah called "Macdonald's Post."—Battery on the North Side of the River.—General Floyd marches towards Covriporam.—Attack of the Entrenchment at the Powder Mill—Battery at the Mill—Enfilading Battery.—Bombay Out-posts attacked by the Enemy.—A Letter from the Sultaun—General Harris's Reply.—Batteries open against the Fort, and further Operations.—Attack of the Enemy's Entrenchments.—Wallace's Post.—Skelly's Post.—A Letter from the Sultaun—General Harris's Answer.—Breaching Batteries.—Enfilading Fire increased.—Howitzer Battery.—Preparations for the Assault.—General Baird commands the storming Party.—The Breach stormed, and Seringapatam taken—the Palace surrenders—Tippoo Sultaun killed.—His Family, and the Families of his principal Chiefs, secured.—Loss during the Siege.—Strength of the Garrison of Seringapatam.—Ordnance, Stores, Treasure, and Jewels captured.

WHILST the Bombay army was taking up its ground upon the north side of the Cauvery, some of the Sultaun's chiefs, with a small party, advanced to a height near the ruined village of Agrarum, situated in the enfilade of the west face of the fort. They appeared to have resolved upon establishing a redoubt, as a numerous working party were soon afterwards employed upon the height.

To frustrate this design, it was expedient to seize the height without loss of time; since, it not only commanded the ground upon which the approaches were to be carried on, but was near the spot intended for the enfilading battery. Accordingly, General Stuart was directed to attack it from his division, which, upon this occasion, was reinforced by his Majesty's 74th regiment, and a native battalion from the main army.

His Majesty's 74th and 75th regiments, and two native battalions, under the command of Colonel Hart, were destined for this service; and twelve or fourteen pieces of cannon from Shawe's, and other posts, were to support the attack, which was to take place at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th.

In advancing, the column was for some time galled by a severe cannonade; but, as the attack was made with great gallantry, the enemy were soon compelled to retire, and the height being taken possession of, perfectly secured our troops against the fire of the fort.

This post was of great importance. It was within one thousand yards of the north-west angle, and in a most favourable situation for the proposed battery, as well as for an advanced post on the right of the Bombay army. It was afterwards connected, by intermediate posts, with the hill on the left, already mentioned; and the whole afforded great security to the front of the encampment. In addition to these advantages, there were several ravines, which rendered the communication to the height, and the village of Agrarum, sufficiently safe without the labour of making approaches.

As the attack of the height on the north side of the river engaged the enemy's attention, so it presented a favourable opportunity of advancing our posts on the south. The 2d battalion of the 12th regiment of sepoys, under the command of Major Macdonald, was therefore ordered to take possession of a nullah, called the Little Cauvery, which was effected after some contest. This nullah runs parallel to the fort, at the distance of one thousand yards. It was at first rather confined as a post, on account of the enemy's entrenchment at the powder mill; but it became of immediate importance, from its connection with Shawe's and the Bombay post at Agrarum, and from the cover it afforded to a large body of troops. It was afterwards rendered an useful depôt for the engineers' tools and materials, and named "*Macdonald's Post.*"

On the night of the 17th, Captain Dowse, with his corps of pioneers, under the direction of Captain Mackenzie of the engineers, an officer of acknowledged ability and experience, completed a battery for six eighteen pounders, and two howitzers, on the north bank of the river. It was placed, at night, exactly according to the surveys of 1792, and imagined to be, directly, in the line of the west face, which it was intended to enfilade, as well as to take in reverse the whole of the enemy's new entrenchments; but, unluckily, the survey proved erroneous, and this battery not answering the intentions so fully as could be wished, afterwards underwent some alterations.

Besides this battery, an approach from Shawe's to Macdonald's post was made on the night of the 17th. It was widened and deepened on the 18th.

On the morning of the 19th, Major-general Floyd, with the whole of the cavalry, the Nizam's horse, and a brigade of native infantry, began his march towards the Covriporam pass, to bring on the expected supplies of grain and provisions.

On the 20th, two iron twelve pounders were advanced to a spot, in front of Sultaunpettah tope, and near some tombs, where there is a natural barbet battery, formed by two compartments of a rice-field, one rising about four feet above the other. The situation was very commanding, and guns could fire from it without being seen from any part of the fort, excepting from the north-west angle. It was in the enfilade of the northern part of the entrenchment upon the west bank of the Cauvery, which, from the direction it took, could not be perfectly enfiladed from the Bombay post. Guns placed here, were well calculated to support an attack, which was soon to take place upon the small entrenchment at the powder mill; and also to annoy the enemy's parties on the night of breaking ground, by taking them in flank.

The two twelve pounders commenced firing at eight in the morning, and soon drove the enemy from the northern part of the entrenchment. Although distant, it was ascertained, that they could annoy the fausse braye before the north-west bastion, as well as the bastion itself, and take in reverse the west cavalier.

The attack upon the enemy's entrenchment at the powder mill was made this evening, at six o'clock. Before it commenced, a heavy cannonade, for half an hour, was kept up, upon this entrenchment, from eighteen guns in the different posts.

Colonel Sherbrooke, commanding the advanced posts, directed the attack. Three different columns were to advance at the same time from Macdonald's post; one, to the left, under Lieutenant-colonel Moneypenny, consisting of four companies of his Majesty's 73d, and four of the Bengal volunteers, was to proceed along the bank of the river Cauvery, and to turn the right flank of the enemy's entrenched post. Another, to the right, consisting of the flank companies of the 12th regiment, and two companies of Bengal volunteers, under Lieutenant-colonel Gardiner, was to move along Macdonald's nullah, and to turn the enemy's left. The centre column, composed of six companies of the 73d, and four of the Bengal volunteers, under the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel St. John, was directed to make a feint, which was to be converted into a real attack, if circumstances should render it necessary.

At dusk, the three columns, preceded by small parties of European pioneers, advanced, under a well directed fire from the guns; which so perfectly commanded the entrenchment, that the enemy could make but little resistance; and the different attacks were in consequence completely successful. It has been ascertained, that the enemy's loss on this occasion amounted, in killed and wounded, to two hundred and fifty men; and it is remarkable, that although about eighteen hundred of the Sultaun's infantry occupied the entrenchment, we had in these attacks only one man wounded.

Soon after the enemy were driven from their entrenchment, a working party was employed in extending from the mill a parallel, or place of arms, five hundred and thirty yards in length; its right terminated by an aloe hedge on the bank of the little Cauvery.

This work was so far completed during the night, that it afforded cover for our troops at the distance of seven hundred and eighty yards from the fort, and four hundred and forty yards from the nearest point of the enemy's entrenchment. Its situation was remarkably strong, being covered on one flank by the river Cauvery, and on the other, by the Little Cauvery, both of which have steep banks from fifteen to twenty feet in height.

From the left of the mill, which had been destroyed by the enemy, we had now a most complete view of the west face of the fort; that is, from the north-west angle bastion, to a low new work beyond the second, or great, round tower. The stone glacis, which extends along the whole of the north face of Seringapatam, but does not cover the walls sufficiently, to prevent their being breached from the north side of the river, terminates at the west face of the north-west angle bastion. Here, instead of a glacis, sloping to the bed of the river, there is an upright retaining wall, which forms the outer part, or the counterscarp, of the ditch. This wall was of considerable thickness; but being much lower than the crest of the glacis, it left the fausse braye, and the main rampart, greatly exposed to breaching batteries from the west bank of the river. The retaining wall might have been breached, if necessary; and the ditch laid open to the very base of the rampart.

Looking into the bed of the river from the left of the parallel, near the powder mill, the rocks appeared smooth; and, as there was scarcely any water, excepting one or two small streams gliding along the bed of rock, there seemed to be no obstacle to the intended passage across this part of the river. Here, again, we

discovered several men walking across the river, opposite the very point proposed to be breached; that is, in the west curtain, a little to the right of the flank of the north-west bastion. This being the old rampart, appeared weaker than the new bastion; besides, by breaching at this part, the ditch might have been laid open, in the manner I have noticed, by destroying the retaining wall; an advantage we could not have had in reserve, if it had been resolved to breach the bastion.

On the 21st, at sunset, a battery for six eighteen pounders was marked out a little in front of the parallel, and as nearly in the line of the north face as the nature of the ground would admit. This battery enfiladed the north face, and was also designed for taking off the defences of the west face of the north-west bastion, as well as those of the west cavalier. Its distance from the fort being only seven hundred and eighty yards, it would be serviceable also in demolishing the saliant angle of the fausse braye, and breaching the shoulder, and that part of the new bastion which flanked the proposed breach.

Instructions were sent to Captain Mackenzie, who had the superintendance of the north attack, to construct another enfilading battery on that side of the river, and to place it to the left of the first, exactly in a line with the west curtain; and in such a position, that its fire should range behind the rampart, and along the whole of the west face.

He proceeded to reconnoitre the ground about sunset, which had, hitherto, been impracticable, on account of the enemy's advanced parties, who concealed themselves among some ruined

houses, adjoining this post. Some companies of his Majesty's 74th regiment dislodged the enemy from the houses: and after giving Captain Mackenzie sufficient time to mark out the battery, they retired in excellent order; but as this movement had the appearance of a retreat, the enemy soon after rallied in great force, and immediately commenced a very heavy fire of musketry and rockets, whilst the fort kept up a continued fire from cannon. Although they could not make any impression upon our post, the circumstance of withdrawing the Europeans, appeared to have inspired them with so much confidence, that they determined to make a general attack upon the out-posts of the Bombay army.

Accordingly, at half past two on the morning of the 22d, the enemy's rocket-men, having got into the rear of General Stuart's encampment, threw a great number of rockets at the same instant. This was the signal of assault, for immediately afterwards it was followed by a prodigious fire of musquetry at all the posts in front of the Bombay army. They were attacked by about six thousand of the enemy's infantry, and Lally's corps of Frenchmen, under the command of Meer Golam Hussein, and Mahomed Hulleem, Meer Meerans. The French appear to have led the attack of the post on the right, and to have behaved with great spirit, as some of them fell within the entrenchment upon our bayonets, and others were killed close to it; but being received with the utmost steadiness, they were compelled to retire. The other posts were defended with equal gallantry; and the enemy having failed in all their attempts, which were obstinately continued for several hours, at length retreated, with the loss of six or seven hundred men killed and wounded.

These attacks prevented Captain Mackenzie from establishing the battery. However, the six-gun battery at the mill, having met with little interruption from the enemy, was constructed in six hours, by the uncommon exertions of Captain Dowse's corps of native pioneers, assisted by the European pioneers, under Lieutenant Farquhar of his Majesty's 74th. Four of the guns and two howitzers were got into the battery before day-light: these opened on the 22d, in the morning, upon the cavalier and the north-west angle bastion; and although without that support which was intended from the north side of the river, the fire of six guns, opposed to them by the enemy, was in a short time completely silenced.

On the night of the 20th, General Harris had received a letter from Tippoo Sultaun, expressive of a desire to open a negotiation for peace.* To this overture the General answered, at noon on the 22d, by transmitting a draft of preliminaries, founded on instructions with which the Governor General had furnished him,† but modified with respect to the security to be required, according to the change of circumstances, since the date of those instructions. The terms proposed to the Sultaun are detailed in Appendix, XXVI. In lieu of forts, which it was now too late in the season to receive, additional hostages were required. Namely, four sons of the Sultaun, and four of his principal officers, to be selected by General Harris. These, with two crores of rupees, stipulated in the draft of preliminaries,‡ were to be sent in forty-eight hours to camp, otherwise the General reserved to himself

* Appendix, XXV. † Appendix, XXVI. ‡ Appendix, XXVII. Preliminaries sent by the Governor-general to General Harris.

the power of extending his demand, even to the possession of Seringapatam.

As the six-gun battery at the mill had the desired effect, and breached the north-west angle bastion, and the fausse-braye wall, two guns were added to it during the night of the 22d.

The pioneers and a working party, at the same time, constructed the battery which was marked out by Captain Mackenzie, on the evening of the 21st. This battery was sunk about three feet, and the merlons formed upon the *terre plaine*; a mode of construction by which both materials and labour are saved, and was peculiarly adapted to this position, which being exposed to an extended front, it was of consequence to conceal the battery as much as possible. It was constructed, at first, for four eighteen pounders and two howitzers, which were now removed from the first enfilading battery. The enemy made no attempt to interrupt the working parties, nor was there any firing the whole night, either from or against the fort.

Both of these batteries opened on the 23d at sunrise. They mutually supported each other, and fired with great effect; particularly the new enfilading battery, which, being exactly placed, ranged most completely behind the western rampart: its fire appeared so destructive, as to render it almost impossible for any troops to remain long for the defence of the curtains; and the only safety was in the bastions, or in the cavalier. The eight-gun battery soon silenced every gun that was opposed to it.

On the left of the parallel, near the mill, two six pounders were

placed for supporting the enfilading battery, which the enemy still continued to annoy with musquetry from the adjoining ruined houses: these guns having opened upon their advanced parties, obliged them to retire precipitately to a tete-du-pont, which covered the Delhi ford.

During the night of the 23d, the principal part of the detail of Shawe's post was advanced six hundred yards, and occupied a deep ravine, which formed a secure lodgment against the fire of the fort. From Shawe's post to this ravine, there were other ravines, which communicated and served as approaches. This is a farther instance of the advantages derived from the nature of the ground, during the siege, by which much labour, and consequently time, which to us was invaluable, had been saved. In short, as no advantage of this kind had escaped notice, and as nothing had been undertaken without the fullest deliberation, the operations went on as well as could possibly be desired, and we had now the fairest prospect of bringing this important siege to a glorious and speedy issue.

As Captain Dowse's pioneers, on whom we relied for the construction of the batteries, had been on duty the 22d at night, their services could not be had on the following night; for which reason, there was only a small working party employed, in constructing two sunk batteries, of two twelve pounders each; the one, about six hundred yards in front of Shawe's post, which was intended for the annoyance of the enemy's entrenchments, was finished during the night: the other sunk battery was placed at the tombs, near Sultaunpettah tope; but, on account of some

alarms, it was not begun till about three o'clock in the morning; consequently, little was done; however, the two twelve pounders being got into it, were covered from the fire of the fort. It was intended to have deepened and finished the battery at the tombs during the day; but the soil proving rocky, and unfavourable, the scheme was relinquished. The situation was commanding; and the intention of the battery was to annoy the enemy's entrenchments, and to fire in reverse upon any works which might have been attempted in the bed of the river, for the purpose of flanking the passage to the proposed breach.

As a number of Frenchmen assisted in the defence of the fort, some of whom were officers of experience, it was necessary to proceed with caution, and to guard against any schemes which might have been suggested for retarding the operations of the siege. For this reason, to avoid counter-approaches, it was resolved that our zig-zags should run wide of the fort, and of the island; that when prolonged, they should terminate at points, within the command of our advanced posts. In order, likewise, to prevent the effect of a retrenchment, or of mines in the breach, it was deemed expedient to make a shew of breaching the shoulder of the north-west angle bastion, (which would at the same time destroy the flank,) and to conceal the intended breach, until all the guns in the breaching batteries were in readiness to bear upon that point. From the appearance of the wall, no doubt was entertained that they would very soon produce the desired effect.

The village of Palellypettah, in advance of Sultaunpettah tope, was occupied on the 23d at night, by the detail, and two field

pieces, which heretofore had been stationed at the north side of Sultaunpettah tope. A traverse across the main street, was sufficient to make this village an excellent post.

The enemy's guns, on the evening of the 24th, were entirely silenced upon the west face. The west cavalier, the north-west bastion, and the two round towers were already dismantled; and the fire from the fort was confined to the south face, to some distant bastions and cavaliers, and even to the round work before the south-east angle of the fort, which was above two thousand yards distant from the nearest of our batteries.

A working party was employed, on the night of the 24th, in advancing a zig-zag from the right of the eight-gun battery; the first part two hundred and fifty, and the second, one hundred and thirty yards. Before morning the troops were well covered; and the zig-zag was enlarged by a working party, furnished from the guard of the trenches, during the day.

From Lally's redoubt, which is on very commanding ground, from the two batteries on the north side of the Cauvery, and from a rock on the east end of Montresor's island, the river on the western face now appeared almost dry. The Sultaun seemed to have intended a second ditch, which at this time was carried no farther than the north-west angle bastion: there, at the foot of the glacis, a good deal of water was retained by the rubbish and ruins of the Delhi bridge, which were collected apparently for that purpose. Beyond the west face of the N. W. bastion there was scarcely any water, and opposite to that part where the breach

was intended, as far as could be discerned from the above points of view, the passage appeared by no means difficult.

The enemy's guns were now almost silenced: they still, however, fired occasionally from the two round towers. These were the only guns which could flank the proposed breach: it was absolutely necessary that their fire should be kept under: to oppose these works, a battery of four eighteen pounders was marked out on the evening of the 25th, in front of the right of the second zig-zag, at the distance of eight hundred and eighty yards from the great tower, and constructed during the night. This battery opened on the morning of the 26th, with so much effect, that in half an hour the guns of both towers were withdrawn. The cannonade was continued against the left flanks of the towers with considerable effect; and at two o'clock the fire was directed to a mud cavalier beyond the great tower.

As the enemy still retained possession of parts of an entrenchment, at the distance of two hundred and thirty yards from the extremity of our approaches, it became necessary, before the further operations of the siege could be prosecuted, to dislodge them, in order to secure the working parties against the effect of musquetry.

Upon a nearer view, these entrenchments were found to be established at the distance of three hundred and eighty yards from the fort, behind the bank of a water-course, which issues from a dam across the Cauvery at Montresor's island, passes the powder mill, and runs in a direction nearly parallel to the west face of the

fort. On the right of the entrenchment, as before observed, was a redoubt; and on the left, a small circular work: these posts, together with the serpentine turns in some parts of the entrenchment, sheltered the enemy, in some measure, against the fire from the north side of the river.

Previous to the attack it was arranged, that the batteries should keep up a brisk cannonade upon those works, and on the entrenchment, for half an hour before the troops advanced; and when they were seen to approach the enemy's posts, the fire of the batteries was then to be directed to those works of the fort, from which the greatest annoyance might be expected.

Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the trenches, had the direction of the attacks. One was to be made upon the right of the entrenchment; and another, upon that part in front of the four-gun battery. The column which was to attack the enemy's right, consisted of four companies of the Scotch brigade, and four of Bengal sepoys, under the command of Major Skelly. A little after sunset they advanced rapidly from the head of our approaches, stormed the entrenchment with great spirit, and threw the enemy into such confusion, that they were obliged to retreat. At the same instant a similar attack was made, with equal success, by Lieutenant-colonel Moneypenny, with four companies of his Majesty's 73d, and four of Bengal volunteers. Both columns now inclined to the right, and pursued the enemy, who continued firing as they retreated.

The object of the attacks being obtained, it was no longer necessary to expose our men to the enemy's guns and musquetry,

by which they were at this time severely galled: Colonel Moneypenny and Major Skelly, therefore, took post in the aqueduct, which before had formed a ditch to the enemy's entrenchment, and now became our third parallel.

Although thus secured from the fire of the fort, they were soon afterwards very much annoyed by the enemy's musquetry from the circular work on their right, wherein they had collected in great numbers. At this time Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, of his Majesty's 74th, arriving from camp with the relief for the trenches, and observing the relative situation of the posts, he immediately determined to seize the circular work; and accompanied by Major Coleman, with a part of the light company of the 74th, and a company of De Meuron, amounting in the whole to only one hundred and twenty men, he attacked the enemy with the greatest gallantry, and not only dislodged them from their post, but routed and pursued them with this small party, across the Periapatam bridge. Here, entering the island with the fugitives, he came upon the right of the Sultaun's entrenched camp, bayoneted some of the enemy in their tents, and spiked several guns. This bold and daring attack secured his retreat, which was effected in good order, for none of the enemy ventured to follow him. It created such an alarm within the fort, that they seemed to apprehend a general assault. A great number of blue lights were displayed upon the south and west faces of the fort, and a most furious random cannonade, from every gun that bore upon our posts, was continued, without intermission, during the attacks of this evening, and for above an hour after they had all ceased.

Our loss was considerable; but the objects which were attained

were of the utmost consequence. This advanced parallel, extending a front of seven hundred yards, was well protected on the right by the circular work, and on the left by the river Cauvery; but, notwithstanding the strength of this position, it was deemed prudent to have it doubly guarded, until some necessary improvements should be made. For this reason the relief did not take place at the usual time; so that four regiments, instead of two, remained in the posts during the night.

The enemy lost in defence of these posts, about one hundred and fifty men. They were defended by fifteen hundred, under the command of Syed Ghoffar, and Meer Golam Hussein.

During the night of the 26th, our approaches were advanced to the redoubt on the right of the enemy's entrenchment, which is within four hundred yards of the fort; and the nullah, which our troops occupied, was rendered more secure. But as the enemy had, during the night, reoccupied the circular work, and concealed themselves amongst some rubbish near an old building on the bank of the Little Cauvery, their musquetry was so galling at day-break on the 27th, that it rendered the newly-acquired posts almost untenable. Their critical situation being reported to the Commander in Chief, he instantly sent orders that they should be maintained to the last extremity. Colonel Sherbrooke, at this time commanding in the trenches, upon receiving this order, and observing that the principal annoyance was from the circular work, immediately directed Colonel Wallace, with three companies of the 74th, to attack it. This service was performed with his usual gallantry; and by effecting a lodgment behind it, he was concealed from the fire of the fort; but being still annoyed from the rubbish and the

old building, Colonel Wallace detached Major Skelly with a few men, who with great spirit attacked the enemy, and dislodged them. The possession of this post, which was named Skelly's Post, and of the circular work, named Wallace's Post, perfectly secured the whole line of advanced posts, from any further annoyance from the enemy's musquetry.

The whole of these posts, extending from the Cauvery to Skelly's Post, now formed a very strong parallel of seven hundred yards in length; which confined the operations of the enemy, and enabled us to prosecute the remainder of the siege with greater facility. To connect the posts, and enlarge the approaches made on the 26th, was all that could be effected on the night of the 27th. The construction of the breaching battery, which was intended for this night, was therefore postponed until the night after.

Tippoo Sultaun, on the morning of the 28th, acknowledged the receipt* of General Harris's letter of the 22d; and stated, "*that "the points in question*" (meaning the proposals contained in the draft of preliminaries, sent to him by the General) "*were weighty "and important, and without the intervention of ambassadors, could "not be brought to a conclusion; and that therefore he was about to "send to the General, two gentlemen, who would explain themselves personally to him.*

To this proposition, evidently calculated to gain time, on the part of the Sultaun, the General replied,* by referring to the terms which he had forwarded on the 22d, as the only conditions on

* Appendix, XXVIII. † Appendix, XXIX.

which he would treat. He declined to admit any vakeels, unless accompanied by the hostages, and specie, required; and insisted on an answer before three o'clock on the 29th.

The working parties, during the night of the 27th, strengthened Skelly's Post, by a double entrenchment; and extended from Wallace's to the left a place of arms, two hundred yards in length, which effectually covered the troops. They also deepened and widened the zig-zag, which was to lead to the breaching battery.

This battery was marked out at sun-set on the 28th, between the aqueduct and the bank of the Cauvery. There was only space for six guns; but seventy yards in advance, and a little to the right, there was an eligible situation for another breaching battery, sufficient for five guns. From the commanding position of these intended batteries, and from the distance, which was about four hundred yards from the wall, they could not fail to effect a breach in a very short time; but as only one of them could be completed in one night, and as it was still an object to conceal the real point of attack, for the reasons before mentioned, it was resolved that the first six guns should bear upon the N.W. bastion, until the other five were in readiness. It was expected, that by breaching the shoulder, and flank of the bastion, we should not only silence the guns which flanked the curtain, but also that this, or any breach, would produce favourable consequences, in the event of a serious disposition on the part of the Sultaun to negotiate for peace.

During the night of the 28th, Captain Dowse's pioneers constructed the breaching battery of six guns, and the platforms

were laid by ten o'clock in the morning of the 29th; but owing to the guns being dragged through the approaches, which in some places proved soft and swampy, they sunk deep, and notwithstanding every possible exertion, could not be brought into the battery. This occasioned the loss of one day's firing upon the north-west bastion; which at a time, when the Sultaun had manifested some disposition to negotiate, might have been of importance.

On the 29th at night, a battalion of sepoys was employed as a working party. They repaired the embrasures of the eight and the four-gun batteries; and widened and deepened the zig-zag in the rear of the breaching battery.

At the same time Captain Mackenzie enlarged the enfilading battery, by adding two guns to its left; from which he also extended a place of arms, for the reception of four field pieces (in addition to the six eighteen pounders,) for the purpose of increasing the enfilading fire during the assault. It was expected, that so powerful an enfilade, *en ricochet*, would render it almost impossible for the Sultaun's troops to remain on the curtains of the first or second walls, for the defence of the breach.

It was very remarkable, that the enemy seldom disturbed the working parties at night; and although they still retained some footing in the entrenchment, they seldom fired a musquet during the day.

On the morning of the 30th, the six-gun breaching battery commenced firing against the N. W. bastion, and continued

throughout the day; in the evening, the main rampart, and the fausse braye wall, were considerably shattered.

During the night of the 30th, the second breaching battery, which, in compliment to his Highness the Nizam, was named "The Nizam's Battery," was completed. A place to the right of this battery, behind the bank of the aqueduct, was prepared to receive six howitzers ($5\frac{1}{2}$ and 8 inch); and the platforms of the first breaching battery were altered, that the guns might point more to the right. It was expected that the whole might begin to fire in breach on the morning of the 1st of May; but as the guns had not been placed in the Nizam's battery, and as it was still an object to conceal our intention of breaching the curtain, until the two batteries could open at the same time, the six-gun battery resumed its fire againt the bastion.

From the breaching batteries we had a full view of the bed of the river. There appeared no impediment whatever; the rocks were smooth, and there was very little water. These circumstances were confirmed by Captain Norris of the engineers, and Lieutenant Farquhar of the pioneers, who nearly crossed the river on the 30th at night: being discovered by the enemy, they were obliged to retire.

To the right of the second, or great, round tower, there was a new work, of which two or three guns bore upon the shoulder of the Nizam's battery, and in some degree flanked a part of the river. This work being low, could not be seen from the four-gun battery; nor was there space sufficient on the right of the

Nizam's battery, to turn two guns in that direction; for these reasons, a two-gun battery was marked out in the rear of the Nizam's, for the purpose of opposing this low work. This battery was constructed during the night of the 1st of May.

Besides this battery, another was placed in the enfilade of the three cavaliers, for four twelve pounders. This was the only mode (on account of their distance) of disturbing the enemy in those works; from which, there was reason to apprehend, the right column might suffer severely in their progress along the southern rampart.

The batteries being now all completed, and the siege drawing fast to a conclusion, we became anxious for the arrival of General Floyd, and the expected convoys. This anxiety did not proceed from any idea that their presence was at all necessary to our success; but from a hope, that their arrival might have the effect of convincing the Sultaun of his danger, and of inducing him, by a capitulation, to avert the dreadful consequences to be apprehended from the assault of so large a city, filled with inhabitants.

At this time we had intelligence, that General Floyd was encamped on the west side of the Covriporam Pass, waiting the arrival of the detachments with the convoy. Cummur ud Dien Khan, with the whole of the Sultaun's horse, was within one march of General Floyd's position.

At sunrise on the 2d of May, the Nizam's battery opened upon the curtain, sixty yards to the right of the north-west bastion, the

part intended to be breached. Against the same point, the six-gun breaching battery now, for the first time, directed its fire.

These batteries fired with very great effect, and were well supported by the Bombay enfilading battery of six eighteen pounders; by six howitzers in the parallel on the right; by four eighteen pounders in the mill battery (the other four being now advanced); and by the four-gun battery; together with two twelve pounders at the tombs, and two guns of the same caliber in front of Shawe's post; in all, twenty nine pieces of cannon and six howitzers. In the course of this day's firing, a practicable breach was made in the fausse braye wall; and the main rampart so much shattered, that it was expected a little more firing would reduce it to a similar state.

Soon after the batteries opened, a shot having struck a magazine of rockets in the fort, occasioned a dreadful explosion. About this time, Lieutenant-colonel Montague of the Bengal artillery, a brave and experienced officer, was unhappily wounded by a cannon shot, whilst he was ascertaining the effect of the breaching batteries.*

* Colonel Montague's arm, being shattered near the shoulder, required immediate amputation. During five or six days he appeared to be in a fair way of recovery; but a contusion in his chest, occasioned by the same shot, produced a mortification, which carried him off on the eight day after he received his wound.

His superior military talents, improved by a regular military education, and his long experience in actual service, rendered him an invaluable officer. In the early part of his career, his skill in his profession, his zeal, and indefatigable activity, having been displayed on various occasions, he was afterwards selected for every important service. With General Goddard, with Sir Eyre Coote, and at the siege of Cuddalore, he was peculiarly distinguished; and in the campaigns of the Marquis

The only work on the night of 2d, was the continuation of a zig-zag, leading from the aqueduct behind the six-gun breaching battery to the howitzer battery, and extending from thence an approach to the rocky bed of the river. As our batteries could not fire with safety whilst the working parties were thus employed, nearly in their front, the enemy availed themselves of the opportunity to make some repairs to the breach.

Lieutenant Lalor, of his Majesty's 73d regiment, crossed the river in the night, and measured the retaining wall. He reported its height to be seven feet, including twelve inches of water, and that there was no impediment of any kind to the passage of troops.

The batteries having at noon, on the 3d of May, rendered the breach almost practicable, scaling ladders, fascines, and other materials, were ordered to be sent to the trenches after sunset, and to be kept in readiness for the assault.

About three o'clock in the afternoon one of the breaching batteries caught fire, which being perceived from the fort, the enemy crowded upon the walls, and directed their musquetry, grape, and rockets, against those who were employed in extinguishing the flames. Upon this occasion, Captain Henry Cosby had very gallantly and successfully exerted himself; but soon after, he had descended from the merlons into the battery, he was unfortunately killed by a grape shot. He was an officer of very distinguished

Cornwallis in India, he not only confirmed, but increased his established reputation. He was again called forth upon the projected expeditions against the Isle of France, and Manilla; and finally, was chosen to command the Bengal artillery destined for the glorious enterprize against Seringapatam. He died universally regretted, being not less distinguished in private life than in his public character.

zeal; and from the spirit and good conduct he had already manifested on several occasions, he was universally allowed to possess those qualities which promised to render him, had he lived, an ornament to his profession.

As the breach was considered practicable on the evening of the 3d, the troops destined for the assault were stationed in the trenches before day-break on the 4th; they consisted of two thousand, four hundred and ninety-four European, and eighteen hundred and eighty-two native infantry, under the command of Major-general Baird, who had offered his service on this occasion.

The enemy appeared to have no suspicion of our intention to storm; they kept up a smart firing from some distant works, on which our guns did not immediately bear, and which, indeed, it was not at all necessary to silence; for, although the breaching batteries, from their elevated situation, were seen from those works, our troops, whilst they crossed the river, or ascended into the breach, would be entirely concealed from their view. In the batteries, however, they did some execution; Captain Jourdain, of the artillery, was killed, and Major Mandeville, of the same corps, and several others, were wounded.

Whilst anxiously waiting for the hour of assault, our attention was attracted to the north side of the river, by a distant cannonade in the rear of General Stuart's camp. This was a party, under Purneah, who had advanced, with a gun, to a rock in the rear of the encampment, from which they fired without effect; but their horse succeeded in driving off a few cattle and followers.

General Baird, having been instructed by the Commander in Chief, to make the capture of the rampart his first object, formed the force under his command into two separate columns, which were to advance from the trenches at the same time, and after getting possession of the breach, to file off to the right and left.

Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop, commanding the left column (which consisted of six European flank companies from the Bombay army, his Majesty's 12th and 33d regiments, ten flank companies of Bengal sepoys, and fifty artillery men), was directed to assault the northern rampart.

The flank companies of the Scotch brigade, and regiment De Meuron, the grenadier companies of his Majesty's 73d and 74th regiments, fourteen flank companies of sepoys, and fifty artillery men, composed the right column, which was destined for the attack of the southern rampart, under the command of Colonel Sherbrooke.

The officers commanding both columns received orders to push forward with their European flank companies to the eastern rampart, there to unite and form, until arrangements were made for the attack of such of the cavaliers as might not have been seized at the first onset; or for the attack of the enemy's troops within the town, if those measures should become necessary.

About half past one o'clock, in the afternoon, General Baird having completed his arrangements, stepped out of the trench, drew his sword, and in the most heroic and animating manner said

to his men, "come, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy the name of British soldiers!" In an instant both columns rushed from the trenches, and entered the bed of the river, under cover of the fire of the batteries. Being immediately discovered by the enemy, they were assailed by rockets and musquetry.

The forlorn hope of each attack consisted of a serjeant and twelve Europeans, who were followed by two subalterns' parties; that of the right column was commanded by Lieutenant Hill of the 74th, and the other of the left column by Lieutenant Lawrence of the 77th.

A brigade of engineers, under Captain Caldwell, accompanied the storming party. Lieutenant Farquhar of the 74th, commanding the European pioneers, and Lieutenant Lalor of the 73d, both of whom had examined the ford, conducted the columns: the remainder of the regiment De Meuron, and three battalions of native infantry, under the command of Colonel Wellesley, remained in the trenches, to be ready to support the troops ordered upon the assault, in case it should be necessary. Major-general Bridges commanded in camp, and Major-general Popham took charge of the trenches.

In six minutes the forlorn hope, closely followed by the rest of the troops, had reached the summit of the breach, where the British colours were instantly displayed. This was indeed a glorious and most animating sight: it relieved all anxiety; for until our troops had crossed the ditch (although every precaution was taken for filling it, if necessary), even the most sanguine mind could not be entirely void of doubt.

In a few minutes more the breach, one hundred feet wide, was crowded with men, who being now collected in sufficient force to enter upon the rampart, filed off to the right and left, according to General Baird's instructions.

The movement of the columns was confined to a narrow space, the breadth of the rampart. Of the left little could be distinguished, as the leading companies were soon hid by the cavalier, and by those that followed; so far we perceived, that as the column advanced, the enemy retired, and another flag was shortly displayed upon the north-west bastion.

To the right of the breach we had a distinct view of every movement. Here, the enemy retreated the moment our men advanced upon them with the bayonet. Captain Moll, commanding the grenadier company of the Scotch brigade, was very conspicuous; almost singly, he pursued the enemy until he came to the mud cavalier, behind the great round tower, on which he planted a flag, and displayed his hat on the point of his sword. Under these banners his men soon collected; and being supported by the rest of the troops composing the right attack, they advanced rapidly, and drove the enemy before them. At this moment a small party crossed to the second rampart, from which there was no opposition, and soon got to the cavalier. Many of the fugitives in attempting to escape from the fort, by lowering themselves down with their turbans from the walls near the S. W. angle, were dashed to pieces on the rocky bottom of the ditch. The panic seemed to be general. Thousands who quitted the fort, threw down their arms, and fled with the utmost precipitation.

The three cavaliers within the south face, from which it was ap-

prehended the right attack would have received great annoyance, fortunately made no resistance. Those stupendous works were abandoned; the right attack succeeded in getting possession of them, and of the whole of the southern ramparts; and within less than an hour, arrived upon the eastern face of the fort.

The defence from the west cavalier, behind the breach, was confined to one or two discharges of grape, just as the assault began. The breaching batteries of eleven guns, six howitzers in the advanced parallel, the four-gun battery, and the four guns in the mill battery, all bearing upon this part of the fort, supported by ten guns on the north side of the river, most completely enfilading the western ramparts, having kept up a brisk fire for some time before the assault, will easily account for the small resistance made by those who attempted to defend them.

Under so powerful a fire, the approach of the Sultaun's troops to these ramparts was to them extremely hazardous, particularly from the south side of the fort; and when arrived upon the western face, the danger increased, for there was no security against the enfilading fire, except in small holes dug upon the rampart, or behind two or three miserable traverses which had been constructed during the siege, where the enemy lay concealed, until our troops entered the bed of the river.

So entirely abandoned was the inner or second rampart, and the cavalier, that a small party of only eight or ten men of his Majesty's 12th regiment, crossing a *bâtardeau* in the inner ditch, a little to the right of the breach, got possession of the west cavalier.

Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop was unfortunately disabled by a wound, in a personal conflict upon the breach with one of the Sultaun's chiefs. Although the column which he commanded soon got possession of the north-west bastion, yet it was afterwards, in its progress along the northern rampart, so vigorously opposed by the enemy, posted behind traverses, defending them one after another, that the front was frequently brought to a stand. The leading officers being all either killed or disabled, Lieutenant Farquhar of the pioneers put himself at the head of the column; he, also, was instantly killed. Our loss would have been still greater, had not the light infantry, and part of the battalion companies of his Majesty's 12th regiment, under Captain Goodall, been judiciously detached to reinforce the party upon the inner rampart, whence they flanked the traverses, which the enemy defended. Thus supported, the column now led on by Brigade-major Lambton, pushed forward with irresistable ardour, killed many, and drove the enemy before them as far as the north-east angle. Here, the enemy, perceiving the approach of the right column, were thrown into the utmost confusion; many attempted to escape, and thousands were put to the sword.

Captain Goodall's party were of infinite service in flanking and taking in reverse the enemy's traverses on the outer rampart, which were at this time defended by the Sultaun in person; and they arrived very opportunely at the small gate on the northern face, and fired obliquely into the rear of the gate, while it was attacked in front from the outer rampart by the troops composing the left attack.

The passage across the river from our advanced trench, was by no means difficult; it was a smooth rock, having two or three

small streams, twelve or fifteen inches deep; and when arrived at the stone glacis, the troops ascended by the slope which terminates the glacis before the north-west bastion, to the top of the retaining wall which forms the outer part of the ditch. In the inner part of this wall are steps, made by single projecting stones, by which they could descend into the ditch without using scaling ladders; but these were employed by the right column, in getting over the retaining wall. The water in the ditch, directly opposite to the breach, was only about knee deep, although much deeper on either side. The breach was wide, and the ascent easy; and when upon it, unless at the very summit, the troops could not be seen from the west cavalier. As the defences to the right and left had been silenced by the batteries, the breach was, in fact, a place of safety: the danger was in getting to it.

Being arrived at the summit of the breach, a formidable ditch appeared between it and the cavalier, or the second wall; but as the enemy had not cut off the breach, and were unable to defend the inner rampart, on account of the destructive fire of the enfilading battery, it was only formidable in appearance. This rampart is of mud, and seems to be the remains of the ancient fort of Seringapatam. There were no obstacles to moving to the right and left, along the outer rampart, from which there are several communications to the inner one.

On the right attack, as the enemy had retreated precipitately at the first onset, few of them were killed upon the southern rampart; but in the rear of the great round tower, about three hundred yards from the breach, Majors Dallas, Allan, and myself, discovered three men apparently dead; two of them, from their dress

and other circumstances, appeared to be persons of consequence: upon a closer examination, one of them shewing some remains of life, was removed by Major Dallas from under the two bodies which had fallen upon him. He was severely wounded.

On being raised up, he at first looked wild and alarmed, as if he had mistaken our intentions; but when Major Dallas took him by the hand, and looking in his face, pronounced his name "Syed Saheb," he started and said, "yes, it is Syed Saheb," and in an instant he became tranquil and composed. He then raised Major Dallas's hand several times to his forehead, and embraced his knees in a most affecting manner. At first he was unable to speak, but having drank a little water, and apparently recovered a greater degree of strength, he asked Major Dallas's name, and how he came to know him. Being informed that he was the officer who commanded the escort with the commissioners at Mangalore in 1784, he recognized him.

Syed Saheb observing how much we were interested in his behalf, shewed his sense of our attentions by silent expressions of gratitude that are indescribable. We called the assistance of a surgeon, who was passing, but unfortunately, he had neither instruments nor dressings; Syed Saheb shook his head, and observed, it was of no consequence, for he was badly wounded, and must die.

Whilst we sent for his palanquin, which was close at hand, to convey him to camp, we asked him several questions, and particularly if the Sultaun was in the fort; he replied "that he was in the palace." Scarcely believing it possible, we again urged him

upon this point: he assured us "that the Sultaun and all his family were still there, and that he had left them but a short time before."

At this moment, a firing of musquetry recommenced on the south rampart, at a little distance from us; and being informed that the enemy, led on by Frenchmen, had rallied, and were advancing in force, we ascended the rampart, leaving Syed Saheb in the charge of two sepoys. We were much concerned to learn, that soon after we quitted him, in attempting to get up, he staggered, and fell into the inner ditch. This accident probably occasioned his death.*

The firing from the rampart soon obliged the enemy to retreat amongst the houses; and a short time afterwards, eight or ten French officers surrendered themselves, amongst whom was Monsieur Chapuy, chef de brigade, and commandant of the French troops serving with the Sultaun.

Proceeding along the southern rampart, we came to a cavalier beyond the Mysore gate. Here, we had a distinct view of the palace, and plainly discovered a number of persons assembled in a kind of Durbar; one or two being seated, others approached them with the greatest respect. We imagined, from the intelligence just received from Syed Saheb, that the Sultaun himself was there; but subsequent circumstances render it probable that he was not so at that moment.

* Syed Saheb was a favourite officer of the late Sultaun. He appeared to be about sixty years of age, was a man of considerable ability, and particularly versed in revenue affairs; but as a military commander, his character was held in no estimation. His daughter was married to Tippoo Sultaun about the year 1796.

All had remained quiet since the firing from the rampart; but whilst we were looking into the palace, there was a smart discharge of musquetry on the north side of the town, apparently at the north gate, or new sally-port.

After viewing the persons assembled in the palace for some time, we proceeded along the rampart to the eastern, or Bangalore, gate, to inform General Baird of what we had seen, and of the intelligence received from Syed Saheb. The General had before heard that the Sultaun was in the fort, and had halted, in order to refresh the troops before he proceeded to summon the palace, as they were much exhausted with fatigue, and the extreme heat of the day.

At this time two fresh battalions of sepoys had just arrived; and as the troops were now in complete possession of every part of the rampart, General Baird trusted that the Sultaun would be convinced how fruitless it was to make further resistance. He therefore requested Major Allan, Deputy Quarter-master General, who was well qualified to execute the duty, to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace, and to offer protection to Tippoo Sultaun, and to every person in the palace, provided he immediately surrendered himself and his family, unconditionally, to General Baird. The Sultaun was, at the same time, to be apprized, that if the smallest hesitation appeared on his part, in accepting the offer, the palace would be instantly assaulted, and every man put to the sword.

The grenadiers, and part of his Majesty's 12th regiment, with the 2d battalion of the 9th regiment of sepoys, accompanied

Major Allan on this service, whilst General Baird prepared the flank companies, now somewhat recovered from their fatigues, to put his threat in execution, in case the Sultaun should provoke a renewal of hostilities, which had ceased on all sides for upwards of an hour.

Major Allan discharged the important trust reposed in him, with great humanity and judgment. Upon arriving at the palace, he found Major Shee, with part of his Majesty's 33d regiment drawn up on the outside, and opposite to the gate; and several of Tippoo's people were in a front balcony, apparently in great consternation. In a short time, however, the Killedar, with an officer of consequence, and a confidential servant of the Sultaun, descended by an unfinished part of the wall. With those persons, Major Allan, accompanied by Captain Scohey, and Captain Hastings Frazer, ascended the broken part of the wall, and got into the palace; where, after some delays, they were received by two of the younger Princes, to whom Major Allan gave the strongest assurances of protection; and to quiet their fears, he promised to remain with them.

Soon after, General Baird being arrived at the palace gate, Major Allan went out to him, and informed him, that he had seen two of the Princes, who were disposed to surrender themselves and the palace, upon a promise of protection; that he had not been able to obtain any information regarding the Sultaun, farther, than that the Princes had solemnly declared he was not in the palace.

General Baird at first hesitated to agree to those conditions, in

hopes that the Princes might be induced to inform him where their father was; and he even threatened to search the most secret recesses of the palace, if the Sultaun was not instantly produced. Unable, however, to obtain the least information concerning him, and desirous of conveying the Princes out of the fort before it was dark, he deputed Lieutenant-colonel Close and Major Allan to take charge of them. Having brought them to General Baird, they were received by him with every mark of kindness, and with the strongest assurances of protection. He delivered them to Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Marriot, who conducted them, under an escort, to the Commander in Chief in camp.

General Baird now proceeded to search the palace, accompanied by Lieutenant-colonel Close and Major Allan; taking care, however, to avoid the Zenana, around which, a sufficient force had been posted to prevent the possibility of the Sultaun's escape. In the palace, they were informed by the Killedar, on being severely threatened, that Tippoo was not there, that he had been wounded during the assault, and lay in a gate-way on the north face of the fort;* that he would conduct them to the spot, and if found to deceive them, he was willing to suffer death.

General Baird, upon receiving this information, quitted the palace, and accompanied by several officers, proceeded to the gateway, which was filled with dead bodies. The number was so great, and the place so dark, that it was impossible to distinguish

* From this circumstance, it seems very probable that Tippoo Sultaun was not killed until the last discharge of musquetry at the north gate, which was nearly an hour after General Baird was in possession of the fort.

one person from another. The Sultaun's horse, which had been shot, and his palanquin, were first discovered. As it was a point of the utmost political importance to ascertain the fate of the Sultaun, the bodies were taken out, and particularly examined in the presence of the Killedar, who, after some time, having pointed out that of the Sultaun, it was put into a palanquin, and carried to the palace, under the charge of a guard*.

The Sultaun had been shot, a little above the right ear, by a musquet ball, which lodged near the mouth, in his left cheek: he had also received three wounds, apparently with the bayonet, in his right side.

To secure the fidelity of the principal chiefs, it was the Sultaun's policy to retain, within his capital, in a state of confinement, their wives and children: these fortunately were still in the fort: their security became now no less an object of policy to us, than it had been to the Sultaun; and General Baird did not fail to direct his immediate attention to this point. Safeguards were sent to most of the principal families, and protection was granted to the inhabitants in general. All violence ceased with the conflict; and it is but justice to add, although above eight thousand of the enemy's troops were killed in the assault, very few of the unarmed inhabitants suffered, and these unavoidably from random shot; a circumstance, we may venture to pronounce, unprecedented; which is to be ascribed, not only to the high discipline of the troops, and the humane exertions of the officers, but to

* I am indebted to my friend Major Allan, for a more particular account of his interview with the Princes in the palace, and of finding the Sultaun's body, which is inserted in Appendix, XLII.

the happy choice of time for making the assault, which enabled them to discriminate, and to their operations being confined solely to the ramparts.

The loss of the army during the siege was, twenty-two officers killed, and forty-five wounded; one hundred and eighty-one European non-commissioned rank and file killed, six hundred and twenty-two wounded, and twenty-two missing; one hundred and nineteen natives killed, four hundred and twenty wounded, and one hundred missing.* Of the above number of officers, twenty-five were killed and wounded in the assault.

By a return† of the strength and disposition of the Sultaun's force, made out by Khan Jehan Cawn, one of the most respectable of Tippoo's officers, it appears, that on the 4th of May, during the assault, there were in the fort thirteen thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine regular infantry; and without the fort, and in the entrenchments on the island, eight thousand one hundred: so that the garrison consisted of twenty-one thousand, eight hundred, and thirty-nine men. The total loss of the Sultaun's army during the siege has not been accurately ascertained, but it must have been very considerable, as the daily loss in killed and wounded, exclusive of that which has been enumerated on different occasions, has been estimated at about forty men. In the assault alone, four and twenty principal officers were killed, and seven wounded;‡ besides a great number of inferior rank.

There were found in the fort, three hundred and seventy-three brass guns, sixty mortars, and eleven howitzers; four hundred and

* Vide Appendix, XL. † Appendix, XXX. ‡ Appendix, XXXI.

sixty-six iron guns, and twelve mortars: In all, nine hundred and twenty-nine pieces of ordnance; of which two hundred and eighty-seven guns were mounted on the fortifications. There were four hundred and twenty-four thousand four hundred round shot, five hundred and twenty thousand pounds of gunpowder, and ninety-nine thousand musquets and carbines, &c.

Within the fort there were eleven large powder magazines; seventy-two expence magazines; eleven armories for making and finishing small arms; two founderies for cannon; three buildings, with machines for boring guns and musquets; four large arsenals; and seventeen other storehouses containing accoutrements, swords, and other articles; besides many granaries, abundantly stored with provisions of every kind. Of treasure and jewels, the total value was, star pagodas 25,35,804; or one million, one hundred and forty-three thousand, two hundred and sixteen pounds sterling.

The number of French at Seringapatam amounted to about one hundred and twenty, including twenty officers, some of whom were wounded during the siege. The whole had commissions from the French government, and were under the command of M. Chapuy.

Thus ended the siege of Seringapatam, an achievement no less important than decisive; and which has never been surpassed in splendor, by any event recorded in the history of the military transactions of the British nation in India. The fall of this capital placed the whole kingdom of Mysore, with all its resources, at the disposal of the British government, and extinguished the only

power in India, which was deemed formidable, or in any wise disposed to second the dangerous views of the French.

When it is considered that these eminent advantages were acquired within four months from the Marquis Wellesley's arrival at Madras, and within two from the commencement of hostilities, it will be admitted, that the government of India displayed, on this occasion, the utmost efforts of vigour and ability; that the wisdom of those early measures, for disappointing the avowed projects of Tippoo Sultaun, were admirably supported by the valour and discipline of the armies in the field; and lastly, that the consummate judgment with which this rapid and brilliant campaign was conducted, in all its stages, by the Commander in Chief, and by the several officers employed under him, from his Majesty's service, and from the three presidencies of Fort William, Fort St. George, and Bombay, is justly entitled to the highest praise.

When Lieutenant-general Harris took the field, the Governor-general thought it his duty to invest him with the most efficient and extensive powers which it was possible for his lordship to delegate; and he carried with him to the gates of Seringapatam, the full vigour and energy of the supreme government. To the judicious exercise of this ample authority, combined with the liberal supplies which had been provided for the army, may be ascribed in a great measure, the unparalleled rapidity and promptitude of its operations.

The following orders, which were issued by the Right Honourable the Governor-general, and by the Commander in Chief, upon the fall of Seringapatam, so fully express the merits of the army,

that I trust it will not be deemed superfluous to give them a place in this chapter.

G. O. BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

" The Commander in Chief congratulates the gallant army, which he has the honor to command, on the conquest of yesterday. The effects arising from the attainment of such an acquisition, as far exceeds the present limits of detail, as the unremitting zeal, labour, and unparalleled valour of the troops, surpass his power of praise. For services so incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

" While Lieutenant-general Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the assault, he cannot omit to return his thanks, in the warmest terms, to Major-general Baird, for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and for the humane measures which he subsequently adopted, for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests that Major-general Baird will communicate to the officers and men, who on that great occasion acted under his command, the high sense he must entertain of their achievements and merits.

" The Commander in Chief requests that Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that

very important department; and his best acknowledgments are due to Major Beatson, for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service, by the constant exertion of his ability and zeal.

" The merits of the artillery corps, are so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the Commander in Chief can only desire Colonel Smith, to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command, that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

" In thus publicly expressing his sense of their good conduct, the Commander in Chief feels himself called upon to notice, in a most particular manner, the exertion of Captain Dowse and his corps of pioneers, which, during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labour, and the ability with which that labour was applied.

" On referring to the progress of the siege, so many occasions have occurred for applause to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieutenant-colonel Shaw, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel Moneypenny, the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel St. John, Major Macdonald, Major Skelly, and Lieutenant-colonel Wallace, conducted the attacks on the several out-works and posts of the enemy, demands to be recorded. And the very spirited attack led by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell of his Majesty's 74th regiment, which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy's works, on the 26th ultimo, claims the strongest approbation of the Commander in Chief.

"The important part taken by the Bombay army, since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honourable conclusion, has been such, as well sustains its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post, at the village of Agrar, was seized by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigour with which every attack of the enemy on the outposts of that army was repulsed, and the spirit shewn in the assault of the breach, by the corps led by Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice, for which the Commander in Chief requests Lieutenant-general Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

"Lieutenant-general Harris trusts, that Lieutenant-general Stuart, will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service; in the course of which, he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty, from the warmest feelings of private friendship."

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ORDERS

Dated Seringapatam, 8th May, 1799.

"Lieutenant-general Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army, the following extract of a report transmitted to him yesterday, by Major-general Baird, as it places, in a distinguished point of view, the merit of an officer, on the very important occasion referred to, whose general gallantry and good

conduct, since he has served with his army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the Commander in Chief.

"If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack."

True Copies,

(Signed) P. A. AGNEW,

Military Secretary.

G. O. BY GOVERNMENT.

Fort St. George, 15th May, 1799.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-general in council, having this day received from the Commander in Chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam, on the 4th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander in Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army, which achieved the conquest of the capital of Mysore, on that memorable day.

"His Lordship views with admiration, the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation, and skill, with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

"Under the favour of Providence, and the justice of our cause,

the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence, that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honourable issue.

" But the events of the 4th of May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor-general in council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India, to a degree of splendour and glory, unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

" The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, by restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India on a durable foundation of genuine security.

" The Governor-general in council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that in this arduous crisis, the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

" By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in council."*

(Signed) J. WEBBE,
Secretary to the Government.

* General Harris's letter to the Marquis Wellesley, and his Lordship's second general order on this occasion. Vide Appendix, XXXII.

CHAPTER X.

Surrender of Abdul Khalik.—Funeral of Tippoo Sultaun—his Character—some Anecdotes of—his daily Occupations—his Conduct during the Siege.—Astrologers apprize the Sultaun of an inauspicious Day.—His Oblation, and Ceremony, to avert Misfortunes—his Conduct on the 4th of May—his Murder of European Prisoners during the Siege.—Colonel Wellesley appointed to command Seringapatam.—Good effects of his Exertions to restore Tranquillity and Order.

On the morning after the capture of Seringapatam, Abdul Khalik, the Sultaun's second son, and the eldest of the two hostages who were delivered to the Marquis Cornwallis in 1792, surrendered himself. Captain Gerrard having gone out towards the Dowlet Baug, with a small party of sepoys, and perceiving on the opposite side of the river a few horsemen, one of whom waved a white flag, he advanced to the bank of the river, where he was met by one of the horsemen, who informed him, that Abdul Khalik was desirous of throwing himself on the protection of the English, provided his personal safety was secured, and his honour preserved. To these stipulations, Captain Gerrard felt no hesitation in pledging himself; and at the Prince's earnest desire, conveyed him to the palace, where he was received by General Baird with every demonstration of kindness and attention. Being seated, the General questioned him upon several points; and at length, he asked him if he had heard any thing of his father. He replied in the negative; upon which the General, after a short pause, informed him, that

there was some reason to imagine the Sultaun had fallen in the assault, and that the body of a person, supposed to be him, was now in the palace. Upon receiving this intelligence, Abdul Khalik betrayed not the smallest symptom of emotion: he only remarked, that the fact might be easily ascertained, and proposed sending one of his attendants for that purpose. The person who was sent, immediately returned with a report of the Sultaun's death, which the son received with perfect indifference. The only passion excited in this young man's breast, and which he could not restrain on this melancholy occasion, was that of curiosity. Forgetting the precepts in which he had been educated, he unguardedly expressed a desire to see the deceased Sultaun; and when the curtain, which concealed the body in the palanquin, was drawn, he viewed it without any apparent concern. His curiosity being now gratified, he requested Colonel Wellesley, who had just relieved General Baird, to hasten the interment, and desired that the body might be deposited in the tomb of Hyder Alli, at the Loll Baug.

Immediately afterwards, Abdul Khalik was conducted to camp by General Baird. In the way thither he met his two younger brothers, Moiz-oo-dien,* and Sultaun Padshaw,† returning to the fort. They made inquiries after their father, as they had not, at that time, heard of his fate. From Abdul Khalik, however, no certain account was obtained, though his answers gave them reason to suspect what had happened; but when they entered the palace, and heard that the Sultaun was dead, their sensibility displayed itself in the most unaffected marks of sorrow and concern.

* Moiz-oo-dien was the youngest of the hostages delivered to the Marquis Cornwallis. † Sultaun Padshaw's name is Mohee-oo-dien.

The preparations for the funeral of Tippoo Sultaun, were superintended by the principal Cauzee of Seringapatam; every article was provided according to his directions, that the ceremony might be performed with as much pomp as circumstances would permit. The bottom of the state palanquin served as a bier, in which the body was laid, wrapt up in muslins, and covered by a rich brocaded cloth.

Colonel Wellesley having informed Abdul Khalik, that four flank companies of Europeans should attend, and that minute guns should be fired during the funeral; the Prince, at first, expressed some disinclination to accept the escort; but on being assured that it was meant, purely, as a mark of respect to the deceased Sultaun, he consented.

Meer Allum, who had signified a desire to assist at the interment with the Mussulmen chiefs of his army, was informed, that the body would leave the fort at half past four o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th.

The bier was supported by the attendants of the palace, preceded by two companies of European grenadiers, and followed by an equal number. Abdul Khalik rode immediately behind the bier, accompanied by the Killedar and other Mussulmen on foot. The Cauzee chaunted some verses from the Koran, which were repeated by the attendants.

The streets, through which the procession passed, were lined with inhabitants; many of whom prostrated themselves before the body, and expressed their grief by loud lamentations.

Meer Allum, and the chiefs of the Nizam's army, met the body at the entrance of the Loll Baug, and after paying their respects to the Prince, fell into the procession.

When the body had reached the gate of Hyder's mausoleum, the grenadiers formed a street, and presented arms as it passed. The usual service being performed, the body was placed near to that of the late Hyder Alli Khan; and a *keeraut*, or charitable gift, of 5000 rupees, was distributed by the Cauzee to the different facquirs, and to the poor who attended the funeral: and to add to the solemnity of the scene, the evening closed with a most dreadful storm, attended with rain, thunder, and lightning, by which two officers and some others in the Bombay camp were killed, and many severely hurt.

The fate of Tippoo Sultaun, affords an awful example of the instability of human power, unsupported by justice or moderation; and though its effects upon his unoffending family, cannot be contemplated without strong emotions of compassion, the example, thus heightened by misfortune, may prove the more salutary to the princes of India, by impressing on their minds a deeper sense of the danger of violating public engagements, and of inviting foreign invaders to assist them in schemes, for the destruction of the British power in that quarter.

No materials have yet come into our possession, from which the character of Tippoo Sultaun can be accurately deduced. During the last seven years of his life, his conduct had been a continued scene of folly, caprice, and weakness. He appears to have been accomplished, and his favourite employment, of late, was to write

memoranda of the most trivial occurrences. He was fond of reading, scrupulously attentive to matters of religion, and a rigid chastiser of drunkeness and other vices.

All his actions of recent date, seem to have proceeded from the impulse of the moment; and it is impossible to trace any one fixed principle on which he regulated his conduct. His arrangements in every department conveyed the idea of an unsettled and capricious mind. Every year, often every month, presented a new change of system; and before it was at all comprehended, a fresh plan was introduced and as quickly abandoned: a particular set of features, or cast of countenance, was sufficient to raise one man from obscurity to splendour, and to precipitate another from honour to disgrace. His government may be said to have been in a state of incessant revolution; and, notwithstanding the minuteness and severity of his regulations, no prince was ever so grossly imposed upon. He does not appear, like the generality of Indian princes, to have been fond of hoarding his treasures; but, on the contrary, his pride was to have a number of dependents; and his indifference to the peculations of his servants was altogether unaccountable.

It is hardly possible to suppose that he wished to introduce the principle of equality among his subjects; but he disgusted all the men of rank, and his father's old servants, by an indiscriminate and capricious mixture of men of the lowest rank, with those of family and long services. He would promote a Tipdar, (commander of a hundred men) or a petty Aumildar to be a Meer Meeran (the highest military rank); and raise a Risaldar* to the

* Commander of ten to a hundred horse.

honours of a Meer Asof,* or a wretched Killedar, on the monthly pay of 10 pagodas, to those of a Meer Suddoor.†

During the whole of the siege, he appears to have laboured under an infatuation, that Seringapatam ‡ was impregnable; and this idea was confirmed by the constant reports of his courtiers, who persuaded him, till within an hour of the assault, "*that the "English would be obliged to raise the siege from want of pro-"visions, and that their shot had produced little effect on the walls.*" In the morning of the 4th, however, on examining the works himself, his natural perception discovered to him the danger of his situation; but he never seems to have had an idea of yielding up his capital, even in the last extremity.

In short, the whole of his conduct, since the year 1792, proves him to have been a weak, headstrong, and tyrannical prince; influenced in his views, both foreign and domestic, by a restless and implacable spirit, and totally unequal to the government of a kingdom, which had been usurped by the hardiness, intrigues, and talents of his father. §

* A member of the Board of Revenue.

† Superintendant-general of forts, &c.; also a member of the ordnance, or rather board of works.

‡ The Sultaun's constant expression upon every occasion was, who can take Seringapatam!

§ I am indebted chiefly to the Marquis Wellesley, for the materials from which this sketch of the character of Tippoo Sultaun has been drawn. As it appeared to be the most accurate delineation of any which had come to my hands, it is now offered to the public, in the hope that it may not prove unacceptable. More particulars of the Sultaun's character, will probably be gathered from the numerous original documents found in his palace; and now in the possession of the Governor-general.

Tippoo Sultaun appears to have been born in the year 1749.* His stature was about five feet eight inches; he had a short neck, square shoulders, and was rather corpulent: his limbs were small, particularly his feet and hands; he had large full eyes, small arched eyebrows, and an aquiline nose; his complexion was brown, and the general expression of his countenance, not void of dignity.

It is related by Hubbeeb Oollah,† and Rajah Cawn,‡ both of whom were well acquainted with the Sultaun's character, that in the lifetime of his father, he was universally esteemed by the ministers and favourites of Hyder's court, who had formed the most sanguine expectations of his reign; but from the moment he ascended the musnud, those fair appearances began to decline, and his conduct from that period seemed to be directed wholly by ambition, pride, caprice, and cruelty.

The British government, in particular, was the object of his irreconcilable hatred; which he often expressed in public, and especially, on one occasion in his Durbar, when he declared, "that "a nice sense of honour should be the predominant feature in the "character of a king; and that one who had suffered misfortunes "from the superiority of his enemies, should never be appeased "until he had obtained ample revenge. That, for his part, he "should every day seek the most likely means for effecting the

* According to a manuscript history of Hyder Alli, in the possession of Major Allan, which corresponds nearly with the age Tippoo Saib was said to be at the time he commanded a detachment of his father's army, in 1768.

† The Sultaun's principal Moonshy, or secretary.

‡ His favourite servant.

" ruin of his enemies, and that his mind was principally occupied " in the contemplation of this object. The means I have taken" (he added) " to keep in remembrance the misfortunes I expe- " rienced six years ago * from the malice of my enemies, are to " discontinue sleeping in a cotton bed, and to make use of a cloth " one : when I am victorious, I shall resume the bed of cotton."

After the peace of 1792, some of his counsellors strongly urged him to discharge the superfluous persons attached to the different departments of his government, and to diminish the extent of his military establishment; without which, his receipts would never be adequate to his expenses. He replied, " these people are fed " by God, not by me;" and he never would listen to suggestions for reducing any part of his establishments.

He was fond of riding, and particularly excelled in horsemanship; he disapproved of palanquins, hackeries, † and all such conveyances, as proper only for women. In his dress he was remarkably plain; he usually wore a sword slung across his body, with a dagger in his girdle. Whenever he went abroad, either on horseback or otherwise, he was accompanied by a numerous body of attendants, carrying muskets and fowling pieces; and with this retinue, he sometimes appeared on the ramparts during the siege.

His thoughts were constantly bent on war and military preparations. He has been frequently heard to say, that in this world he would rather live two days like a tiger, than two hundred years

* Alluding to the conquests of Marquis Cornwallis.

† A covered carriage drawn by a pair of bullocks.

like a sheep. He adopted as the emblem of his state, and as a species of armorial bearing, the figure of the royal tiger, whose head and stripes constituted the chief ornaments of his throne, * and of almost every article which belonged to him.

* This throne was of considerable beauty and magnificence. The support was a wooden tiger as large as life, covered with gold, in the attitude of standing, his head and fore legs appeared in the front, and under the throne, which was placed across his back. It was composed of an octagonal frame, eight feet by five, surrounded by a low railing, on which were ten small tiger heads, made of gold, and beautifully inlaid with precious stones; the ascent to the throne was by small silver steps on each side. From the centre of the back part, opposite the large tiger's head, a gilded iron pillar rose, seven feet high, surmounted by a canopy superbly decorated with a fringe of pearls. The whole was made of wood, and covered with a thin sheet of the purest gold, richly illuminated with tiger stripes, and Arabic verses. The *huma* was placed upon the top of the canopy, and fluttered over the Sultaun's head.

This bird, the most magnificent and beautiful ornament of the throne, was sent by the Marquis Wellesley to the Court of Directors. It was about the size and shape of a small pigeon; and intended to represent the fabulous bird of antiquity, well known to all Persian scholars. Its tail, which was long, and its wings were in the attitude of fluttering: it was formed of gold, and entirely covered with diamonds, rubies, and emeralds. In India, it was valued at sixteen hundred guineas.

The *huma* is thus described in Mr. Richardson's Persian Dictionary. "A bird "peculiar to the east; it is supposed to fly constantly in the air, and never to touch "the ground; it is looked upon as a bird of happy omen, and that every head it "overshades, will in time wear a crown." He adds, that the Persian word commonly denotes a bird of paradise, a phœnix, a large royal eagle, and a pelican.

M. D'Herbelot, in his Bibliotheque Orientale, has given the history and attributes of this bird at greater length. "*Homai* et *Humai*, mot Persien qui signifie le "plus noble oiseau que les Orientaux connoissent. Les Persans l'appellent aussi "*Bad-Khour*, à cause qu'il ne vit, et ne se repaît, à ce qu'ils disent, que de l'air et "du vent.

"Il pourroit sembler que ce fût l'oiseau que nous appellons *de Paradis*, nommé "par les Latins *Manucodiata*, si plusieurs Auteurs Arabes et Persiens n'assuroient

Upon most of the arms of Tippoo Sultaun there is a cypher, formed by the words *Assud oolla ul Ghaulib,* in Arabic characters, signifying, "*The Lion of God is the conqueror.*" These are so arranged and intermixed, as to produce a resemblance of a tiger's face. The title of *Lion of God,* was given by Mahomed to his son-in-law Alli, to denote the prowess and valour by which he signalized himself in fighting under the Prophet's banners. Innumerable are the traditions and records of the deeds of this celebrated warrior; Tippoo Sultaun seems to have adopted Alli as the guardian genius, or tutelary saint, of his dominions; as the peculiar object of his veneration, and as an example to imitate. His selection of the tiger as an emblem, appears to be intended in honour of Alli, for the natives of Hindostan make no distinction between a lion and a tiger. The former, it is said, has been seen in the most northerly parts of Hindostan; but the fact is very doubtful: the latter abounds in every part of India. Hence the word *Assud,* which has been interpreted by all the European

" que le Humai est une espèce d'aigle royale qui, ne mange point les autres oiseaux, " et qui se nourit seulement des os qu'elle trouve. *Sâadi* dit qu'il est estimé le plus " excellent des oiseaux, parce qu'il ne fait mal à aucun animal, et qu'il se contente " de manger les os qu'il trouve.

" Il ne faut pas pourtant confondre cet oiseau avec celui que les Persiens ap- " pellent *Ustukhan-khour :* les *mangeur d'os;* car celui-ci est l'*Ossifraga* des Latins, " que nous appellons l'*Orfraye,* qui déterre les corps, et mange leurs os dans les " cimetières; ce qui lui a fait donner aussi le nom d'*Avis Bustuaria* chez les " Latins.

" C'est du nom de cette aigle royale ou Humai que se forme le mot de *Hu-* " *maiaioun,* qui signifie en Persien, *Noble, Heureux, Excellent,* et *Auguste,* à cause " que l'ombre faite par cet oiseau, en volant sur la tête de quelqu'un, lui est, selon " la tradition des Orientaux, un prognostic certain de fortune et de grandeur: ce " qui fait dire au même *Sâadi,* que personne ne recherchera jamais l'ombre du " Chat-huant, quand bien même il n'y auroit point de Humai dans l'univers.

Orientalists, to signify a lion, is by the natives of Hindostan termed *Sheer*, or tiger. Moreover, *Hyder*, which also signifies a lion, but interpreted like the former by the natives of Hindostan, tiger, is another title of Alli: it was likewise the name of Tippoo Sultaun's father. The name Hyder, thus distinguished by the triple circumstance of its being the title of Alli, the name of Tippoo Sultaun's assumed emblem, and the name of his father, the founder of his dominion, is introduced by him on every occasion; and either the word at length, or its initial letter, is stamped upon every article of every kind belonging to him.

Subsequently to the war between Tippoo Sultaun and the English, which terminated in 1792, he adopted as the style and title of his dominions, the words *Khoodadaud Sirkar*, which literally signifies, "the government the gift of God." By this title he invariably designated his government, in all letters, instruments, and documents whatever: the word *Khoodadaud* signifying literally, "the gift of God," and the word *Sirkar*, "government."

During the siege, Hubbeeb Oollah was present at a Durbar, when Tippoo observed to Budr ul Zeman Khan (who defended Darwar so gallantly in the last war), "in the course of my life "I have been present at many actions, but never at the defence of "a fort. I have no idea of the proper method of defending this "fort; after the present siege, by God's favour, I will make my-"self master of this part of the art of war."

When the Sultaun had any business of importance to transact, or any letters to dispatch that required deliberation, he always devoted one day to his own reflections, before he took the opinion

of any of his counsellors. After having sufficiently considered the subject in question, he assembled the principal officers* of the departments of the state, and writing in his own hand the nature of the subject to be referred to their consideration, he required from each person, an answer in writing. He derived little benefit, however, from these deliberations, as most of those who were acquainted with the Sultaun's disposition, accommodated their opinions to his wishes. Some, who had his welfare at heart, stated freely what they thought most beneficial, without paying any regard to his prejudices. On these occasions, the Sultaun never failed to manifest great resentment, which he expressed to others whose sentiments were similar to his own, by saying contemptuously, "what are these fellows talking about? are they in "their senses? do give them a little understanding." His real friends, finding that their advice had no effect, but invariably proved injurious to themselves and their families, were compelled, at length, to regulate their opinions by his whims and prejudices. No person was allowed to be present at these deliberations, except the confidential Moonshies, and officers of the different departments.

The Sultaun was extremely averse to spirituous liquors, and to all kinds of exhilarating drugs, the sale of which he prohibited throughout his dominions. When Meer Sadduck,† his minister,

* These were denominated: 1st. *Meer Meeraun;* or heads of the military departments. 2d. *Meer Assofs;* head revenue officers. 3d. *Meer Yem;* head of the marine department. 4th. *Meer Suddoor;* head of the department connected with forts and garrisons 5th. *Meer Khauzin;* the treasurer. 6th. *Mulliek-oo-Toojar;* heads of the commercial department.

† Meer Mahomed Sadduck was an inhabitant of Arcot, and raised by Hyder Alli Khan, from the office of Cutwal to his army, to be his Dewan. In this station,

represented to him the extent of the loss which he had sustained in the course of a few years, by his edicts against the sale of those articles, the Sultaun replied, "That kings should be inflexible "in their orders; that God had forbidden the use of wine; and "that he should persist in exacting a strict obedience to his edicts "on that subject."

He was passionately fond of new inventions, on which he lavished immense sums, without reaping any adequate advantage. In his palace was found a great variety of curious swords, daggers, fusils, pistols, and blunderbusses; some were of exquisite workmanship, mounted with gold, or silver, and beautifully inlaid and ornamented with tigers' heads and stripes, or with Persian and Arabic verses.

The money expended in gratifying this propensity, joined to the sum of £ 3,300,000 sterling, which he was compelled to pay the allies at the conclusion of the war in 1792; and since that period,

being continued by the late Sultaun, he soon became almost his sole favourite. He probably owed this distinction to his ready execution of every command, however oppressive.

The inhabitants of the Sultaun's dominions universally detested Meer Sadduck, and ascribed to him every act that was tyrannical. He was even suspected of treason by all but his master; and after the fall of Seringapatam, it was almost impossible to persuade any man that he did not invite the English into the country.

There is little doubt but he was killed by the Sultaun's troops, in attempting to escape; and the shocking manner in which his body was mangled, confirmed the report of his having fallen a sacrifice to their vengeance. Their spirit of hatred did not rest here: his body was dug up, and for upwards of two weeks was treated with insult, by men, women, and children, assembling round it, and throwing filth of all kinds upon it Strong measures became necessary to put a stop to this extraordinary scene.

his disbursements having exceeded his receipts, upon an average, to the amount of ten lacks of pagodas,* may account for the diminished state of the treasure found in the fort of Seringapatam, which certainly fell far short of general expectation. It is probable, that if Tippoo Sultaun had lived a few years longer, he would have replenished his coffers at the expense of his subjects.

The Sultaun generally rose at break of day: after being *champoed*,† and rubbed, he washed himself, and read the Koran for an hour. He then gave audience to such of his officers, civil or military, as it was necessary for him to see upon public business; and afterwards spent about half an hour in inspecting the *Jamdar Khana*, which was a place where the jewellery, plate, fruit, and other articles were kept. Upon his return, his breakfast was prepared for him, and at this repast, a moonshy and the three youngest children were generally present. On occasions of particular business, he shut himself up with his counsellors, and the children were not sent for. His favourites, and those whom he was in the habit of consulting, were Meer Sadduck, the Binky Nabob, Sied Mahommed Asoof, Purneah, Golam Alli, Ahmud Khan, (the late embassador to Poonah) and his principal Moonshy, or secretary, Hubbeeb Oollah.

During breakfast, the conversation, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, turned chiefly on his past wars and exploits, and on his future projects; and this was the time when he dictated the heads

* Vide Appendix, XLIX. Captain Macleod's statement.

† The operation of pressing, or kneading, the flesh or muscles, for the purpose of promoting the circulation of the fluids.

of such letters, as he wished to be written. His diet at breakfast consisted chiefly of nuts, almonds, fruit, jelly, and milk.

After breakfast, he dressed himself in rich clothes, and proceeded to the Durbar, where he dispatched the ordinary affairs of his government: upon other occasions, his dress was plain and coarse. It was his custom to review, every morning, the new levies and recruits, and to inquire into their cast, country, and the extent of their religious knowledge. If he was satisfied with their examination, they were, in consequence, entertained at a higher rate of pay; but if they were found deficient in a knowledge of the faith, they were delivered over to the Cauzy of the Cutchery to which they were attached, to be instructed in the principles of the Mahomedan religion. These examinations often lasted for several hours. In the evening, when the Sultaun had leisure, he commonly went out on horseback to superintend the discipline of his troops. He generally stood upon the outwork, before the Bangalore, or eastern gate; and from thence directed their exercise and manœuvres. On other days, he inspected the repairs of the fortifications, and buildings.

Returning to the palace, he received reports of the work done in the arsenals, manufactories, &c. the news of the day, and the communications from his spies and intelligencers. At this time, likewise, he delivered his orders, as well as his answers to petitions and letters from the different provinces.

He generally passed the evening with his three eldest sons, one or two of the principal officers of each of the departments of state, a Cauzy, and Moonshy Hubbeeb Oollah.[1] All these usually sat

down to supper with him; and Hubbeeb Oollah asserts, that his conversation was remarkably lively, entertaining, and instructive. During this meal, he was fond of reciting passages from the most admired historians and poets: sometimes he amused himself with sarcasms upon the *Caufers*, (or infidels) and enemies of the Circar; and often discoursed upon learned and religious subjects with the Cauzy and Moonshy. Having dismissed his company, which he always did immediately after the repast, he was accustomed to walk about by himself for exercise; and when tired, to lie down on his couch, and read a book, either upon the subject of religion or history, until he fell asleep. These were his usual occupations, except on days of important business, or religious ceremonies.

During the last fourteen days of the siege, Tippoo Sultaun took up his residence in the Cullaly Deedy, which was formerly a water-gate through the outer rampart of the north face of the fort. This gate was built by the Delaway, or Regent of Mysore, Deo Raje,* about eighty years ago; it was named Cullaly, in compliment to the Delaways, being the name of the village which was their birth place and residence, in the same manner as Mysore is that of the Rajahs. Tippoo closed up this gate, on the side towards the river, about the year 1793. Here, he occupied a small stone choultry, within the gate, inclosed by curtains, forming an apartment in which he ate and slept. Near to this choultry, four small tents were pitched, for his servants and baggage.

He had, now, less the appearance of state than was ever before observed: his time was taken up in ordering the detail and

* Or Dewah Rajahiah.

distribution of his troops, or in giving directions for the defence of the fort.

It appeared, from some of his expressions, that he had resolved on defending the fort to the last extremity. He had often been heard to say, that, "*as a man could only die once, it was of little* "*consequence when the period of his existence might terminate.*"

The Mahomedan and Bramin astrologers apprised the Sultaun, that the 4th of May 1799, being the last day of a lunar month, was an inauspicious day; and in the forenoon of that day, the Bramin astrologers waited upon him, at the Cullaly Deedy, and repeated the same unfavourable omen. Alarmed by these prognostics, the Sultaun went, about ten o'clock in the forenoon, to the palace, and distributed among the Bramins an oblation, consisting of the following articles:

To the Shinassee of Chenapatam, he gave an elephant, a bag of oil seeds (of the sort named teel), and two hundred rupees.

To different Bramins, he gave a black bullock, a milch buffalo, a male buffalo, a black she-goat, a jacket of coarse black cloth, a cap of the same material, ninety rupees, and an iron pot filled with oil; and, previous to the delivery of this last article, he held his head over the pot, for the purpose of seeing the image of his face; a ceremony used in Hindostan to avert misfortune. He then dismissed the Bramins, and desired they would pray for the prosperity of his government; which was the more remarkable, the Sultaun being a bigotted Mahomedan. He, soon after this cere-

mony, left the palace, without going into the Zenana, and returned in his palanquin to the Cullaly Deedy. There he was met by two spies, who reported that the besiegers were preparing to storm, and that they would attack either in the course of that day, or at night. The Sultaun remarked, that it was improbable they would attempt an assault in the day time. He had returned a similar answer to Syed Saheb in the morning, upon his sending a message to inform him, that he believed four or five thousand Europeans were assembled in the trenches, and that each man appeared, when in motion, with his arms trailed in one hand, and a bundle of spare ammunition in the other.

Syed Goffar, who commanded near the breach, also informed the Sultaun, that there seemed to be an unusual number of men in the trenches, as if an assault was intended; and he recommended that the Sultaun should give orders to the troops to be alert. Tippoo again expressed his belief, than an assault would not take place in the day time; but that if it should, the attack must be repelled.

It was near one o'clock when the Sultaun reached the Cullaly Deedy. He immediately ordered his dinner, which he had not time to finish, when he was disturbed by the noise of the storm. He instantly washed his hands, and called for his sword and fusils; whilst buckling on his sword, he received intelligence that Syed Goffar was killed.* He exclaimed, "Syed Goffar was never "afraid of death: let Mahommed Cassim take charge of Syed "Goffar's division."

The Sultaun then ascended the north rampart, followed by four

* Syed Goffar was killed by a cannon about half an hour before the assault.

men who carried his fusils, by a fifth who carried a blunderbuss, and by two or three eunuchs. He advanced towards the attack, and when within about two hundred yards of the breach, he stood behind one of the traverses on the rampart, and fired seven or eight times with his own hand, at such of the assailants as had advanced within shot. His head servant, Rajah Cawn, is of opinion, that three or four Europeans fell by the Sultaun's fire.

When the Sultaun observed, that such of his own men as were in front had either fled or were killed, and that the storming party was advancing towards him in greater force than he had at first apprehended, he retired along the north rampart. In his retreat, he came up with one of his favourite horses, which he mounted, and proceeded eastward upon the rampart, till he came to the slope at the new sally-port, in the inner, or new rampart. Here he descended, still on horseback, and crossed the bridge which passes over the inner ditch. When he entered this sally-port, or water-gate, it was so much crowded that he could not make his way into the town.

Whilst in this situation, the advance of the storming party, which had followed his track along the rampart, came up to the bridge, and on the first fire into the gate the Sultaun was wounded; upon receiving this wound, he advanced through the crowd three or four paces into the gateway; when some of the storming party having come up, the firing increased, and at nearly the same instant the Sultaun was shot through the left breast, and his horse wounded in one of his legs. At this time, the gateway exhibited a shocking spectacle of dead and dying.

The Sultaun having told Rajah Cawn that he was wounded, this faithful servant, who still remained with his master, proposed to him to discover himself; but the Sultaun said, "are you mad? "be silent." Rajah Cawn now endeavoured to disengage him from the saddle, in which attempt they both fell, together with the horse, amongst the dead and wounded men.

Rajah Cawn was shot through the leg. The firing had now nearly ceased below the arch of the gateway; and a grenadier came up to Tippoo, (not knowing him to be the Sultaun) and seized his sword belt, with a view to strip it of the gold buckle by which it was fastened. The Sultaun instantly stretched out his right hand, (the lower part of his body being entangled amongst dead bodies) and snatching a drawn sword, which happened to lie within his reach, made a stroke at the soldier. The blow falling upon his musket, he made a second stroke at another soldier with more effect; and immediately afterwards was killed, by a musket ball which penetrated his right temple.

Rajah Cawn, the only person now living, who accompanied him during the whole forenoon of the 4th of May, declares that he could not discover where the Sultaun intended to go, if he had succeeded in making his way into the town through the gate. He imagines, however, that his greatest anxiety was on account of his family; and that, from some expressions which had fallen from him, he had conceived the design of putting them to death, under an apprehension that they would be exposed to indignities in the tumult and fury of the assault.

Whatever might have been the Sultaun's intentions at that moment, he was undoubtedly conscious, that from former, as well

as very recent cruelties committed on the persons of British soldiers, he had forfeited all claims upon their generosity; and, though he had no ground, from experience, to suppose that they could be induced by any provocations, to depart from the humane and honourable principles of their profession, his mind, probably, felt some alarm, on account of an atrocious act of barbarity committed by him only a few days before the capture of the fort.*

Captain William Macleod, who conducted the intelligence department, during this and the last war, in the most able and satisfactory manner, communicated, officially, to the Commander in Chief, the following account of this atrocious murder of thirteen European prisoners, (by order of the late Tippoo Sultaun) during the siege of Seringapatam.

" In the afternoon of the storm of Seringapatam, I was told by a mussulman, related to Syed Saheb, that Tippoo had, a few days before that period, caused all the European prisoners to be put to death; and during the siege I had accounts, through the means of hircarrahs, that eight of our European soldiers, who lost their way on the night of the 6th of April, were taken prisoners, and carried to Tippoo Sultaun. This report I believe was perfectly correct, both because it described the dress and appearance of the men, and because it was made by a man, whom I never suspected of deceiving me.

" A Peon undertook to shew the spot where some of the murdered prisoners were buried. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley, anxious to ascertain the fact, sent some of the officers of his own

* Appendix, XXXIII. Another account of the Sultaun's conduct on the 4th of May.

regiment, who recognized, I was told, the body of a soldier of his Majesty's 33d regiment, at the place pointed out by the Peon.

" Dewai Row, an accountant belonging to the fort, told me, that thirteen European prisoners, taken during the siege, were sent into the fort by the Sultaun's order, from his camp, when upon the glacis: that he understood some of them were taken prisoners in consequence of losing their way in one of the night attacks; and that he heard others were taken when they had strolled from the trenches into the river. He declared that the thirteen were put to death, by three and four at a time, for three or four successive nights; and he supposed, from recollection, that the last party had suffered about six day's before the storm: from which it would appear, that they were murdered between the 25th and 28th of April.* This man, Dewai Row, kept the accounts of the prisoners in the fort. I have been told by him, that each party of Europeans condemned to suffer, was removed at night from the prison, and led to a square building, behind Nunda Raije's house, called the Hackery stables. Here, the savage mode of destroying them, was by breaking their necks in twisting the head, while the body was held fast. The executioners were the Jetties, a cast of Hindoos who perform feats of strength. The bodies of these unfortunate prisoners were rolled up in mats, and carried out of the fort to be buried.

" From many accounts I have heard from inhabitants of Serin-

* It is probable, that the attacks of the entrenchments, on the evening of the 26th of April, (when the furious random-firing from every gun in the fort, displayed the disposition of the Sultaun's mind) first determined him to commit these horrid acts of cruelty.

gapatam, I am convinced beyond a doubt, that twelve or thirteen European prisoners were put to death by Tippoo's orders during the siege."

(Signed) WILLIAM MACLEOD.

Seringapatam, 16th July, 1799.

On the morning of the 5th of May, Colonel Wellesley, who had relieved General Baird, and was on the following day appointed to the permanent command of Seringapatam, used every possible exertion to prevent excesses of every kind. Cowle flags were hoisted in different parts of the town, and public notice given, that severe examples would be made of any persons detected in the act of plundering the houses, or molesting the inhabitants: for although General Baird had given protection to some of the principal families, and used every means in his power to restore tranquillity in the town, yet it could not be expected that a city so extensive, taken by assault, could immediately subside; nor was tumult and disorder, which were unavoidable in a city so taken by assault, could immediately subside; nor was quillity to until four men had been executed for plunder, that perfect tran- quillity was restored. These examples, and the personal activity of Colonel Wellesley, who went himself to the houses of the principal families with safeguards, soon inspired a general confidence. The inhabitants who had quitted the town during the night of the storm, and had slept in the open fields, returned quietly to their houses and occupations. In a few days the bazars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale. The main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair, than that of a town just taken by assault.

CHAPTER XI.

Description of Seringapatam—Improvements since 1792.—*Retrospect to the Operations of the Siege.—The Completion of the Inner Rampart could not have prevented the Success of the Siege.—Scheme for attacking the second Wall without any addition to the Batteries.—Remarks upon the Rise of the River Cauvery.—The Defeats of Sedasier and Mallavilly, and the improved Condition of our Cavalry, the Causes of the Sultaun's Inactivity.—To the Vigilance and Energy of the Government in India, is to be ascribed the Success of the War.*

THE island of Seringapatam is three miles and a half in length from east to west, and about a mile and a half in breadth. It is formed by the river Cauvery, and rises considerably in the middle, from which there is a gradual slope towards the river. The fortress occupies two thousand yards of the west extremity of this island, and is a place of great strength. Covered upon the north and west by the Cauvery, it was defended until the peace of 1792, by a single rampart: the east and west faces, being considered weaker, were strengthened by double walls and ditches, by outworks before the gates, by a strong circular work upon the south-east angle, and by several formidable cavaliers within, and upon the southern rampart.

Perhaps no place of the same extent of fortification, ever

required so much labour in its construction. The rampart, which is thick and strong, varies in height from twenty to thirty-five feet and upwards; the whole of the *revêtement*, except the north-west bastion, is composed of granite, cut in large oblong pieces, laid in cement, transversely, in the walls. The ditches are excavated in solid rock; a stone glacis extends along the north face, more with a view of making the outer part of the ditch than of covering the walls. The western ditch has not been constructed with much less labour: it is formed by a strong mound, or wall, of considerable thickness, parallel to the rampart, and entirely built of stone.

Within the fort are very few good buildings; and except the main street, which leads from the Bangalore gate to the west face, and a street behind the north rampart, the town in general has but a mean appearance. The old Mysore palace is in a ruinous condition, and has been for some years past converted into a military storehouse. The Sultaun's palace is a magnificent building in the Asiatic style; but much disfigured by a high wall, and a variety of old and unfinished buildings which surround it. The great mosque, near the eastern gate, is covered with the finest chunam,* and ornamented with lofty minarets, which give it a grand and noble appearance.

Considerable additions had been made to the fortifications of Seringapatam since the year 1792. These consisted chiefly of an excellent covertway upon the eastern face, constructed *en crémaillière*, for the purpose of preventing the effect of an enfilading

* A cement used in India, made of limestone, or shells, which in whiteness and polish, resembles the finest marble.

fire from the north side of the river, to which it is greatly exposed. Some new work of the same sort had been introduced in the parapet of the north rampart, and a number of traverses, and several mud cavaliers, erected upon it. To the north-west angle of the fort, an entire new bastion of European construction, with faces and flanks, had been added; and a new inner or second rampart, having a deep ditch, extending the whole length of the north face, was in some forwardness.

At the north-east angle, some sluices had been made for letting in and retaining water in the ditch, and the stone glacis had been raised; these works added but little to the strength of this part of the fort.

The Dowlet Baug was connected with the north-east angle, by scarping the bank of the river, and raising a parapet. A ditch and rampart secured the eastern side of this garden, from which a strong entrenchment was extended entirely across the island, and joined the Periapatam bridge:* within this entrenchment, as I have before observed, the whole of Tippoo's infantry was encamped when the British army arrived before the place. This position of the enemy being more compact, and close under the guns of the fort, was far more judicious than that which he had occupied in 1792. All those posts which at that period had been constructed, with great labour, upon the north side of the river, and upon the eastern part of the island, were now neglected; and the Sultaun

* For want of an actual survey of this entrenchment, I have been obliged to sketch it, upon the plan of the environs of Seringapatam, from recollection. It will however be sufficient to give a correct idea of the position which the Sultaun's infantry occupied upon the island.

seemed to expect that we should fall into the snare he had prepared for us. His surprise and disappointment must consequently have been great, when he saw that our army, by taking up a position, where no preparations of any kind had been made, and upon the opposite side of the fort, rendered all his improvements, except the new bastion on the north-west angle, of no manner of use to him.

Four days afterwards, indeed, suspecting that the attack might be carried on from this quarter, the Sultaun began a new entrenchment on the west bank of the river, nearly parallel to the west face, which was soon found to extend from the Periapatam bridge to the river Cauvery.

The reasons which decided the attack upon the north-west angle have been already fully explained; it would be superfluous to say more, than that a closer inspection of all the other parts of the fortifications, have confirmed the justness of that decision.

Admitting even that the inner, or second, rampart on the west face had been completed, a reference to the plan of the attack will shew, that as it runs parallel to the outer-wall, it would have been, of course, equally exposed to the same enfilading fire; and as it had no flanks, it was by no means so formidable, as upon a first view it might have appeared. I conceive, that this second wall could not have retarded the siege more than three days; for, after having formed lodgements in the breach, and in the bastions to the right and left of it, the outer rampart would have become a sort of sap, to which there would have been no difficulty, as the enemy's guns were silenced, in making an approach, obliquely

across the bed of the river, by gabions and other materials; and whilst this work was carrying on, a few mines sprung in the outer-rampart, would have blown it into the inner ditch. Thus a passage might have been made to the second rampart, which at the same time would have been laid more open to the fire of the breaching batteries. For these reasons it is evident, that the second wall might have been breached without any addition to the batteries, and that nothing could have prevented the immediate success of the siege, but the rise of the Cauvery; an event which did not take place till the 19th of June.

The severe storm on the evening of the Sultaun's funeral, which lasted only a few hours, occasioned a temporary rise of the river for two days; and this circumstance, no doubt, might have caused some uneasiness, if it had happened before the conclusion of the siege; but as the weather immediately cleared up, and the river again fell to its lowest ebb, no serious inconvenience, in reality, resulted. Even had any injury of importance been sustained, all solicitude would have been removed by the near approach of the convoy, and reinforcements to the army, which were daily expected, by the arrival of the detachments under Lieutenant-colonels Brown and Read, which at this time had formed a junction with Major-general Floyd.

But supposing the worst to have happened, and that the river Cauvery had risen sooner than was expected, the precautions which had been taken, by establishing large depôts of grain at Coorga, and Kistnagheri, sufficient for 40,000 men for six months, perfectly secured the army against any serious disaster from that cause. No contingency, in short, which human wisdom could

foresee, or human care and diligence could provide for, was neglected in the various and complicated arrangements made for the success of this important enterprize.*

It has been already remarked, that the Governor-general had at first to encounter a decided opinion against the measures, he judged necessary to adopt upon the arrival of M. Malartic's proclamation in Bengal; and although his conduct is now admitted to have been judicious and proper,† yet the unexampled success of the campaign, and the temporary fall of rain, which affected the river Cauvery on the 5th of May, were circumstances which gave rise to an erroneous conjecture, "that the campaign had "nearly failed, and that its success was chiefly to be attributed to "good fortune." Such an idea could only have been entertained by those, who were totally unacquainted with the precautions which had been taken.

It cannot be denied, that particular circumstances of good fortune attended the capture of Seringapatam. The death of Tippoo Sultaun, and the possession of his family, and the families of all his chiefs, accelerated the entire conquest of Mysore; but on the other hand, it must be admitted, that the march to Seringapatam was impeded by difficulties which we had no reason to expect; and that this disappointment proceeded, not from any defect in the equipment, nor from opposition on the part of the enemy, but

* At Coorga (vide Appendix, XIX), there were 6,360,000 pounds of rice, equal to the subsistence of 40,000 men for 159 days; and at Kistnagheri, Colonel Read had in store 925,600 pounds, or 23 days allowance. In all, 182 days, or six months allowance.

† Address from the inhabitants of Madras, Appendix, XXXIV.

from a party spirit, which had suddenly broken out amongst a certain class of natives attached to the bullock departments of the army, and which no human foresight could have guarded against.

Tippoo Sultaun might certainly have been more active; and by frequent cannonades, the arrival of the British army at Seringapatam, might have been protracted a few days. One attempt to oppose its march was made at Malavilly; but here, the enemy having felt, as at Sedasier, the great superiority of our troops, and being aware of the improved condition of our cavalry, was averse to any efforts which might expose him to the hazard of another battle; and resolved to rest the issue of the war entirely upon the defence of his capital.

When a besieging army is fully equipped, the probable duration of any siege, particularly of Indian forts, may be easily calculated. It cannot be supposed, after the Marquis Cornwallis's campaigns, that we were ignorant of the defences of Seringapatam. Notwithstanding the unexpected deficiency on the 16th of April, the army had a supply of rice and provisions until the 20th of May, before which period the convoy must have arrived; it actually did arrive on the 13th. And with regard to the season, there were six weeks of fair weather after the conclusion of the siege. In short, had the government of India been less vigilant, or less active, at the time the Sultaun's hostile intentions were disclosed in June 1798; had not the most decisive measures been instantly adopted and pursued, with unremitting perseverance, or had the necessary preparations been deferred until Tippoo Sultaun chose to commence hostilities, by invading the Carnatic, then, indeed, it must be acknowledged, that it would have required an unusual share of

good fortune to surmount the difficulties of such a situation, and a tedious and disastrous war might have ensued. But, after the army was once equipped, the depôts established, and the arrangements made for the advance of convoys and reinforcements, it is altogether erroneous to suppose that the success of the enterprize was any other, than the pure and natural result of those measures which had been taken to ensure it.

In regard to the equipment of the army of Madras, it was evidently not so tedious an operation as the Governor-general, soon after his arrival in India, had been taught to believe. It may therefore be inferred that those radical defects, which he had occasion to notice in his correspondence, were neither of that extent, nor importance, that was at first imagined.

How much the Marquis Wellesley was satisfied with the government of Fort St. George, and its army, has appeared in the subsequent parts of his correspondence; and, with respect to the administration of that government, which immediately preceded the late important events in India, he has borne the most ample testimony of the sense he entertained of Lord Hobart's constant attention to the improvement of the military establishment, and to the cultivation of that spirit of activity, zeal, and discipline, from which such happy effects resulted when the army was called into the field. *

* The sword of the Killedar of the fort of Seringapatam, which was delivered up to Major Allan, by the Killedar himself at the gates of the Sultaun's palace, on the 4th of May, was sent by the Marquis Wellesley to Lord Hobart, accompanied by a letter, wherein the Marquis expresses himself in these words.

"I beg you will accept it" (the sword) "as a testimony of my sense of your

But the facility of carrying the Governor-general's measures into effect, was, in a great degree to be ascribed to the many advantages which were derived from the glorious termination of the campaign of 1792. Of those advantages, the Marquis Wellesley certainly made a most seasonable and proper use; and as his Lordship, upon a late public occasion,* has fully expressed his estimation of them, it will not be deemed improper to insert it here.

"In reviewing the more immediate causes of our success, I "cannot repress a tribute of gratitude to him who laid the foun- "dations of that strength, which it has been my lot to call into "action. The name of the Marquis Cornwallis is inseparably "connected with the fame and power of Great Britain in this "quarter of the globe; and will continue to be an object of "affection and reverence, as long as wisdom, fortitude, and inte- "grity, shall be respected, or any sense retained of justice, cle- "mency, benevolence, public faith, or military glory. The final "conquest of Mysore recalls the memory of that glorious war, in "which the first shock was given to the hostile power of Tippoo "Sultaun. It must never be forgotten, that under the auspices of "the Marquis Cornwallis in that war, the supply and movement "of our armies in Mysore were first reduced to a system of re- "gularity and order; and our officers acquired that experience "and skill so conspicuous in the able and masterly operations of "the late campaign: under the same auspices, the whole system

"Lordship's constant attention to the improvement of the military establishment of "this presidency, and to the cultivation of that spirit of activity, zeal, and dis- "cipline, from which such happy effects have resulted in the late war with Tippoo "Sultaun."

* In his answer to the address from the inhabitants of Calcutta.

" of our defensive alliances in the Peninsula of India was founded;
" and the national faith was maintained in a degree of purity and
" lustre, which inspired a general confidence in the British Go-
" vernment, and disposed the native powers to strengthen and
" cement their connection with the Company on the solid basis of
" reciprocal interest and mutual security. This favourable dis-
" position was confirmed by the prudence, integrity, and honour,
" of my immediate predecessor; and in the important nego-
" tiations which it has been my duty to conduct, I have derived
" considerable assistance from the advantageous impressions of
" the British character, which I found deeply fixed in the minds
" of our allies."

CHAPTER XII.

The Library of Tippoo Sultaun.—Valuable original State Papers found in the Palace, relating to Negotiations with the French—with the Court of Cabul—with the Ottoman Court—with Scindeah.—Intrigues at Hyderabad.—Correspondence with secret Agents at Delhi—and in the Company's Possessions.—Memoranda in the Hand-writing of Tippoo Sultaun.—An Instance of the Sultaun's Barbarity under his own Hand.—Tippoo Sultaun's Dreams written by himself.

THE library of the late Tippoo Sultaun, consisted of about two thousand volumes in the various branches of Asiatic literature; and an extensive collection of original state papers, of a nature the most interesting and important. These valuable documents constitute a sufficient stock of materials for a complete history of the reigns of Hyder Alli Khan and Tippoo Sultaun; and the proofs which they afford of the systematic and unremitting ardour with which the late Sultaun laboured at the subversion of the British power in India, are numerous, and of the most unequivocal kind. As some account of these documents will serve, further, to develop the character of Tippoo Sultaun, it seems proper to give it in this place, before I proceed to detail the important events which immediately followed the capture of Seringapatam.

All the records which were found in the palace, are now in the possession of the Marquis Wellesley; and as his lordship intends

to have the whole translated as soon as possible, the public may expect, in a short time, to be presented with a work not less curious than interesting.

Colonel William Kirkpatrick has already examined many of those papers. His extensive knowledge of the Oriental languages, and of the political interests of the different courts in India, enabled him to make a very full and satisfactory report upon them to the Governor-general;* which, as it contains much useful information, and many judicious remarks, is here inserted at full length.

" In obedience to your Lordship's directions, I proceed to state the general nature of the most important and interesting of the numerous original papers, which have been found in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun. I shall confine myself, for the present, to a review of those which have reference merely to the transactions of that prince. The records of the usurpation and reign of Hyder Alli Khan are, however, voluminous, and promise to prove highly illustrative of the history and character of that chief.

" The papers, of which I propose giving a succinct account, may be classed under the following general heads.

" *First.* Papers in the French language, relating to the negotiations of Tippoo Sultaun with the French.

" *Secondly.* Papers in the Persian language, relating to the same subject.

* On the 27th of July, 1799.

" *Thirdly.* Papers relating to the negotiations and correspondence of Tippoo Sultaun with the court of Cabul.

" *Fourthly.* Papers respecting the negotiations of Tippoo with the Ottoman court.

" *Fifthly.* Papers relating to the intrigues of the Sultaun at Poonah, and at the Durbar of Dowlut Row Scindeah.

" *Sixthly.* Papers relative to the negotiations and intrigues of Tippoo Sultaun, at different periods, at the court of Hyderabad.

" *Seventhly.* Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and his secret agents at Delhi.

" *Eighthly.* Correspondence of the Sultaun's agents at Calicut, and other parts of the Company's possessions on the coast of Malabar.

" All the foregoing papers relate, more or less, to the hostile designs of the Sultaun, against the British power in India. Besides these papers, there have been found other documents of a miscellaneous nature, and illustrative of the character and genius of Tippoo Sultaun's government, of the constitution of his military force, and of the resources of his dominions.

" The papers comprehended under the first of the foregoing heads, refer solely to the negotiation commenced by Tippoo Sultaun with the French, in the year 1797, through the agency

of an obscure individual named Ripaud,* and continued to the period of the Sultaun's deputation of M. Dubuc to France, towards the end of the year 1798. There are, also, various other French papers relating to the connection subsisting between the French nation and Tippoo Sultaun, at a more distant period, which have not yet been examined.

* Citizen Francis Ripaud, who commanded a French privateer, was by stress of weather, obliged to put into Mangalore in the latter part of 1796. He was there apprehended, sent to Seringapatam, and placed under restraint. By these papers, to which Colonel Kirkpatrick alludes, it appears that Tippoo Sultaun interrogated Ripaud with respect to the disposition and ability of the French to co-operate in his projected attack of the Company's possessions; and that Ripaud, (who is a violent Republican) with a view to excite the Sultaun to hostilities against the English, by encouraging him to expect a powerful co-operation of the French, and to effect his own delivery, magnified the resources of his nation, and induced the Sultaun to believe, that a very considerable force was already assembled at the Isle of France, and only waited his summons.

These assurances had made an early and deep impression upon the Sultaun's mind: in the Sultaun's own hand-writing are these words; *what occurs to my mind "is this: to retain the Frenchman Ripaud as a vackeel;—to send two confidential "persons with this Frenchman;—to satisfy the mind of the French nation;—and to "require Christian forces.—Subject adjusted the 25th March*, 1797."

The circumstance of Ripaud's arrival, therefore, evidently suggested to Tippoo Sultaun, the policy of deputing embassadors to the Isle of France, and eventually to France; and it gave rise to a question proposed by the Sultaun to the officers of his government, for their opinions and advice. This question was not, whether an offensive and defensive alliance should be formed with the French; but what should be the terms and conditions of such an alliance, which the Sultaun seems absolutely to have determined on. Notwithstanding this determination of their master, some of his principal officers ventured to express their disapprobation of the plan; most of them have expressed their opinions of the little dependance to be placed upon the faith of the French nation; and they all mention Ripaud in terms of abuse and contempt, and forcibly dissuade Tippoo Sultaun from conducting a negotiation of

"The French papers relating to the negotiations of the late Sultaun with the French, consist of,

"*First.* A variety of letters from citizen Ripaud to Tippoo Sultaun, dated between the month of November, 1796, and October, 1797.

"*Second.* Correspondence in French between Tippoo Sultaun and the government of the Isle of France; including the propositions of the Sultaun, for an offensive alliance against the English, and dated in the month of April, 1797.

"*Third.* Letters from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory of France to the same effect, dated in July, 1798.

"*Fourth.* Letters from Messrs. Chapuy and Dubuc to the Sultaun, written on their arrival from the Isle of France, and dated in April, 1798.

"*Fifth.* Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and M. Dubuc, during the residence of the latter at Tranquebar.

such importance, through the agency of a man of so low and despicable a character. However, the Sultaun's eagerness to prosecute his favourite plan of ruining the British power in India, rendered him regardless of the admonitions of his counsellors, and of the doubts which his own mind appears to have suggested to him of the faith and honour of the French nation. He was aware of the probable consequence of a disclosure of his intrigues; yet he could not resist the opportunity afforded by the arrival of this adventurer (of whose character he entertained suspicions) of carrying his favourite plan into effect, by the deputation of embassadors to the Isle of France. It is curious thus to trace one of the primary causes of the war in India, and the ruin of Tippoo Sultaun's power, to the accidental circumstance of Ripaud's cruize to the Malabar coast.

" The principal tendency of Ripaud's letters to the late Sultaun, is to inflame that Prince's hatred of the English, and to encourage him to expect the most powerful and cordial co-operation against them from the French nation; and amongst those letters, is one dated in May 1797, particularly interesting, as clearly proving the intercourse which subsisted between Monsieur Raymond, formerly commander of the Nizam's regular infantry, and Tippoo Sultaun. This document is the more important, as it is doubtful, whether we shall ever be able to ascertain any further particulars relative to the nature and extent of this connection. M. Dompard, through whom it seems to have been formed and maintained, and who commanded the French party in the Sultaun's service, usually denominated Lally's corps, having died about the same time with Raymond; and his papers being probably lost, or beyond our reach. Enough, however, is established by the letter in question, to demonstrate, that the danger which menaced the British interests in India, from the French party at Hyderabad, was of the most serious kind; and that had hostilities occurred between the Company and Tippoo Sultaun during its existence, there is good reason to believe that the Sultaun would have been openly joined by that party.

" The papers included in the general head, *viz.* Persian papers relative to the negotiations of Tippoo Sultaun with the French, refer to different periods of the reign of Tippoo Sultaun: they consist of,

" *First.* Various documents relative to the mission, in the year 1787, of Gholam Alli Khan, and others, to the Ottoman court, to France, and to England. The object of this mission, as appears

from the original instructions to the embassadors, was to engage France to renew hostilities in concert with the Sultaun against Great Britain. The embassy to England seems to have been designed only as a veil to the operations at the court of France. It is proper to observe, that this embassy did not proceed further than Constantinople; for Tippoo, apprehending lest its progress by that route should not correspond with his impatience to commence a negotiation with the French, determined some time after its departure, to send a direct embassy to France by sea.

"*Second.* Sundry documents relative to the mission, in the year 1788, of Mahommed Osman and others, to the court of France. This is the embassy, substituted in the place of that which had previously proceeded by the route of Constantinople. Its instructions, and its objects, were essentially the same as those of the mission which preceded it; with this difference only, that it was not charged with any presents, or message, to the court of London. The papers relative to these two embassies joined to, and illustrated by, certain passages in the Poonah correspondence, and in other papers, abundantly warrant the conclusion, that Tippoo Sultaun never ceased to meditate on the means of subverting the British power in India, from the moment he executed the treaty of Mangalore, to the hour of his death. Indeed we have the authority of one of his best informed and most confidential servants, Moonshy Hubbeeb Oollah, for believing, that he never in his own Durbar dissembled either his implacable hatred of our nation, or his eagerness to attack us; and that no topic was more freely, or more frequently discussed in his presence, than the chastisement of the English.

" *Third.* Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Louis XVI. written, not long after the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, evidently with the view of renewing his connection with the French nation.

" *Fourth.* Draft of letters from Tippoo Sultaun to Citizen Ripaud, in the year 1796-7.

" *Fifth.* Consultations, memoranda, and discussions, relative to the projected French alliance in 1797.

" *Sixth.* Instructions to the embassadors deputed to the Isle of France in 1797.

" *Seventh.* Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and his principal officers in Canara, relative to the embassy, previous to its departure between April and October, 1797.

" *Eighth.* Letters to the administration of the Isle of France, transmitted through his embassadors, in 1797, &c.

" It is here necessary to remark, that the embassy was first dispatched from Seringapatam, in the month of April, 1797, when it was composed of Mirza Bauker, Meer Yusoof Alli, Hussein Alli Khan, and Meer Gholam Alli (or Gholam Saheb). Before the embassy was in readiness to depart, the monsoon set in: this occasioned its detention on the coast, until the return of the fair season. In the mean while, dissensions and jealousies broke out among the embassadors, which led to the supercession and recall of Mirza Bauker, and of Gholam Alli; and to the resignation, on

the plea of sickness, of Meer Yusoof Alli. In consequence of these changes, the Persian letters, and instructions, with which the original embassadors had been charged, were revoked, and others, not materially differing from the former, substituted in their place. The embassy finally consisted of only two persons, *viz.* Hussein Alli Khan, and Mahommed Ibrahim, and did not sail for the Isle of France until the month of October, 1797.

" *Ninth.* Report of the embassadors on their return from the Isle of France in April, 1798.

" *Tenth.* Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and his principal officers in Canara, relative to the embassy, subsequently to its return, and respecting the French troops which accompanied it.

" *Eleventh.* Draft of letters from Tippoo Sultaun to M. Dubuc, and papers purporting to be translations in Persian, of letters from M. Dubuc to the Sultaun, written between July, 1798, and February, 1799. The French translations of the Persian letters, and the Persian translations of the French letters, are in general extremely unfaithful, although the main scope of both is usually preserved in the version.

" *Twelfth.* Copies of letters to the Executive Directory, to M. Malartic, and to M. Sercy, transmitted by the hands of M. Dubuc.

" *Thirteenth.* Memoranda, or instructions to the vakeels Bismilla and Abdul Raheem, colleagues of M. Dubuc.

"The papers which constitute the third general division, are negotiations and correspondence with the court of Cabul.

"*First.* Letters from Tippoo Sultaun to Timur Shah (the father and predecessor of Zeman Shah), and to his principal ministers, A. D. 1790-1.

"*Second.* Letters written at different periods by Tippoo Sultaun to Zeman Shah, and his principal minister.

"*Third.* Letters from Tippoo Sultaun to Gholam Mahommed Khan, a vakeel of Zeman Shah, in Hindostan.

"*Fourth.* Letters from Zeman Shah and his principal ministers to Tippoo Sultaun, with letters from Gholam Mahommed Khan to Tippoo Sultaun.

"*Fifth.* Instructions to the embassadors sent at different times by the Sultaun to Cabul. The first embassy was sent in 1796, and the second and last was dispatched about the beginning of 1799. The embassadors on both occasions were Meer Hubbeeb Oollah, and Mahommed Reza.

"*Sixth.* A memorandum purporting to be propositions from Tippoo to the court of Cabul, and apparently delivered by the Sultaun's embassadors at Cabul.

"Besides the foregoing documents, much of the correspondence between Tippoo and his agents at Delhi, relates to the negotiations which he had set on foot at the court of Cabul. It is

moreover to be observed, that these papers abound in proofs not only of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile designs against the English for a length of time, but also of the dispositions of the court of Cabul to enter into those views.

" The papers comprehended under the fourth general head, are those relative to the negotiations and correspondence with the Ottoman court.

" *First.* Instructions to Gholam Alli Khan, and the other embassadors deputed in the year 1787, to Constantinople.

" *Second.* Letters of the embassadors to the Sultaun written during their absence.

" *Third.* Journal of the embassy.

" *Fourth.* Correspondence at different periods between Tippoo Sultaun and the Ottoman court.

" The instructions to this embassy breathed the same spirit of hostility against the British power in India, which distinguished the instructions of the embassadors sent to France. They were filled also, as indeed are most of the Sultaun's letters to the Grand Signior, with bitter invectives, and the basest calumnies against our governments in India. I have not hitherto been able to discover any clue to the manner in which the several advances of Tippoo Sultaun to the Ottoman court had been received. The only formal embassy, sent to Constantinople by Tippoo Sultaun, since that of 1787, was dispatched about the month of February, 1799. It was

composed of two persons named Syed Alli Mahommed, and Syed Nudor-u-dien, to whom was associated, but in the inferior character of secretary, the same Hussein Alli Khan, who was at the head of the embassy to the Isle of France. It was pretended by some persons at Seringapatam, that he had been degraded to this station, in consequence of the Sultaun's dissatisfaction at the result of his mission to the Mauritius. No copy of the instructions to this embassy has been found; but the letters with which the embassadors were charged, sufficiently denote the general object of the mission.

"The papers relative to the intrigues of Tippoo Sultaun, during different periods, at the court of Hyderabad, are numerous and important. These constitute the fifth general head, and consist principally of,

"1. Correspondence of Mehdy Ali Khan during his embassy to the court of Hyderabad. 2. Instructions of Ali Reza, and Kootuf-ul-Mulk, sent on an embassy to Hyderabad in the years 1798, and 1799. 3. Some particulars relative to this embassy. 4. Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and various chiefs of the Nizam's army, during the first campaign of the allied forces under Lord Cornwallis. 5. Correspondence between Tippoo and Khauder Hussein Khan, a secret agent sent by the Sultaun to Hyderabad in 1796-7. 6. Correspondence between Tippoo and Syed Medina, or Medina Saheb, sent by the Sultaun to Hyderabad in 1796-7. 7. Letters to Tippoo Sultaun and others, from several persons at Hyderabad in the interest of the Sultaun. 8. Instructions to Syed Ghoffar, who was sent with a large force towards Kurnool in 1796, for the ostensible purpose of collecting arrears of tribute due by Alif Khan. 9. Original letter from Syed Ghoffar to Tippoo Sultaun.

"The correspondence of Mehdy Ali Khan has not yet been examined. The object of Ali Reza's mission to Hyderabad, was undoubtedly of a nature hostile to the British interests. The letters of Assud Ali Khan, and other Sirdars of the Nizam to the Sultaun, written while the allied forces were in the vicinity of Seringapatam in 1791, were certainly of a most unwarrantable tenor; yet they rather prove Tippoo to have been the dupe of the cunning of those Sirdars, than that they had any deliberate design of betraying the interest of the allies.

"The correspondence of Kauder Hussein Khan, joined to the various letters from other persons concerned in the different intrigues of which that agent had the conduct, prove that Tippoo Sultaun secretly encouraged the rebellions of Ali Jah, and of Gholam Hussein Khan (the son of Dara Jah, and the Jaghiredar of Rachore). This correspondence has also brought to light a conspiracy, in which Ferridoon Jah, the son of his Highness the Nizam, had engaged for the purpose, if not of deposing his father, at least of securing the musnud upon his death. Tippoo appears clearly to have entered warmly and deeply into this plot; and to have placed the forces commanded by Syed Ghoffar (ostensibly employed to menace Alif Khan, the Kurnool chief), eventually at the disposal of Ferridoon Jah.

"The correspondence between Tippoo and Medina Saheb, abounds with proofs of the Sultaun's hostile designs against the British power in India, and of his desire to dissolve the connection subsisting between the Company and the Nizam. It also confirms the truth of the various communications made from time to time to the Governor-general by the Resident at Hyderabad, relative to the

transactions and negotiations of Medina Saheb; with this exception, that the written instrument delivered by that agent, purporting to contain proposals from Tippoo Sultaun to the Nizam, and called in the correspondence of that period, *the mutálib* (or demands), did not proceed immediately from the Sultaun, but was the act of Medina Saheb himself, who is afterwards reprehended by his master for his indiscretion in committing so delicate a matter to writing, and informed, that the communication ought to have been a verbal one, and to have been made directly to the Nizam himself, and not through Imtiant-ud-Dowlah, or any other person.

" The miscellaneous correspondence from Hyderabad, and the letters of the Sultaun's agents there, especially those of Kauder Hussein Khan, furnish the clearest proofs of treason in several subjects of the Nizam. Some of them, persons of distinction.

" The instructions to Syed Ghoffar, are silent on the subject of Ferridoon Jah; but they direct him to take measures for making it generally believed, that his expedition has no other object than that of realizing the Kurnool Paishcush. Other secret instructions to Syed Ghoffar, may yet be discovered. In the mean time, the most unequivocal proof exists of Tippoo's intention to employ the army under Syed Ghoffar in the support of Ferridoon Jah, who is the son of the Nizam, alluded to by the Sultaun in his letter to General Mangalon at the Isle of France, dated the 21st of April, 1797.*

* Extract from Tippoo Sultaun's letter to General Mangalon. " The Nizam, " an ally of the English, and the chief of the Moguls, is very ill; and his great age " leaves no prospect of his recovery. He has four children, who are disputing the

"The letter from Syed Ghoffar strongly recommends an immediate invasion of the Nizam's territories, and points out the circumstances favourable to the enterprize.

"The papers referred to under the sixth general head, relative to the intrigues and negotiations at Poonah, consist of, 1. Instructions to different embassadors sent by Tippoo Sultaun to Poonah, at various periods since the commencement of his reign. 2. Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun, and the several embassadors and agents which he had employed at different times at Poonah. Some parts of this correspondence are in the Marhattah language. 3. Correspondence between Tippoo and certain of the Marhattah Sirdars, in the interest of the Sultaun. 4. Correspondence between the Sultaun and the Paishwah, chiefly in the Marhattah language.

"With the exception of the correspondence of the vakeels, who were at Poonah when the war commenced, the papers relative to Tippoo Sultaun's various intrigues and negotiations at Poonah, have been hitherto, only, superficially examined. A slight inspection of these documents has, however, been sufficient to shew, that the favourite object of his negotiations at Poonah, as well as every where else, has always been hostility against the English. His efforts to detach the Marhattahs from us, appear to have been particularly active in 1797-8. And some parts of his latest

"right of succession; one of them, who is much attached to me, is the favourite of "the chiefs and of the people, and is expected to succeed." After a general view of the state of affairs in India, the Sultaun concludes, "I inform you of these events, "in order to prove to you, that it is now the moment for you to invade India. "With little trouble, we shall drive them out of India: rely on my friendship."

correspondence with Poonah, authorize a suspicion, if they do not absolutely prove, that the backwardness of that court to arm against Tippoo, conformably to its engagements with us, was as much the effect of the Sultaun's intrigues, as of the domestic embarrassments of the Paishwah, to which it has been constantly attributed.

"The papers comprehended under the seventh general head, being the correspondence between Tippoo, and his secret agents at Delhi, consist, principally, of letters to him from those agents, and of the drafts, or copies of several letters from the Sultaun to them. This correspondence, proves Tippoo to have been extremely active in his endeavours to open and establish an interest even with princes, whose names might be supposed to have hardly reached him: thus, we find him condescending to court, not only the Rajahs of Joadpoor and Jynaggur, but even the more remote and obscure Rajah of Napaul.

"I was informed at Seringapatam, by Moonshy Hubbeeb Oollah, that Tippoo had opened a communication with Vizier Alli, through the channel of Moal Chund, and Soojam Row, the Sultaun's agents at Delhi. These men appear, indeed, to have possessed his confidence in a high degree, which is the more extraordinary, as they were natives of Hindostan; were in the employ of others, as well as in his, and were personally unknown to him. I have not yet discovered any trace of the negotiation with Vizier Alli.

"Of the papers comprehended under the eighth, and last general head, or correspondence of secret agents at Calicut, and other

parts of the Company's possessions on the coast of Malabar, I am not yet able to give any account. They are numerous: some of them are in Persian, many of them in the Canarese, and many in what is called the Arwie dialect.

"Besides the correspondences enumerated under the foregoing heads, there are many letters to and from Persia, Muscat, Arabia, and other parts. No complete series of these has hitherto been discovered, nor have the letters which have appeared been more than cursorily examined. Enough has been seen, however, to leave no doubt of Tippoo Sultaun's having been equally active in his endeavours to injure us with the King of Persia, and the petty sovereigns of Arabia, as in his efforts to excite the other states which have been already mentioned."

Colonel Kirpatrick concludes this interesting report, by suggesting to the Governor-general, that the whole of these numerous and valuable documents should be, in the first instance, translated into English; and that such of them as should be judged sufficiently curious and important, should be then arranged according to dates, and under distinct heads. After being thus digested, his opinion is, that they would constitute such a stock of materials, as, with the addition of those already published, and others that are to be procured, would enable a writer, duly qualified, to present to the world a history of the reigns of Hyder Alli Khan, and Tippoo Sultaun, equally authentic as interesting.

The hostile disposition of Tippoo Sultaun towards the English, has never been doubted; but the eagerness and virulence, with which he prosecuted his favourite plan, of ruining the British power

power in India, were not suspected, and could never have been credited, without such undeniable proofs as we have now before us. The review of his correspondence and negotiations, by Colonel Kirkpatrick, is perhaps the best delineation of the Sultaun's political character: of his private, and moral character, much may be gathered from the anecdotes which have been already given. But of his inhuman cruelty, although the murder of the European soldiers already related, might be considered a sufficient testimony, I must add one instance more, from a paper in the Sultaun's writing, faithfully translated from the original, by Colonel Kirkpatrick; it is particularly deserving notice, as it furnishes the most indisputable proof of his sanguinary and cruel disposition. The Sultaun writes, "there are five hundred Coorg prisoners, who "must be thrown in parties of fifty, into ten forts; where they "must be dealt with, in such manner, as shall ensure their death "in the course of a month, or twenty days; such of their women "as are young, must be given to Musselmauns; and the rest, "together with their children, must be removed to, and kept in "confinement at, Seringapatam, on a small allowance."

The above was found amongst other memoranda, and various miscellaneous papers, in the Sultaun's own hand-writing; and one of which, not a little remarkable, is a register of his dreams. Moonshy Hubbeeb Oollah, one of the most confidential of the Sultaun's servants, was present when Colonel Kirkpatrick discovered this curious manuscript, * in an escrutoire among several papers of a secret nature. Hubbeeb Oollah knew that there was

* The original manuscript was sent to England by the Marquis Wellesley, and has been presented, in his Lordship's name, to the Chairman of the Court of Directors

such a book of the Sultaun's composition, but had never seen it, as the Sultaun always manifested peculiar anxiety to conceal it from the view of any who happened to approach, while he was either reading, or writing in it. Of these extraordinary productions, six only have as yet been translated, and they are inserted in the Appendix.* By some of these it appears, that war and conquest, and the destruction of the Kaufers (infidels), were not less the subjects of his sleeping, than of his waking thoughts

* Appendix, XXXV.

CHAPTER XIII.

Alli Reza is sent to General Harris by Cummur-ud-Dien Khan.—Futteh Hyder, Cummur-ud-Dien Khan, and Purneah, surrender themselves.—The Sultaun's Army is disbanded.—Stable Horses, Elephants, Camels, and Gun Bullocks, delivered up.—Operations of the detachments under Lieutenant-colonels Brown and Read—they ascend the Covriporam Pass—join General Floyd—and advance to Seringapatam.—Strength of the allied Armies at this Period.—The Bombay Army marches to Canara.—General Harris's Measures for taking Possession of this Province.—Favourable Disposition of the Inhabitants to submit to the British Government.

ALLI Reza, one of the vakeels who accompanied the hostages delivered to Marquis Cornwallis in 1792, arrived at Seringapatam, on the evening of the 7th of May, with a message from Cummur-ud-Dien Khan; the purport was, to acquaint General Harris, "that as fate had disposed of Tippoo Sultaun, and transferred his "power to the hands of the English, he begged leave to have a "conference; and in the mean time, he had sent Alli Reza to in-"form him, that four thousand horse under his command, were "now at his disposal, and ready to obey his orders." On the evening of the 9th, General Harris received letters from Cummur-ud-Dien Khan, Futteh Hyder (the Sultaun's eldest son), and Purneah, all manifesting the same favourable dispositions; and by the 14th of May, these chiefs had all paid their respects to

the General, who received them with the honours and distinction due to their rank. They were indeed the only remaining chiefs who held commands in the Sultaun's army; for during this short campaign, of less than two months, thirty-one had been killed, and seventeen wounded.* And as the whole of Tippoo Sultaun's sons, thirteen in number, together with all his chiefs of note, were then at Seringapatam, the surrender of Cummer-ud-Dien, Futteh Hyder, and Purneah, was instantly followed by the submission of the whole of the Sultaun's troops to the British power, and soon after by the re-establishment of peace and order throughout the territories of Mysore.

The primary objects of General Harris's attention, after the fall of Seringapatam, were to adopt the necessary arrangements for disbanding the late Sultaun's army, and for obtaining possession of the principal strong-holds throughout his dominions. The measures for the first of these objects were accordingly taken through the agency of Purneah. The *Silledar*, or *Looty* horse, of their own accord, returned to their homes: some discussions, however, took place with regard to the disposal of the *Bargeer*, or stable horse, which were at length terminated on the 18th of May, by the assistance of Purneah. The corps, formerly Lally's, surrendered; and the Europeans composing it, together with those under Monsieur Chapuy, recently arrived from Mauritius, were sent prisoners of war into the Carnatic.

The stable horses, elephants, camels, and bullocks,† belonging to the Circar were delivered up, and many of the former were alloted to complete deficient corps of the Company's cavalry,

* Vide Appendix, XXXI. † Appendix, XXXVI.

while others, not calculated for that service, were appropriated to the use of his Highness the Nizam.

During these important transactions, Major-general Floyd, having effected a junction with the detachments of Lieutenant-colonels Brown* and Read,† arrived at Seringapatam with the convoy on the 13th of May.

The operations of these detachments had been distinct and separate during the advance of the army to Seringapatam. Lieutenant-colonel Read, being invested by the Marquis Wellesley, with the same extensive powers which had been delegated to him by the Marquis Cornwallis, in the former war, was appointed to superintend, and collect, the revenues of such of the enemy's districts, as might, in the course of the campaign, submit to the British power. In this manner, Colonel Read had been so successfully employed after the capture of Bangalore in 1791, that before the peace of 1792, he had actually paid into the company's treasury, a sum not less than one lack of pagodas, collected in districts between Bangalore and the Carnatic, from which, in their then unsettled state, little or nothing was to have been expected. This proof of his zeal and ability, added to the practical knowledge he had acquired in matters of revenue since that period, pointed him out as the fittest person that could be selected for so important a duty.

Although the rapidity of the conquest of Mysore, rendered Colonel Read's labours, in the settlement and collection of revenues, unnecessary, yet they proved highly serviceable in the still more

* Appendix, XXXVII. † Appendix, XXXVIII.

essential object, of collecting supplies of grain and cattle for the army. He had delivered to Lieutenant-general Harris, before he entered Mysore, above one month's allowance of rice, at half a Seer per day, for thirty thousand fighting men, besides fifteen hundred Brinjarry bullocks, laden with rice and other grain, sufficient for the maintenance of forty thousand followers for one month.* Exclusive of this immediate supply, he had also entered into engagements, on the part of government, with the head Brinjarries, for the delivery of fifty-two thousand, three hundred and seventy-seven† bullock loads of grain, which they were to bring, at stated periods, into the Barramaul; and which, added to the depôts at Coorga and at Kisnagheri, would have formed so ample a supply, as to leave no apprehension of any scarcity of grain, even if the war had been prolonged to a second campaign.

Whilst the Brinjarries were drawing towards the Barramaul from the most remote parts of the Decan, Lieutenant-colonel Read was employed in reducing the country to the northward of Ryacotah. He took the strong hill fort of Sooligheri by storm, and Pedanaigdurgum, another hill fort, by capitulation. His operations were intended to have embraced a wide range, when the more urgent service of conveying to the army the large supplies provided in the Barramaul, made it necessary for him to change the direction of his march, and to proceed to the vicinity of Covriporam, for the purpose of collecting at that place, the numerous Brinjarries, and their supplies, intended for the army.

From Tritchinopoly, Lieutenant-colonel Brown having marched towards Coimbatoor, at the head of a respectable force, began his

* Vide Appendix, XIX. † Appendix, XXXIX.

operations by the reduction of Caroor, which surrendered to him, without any serious resistance, on the 5th of April. On the 8th of the same month he sent a detachment against Erode, and marched himself on the 9th to reduce Aravacoorchy, which, although considerably strengthened since last war, surrendered on the 10th. In consequence, however, of accounts having reached the Governor-general of the alarming deficiency of grain in camp before Seringapatam, his Lordship directed him to relinquish the intended operations in the district of Coimbatoor, and to unite as speedily as possible his detachment to that of Colonel Read, with a view of forming a force sufficiently strong, to give due protection to the large and important supplies proceeding to the grand army.

Lieutenant-colonel Read having summoned the fort of Covriporam, which is situated at the entrance of the Pass of that name, it surrendered to him without resistance on 22d of April. Here he collected his supplies for the army, and leaving them under the protection of the fort, proceeded with his detachment to clear the Pass, which proved a most arduous service. For, although he marched from Covriporam on the 23d, he did not reach Marenhully, or the head of the Pass, until the 27th of April; and with every exertion which he could make, it was the 6th of May before the supplies got through the Pass. In the mean time, General Floyd's detachment had reached Cowdahully, a station within a few miles of Marenhully: he was closely followed on his march from Seringapatam by the enemy's cavalry, commanded by Cummur-ud-Dien Khan, who had not been able to oppose any serious resistance to his progress.

On the 6th of May, the united detachments of General Floyd, and

Lieutenant-colonel Read, were reinforced by the southern division of the army under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Brown; and on the 7th, the whole, amounting to fourteen thousand fighting men, including six thousand of the Nizam's horse, being assembled at Hunnoor, moved forward with their convoy, towards Seringapatam. General Floyd expected to be harrassed by the enemy's cavalry in his return to the army; but the events which had taken place in the mean time, removed all impediments.

This convoy, consisting of thirty-three thousand Brinjarry bullocks, and four thousand three hundred and fifty-eight draught and carriage cattle, laden with rice, grain, and other articles, two thousand five hundred and sixty slaughter cattle, and twenty-one thousand nine hundred sheep, besides arrack and medicines, arrived in safety, at Seringapatam, on the 13th of May. So ample a supply, under any circumstances, would have afforded effectual relief to the army; it would have enabled us to maintain our position, and a second convoy, if necessary, by means of the cattle just arrived, after depositing their loads, might have been brought from Coorga. The rise of the Cauvery, therefore, need not have compelled us to raise the siege. The Marquis Cornwallis's army remained in tents, in Mysore, throughout the year. The British army under the command of General Harris consisted, after the arrival of General Floyd, of thirty-five thousand five hundred and fifty-five fighting men, of whom eight thousand seven hundred and four were Europeans.* The Nizam's infantry were three thousand six hundred and twenty-one, and his cavalry about six thousand. In all, the allied force, encamped before the capital of Mysore, consisted of forty-five thousand one hundred and seventy-six fighting

* Appendix, XI.

men; a number nearly equal to the total military field establishment* of the late Tippoo Sultaun. The position of the encampment has been already described. It was uncommonly strong, and its high situation rendered it dry and healthy. In the event, therefore, of a rise in the river, a portion of the infantry and artillery, of this numerous force, might have been cantoned in a fortified camp, or at the new fort of Mysore, defended by the field pieces and battering guns, whilst the remainder might have been actively employed in the Sultaun's territories; and occasionally, in bringing supplies to the camp at Seringapatam, or to Mysore, until the season returned for resuming the operations of the siege.

The Sultaun's army being now entirely annihilated by the surrender and the dispersion of his infantry, and Silledar horse, and by the stable horses, elephants, camels, and gun-bullocks, having been delivered up, the necessary measures were immediately pursued by Lieutenant-general Harris for taking possession of the remaining parts of the Sultaun's dominions. On the 19th of May, the army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant-general Stuart, marched from Seringapatam, on its return to Malabar, by the way of Coorga, and arrived at Cannanore on the 22d of that month, at which period the rains had not commenced; but as the season was far advanced, the troops were ordered to canton in the northern division of Malabar, which was favourably situated for the prompt execution of any further plan of operations that might have eventually been required.

* Tippoo Sultaun's field army was estimated at forty-seven thousand four hundred and seventy fighting men. Vide Appendix, XXX. The total number of his military establishment, including Peons and matchlockmen, was nearly one hundred thousand.

The immediate possession of Canara appeared an object of the first importance, since there was reason to believe, that the French would endeavour to effect a landing upon this coast, if by any means they should attempt to send troops to the assistance of Tippoo Sultaun. General Stuart accordingly ordered a detachment of three battalions of sepoys, and a proportion of artillery, to march thither under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Wiseman. This force was deemed sufficient to secure the general obedience of the country, and to get possession of the principal harbours upon the coast, until the season of the year should admit of the movement of a larger body of troops to establish more completely the company's authority, and to repel any hostile invasion that might be attempted by the French.

Circular letters were addressed by Lieutenant-general Harris to the commandants of the principal fortresses in Canara; and these were supported by similar requisitions from the Meer Suddoor, or general superintendant of garrisons, under the late Sultaun's government, requiring the surrender of their respective forts to the British troops, and giving them general assurances of favour and protection.

Similar measures were adopted to obtain the surrender of the forts in other parts of the late Sultaun's dominions, and with uniform success wherever our troops had proceeded. The cultivators of the land, had returned quietly to their occupations in most parts of the country; and as the strongest disposition appeared, throughout the whole of the Sultaun's territories, to submit to the orders of the British government, there was every reason to expect that they would be taken possession of without reluctance or opposition.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Governor-general frames a Settlement of the conquered Countries—an Abstract of its Principles.—His Lordship's Decision on the Establishment of a central and separate Government in Mysore.—He determines the Rule of Distribution of Shares to the Company, the Nizam, the Marhattas, and to the Government of Mysore.—His Attention to the Establishment of a strong Frontier of Hill Forts, &c.—His Arguments for and against the Family of the Mysore Rajahs and the Sultaun's Heir.—His Lordship prefers the Descendant of the Rajahs of Mysore—provides for the Families of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun—for the Mahomedan Chiefs and Officers of the Sultaun—and for the Families of those who had fallen in the Course of the War.—Appoints a Commission for the Affairs of Mysore.

WHILST Lieutenant-general Harris was pursuing measures for obtaining possession of the remaining forts and districts, the Marquis Wellesley was occupied in framing a general settlement of the conquered territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun. The following is a summary abstract of the principles, by which his Lordship's conduct has been governed, in framing this settlement, and of the means which he afterwards employed for carrying it into effect.

From the justice, and success, of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, the Company, and the Nizam, derived an undoubted right

to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms. This right of conquest entitled them, to retain the whole territory in their own hands; the cession of any portion of it to any other party might be a consideration of policy, or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right.

The Marhattahs, whatever might have been their disposition, having taken no share in the war, had forfeited every pretension to the advantages of peace. The numerous progeny of Tippoo Sultaun, even if it had been possible to adjust their separate pretensions to the succession, could plead no title, which had not been superceded by the conquest of the kingdom; nor was it possible in estimating their claims, to forget the usurpation of Hyder Ally, and the sufferings of the unfortunate family expelled, by his crimes, from the throne of Mysore. A lineal descendant of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore still remained at Seringapatam; but, whatever might be the hopes of his family, from the moderation and humanity of the conquerors, this young Prince could assert no right to any share of the conquered country.

To the free and uncontrouled exercise of the right of conquest thus vested in the Company and the Nizam, no obstacle existed in the internal state of the kingdom of Mysore. The whole body of the people had manifested the most favourable disposition to submit to our authority. The commanders of most of the principal fortresses had surrendered, or expressed their readiness to surrender to our arms: and within a few days after the fall of Seringapatam, the Governor-general was satisfied, that no difficulty would arise from the influence of the Mahomedans introduced into Mysore, under the usurpation of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun.

It had been the uniform policy of the latter, to destroy every vestige of hereditary right, established office, or territorial possession, among his subjects, and to concentre, not only the whole authority of the state, but the whole conduct of the government in his own person. During his reign, therefore, his numerous Mahomedan chiefs possessed neither weight, nor collective force. Many of them had fallen at Malavilly, Sedaseer, and Seringapatam; and most of the survivors, together with their families, were actually in the fortress of Seringapatam, subjected to our discretion, and confiding in the clemency of the British government, without union, spirit, or strength to resist its power. The inclination and temper, both of the surviving chiefs, and of the people, were also most happily disposed to receive any new settlement, which might promise to secure them against the revival of a despotism, the barbarity and caprice of which has never been surpassed, even by the most tyrannical of the Mahomedan conquerors of India.

In regulating the exercise of our right of conquest, it appeared that no principle could more justly be assumed, than that the original objects of the war should constitute the basis of the peace, and of the general settlement of our territorial acquisitions. These objects had been repeatedly declared by the allies, to be a reasonable indemnification of our expence in the war, and an adequate security against the return of that danger which originally provoked us to arms.

With a view to each of these just and necessary objects, it was requisite that the Company and the Nizam should retain a large portion of the conquered territory. But it required much

consideration to determine the precise extent of that portion, as well as the just rule of partition. The war had not been undertaken in pursuit of schemes of conquest, extension of territory, or augmentation of revenue. In proportion to the magnitude and lustre of our success, it became a more urgent duty to remember, that a peace, founded in the gratification of any ambitious, or inordinate view, could neither be advantageous, honourable, nor secure.

The approved policy, interests, and honour, of the British nation, therefore, required, that the settlement of the extensive kingdom subjected to our disposal, should be formed on principles acceptable to the inhabitants of the conquered territories; just and conciliatory towards the contiguous native states; and indulgent to every party, in any degree affected by the consequences of our success.

To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, to the exclusion of any other state, would have afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Marhattahs, and aggrandized the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion. Under whatever form such a partition could have been made, it must have placed in the hands of the Nizam, many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysore, and exposed our own frontier in that quarter, to every predatory incursion. Such a partition would have laid the foundation of perpetual differences, not only between the Marhattahs and the Nizam, but between the Company and both these powers.

To have divided the country into three equal portions, allowing the Marhattahs, who had borne no part in the expence or hazard

of the war, an equal share with the other two branches of the triple alliance in the advantages of peace, would have been unjust towards the Nizam, and towards the Company; impolitic, as furnishing an evil example to our other allies in India, and dangerous, as effecting a considerable aggrandizement of the Marhattah empire, at the expence of the Company and of the Nizam. This mode of partition, also, must have placed Chitteldroog, and some of the most important northern fortresses in the hands of the Marhattahs, while the remainder of the fortresses, in the same line, would have been occupied by the Nizam; and our unfortified, and open, frontier in Mysore, would have been exposed to the excesses of the undisciplined troops of both powers.

The Marhattahs, unquestionably, had no claim to any portion of the conquered territory; and a considerable extension of their empire was objectionable, especially, when accompanied by the possession of strong fortresses bordering on the line of our frontier. It was, however, desirable to conciliate their good will, and to offer to them such a portion of territory, as might give them an interest in the new settlement, without offence or injury to the Nizam, and without danger to the frontier of the Company's possessions. On the other hand, it was prudent to limit the territory retained in the hands of the Company, and of the Nizam, within such bounds of moderation, as should bear a due proportion to their respective expences in the conquest, and to the necessary means of securing the future safety of their respective dominions.

These subjects underwent the most minute inquiry and investigation. A comparative statement of the several plans for the partition of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, was drawn up under the

Governor-general's instructions, with a view to the relative interests and power of the Nizam, the Marhattahs, and the Company; to the nature, produce, and geographical boundaries of the country, and to the position, and strength, of the several fortresses and passes. An attentive investigation of every comparative view of these important questions, terminated in a decision, that the establishment of a central, and separate, government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Marhattahs, under certain stipulations, to a participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties; to secure to the Company a less invidious, and more efficient, share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage, and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory, or power; and to afford the most favourable prospect of general and permanent tranquillity in India.

Having decided these leading principles of the new settlement, the Governor-general proceeded to determine the rule of distribution for the respective shares of the Company, the Nizam, and the Marhattahs; to fix the most eligible position for the cessions to be made to each party; and to define the limits of the new government of Mysore.

To the Company's share naturally fell the province of Canara, and the districts of Coimbatoor and Daraporam; with all the territory lying between the British possessions in the Carnatic, and those in Malabar. These acquisitions appeared the most eligible, not only on account of their intrinsic value, in point of produce, but as securing an uninterrupted tract of territory, from the coast

of Coromandel to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea-coast of the kingdom of Mysore, and the base of all the eastern, western, and southern Ghauts.

To these the Governor-general thought it necessary to add, the forts and posts, forming the heads of all the passes above the Ghauts, on the Table Land. The possession of the base of the Ghauts alone, formed no effectual barrier for the inhabitants of the low lands against an enemy possessing the summits of those mountains; and his Lordship therefore considered the acquisition of all the entrances of the passes, situated above the Ghauts, to be an essential object of security against every possible approach of danger from the Table Land. This acquisition derived a further importance, from the means which it appeared to afford of curbing the refractory spirit of the Polygars, and of all other turbulent and disaffected subjects in the Carnatic, and on the coast of Malabar. The district of Wynaad, with a view to the tranquillity of the Company's territories on the latter coast, was also considered an useful possession. The last addition, which was deemed necessary to make to the Company's share of the conquered dominions, consisted of the fortress, city, and island of Seringapatam; the possession of which, would effectually secure the communication between their territories on both coasts, and consolidate all their lines of defence in every direction.

To the Nizam, it appeared most expedient to allot the districts of Gooty and Gurrumcondah, bordering on the cessions which he acquired by the peace of 1792; together with a tract of country, the frontier of which should be drawn nearly along the line of Chitteldroog, Sera, Nundydroog, and Colar; leaving, however,

these fortresses to the southward, to form the frontier of the new government of Mysore. The Nizam, certainly, could not assert any just claim to an equal participation with the Company in the advantages of the peace. The operation of the sixth article of the treaty of Paungul, respecting an equal division of conquests, was limited to the war which terminated in 1792. Since the peace of Seringapatam, the tenth is the only article of the treaty of Paungul, which can be considered to continue in force; and no subsequent engagements had been contracted with the Nizam, which could entitle him to any advantage in the present peace, exceeding his relative proportion in the expences and exertions of the allied force during the late war. It was, however, desirable, that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company, (after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to the tenure) should not exceed the Nizam's portion; and accordingly, the Governor-general determined, that this principle should be observed in the partition; reserving, however, to the Company, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expences and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new government of Mysore.

For the Marhattas, it was resolved to reserve a portion of territory, the revenues of which should not exceed two-thirds, nor fall short of one-half, of the portions retained in sovereignty by the Nizam, and the Company, respectively, after deducting their respective charges. Considering that any cession to the Paishwah must be viewed as a matter of mere favour, it appeared to the Governor-general, that the share to be allotted to him was amply sufficient. It would comprise Harponelly, Soonda, Anagoondy,

part of the district of Chitteldroog, and a part of Biddenore above the Ghauts, and other districts. But the frontier fortresses of Chitteldroog and Biddenore would remain for the protection of the new government of Mysore. His Lordship also determined that no portion of territory should be ceded to the Paishwah unconditionally; and that the cession should form the basis of a new treaty with the Marhattah empire.

The territory remaining unoccupied by this plan of partition, would be bounded to the northward by a strong line of hill-forts and posts, forming a powerful barrier towards the southern frontiers of the Nizam, and of the Marhattahs, from Punganoor, on the line of the eastern, to Biddenore, on that of the western Ghauts; and would be entirely surrounded to the east, west, and south, by the territories of the Company above and below the Ghauts; the Company also holding the fort of Seringapatam in the centre of the Table Land.

The necessity now occurred of determining in what hands the new government of Mysore should be placed: and although no positive right or title to the throne existed in any party, it seemed expedient that the choice should be made between the pretensions of the family of Tippoo Sultaun, and those of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore.

The claims of humanity on both sides, rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task to the Governor-general. No alternative remained, but to depose the dynasty, which was found upon the throne, or to confirm the Mahomedan usurpation, to the perpetual exclusion and degradation of the legitimate Hindoo

sovereigns of the country. The usurpation, although not sanctioned by remote antiquity, had subsisted for such a length of time, as to have nearly extinguished the hopes of the Hindoo family, and to have accustomed them to the humility of their actual fortunes; while the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, born in the state of royalty, and educated with the proudest and most exalted expectations of sovereignty, and power, would be proportionally sensible to the sudden change of their condition, and to the unexpected disappointment of their splendid prospects.

In this view of the subject, it would have been more grateful to the Governor-general (securing a munificent provision for the ancient family of Mysore) to have restored that of Tippoo Sultaun to the throne, if such a restoration could have been accomplished without exposing Mysore to the perpetual hazard of internal commotion and foreign war, and without endangering the stability of the intended settlement of the British interests, and those of our allies, in that quarter of India.

Since the peace of Seringapatam, and more especially since the year 1796, the destruction of the British power in India, had formed the favourite and unremitting object of Tippoo Sultaun's hopes and exertions. His haughty mind never could be reconciled to the sacrifices he was compelled to make for the purchase of peace in 1792; and his increasing eagerness to recover the extensive portion of his dominions then ceded to the allies, urged him to pursue a systematic course of intrigue against the British power, among all the native states; and to revert to his ancient and hereditary connection with France, as the only effectual means of gratifying either his ambition or revenge.

Sufficient proofs had been obtained, previous to the war, of the nature and objects of his machinations: they have since been corroborated by the voluminous records discovered in the palace at Seringapatam; and it is now incontestible, that Tippoo Sultaun's thoughts were perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British power; that he trusted to have accomplished our expulsion, by instigating the French to invade India; and that he prosecuted this unalterable purpose, with all the zeal and ardour of passionate resentment and vindictive hatred.

Perhaps the most wise policy which Tippoo Sultaun could have pursued, would have been to have remained satisfied with the dominions left to him at the peace of 1792. But a policy of so moderate and pacific a spirit, being utterly incompatible with the impetuosity of his temper, and with the military character of his government, it might be at least a matter of rational speculation, whether a close alliance with France (however dangerous in its remote consequences), was not his true interest in the actual state of his immediate views and pursuits. The possession of his lost dignity, wealth, and power, could not be recovered without the conquest of a great part of the Company's territory; nor effectually secured, without the total subversion of the British interests in India. A French army was the only instrument by which such an enterprise could be attempted: an alliance with France was therefore the necessary consequence of Tippoo's Sultaun's restless, but natural desire, to restore his empire to its former splendour and strength. In addition to his correspondence with the French at Tranquebar, with those at the Isle of France, and with the Executive Directory at Paris, his embassy to Zemaun Shah, his intrigues at Poonah and Hyderabad,

and his correspondence with Monsieur Raymond,* (all which transactions appear distinctly on the records discovered at Seringapatam), furnish abundant evidence, that his antipathy to the English was the ruling passion of his heart, the main-spring of his policy, and the fixed and fundamental principle of his councils and government.

The heir of Tippoo Sultaun must have been educated in the same principles, encouraged to indulge the same prejudices and passions, and instructed to form the same views of the interests and honour of the throne of Mysore. These sentiments would necessarily acquire additional force in his mind, from the issue of the late war. Our unexampled success had subverted the foundations of his father's empire, and transferred to our possession, every source of the civil or military power of Mysore. Placed on the throne by our favour, and limited by our controul, he would feel himself degraded to a state of humiliation and weakness, so abject, as no prince of spirit could brook. Under such an arrangement, our safety would have required us to retain, at least, all the territory which we now hold by the partition treaty of Mysore. Whatever we retained, must have been considered by this prince, as a new usurpation upon his Royal inheritance, and an additional pledge of his degradation and disgrace. In proportion to the reduction of his territory and resources, he would have had less to lose, and more to regain, in any struggle for the recovery of his father's empire: nor does it seem un-

* Appendix, XLI. A letter from M. Ripaud to Citizen Sultaun Tippoo, which establishes the fact, that M. Raymond, Commander of the French army at Hyderabad, had opened a correspondence with the Sultaun.

reasonable to suppose, that the heir of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions, in pursuit of so proud an object, as the recovery of the vast and powerful empire, which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of every quarter of India.

In the most narrow view of the subject, it is manifest, that the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have a powerful interest in the subversion of any settlement, which should confirm the partition of his father's dominions, and establish the limitation of his independence. If, therefore, the late peace had been followed on the throne of Mysore by the most cordial reconciliation, would have been [illegible] With such a principle [illegible] nor union of [illegible] pearances [illegible] even [illegible] w[illegible] [illegible] ager [illegible] ambition, and to recover [illegible] Whatever [illegible] been left to the [illegible] government [illegible], would always have [illegible] throughout [illegible] terests. The hostile [illegible] Mysore would [illegible] ened, but not destroyed.

An enemy would still have remained in the centre of our possessions, watching every occasion to repair the misfortunes of his family at our expence; and forming a point of union for the machinations of every discontented faction in India, and for the intrigues of every emissary of France.

Under these circumstances, the same anxiety for the security and repose of the Company's possessions, which originally compelled the Governor-general to reduce the power of Tippoo Sultaun, now appeared to require, that he should provide effectually against the revival of any degree of a similar danger in the person of his son.

On the other hand, the restoration of the descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, was recommended by a similar course of reasoning, to that which operated to the exclusion of the heir of Tippoo Sultaun.

The indignities which the deposed family of Mysore had suffered, especially during the cruel and tyrannical reign of Tippoo Sultaun; and the state of degradation and misery, to which they had been reduced, must naturally excite a sentiment of gratitude and attachment in their minds towards that power, which should not only deliver them from oppression, but raise them to a state of considerable affluence and distinction. Between the British government and this family, an intercourse of friendship, and kindness, had subsisted in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune. They had formed no connection with our enemies: their elevation would be the spontaneous act of our generosity; and from our support alone could they hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultaun, or

against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy, all the friends of the usurping family; and consequently be adverse to the French, or to any state connected with that family in its hereditary hatred to the British government. The heir of the Rajahs of Mysore, if placed on the throne, would feel that his continuance in that station, depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts. It would therefore be his interest to unite with cordiality and zeal, in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore, would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety; in the place of that power, would be substituted one, whose interests and resources would be absolutely identified with our own; and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity, or alarm, to the Carnatic, would become a new barrier of our defence, and would supply fresh means of wealth, and strength, to the Company, their subjects, and their allies.

In addition to these motives of policy, moral considerations, and sentiments of generosity and humanity, favoured the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title, and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect; nor could it be doubted that their government would be more acceptable, and more indulgent than that of the Mahomedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country, composed almost entirely of Hindoos.

These considerations induced the Governor-general to adopt the resolution of preferring the descendant of the Rajahs of

Mysore, to the heir of Tippoo Sultaun; and at the same time, determined him to grant to the families of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun, a more munificent maintenance than either had enjoyed during the late reign; and to provide with the same liberality, for all the Mahomedan officers, and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultaun, and for the families of all those who had fallen in the course of the war.

For the accomplishment of a settlement founded on the principles which have been detailed, the Governor-general issued a special commission on the 4th of June, appointing Lieutenant-general Harris, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, with the ample powers specified in the commission.* It was the Governor-general's intention, immediately after the fall of Seringapatam, to have proceeded thither for the purpose of superintending the settlement of the affairs of Mysore; but as the favourable state of the country had rendered his presence there unnecessary, the commission was accompanied with instructions,† directing the commissioners to proceed without delay to lay the foundations of the new arrangement; and for the purpose of precluding the intrigues of the natives, and of all the great interests which were in suspence, the commissioners and their secretaries were enjoined to take an oath of secrecy, in order that no part of the plan might transpire, until the arrangements for its accomplishment had been completed.

* Copy of the commission. Appendix, XLIII.

† Instructions to the Mysore commission. Appendix, XLIV.

CHAPTER XV.

The Commissioners assemble at Seringapatam—their Proceedings—Cummur-ud-Dien Khan retires to Gurrumconda.—The Four elder Sons of the Sultaun, with their Families, removed to the Carnatic.

THE commissioners assembled at Seringapatam on the 8th of June, and having, according to the Governor-general's instructions, taken into consideration the most eligible means of carrying into effect the measures of conciliation towards the principal surviving Sirdars of the late Tippoo Sultaun, they came to the following resolutions:

First. To promise, in the name of the Company, pensions for life to the following persons.

FIRST CLASS.

	Star Pagodas per annum.
Meer Golam Alli, Meer Suddoor	3,000
Golam Alli Khan, vakeel	3,000
Alli Rezah Khan, vakeel	3,000
Budruz Zeman Khan	3,000
Syed Mahomed Khan	2,400

SECOND CLASS.

Khan Jehan Khan	500
Syed Mehn-ud-Dien	500
Abdul Wahab	500
Abdu Kuddoos	500
Bauker Saheb, son of Budruz Khan	600
Hussein Saheb, ditto ditto	600

Secondly, to promise, in the name of the Company, stipends or allowances to the following persons, equal to half the amount of their respective salaries under the late government: such stipends to be continued to them during good behaviour, or as long as they should remain unemployed, either by the Company or its allies.

THIRD CLASS.

	Canteria Pagodas. Former Pay.	Present Pay.
Meer Golam Hussien	840	420
Syed Yassin	700	350
Shaik Mohe-ud-Dien	700	350
Mahomed Hullun	700	350
Shaik Mahomed	700	350
Syed Shaw Abbas	700	350
Mahomed Ismael	560	280
Abdul Mahomed	560	280
Meer Ibrahim	630	315
Mahomed Syed	630	315
Mahomed Ismail	630	315
Hafiz Mahomed Khan	630	315
Mahomed Hussein	420	210

In the selection of the three first of the Sirdars named in the first class, the commissioners were guided by considerations, referring partly to the services which they had rendered, or the good disposition which they had manifested towards the British Government, and partly to the high respect entertained for their character, and to the weight and authority which they are universally acknowledged to possess amongst the Mahomedans of the late Sultaun's territories; and with respect to the last two of that

class, they were influenced, solely, by a regard to the latter of the preceding considerations.

All the persons named in the second class (with the exception of Bauker Saheb, and Hussein Saheb, the sons of Budruz Khan), were Meer Meerans under the late government, and were reported, to the commissioners, as men of the most respectable characters in that rank.

In fixing the amount of the pensions to be granted to the Sirdars of the first and second classes, the commissioners were not so much guided by the amount of their respective salaries under the late Tippoo Sultaun, as by the policy of securing, by a liberal provision, the attachment of so many persons of rank, and influence, to the interest and welfare of the British government in India: and in granting provision to them, it did not appear, to the commissioners, advisable to stipulate any condition, which might be thought to derogate from the liberality and munificence of the East India Company. They satisfied themselves, therefore, with intimating to those Sirdars, that they had no doubt their conduct would be such, as to secure a continuance of favour and protection from the British government. These considerations, it was not necessary to extend to the persons named in the third class; who, although they had also been Meer Meerans under the late government, did not possess the same weight of character as the others.

All the Sirdars named under the foregoing heads having, by appointment, attended the commissioners, were received, according to the classes into which they had been previously arranged,

and made acquainted with the powers entrusted to the commissioners, and of the resolutions which, under those powers, they had adopted. This communication was received by every individual with very lively sensations of gratitude, and in several instances, of wonder. Many of them expressed the greatest astonishment, at the unparalleled condescension, and generosity, of the Company's government, in manifesting so much consideration for persons who had so recently borne arms against them, and who could not assert any claims to their favour or protection.

These measures produced the most salutary effect in tranquillizing the minds of the principal Mahomedans remaining in Mysore; and as it placed the clemency, and generosity, of the British government in the most conspicuous and honourable light, it could not fail to conciliate all classes of people, and to prepare their minds for the new arrangements in contemplation for the settlement of Mysore.

The total amount of the allowances which the commissioners had agreed to grant to the Sirdars of the late Tippoo Sultaun, did not exceed the annual sum of star pagodas, 20,907, 2 *r.* 6 *fa.* It will no doubt be necessary to augment the foregoing list of pensioners, and to make provision for the families of certain Sirdars deceased, whose pretensions had not been taken into consideration, excepting in the instance of Syed Saheb's family, (consisting of eighteen persons, male and female), for the maintenance of whom a monthly pension of two hundred pagodas was assigned.

The commissioners were, however, of opinion, that the sum allotted by the Marquis Wellesley (40,000 pagodas) as a fund for providing suitably for these various persons, would be more than adequate to the purpose of extending the Company's liberality to every individual whom it may appear necessary to admit to a participation of it, either on the score of humanity or policy.

It was next determined, that Meer Kummur-ud-Dien Khan should be settled at Gurrumcondah, with a jaghire from the Nizam, and another from the Company.* This arrangement having been concluded, Kummur-ud-Dien departed from Seringapatam on the 19th of June, with many expressions of gratitude towards the Company's government.

The Bramin, Purneah, who had been the principal financial minister of the late Sultaun, having giving satisfactory proof of his readiness to serve the new government, in the same capacity, it was deemed advisable to appoint him Dewan to the young Rajah of Mysore.

The next proceeding of the commissioners, in pursuance of their instructions, was to undertake the removal of the familes of Hyder Alli, and Tippoo Sultaun, from Seringapatam to the Carnatic. This painful, but indispensable measure, the Governor-general felt himself bound by every principle of duty to accomplish without delay, as a necessary previous step towards the intended new settlement of Mysore. His Lordship's humanity had induced him at all times, to exert every effort to mitigate the rigorous parts

* Appendix, XLV. Vide second article of the Partition Treaty.

of this revolution; but on this occasion, his extreme solicitude, that the removal of the families should be effected with as much delicacy as possible, is strongly marked by the precautions which he ordered, and the instructions he sent, for the guidance of the commissioners. The details of this delicate office fell to the lot of Colonel Wellesley, as commandant of the garrison of Seringapatam; subject, however, to such suggestions as might be offered by the other members of the commission. To his prudential precautions, which the occasion required to prevent the possibility of commotion or escape; to his discretion, activity, and humanity, throughout the whole of this difficult and arduous task, is justly ascribed the facility with which it was accomplished.

The deficiency in draft and carriage cattle, which, at that period existed at Seringapatam, as well as in camp, compelled Colonel Wellesley to confine himself, at first, to the removal of the four elder Princes, with their respective families. The other parts of the family, inhabiting the Zenana, were allowed to remain for the present, as no danger was to be apprehended from their continuance at Seringapatam, until it was found practicable to remove them.

The four princes, Futteh Hyder, Abdul Khalick, Moiz-oo-Dien, and Mohee-oo-Dien, with their families, crossed the river on the 18th of June, and next day proceeded on their journey towards Vellore, escorted by two divisions of the Honourable Company's second European regiment, one battalion of native infantry, and two troops of cavalry, with four field pieces, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Coke; and as the Governor-general had directed that an officer conversant in the language, manners, and customs of the natives, and of approved humanity, should accom-

pany the princes, Captain Marriott, Aid-de-camp to the Commander in Chief, was appointed to this office.

The fortress of Vellore had been prepared for the reception of the Princes; and Lieutenant-colonel Doveton, an officer in all respects well qualified for the charge, was appointed to the command. He was also entrusted with the payment of the stipends allotted to both families; and was directed by the Governor-general, to spare no reasonable expence in providing for their accommodation, on a scale suitable to their former rank, and expectations. Lieutenant-colonel Doveton met the Princes beyond Ryacotah, and conducted them to Vellore, where they arrived on the 12th of July. They expressed their satisfaction in the accommodations provided for them, declaring them to be, which was actually the case, far better than those to which they had been accustomed. The remainder of the families of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun, were to be removed to Vellore as soon as might be practicable.

CHAPTER XVI.

Origin of the Kingdom of Mysore.—Lineal Descent of the present Rajah, and a short Account of all the Rajahs of Mysore.—The present Mysore Family—Establishment allowed them by Tippoo Sultaun.—A lineal Descendant of the Delaways—His Establishment allowed by the Sultaun.—The Commissioners visit the young Rajah—Gratitude of his Family—The Rajah is placed on the Musnud—Purneah appointed Dewan to the Rajah—And Lieutenant-colonel Close, Resident of Mysore.

It appears by a work entitled, "An Historical and Political "View of the Decan, by James Grant, Esq." That "the de- "scendants of five Musselmen princes, who had usurped the "dominion of their respective governments, being stimulated by "the ambition of conquest, and the intolerant spirit of their "religion, had waged perpetual war, in confederacy, against "Ramraje, the Hindoo monarch of Bejanagur, who at length "was slain in a pitched battle near Tellecottah, on the banks "of the Kistna, in the year 1565. In consequence of this event, "and a disputed succession, internally, to the throne of Beja- "nagur, the Naiks, or governors of the large provinces, became "independent. Such was the origin of the modern Hindoo prin- "cipality of Mysore."

But, by information obtained since the capture of Seringapatam, we find, that in the year 1600, Raije Worrear was a petty poligar

of Mysore, on which depended thirty-one mousas, or principal villages, exclusive of Mysore. At that period, Mysore was tributary to the Rajah of Chickraipatam, the capital of a small Hindoo soubahship under the Rajah, or Emperor, of Anagoondy. The island of Seringapatam being a part of this soubahship, was not then attached to Mysore.

The site of Chickraipatam is on the north bank of the Cauvery, about three miles west from Seringapatam. The Rajah, named Shri-Renga-Rail, died in 1610 without issue, and Raije Worrear of Mysore, being esteemed for his good character, and abilities, was nominated to the succession of the soubahdary of Chickraipatam, by a decree of the reigning Rajah of Anagoondy. Previous to this succession, the Mysore family did not assume the ceremony of sitting on a throne. Wherefore, this period is considered, although not the origin of the family, to be the foundation of the kingdom of Mysore.

Raije Worrear died in 1618, and was succeeded by his grandson, Chiaum Raije, who first built a small fort on the island of Seringapatam, the east face of which, it is said, intersected the present fort nearly in the middle, or in a line with Tippoo Sultaun's palace. Chiaum Raije also made some additions to the pagoda of Shri-Renga-Samy, and added a few villages to his country. He died in 1638, and was succeeded by his son Immerie Raije, who dying without issue a few months afterwards, a male relation, named Rama-Canterwa-Narsa-Raije, was chosen, according to the usage of the Mysore family, from amongst several other boys. This Rajah improved the fort of Seringapatam; built the pagoda of Narsuma-Samy; constructed the tank of Narsamboody, near

Nunjecode; coined the gold fanams, named after him, Canteria or Canterwa fanams; and made several conquests. To the north he extended his dominions as far as Muddugeery; to the south, as far as Chickengeery; to the east, to Baugloor and Ossoor; and to the west, as far as Hassen and Belloor. He was celebrated for his personal courage and strength; and it is related of him, that in consequence of a challenge to single combat, posted by the Rajah of Tritchinopoly upon his gate, Canterwa proceeded thither in disguise, engaged his rival, and overcame him. He died in 1660.

Canterwa was succeeded by his son Doda-Dewa-Raije; who died after reigning fourteen years; when his son, named Chick-Dewa-Raije, succeeded to the throne. During this reign, the dominions of Mysore were extended to the southward as far as Caroor; to the westward as far as Wastara. In one day, Chick-Dewa-Raije took nine forts, for which reason he got the name of *Nou-Kottah-Narna*, which signifies the nine fortress Narna. It is also interpreted the *Nine-Crore-Narna*, in allusion to his riches. The king of Delhi having heard of his fame, sent him the title of Rajah-Juggah-Deoo. He made several revenue regulations, and other arrangements, which were afterwards considered as models for conducting every department of the state of Mysore. He constructed the two great aqueducts in the vicinity of Seringapatam, which spring from several stone dams, formed across the river Cauvery, between the village of Canambaddy and the Capany river. These aqueducts are for the purposes of cultivation, and render fertile the lands between them and the river Cauvery, which otherwise would be totally unproductive. They wind extremely, preserving a gradual and easy descent through an

uneven surface on each side of the river, in horizontal distance, about thirty miles; so that the total length of those aqueducts cannot be less, I should imagine, than ninety English miles. He also built the Mysore bridge. This famous Rajah died in 1705, and was succeeded by his son, Canterwa-Narsa-Raije, who having been born dumb, the dominions of Mysore were put under the management of two brothers, named Trimulaingar and Shinga Peremaloo, until his death, which happened in 1716. His son Doda-Kistna-Raije, succeeded him, and had the character of a good prince. He added Maggeri to his dominions, and died, without issue, in 1733. His successor, Chiaum Raije, was elected according to the usage of the government, which was managed by Dewa Rajahiah. This man confined his master, Chiaum Raije, on the summit of Copauldroog, where he died in consequence of drinking the water of a poisonous reservoir.

Chiaum Raije having also died without issue, in 1736, Chick Kisna Raije was elected in the usual manner, and being only three years old when he was nominated Rajah, Dewah Rajahiah still remained Delaway, or prime-minister, and his brother Nunda Raije was Surwaddikar, or commander in chief. The Delaway was held in greater estimation than his brother, who, from his actions, appeared to have been led rather by his passions, than by maxims of prudence. At length, however, Nunda Raije became Delaway, and left his master merely the shadow of power. During this reign, Dewanhully and Dindigul were added to the dominions of Mysore, exclusive of the conquests made by Hyder Alli, who usurped the government in 1759, by besieging Nunda Raije in the fort of Mysore. From this period, the Rajah became a state prisoner, and died in 1766, aged about thirty-three.

Hyder, who was at that time at Coimbatore, ordered Chick-Kisna-Raije's son, named Nunda-Raije, to be placed on the throne with the usual ceremonies.

This prince died in 1771, and was succeeded by his younger brother Chiaum-Raije, who by Hyder's orders was placed on the throne. Chiaum-Raije died without issue, at the age of fourteen. Hyder, upon this occasion, ordered eight or ten boys, lineally related to the royal family, to be brought before him for the purpose of electing one of them to be Rajah. The boys being accordingly brought to the palace at Seringapatam, Hyder ordered some fruit to be distributed amongst them; and watching attentively the conduct of the boys after they had received the fruit, he remarked, that one of them gave the fruit to his father, whilst all the others either began to eat their shares upon the spot, or to wrap them up in their clothes. Hyder considered him who had given the fruit to his father, as the most promising, and immediately placed him, then four years of age, on the throne. This prince, named Chiaum-Raije was elected in 1777, and died in 1796, of the small-pox.

Upon the death of Chiaum-Raije, Tippoo Sultaun did not nominate, nor acknowledge, a successor. The young Mysore Rajah, placed on the throne since the capture of Seringapatam, is the only child of Chiaum-Raije, who had been married to seven wives, of whom five are now living. The present young Rajah's mother died about a fortnight after his birth.

One of the wives of Chick-Kisna-Raije who died in 1766, is still alive, aged fifty-eight. The paternal grandmother, and the maternal grandfather of the present Rajah, are both living.

The Mysore family at present consists of the young Rajah; his father's five wives; a grandmother ninety-six years of age; the wife of the former Kisna-Raije (fifty-eight years old); the mother of Chiaum-Raije (sixty years); and a mistress of Chick-Kisna-Raije; in all, ten persons. These had a small establishment of servants, for which Tippoo Sultaun made them an annual allowance of 269 Canteria pagodas 5 fanams. Besides, they had a monthly allowance of provisions, and clothes, issued from the public stores. The annual amount of the former, was estimated at Canteria pagodas 2216. 8. 2.; and of the latter, Canteria pagodas 166. 8. The total amount of the household allowance being Canteria pagodas 2655. 1. 2.; or £. 885 sterling.

The Mysore family resided formerly in the Mysore palace; which is an old Hindoo building, much neglected, and out of repair. Through the influence of Meer Sadduck, they were turned out of it about the year 1796, and removed to a small house adjoining the northern rampart. Since their removal, the palace has been used as an armory and military store-house.

Besides the young Rajah's family, who reside together, the maternal grandfather already mentioned, a poor man, named Bala-Raije, was found at Seringapatam. There was also a son-in-law of the former Kisna-Raije, named Narrain-Raije, who has a son about eighteen years of age, both of whom were in great distress.

There is also at Seringapatam, a lineal descendant from the Mysore Rajah's minister, generally called the Delaway of Mysore, whose family has been usually supposed to inherit the office of

prime-minister. The last Delaway appears to have been Nunda-Rajie, who had usurped the authority of his master, before he was besieged by Hyder Alli, in 1759. He was afterwards confined by Hyder, and died about the year 1772, leaving two sons, Vee-Raije, and Toda-Raije; the latter of whom died unmarried, about the year 1779. Vee-Raije is still living; he is about sixty years of age; has been married twenty-two years, and has a son named Deo-Raije, about fourteen years old. Tippoo allowed an establishment to Vee-Raije, which, including household, clothes, and provisions, amounted to Canteria pagodas 1712. 7. or £. 570 sterling.*

Having thus traced the origin of the kingdom of Mysore, and the descent of the young Rajah, according to the best information which had been obtained, and transmitted to the Governor-general, two months after the fall of Seringapatam, I now return to the proceedings of the commissioners for the affairs of Mysore.

They had cautiously abstained from all intercourse with the family of the Rajah, until the departure of the princes from Seringapatam; but as soon as the four elder sons of the late Sultaun had left the capital, the commissioners paid a visit to the young Rajah; having previously signified to his family, through Purneah, the outline of the Governor-general's intentions toward his Highness.

* This account of the families of the Mysore Rajahs, is chiefly taken from Captain William Macleod's communication on this subject to the Governor-general.

This being the first communication made to them, of their intended elevation, and of the happy change in their fortunes, was received by the family with the utmost surprize, and with the most unfeigned expressions of gratitude. The two nearest relations of the young Rajah, sent the commissioners a written answer, of which the following is a translation:

" *To Lieutenant-general George Harris, the Honourable Colonel*
" *Arthur Wellesley, Mr. Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel*
" *William Kirkpatrick, Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, Com-*
" *missioners for the Affairs of Mysore;*

" *From Letchima Ama,* the wife of Kisna-Raije-Worrear, and*
" *Dewaj Ama,† the wife of Chiaum-Raije-Worrear; with*
" *Compliments.*

" *On the 22d day of Jeisht—year Shidartee: (24th June 1799.)*

" YOUR having conferred on our child, the government of " Mysore, Nuggur, and Chitteldroog, with their dependencies; " and appointed Purneah to be the Dewan, has afforded us the " greatest happiness.

" Forty years have elapsed since our government ceased. " Now, you have favoured our boy with the government of this " country, and nominated Purneah to be his Dewan; we shall, " while the sun and moon continue, commit no offence against

* The second wife of the Rajah, who reigned at Hyder's usurpation.

† The second wife of Chiaum Raije, and maternal aunt of the present Rajah, whose father was married to eight wives, two of whom were sisters.

" your government. We shall at all times consider ourselves as " under your protection and orders. Your having established us, " must for ever be fresh in the memory of our posterity, from one " generation to another. Our offspring can never forget an attach- " ment to your government, on whose support we shall depend."

(Signed) LETCHIMA AMANY.
DEWAJ AMANY.

A true Translation.
(Signed) WILLIAM MACLEOD.

Upon receiving this letter, on the 24th of June, the commissioners gave notice, through Purneah, to his Highness and to his family, of their intention to pay their personal respects to them in the course of the evening.

Accordingly, they proceeded to his Highness's residence, accompanied by Purneah, whose presence they deemed necessary at this first interview; and although every preparation had been made for their reception, they found the young Rajah, and others of this persecuted family, in a condition of poverty and humiliation, which excited the strongest compassion. A portion of an apartment in which the commissioners were received, was concealed from view by a curtain, behind which stood the Ranah, and the other female relations of the Rajah. The male part of the family attended the young Rajah, and received the commissioners with expressions of gratitude and joy, proportioned to the magnitude of the benefits conferred on them, and to the state of indigence and obscurity, from which their family was now relieved. The commissioners again informed them of the general outline of the Governor-

general's proposed arrangements, and of his intentions with respect to the Rajah. In reply to this communication, the Ranah expressed, through one of her attendants, the lively sense which she entertafned of the generosity, and clemency of the British nation, which had now raised her and her family from the abyss of human misery, to that station, of which the had been so long deprived by tyranny and usurpation. She dwelt particularly on the persecution to which they had been exposed, from the cruel, savage, and relentless disposition of the late Tippoo Sultaun; but she added, that the English having at length restored the ancient rights of her house, in the person of her grandson, had opened to her a prospect of passing the remnant of her days in comfort, and in peace.

The young Rajah's name is Kistna Rajah Oodiaver; he is said to be five years old. His complexion is rather fair, and his countenance very expressive: he is of a delicate habit, and apparently of a timid disposition. At first, on the arrival of the commissioners, he betrayed some symptoms of alarm, which however soon disappeared.

The day after this visit to the Rajah, Purneah having reported to the commissioners, that the Brahmins had fixed upon the 30th of June, as the most auspicious day for placing his Highness on the Musnud of Mysore, it was accordingly resolved that the ceremony should be performed on that day.

The commissioners communicated to Lieutenant-general Harris, who was in camp at some distance from Seringapatam, their wish, that he would, if possible, assist in person, at the approaching

ceremony. In consequence, the General, attended by his suite, and a detachment of European cavalry, proceeded to Seringapatam on the morning of the 29th.

The Rajah and his family removed some days before to the old town of Mysore, where the best preparations, which circumstances would admit, were made for their accommodation. These indeed were necessary, since the same policy which had dictated the removal of every vestige of Hindoo magnificence, under the government of the late Tippoo Sultaun, had also led to the demolition of this city. Scarcely any traces remained of the ancient palace of the Mysore Rajahs. There were no buildings; and as the inauguration was to be performed here, it became necessary to erect a temporary shed for the occasion.

It had been resolved to fix the residence of the Rajah in the ancient town of Mysore, as the most eligible situation for the seat of his government; but it was, at the same time, a gratification to the family, that their restoration should take place in the very spot where they had been deposed, and even upon the ancient Musnud used by the Rajahs, which was found in their palace of Seringapatam. Attention was paid to these circumstance, which, however trifling they may seem, have a wonderful effect on minds, tinctured with superstition, and influenced even by the consideration of lucky or unlucky days.

The necessary preparations having been made, the members of the commission, accompanied by Meer Allum and his son Meer Dowrân, escorted by his Majesty's twelfth regiment, and a detachment of cavalry, proceeded on the morning of the 30th of

June to the old town of Mysore. Soon after the commissioners entered the building, the young Rajah, attended by all the male part of his family, by Purneah, and a vast concourse of Hindoos, arrived. He was received at the entrance by the commissioners: Lieutenant-general Harris, as senior member of the commission, and Meer Allum, advanced to meet him. Each taking a hand of the young Rajah, they led him to the Musnud, on which they placed him, under a royal salute from the fort of Seringapatam, and three vollies of musquetry from the troops which were present; and the Commander in Chief then delivered to the Rajah, the seal and signet of the Rauje. The deportment of the young Prince during the ceremony was highly proper, and free from those symptoms of restraint and alarm which he had manifested at the first interview.

It was a pleasing circumstance to observe, that many of the principal Sirdars of the late Tippoo Sultaun, who had benefited by the liberal arrangements of the Governor-general, appeared at this ceremony without invitation; and the joy manifested by the numerous Hindoos who attended on the occasion, may be more easily imagined than described.

After the investiture of the Rajah, the Brahmin Purneah, was appointed by the commissioners to be his Highness's Dewan.

The eminent abilities and integrity of Lieutenant-colonel Close, added to his extraordinary skill in the country languages, and his experience in the manners, customs, and habits of the natives of India, induced the Marquis Wellesley to select him for the important charge of Resident with the Rajah of Mysore; to which

office he was accordingly appointed; and the command of Seringapatam was placed in the hands of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, an officer, whose approved military talents, and integrity, qualified him for the execution of a trust of so much delicacy and importance, and which must, for some time at least, require to be superintended with peculiar vigilance and care.

CHAPTER XVII.

Partition Treaty.—Subsidiary Treaty between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.—Extensive Powers reserved to the Company—Advantages expected from this Arrangement—Diligence and Ability of the Commissioners—Collectors of Revenue appointed to the newly-acquired Districts.—New frontier Forts garrisoned by British Troops.—Dhoondia, a Partizan, occasions Disturbances—is pursued by Detachments under Colonels Stevenson and Dalrymple, and retires within the Marhattah Territory.—Lieutenant-colonel Wiseman takes Possession of Mangalore.—The Conduct of the Marhattahs not likely to interrupt the Settlement of Mysore.

On the 5th of June, the Governor-general furnished the commissioners with the draft of a treaty to be concluded between the Honourable East India Company, and his Highness the Nizam, for the partition of Mysore; and having afterwards received a full communication of their sentiments, and of those likewise of Meer Allum on the subject, he made such alterations as appeared to be advisable. On the 22d of June this treaty was executed by the commissioners and Meer Allum, at Seringapatam, and ratified by the Governor-general in council, at Fort St. George, on the 26th of the same month; and by his Highness the Nizam, at Hyderabad, on the 13th of July.* It is inserted in

* Vide Appendix, XLV.

the Appendix, under the title of the Partition Treaty of Mysore; and a Memorial * added, explanatory of its several provisions. The treaty is further illustrated by the Map, which will shew the great importance of the acquisition of territory, and of frontier stations, derived from the mode of partition adopted by the Governor-general; and the evident advantages arising from it, whether considered in a political or military point of view.

On the 8th of June, the Governor-general forwarded to the commissioners, the draft of a subsidiary treaty, to be concluded between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore. After an ample discussion with the commissioners, and the adoption of such of the alterations proposed by them, as the Governor-general approved; this treaty was executed in the fortress of Nuzzerbah, or New Mysore, near Seringapatam, by the commissioners, and by certain proxies on the part of the young Rajah, on the 8th of July; and ratified by the Governor-general in council, on the 23d of July, under the title of the Subsidiary Treaty † of Seringapatam. Although this treaty is also accompanied by an Explanatory Memorial, ‡ it may be proper, in this place, to advert to the main principle upon which its stipulations are founded.

In framing this engagement, it was the determination of the Governor-general, to establish the most unqualified community of interests between the government of Mysore and the Company; and to render the Rajah's northern frontier a powerful line of defence to the British possessions. With this view, his Lordship engaged to undertake the protection of the Rajah's country, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lacks of

* Appendix, XLVI. † Appendix, XLVII. ‡ Appendix, XLVIII.

star pagodas, or £. 280,000 sterling. But adverting to the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties, from the double governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, his Lordship resolved to reserve to the Company, the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country, and of requiring extraordinary aid, beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparations for hostility.

Under this arrangement, the Governor-general calculated upon the command of the whole of the resources of the Rajah's territory, the improvement of its cultivation, the extension of its commerce, and the security of the welfare of its inhabitants. It was evidently a more candid, and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprize the government of Mysore distinctly, at the Rajah's accession, of the exact nature of his dependence on the Company, than to leave a point of so much consequence for future doubt or discussion. The right of the Company to establish such an arrangement, either as effecting the Rajah, or the allies, has been already explained in the fourteenth chapter.

A sanguine expectation was entertained, that the Rajah and his ministers, being thus apprized of the extensive powers reserved to the Company, would cheerfully adopt such regulations as should render the actual exercise of those powers unnecessary. Much indulgence indeed would be required at the commencement of the new government; and it was the Governor-general's intention to abstain from any pressure upon the Rajah's finances, which,

by embarrassing them, might tend to the impoverishment of the country, and to the distress of the people.

It is but justice to the gentlemen who composed the commission for the affairs of Mysore (which the Governor-general dissolved after the subsidiary treaty was concluded), to remark, that the conclusion, within one month, of two treaties, so extensive in their consequences, and complicated in their details, together with all the subordinate arrangements connected with this important settlement, appears to be an extraordinary effort of diligence and ability; more especially when it is considered, that reference was necessarily made to the Governor-general, at Fort St. George, through every stage of their transactions. The whole arrangement seems to have been conducted by the commissioners, with a spirit of humanity, and liberality, which does equal honour to their feelings, and to their judgment; and which cannot fail to conciliate the good-will of the inhabitants of Mysore.

The territory above the Ghauts, allotted to the Company, has passed into our hands without any difficulty, and collectors have been appointed for the administration of the revenues. The fort of Gurrumcondah is in the possession of his Highness the Nizam; and those of Biddenore, Chitteldroog, Sera, and Nandedroog, are now garrisoned by British troops.

The only impediment of any importance, to the speedy and quiet settlement of the whole country assigned to the Rajah of Mysore, by the Partition Treaty, proceeded from some disturbances, which arose in the province of Biddenore, and which have since been happily quelled.

A partizan of the name of Dhoondia, originally in the service of the Patan state of Savanore (or Shanoor), having committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, had incurred the resentment of that prince. Tippoo Sultaun having contrived to secure the person of Dhoondia, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but either detecting him in some treacherous projects, or suspecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons at Seringapatam, some time previous to the commencement of the late war. From this situation he was released, together with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops on the 4th of May. He immediately fled from Seringapatam; and being joined by a few of the Silledar cavalry of Tippoo Sultaun's disbanded army, took the direction of Biddenore, and in his way thither, his force received some augmentation. Some of the Asophs and Kelladars in Biddenore, betrayed their trusts to him; and in this manner, many of the principal places of that province had fallen into his hands, before it was in the power of Lieutenant-general Harris to detach from the army a sufficient force to act against him. In the mean while, Dhoondia had laid the rich country of Biddenore under severe contributions, which he exacted with the most unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder.

At length, a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel James Dalrymple of the Madras establishment, moved against Dhoondia from Chitteldroog, on the 21st of July, and overtook a party of his banditti, consisting of about two hundred and fifty horse and four hundred infantry.

The shocking cruelties which these plunderers had recently committed, rendered it necessary to make a severe example. It was therefore determined to refuse them quarter, for the purpose of deterring others from similar enormities.

Dhoondia crossed the Tungbuddra. Hurryhur, a fort on the east bank of that river, was taken on the 30th of July, by a division of Lieutenant-colonel Dalrymple's detachment.

While Lieutenant-colonel Dalrymple attacked this banditti on one side, Colonel Stevenson was advancing into Biddenore in another direction, at the head of a light force, composed also of native cavalry and infantry. On the 31st of July, Colonel Stevenson crossed the Tungbuddra, and advancing against Simoga, took that place by assault on the 8th of August; and on the same day, the fort of Hoornelly, situated on the west bank of that river, was taken in the same manner by the detachment under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dalrymple.

Both detachments having now effected the passage of the Tungbuddra, it was determined to make a combined attack on the camp of Dhoondia, which occupied a strong position near the town and fort of Shikârpoor. Accordingly, Lieutenant-colonel Dalrymple, on the 17th of August, charged Dhoondia's cavalry, and drove them with considerable loss into a river situated in their rear. Our infantry at the same time attacked the fort of Shikârpoor, and carried it by assault: Dhoondia escaped by means of a boat provided on the occasion.

Colonel Stevenson, the progress of whose detachment had been

impeded by difficult roads, now assumed, as senior officer, the command of the united detachments, and immediately pursued Dhoondia so closely, as to compel him to take refuge in the Marhattah territory, where Colonel Stevenson, on the 20th of August, saw him encamp with the remnant of his banditti, which he might easily have taken or destroyed, had he been at liberty to pass beyond the boundary of the Marhattah dominion. But the Governor-general having strictly prohibited any violation of the frontier of the Marhattah empire, Colonel Stevenson, with great judgment and discretion, halted his detachment on the boundary, and signified to the Marhattah officer of the adjoining district, that the respect entertained for the rights of the Marhattah state, precluded the further progress of the British forces.

As Dhoondia had on several occasions, by acts of robbery and murder, rendered himself obnoxious to the Marhattahs, there was no danger of their affording him an asylum against the remonstrances of the British government. His camp indeed was plundered, a few hours after it had been pitched within the territory of the Marhattahs, by Dhoonda Punt Gôklah, a chief commanding a division of the Paishwa's army; and his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns, were carried off, which deprived him of all means of future depredation. The province of Biddenore was soon afterwards completely delivered from the banditti, which had acted under Dhoondia's command; for although they retained some posts in the country at the period of his flight, these were all evacuated on the approach of the British troops.

The detachment which was sent from the army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Wiseman, took pos-

session of Mangalore without opposition, on the 4th of June; and the province of Canara, with the exception of the fortress of Jemaulabad, appeared disposed to submit cheerfully to the authority of the British government. There was no doubt that the commanding officer of Jemaulabad, would soon be induced to surrender to the company's arms. In the event, however, of an opposition, he would be reduced without difficulty; and in this confidence, the Governor-general appointed a collector for the province of Canara.

Since the fall of Seringapatam, the conduct of the Marhattahs has been of the most conciliatory nature; and there was not the least appearance of their giving any interruption to the settlement of Mysore. Whatever may be the secret inclinations, either of the Paishwah, or of Scindiah, their mutual weakness, and reciprocal jealousy, are sufficient securities against any danger from that quarter.

CHAPTER XVIII.

A general View of the Advantages resulting to the British Interests from the Conquest of Mysore.—Great Increase of the East India Company's annual Resources, within Twelve Months after the Marquis Wellesley took Charge of the Supreme Government of India.

THE eminent advantages resulting to the British interests, from the splendid success of the judicious and extensive schemes pursued by the Marquis Wellesley, from that period when the hostile designs of Tippoo Sultaun were proclaimed by Monsieur Malartic, until the final settlement of Mysore, are sufficiently obvious. It may not however be useless to take a general view of the whole of this important question; to advert to the state of the general expectations, at different periods of time, previous to the war; and to compare our actual situation in India, since the conquest of Mysore, with those expectations, as well as with our position in June, 1798.

At that time, even the most sanguine dispositions, and those least affected by the prevalent alarm, would probably have been content to have detached Tippoo Sultaun from his alliance with the French nation, in the hope, that without the aid of a French force, he would not attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the Carnatic.

Even at a later period, when the subversion of the French party at Hyderabad, the restoration of the Nizam to the condition of an efficient ally, and the advanced state of our military preparations, had inspired a general spirit of confidence and zeal; the most confident and zealous would have deemed the issue of the approaching contest prosperous as well as honourable, if it had effected a considerable reduction of the power, and resources, of Tippoo Sultaun, and had obtained a reasonable indemnity for the expences of the allies.

The entire destruction of Tippoo Sultaun's power, or the absolute transfer of his resources to any hand, less inimical, or less violent, would have been deemed a glorious termination, even of a long and expensive contest.

But the success of the British arms, in the short period of the late campaign, has not merely excluded the French from Mysore, provided an ample indemnity to the company and their ally, for the charges of the war, destroyed the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, and effectually precluded its revival, but has transferred the sword of our implacable enemy into our own hands; and turned to our own use, the main springs of his wealth and strength.

By the partition treaty of Mysore, the East India Company have acquired an augmentation of direct territorial revenue to the annual amount of about *Star pagodas* 6,47,641. 10. By the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, they have secured an annual subsidy of *Star pagodas* 7,00,000, making, together with their new territorial revenue, the sum of *Star pagodas* 13,47,641. 10; and leaving (after deducting the provision allotted for the families of

Hyder Alli Khan and Tippoo Sultaun), an annual increase of their funds in that quarter of India, equal to *Star pagodas* 11,47,641. 10. But a reasonable expectation is entertained, that the territory acquired by the company, under the treaty of Mysore, will yield, in the course of a few years, a sum not less than *Star pagodas* 14,78,698.*

If such an advance in the nominal revenue of the acquired districts should actually be realized, the positive augmentation of the available, annual, resources of the company, in consequence of the late settlement of Mysore, will amount nearly to twenty lacks of star pagodas, or eight hundred thousand pounds sterling.

But in estimating the increase of the company's annual available resources since the month of June 1798, the augmentation which took place in the subsidy payable by the Nizam is not to be omitted. By the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded on the 1st of September 1798, the annual subsidy was augmented from *Arcot rupees* 6,44,556, to *Arcot rupees* 24,17,100; making an increase annually of *Arcot rupees* 17,72,534, or *Star pagodas* 5,64,982. Thus the total augmentation of the company's available, annual, resources, since June 1798, in that quarter of their possessions, amounts actually to *Star pagodas* 17,12,623; and if the revenue of the newly acquired territory should be realized, according to just expectation, it will amount to *Star pagodas* 25,43,680, or above one million sterling.

Against these acquisitions, must be placed the expence of whatever additions it may be found necessary to make to the military

* Appendix, XLIX.

establishment, either in consequence of the extension of territory, or of the subsidiary engagements which have been contracted with the Nizam, and with the Rajah of Mysore.

The subsidiary force at Hyderabad, must be considered as a part of our efficient strength, prepared for our service on any emergency, and ready to aid us in any future war as it has done in the last. It does not appear probable, that it will be necessary to make any considerable addition to the military establishment of Fort St George, in consequence of the treaty of Hyderabad; nor is it apprehended, whatever the augmentation may be of that establishment, and of the army of Bombay in consequence of the two treaties, that it will bear any proportion to the increase of the revenue and resources. For it must never be forgotten, that while our territory has been extended, our frontier has been contracted and strengthened, our principal enemy utterly destroyed, and an ally, and dependant of the company, established on his throne.

As yet, there are no means of stating with sufficient accuracy, either the amount of the charges incurred in consequence of the various measures of preparation and precaution, which became necessary on the discovery of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile designs in June 1798, or the amount of the expence which is to be placed to the account of the operations of the late war. The accumulated charges, both of our preparations, and of the war, must be considerable; but whenever a statement of the expences of the late war shall be made out, it will be but fair, to distinguish the charges incurred for the purpose of assembling an effective army in the field, from those actually belonging to the operations of the armies in Mysore, and to the siege of Seringapatam.

From the moment that Tippoo Sultaun's negotiations had transpired, it became an indispensable duty to place the Carnatic in a posture of complete defence. The experience of former wars with Mysore; the nature of the frontier of the Carnatic, exposed in various points by numerous passes * through the mountains, to the incursions of the enemy; the actual state of affairs in India, and in Europe, all concurred to convince the Governor-general, that the only rational system of defence against Tippoo Sultaun, was to assemble the armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, in such force, in such a state of equipment, and in such a position, as should excite in the mind of the Sultaun, a just alarm for the safety of his capital. No other plan was calculated to secure the Carnatic against the ravages of his numerous cavalry; because no other plan would have compelled him to concentrate his forces within his own territories, for the defence of the vital point of his empire. His capital was not only the object of his pride, but the centre of his power. It was his strongest fortification; the principal granary of his army; his only arsenal; the repository of his treasury; and the prison of

* Twenty years ago our local knowledge, even of the Carnatic, was very imperfect. In 1784, when some of the Nabob's forts in the enemy's possession, were to be delivered up, even their names had never been heard of; and in regard to passes, it was supposed they were so few in number, that by defending them, an enemy might be prevented from invading the Carnatic. This ignorance proceeded from the Nabob's dislike to surveys being made of his provinces. But in 1788, when I was Captain of Guides to the army, and employed upon a survey of the western frontier of the British possessions in Coromandel, from the river Kistna to Cape Comorin, I ascertained the position and nature of not less than sixty passes through the mountains; several of which are practicable for armies; and two thirds at least of that number sufficiently open to the incursions of cavalry.

the legitimate claimant of the throne, as well as of the families of all his great chieftains, whose obedience he secured, by retaining the objects of their reverence and affection, within the walls of the fortress of Seringapatam.

On the preservation of that fortress, therefore, depended the fate of his empire; and although it was a general opinion, that he would never abandon the defence of it, but with his life, the Governor-general did not neglect any practicable precaution against a contrary course of events.

The success of the plan, founded on that opinion, fully answered its primary purpose, since no part of the Sultaun's force ventured to enter the Company's possessions in the Carnatic, during the late hostilities: it also fully answered the secondary purpose, of enabling our armies, when our pacific negotiations had failed, to act offensively with vigour and effect.

Neither the expence of the magazines of grain, and other stores, on either coast, nor of the battering train, with its equipment of cattle, ought therefore to be charged to the account of the war; for every expence incurred, previous to the 3d of February, 1799, (the day on which Lieutenant-general Harris received orders to march) must, and would have been incurred, if no war had taken place; and ought to be charged to the account of the indispensable defence of the company's possessions, according to the only plan, which could provide effectually for that object.

The expences of moving the battering train to Seringapatam, as well as maintaining the army of Mysore, cannot have much

exceeded the charges which must have been continued, if the whole had remained within our own frontier; and when it is considered, that if the army, with the battering train, had not moved to Seringapatam, the expensive, but necessary system of defence already explained, must have been protracted until all danger from Tippoo Sultaun's connection with the French should have been averted, it will be readily admitted, that the movement of the British forces towards the scene of their certain triumph, was not only the most effectual, but the most economical, measure which could have been adopted to frustrate the views of the enemy, and to secure the tranquillity of the Carnatic.

For, on the one hand, no prospect appeared of any practicable reduction in the expence of a defensive system, during the continuance of the war between Great Britain and France; while every hour of delay in the movement of our army, afforded to Tippoo Sultaun the means of increasing his strength, of receiving succours from the French, and, consequently, of aggravating to the company both the expences and the hazard of the impending contest.

On the other hand, the state of our army, the arrangements which had been made for its equipment and supply, in every department, and the period of the season, left no doubt, that the great object of the war might be attained in one short campaign. Nor did this calculation prove to have been, in any degree, sanguine; for, as we have already noticed, although an alarm of a deficiency of grain prevailed in the army before Seringapatam on the 16th of April, it appeared soon after, upon an accurate examination, at that time (exclusive of the immense depôts established

at Coorga and Kistnagheri) a quantity of grain remained in camp, sufficient to maintain the whole of the fighting men of the army, until the 20th of May; and on the 13th of that month, Major-general Floyd, as already mentioned, returned to Seringapatam, with the large supplies, which had been forwarded from the Carnatic, under the care of Lieutenant-colonels Read and Brown. It may also be useful to remark in this place, that if any accident had protracted the operations of the siege beyond the 4th of May, ample time would still have remained for the reduction of the place previous to the rising of the Cauvery; since the four eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun, with an escort of 1500 men, and a considerable train of attendants, crossed that river on the 18th of June, on which day the water was nearly as low as on the day of the assault.

Reviewing all these circumstances, the expence, incurred by the movement of the army to Seringapatam, may hereafter be compared with the probable charges of any other practicable plan of policy, or of military operation. In any view of the subject, it will undoubtedly appear, that the increase of the Company's revenue, and pecuniary resources, obtained by the issue of the war, far overbalances the combined expence of the preparations for defence, and of the operations of the late campaign.

But, in addition to this positive indemnification for the expences of the war, the augmentation of our commercial and military resources, arising from the conquest of Mysore, should also be taken into consideration.

Formerly, all traffic between the subjects and dependants of the Company, and those of the late Sultaun, was nearly prohibited,

by the restraints to which his hatred to the British nation, or his ignorance and prejudice, had subjected the communication with his possessions. These restraints being removed, and every proper encouragement to commercial intercourse being substituted, it may reasonably be expected that the neighbouring, and now, united countries of the Carnatic and Mysore, will mutually consume a considerable portion of their respective products and manufactures; and that even a proportion of British commodities will soon find a market in Mysore. Our information, with regard to the articles produced, manufactured, or consumed in the countries, acquired by the Company, and by the Rajah of Mysore, is at present too imperfect * to form any accurate calculation of the possible increase of the imports from the coast of Malabar to Europe; but it appears probable, that the Company's investment in the article of pepper, may soon be augmented to any extent which may be deemed advisable.

Our military resources may be considered to have received a great augmentation, not only from the additional supplies of grain, provisions, and cattle, which our connection with Mysore places at our disposal, but from the new channels which it opens for recruiting the native force, both of the presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay. Under this head may also be considered, the superiority of the climate of Mysore, to any in that quarter of India; and the means which it affords of preserving the health, and consequently the efficiency, of the European troops.†

* Appendix, XLIX.

† At Madras, the extremes of meridional heat throughout the year, by Farenheit's thermometer in the shade, are generally 73° and 105°; at Kistnagheri, in the

Highly as these immediate, and direct advantages, of revenue, and of commercial and military resource are estimable; the recent settlement of Mysore may be considered equally important to the British interests, in its tendency to increase our political

Baramaul, 70° and 90°; and at Ryacotah, situated upon what is usually termed the Table Land of Mysore, 65° and 85°.

In the years 1797-8 9, a series of correspondent observations at Kistnagheri and Ryacotah, gave the daily differences at noon, between the temperature at those places almost uniformly 5°. The extreme cold at sun-rise, at Kistnagheri, was 47°.

The lower fort of Ryacotah is probably on a level with the summits of the highest mountains in the Baramaul, or about seven hundred yards above the plains of Kistnagheri. The effect of this open and elevated situation, producing so sensible a change of climate in the short space of seventeen miles, is equally perceptible upon vegetation: here, a garden, situated in low ground, formed by the undulated surface of the Table Land, where the soil being rich, and having a command of water from the adjoining reservoirs, every thing grows in the greatest luxuriance. Larger cabbages, turnips, and carrots, as well as finer grapes, peaches, and figs, have been produced at Ryacotah, than upon any other part of the Peninsula.

This extraordinary luxuriant growth of the vine, requiring but little care, and its abundant produce, as well as the expence of labour being extremely moderate, are circumstances which point out the expediency of experiments being made in the culture of different sorts of grapes, transported to our newly acquired possessions. There may be situations even more favourable than Ryacotah; amongst which I should reckon the plains of China Balaporam, as they are the highest on the Peninsula, and sheltered by the surrounding mountains. The grape of the Canary islands, from almost under the same latitude, would certainly thrive in Mysore. Those of Madeira, of Spain, and other parts of Europe, and of Constantia at the Cape of Good Hope, might also be tried. These experiments would cost little; and if various kinds of grapes were properly cultivated, and superintended by persons conversant in the manufacture of wines, it is not improbable, that they might lead to a new, and advantageous, source of commerce from this part of India.

consideration and influence among the native powers of India, together with our means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order within our possessions, and of defending them against any enemy, either Asiatic or European. These are principles of substantial and durable security, the operation of which must be felt throughout every part of the Company's possessions, and in every branch of their affairs, both in India and in Europe.

The balance, which it was the policy of the treaty of Seringapatam, in 1792, to establish between the native powers of India, was soon deranged by the course of events. Our influence in the general scale proved insufficient, not only to maintain peace between our allies, but to check either the rapid decline of their respective resources and strength, or the growing ascendancy of the French faction at Hyderabad, or the systematic machinations of Tippoo Sultaun: experience has manifested, that the power preserved to that infatuated and restless prince, must always have been thrown into the scale opposed to our interests; and that, in no possible combination, or conflict, of the politics of Poonah and Hyderabad, could the interposition, or neutrality, of Tippoo Sultaun, take a bias favourable to our security. If he menaced war, or sought alliance with either, or with both these states, his uniform object was our disturbance. In no case has his power been brought into action, or even remained at rest, without a hostile design, and an injurious effect to our influence and consideration. The balance is now in our own hands: we now possess the irresistible power, either of concentrating the most efficient part of the resources of Mysore in one mass, for our single defence against any possible combination, or of throwing the same weight

into that scale which shall appear to require such an aid for the preservation of the general tranquillity, on the solid foundations of moderation and justice.

If the Nizam, or the Marhattahs, (notwithstanding their real interest in maintaining the new order of things) should have the disposition to disturb it, our means of defence, as well as of offence, with regard to both those states, are become so powerful, as well from the advancement and strength of our frontier as from the other relative considerations already stated, that the internal union of all the divided feudatory chiefs of the Marhattah empire, or even a confederacy between the Paishwah and the Nizam, could no longer be formidable to the British possessions. The first of these events is highly improbable, and the latter nearly impossible. On the other hand, it is evident, that having annihilated the power of Tippoo Sultaun, no injury can result to our interests from the interminable feuds of the Marhattah empire, and from the mutual jealousy of the Paishwah and Nizam.

The connection between the Nizam and the French is entirely dissolved, under circumstances which must render its renewal impracticable, at least, for many years.

But although we have nothing to apprehend from the Nizam, or from the Marhattahs, danger may still perhaps be apprehended from an invasion of Oude by Zemaun Shah. This danger ought not to be undervalued; but it is less formidable now than it has been in any former time. The loss of such an ally as Tippoo Sultaun, must materially affect the hopes of Zemaun Shah. And

it is obvious, that although he should persist in his threatened invasion, our means of repelling it are greatly increased, since the army of Fort St. George, in a case of exigency, might now co-operate with that of Bengal. Even during the late alarm of invasion from Zemaun Shah, although war with Tippoo Sultaun was apprehended, it has been seen that three thousand native volunteers, with a considerable force of artillery, had been detached to the coast of Coromandel, and yet we still were able to maintain an army of at least twenty thousand men on the frontier of Oude.

The intrigues of Tippoo Sultaun, among the Rajahs inhabiting the coast of Malabar, among the Poligars in the Carnatic, and among every other description of disaffected or refractory subjects, were the sources of continual commotion within the Company's territories; while the vicinity of the hostile frontier of Mysore offered refuge, and impunity, to every offender against their authority, and to every disturber of the public peace. It may reasonably be expected, that the establishment of the British influence in Mysore, will operate as a powerful check on that spirit of disorder, and by removing the causes of internal weakness, may enable our governments to oppose every foreign attack with greater confidence and vigour.

With regard to danger from the designs of France, it is evident, that the probability of her making any effort to disturb the tranquillity of India, will be greatly diminished from the moment that the intelligence of Tippoo Sultaun's fate shall reach Europe. Perhaps it is not too sanguine a view of our situation, to consider the annihilation of the only native ally of France in India, as the

final ruin of all her ambitious and vindictive projects against this great source of the wealth and power of Great Britain. The aid and co-operation of some native state, must always be indispensably necessary to any European force in attempting a serious impression on the British possessions in India; without such aid, it appears impossible that any European army should be able to advance from the sea-coast, or even to maintain itself, wherever it might land. If, however, contrary to every reasonable expectation, France should still persist in her projects against the peace of India, she will have to contend, unsupported by the arms, and, (what is of more importance) by the resources of any Indian ally, with a British army, animated by recent success, unembarrassed either by any native enemy in Mysore, or by any French faction at Hyderabad, and free to act on any point which France might venture to assail.

Such appear to be the consequences of the late settlement, as they relate more immediately to the interests of the East India Company; but it will be proper to consider them also, as they affect our allies.

Although the advantages offered to the Paishwah by the treaty of Mysore, may not be calculated to satisfy the rapacious character of the Marhattah state, it is reasonable to suppose, that, under all the circumstances of the case, they will be received as a distinguished testimony of our amicable disposition towards the court of Poonah; and that they will tend to appease its characteristic jealousy, if not to conciliate its cordial attachment.

The establishment of a Hindoo state in Mysore, with the resto-

ration of the temples and endowments of that religion, must be grateful to the government of Poonah, independently of the advantages arising from the substitution of a power of the same religion, and of pacific views, in the place of an odious Mahomedan usurpation, scarcely less hostile to the Marhattah, than to the British nation.

The solid and permanent benefits, however, which have resulted to the Nizam, from the recent improvement of his connection with the company, and particularly from the new settlement of Mysore, are so obvious and considerable, that they may reasonably be supposed to gratify his most sanguine expectations. The existence of his throne was saved by the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, in October, 1798. The formidable power of Tippoo Sultaun, which perpetually menaced his Highness's possessions, and filled his court and dominions with intrigues and treason, has been annihilated, and a friendly, and allied state established in Mysore. His Highness has received a large increase of territory, revenue, and power, together with several important fortresses, tending greatly to secure the tranquillity of his dominions. His expences in the war have been inconsiderable; and if a comparison were to be instituted of the advantages accruing to him, and to the company, from the whole arrangement, those obtained by his Highness would probably be found to preponderate. For the danger from which he has been delivered, was even more imminent than that which menaced the company's possessions; and while his expences have borne no proportion to ours, he has attained equal benefits, both of indemnification, and security. The collateral benefits derivable by the company, from its connection with the Rajah of Mysore, will necessarily extend to the

Nizam; and be scarcely less felt by him than by us, while he shall remain faithful to his alliance with the company.

The interests of the Rajah of Mysore being identified with those of the company, and the safety, prosperity, and honour of the Paiswah, and of the Nizam, being fully secured by the treaties of Hyderabad and Mysore, and by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, a confident hope is entertained, that the recent settlement of the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun will prove not less durable, than it will be found equitable in its fundamental principles, beneficial in its general operation, and conformable, in every point of view, to the liberal character of the English nation, and to the just and moderate policy, established by parliament, for the government of the British Empire in India.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

MALARTIC'S PROCLAMATION.

Liberté. *Egalité.*

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE,

UNE ET INDIVISIBLE.

PROCLAMATION.

ANNE JOSEPH HYPPOLITE MALARTIC, *Général en Chef, Gouverneur Général des Isles de France et de la Reunion, et Commandant Général des Etablissémens Francais, à l'Est du Cap de Bonne Esperance.*

CITOYENS,

CONNAISSANT depuis plusieurs années votre zèle et votre attachment pour les interèts et la gloire de notre République, nous sommes tres empressés et nous nous faisons un devoir de vous donner connaissance de

Liberty. *Equality.*

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

ONE AND INDIVISIBLE.

PROCLAMATION,

By ANNE JOSEPH HYPPOLITE MALARTIC, *Commander in Chief and Governor General of the Isles of France and Reunion, and of all the French Establishments to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.*

CITIZENS,

HAVING for several years known your zeal and your attachment to the interests and to the glory of our Republic, we are very anxious, and we feel it a duty to make you acquainted with all the propositions

toutes les propositions que nous fait Tippoo Sultaun, par deux ambassadeurs qu'il nous a dépéchés.

Ce prince a écrit des lettres particuliéres à l'assemblée coloniale, à tous les généraux qui sont employés dans ce gouvernement, et nous a adressé un paquet pour le Directoire Executif.

1°. Il demande à faire une alliance offensive et défensive avec les Français, en proposant d'entretenir à ses frais, tant que la guerre durera dans l'Inde, les troupes qu'on pourra lui envoyer.

2°. Il promet de fournir toutes les choses necessaires pour faire cette guerre, excepté le vin et l'eau de vie, dont il se trouve absolument dénué.

3°. Il assure que tous les préparatifs sont faits pour recevoir les secours qu'on lui donnera, et qu'à l'arrivée des troupes, les chefs et officiers trouveront toutes les choses necessaires pour faire une guerre a laquelle les Européens sont peu accoutumés.

4°. Enfin il n'attend plus que le moment ou les Français viendront à son secours, pour dèclarer la guerre aux Anglais, desirant avec ardeur pouvoir les chasser de l'Inde.

which have been made to us by Tippoo Sultaun, through two ambassadors whom he has dispatched to us.

This prince has written particular letters to the colonial assembly, to all the generals employed under this government, and has addressed to us a packet for the Executive Directory.

1. He desires to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops which may be sent to him.

2. He promises to furnish every necessary for carrying on the war, wine and brandy excepted, with which he is wholly unprovided.

3. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him, and that on the arrival of the troops, the commanders and officers will find every thing necessary for making a war, to which Europeans are but little accustomed.

4. In a word, he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India.

Comme il nous est impossible de diminuer le nombre des soldats des 107me et 108me regimens, et de la garde soldée du port de la Fraternité, à cause des secours que nous avons envoyès à nos alliés les Hollandais; nous invitons tous les citoyens de bonne volonté, à se faire inscrire dans leurs municipalités respectives, pour aller servir sous les drapeaux de Tippoo.

Ce prince desire aussi avoir des citoyens de couleur, libres, et nous invitons tous ceux qui voudront aller servir sous ses drapeaux, à se faire aussi inscrire.

Nous pouvons assurer tous les citoyens qui se seront inscrire, que Tippoo leur fera des traitements advantageux qui seront fixés avec ses ambassadeurs qui s'engageront en outre, au nom de leur souverain, à ce que les Français qui auront pris parti dans ses armées, ne puissent jamais y etre retenus quand ils voudront rentrer dans leur patrie.

Fait au port Nord-Ouest, le 10 Pluviose, l'an six de la République Française, une et indivisible.

(Signè) MALARTIC.

As it is impossible for us to reduce the number of soldiers of the 107th and 108th regiments, and of the regular guard of port Fraternité, on account of the succours which we have furnished to our allies the Dutch; we invite the citizens, who may be disposed to enter as volunteers, to enrol themselves in their respective municipalities, and to serve under the banners of Tippoo.

This prince desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of colour, we therefore invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag, to enrol themselves.

We can assure all the citizens who shall enrol themselves, that Tippoo will allow them an advantageous rate of pay, the terms of which will be fixed with his ambassadors, who will further engage, in the name of their sovereign, that all Frenchmen, who shall enter into his armies, shall never be detained after they shall have expressed a wish to return to their own country.

Done at port North-West, the 30th January, 1798.

(Signed) MALARTIC.

No. II.

MALARTIC'S LETTER TO TIPPOO SULTAUN'S AMBASSADORS.

Isle de France, le 8 Ventose an 6e.

MESSIEURS LES AMBASSADEURS.

Je suis trop franc pour vous laisser ignorer que je suis très mecontant de vôtre lettre de ce matin. Votre Sultan vous a envoyé pour nous demander les secours qui dependent de nous aux conditions que nous trouverons justes, et non pas à celles que vous nous prescrivez.

Tout ce que je vous ai demandé ce jours ci, m'a eté dicté par le General Dagincourt, qui est connu particulierement de votre Sultan, sous les ordres duquel il a servi, étant capitaine de grenadiers dans le battalion de règiment de l'Isle de France, qui a fait une campagne la guerre derniére, aux ordres de Bader et de Tippoo Sultaun : ainsi je persiste à vous demander généralement pour tous les officiers et les volontaires le traitement et les vivres

Isle of France, the 27th of February, 1798, 6th Year of the Republic.

TO THE AMBASSADORS.

Gentlemen,

I am of too sincere a temper to suffer you to remain ignorant of the great dissatisfaction which your letter of this morning has given me. Your Sultaun deputed you to solicit our aid on such conditions as we might deem just, and not on those which you now prescribe to us.

The demands which I have proposed to you within these few days past were framed by General Dagincourt, who is particularly known to your Sultaun, under whose orders he served when a captain of grenadiers in the battalion of the regiment of the Isle of France, which made a campaign during the last war under the Bahaudar and Tippoo Sultaun; I therefore persist in demanding, for all the officers and volunteers, the pay and provisions

suivant l'etât que je vous ai communiquè derniérement.

Ce qu'on payoit il y a dix ans, ne peut pas se comparer avec ce qu'on doit payer aujourd' hui.

Celui qui avoit à cette epoque 150 roupies par mois, en demande aujourd' hui, 600.

Vous ne voulez pas de chirurgiens, vous n'en aurez pas, et vôtre prince vous en saura mauvais grè.

Les officiers et les volontaires, qui partiront avec vous, ne doivent pas faire 500 lieues pour être assuré du traitement que Tippoo Sultan leur fixera; je leur ordonnerai de ne debarquer que lorsque Tippoo Sultan les aura fait assurer, qu'il leur accorde le traitement et les vivres que je lui propose.

Nous n'avons pas été vous chercher: vous êtes venus nous demander des secours; ainsi vous devez soumettre aux conditions que je vous propose, qui sont justes et raisonables.

Salut et fraternité,

LE GOUVERNEUR GENERAL,

(Signè) MALARTIC.

A true Copy, *C. Macaulay*, Sec.

stipulated in the last statement which I transmitted to you.

The pay which was granted ten years ago, cannot be made a rule for the pay which ought to be given now.

Those who at that period received 150 rupees per month, now demand 600.

You do not choose to take surgeons; you shall not have them; but your master will not be satisfied with your conduct on this article.

The officers and volunteers who are to accompany you, shall not make a journey of 500 leagues to ascertain what pay Tippoo Sultaun may choose to fix for them; I shall order them not to disembark, until Tippoo Sultaun shall have satisfied them that he will allow the pay and provisions which I propose to him.

We have not sought you, you came to solicit our aid; you ought, therefore, to submit to the conditions which I propose to you; they are just and reasonable.

Salutation and fraternity.

(Signed) MALARTIC,

GOVERNOR GENERAL.

A true Translation,

G. G. Keble, French Translator.

No. III.

NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF TIPPOO SULTAUN'S AMBASSADORS.

The following Articles were taken down agreeably to the dictation of Ripaud, on board the Vessel, on the 27th of Zaukree, 1225 of Mohummud, *(answering to the 15th December, 1797)*.

It has been ordered by the sacred Presence, that *(we)* must bring 30,000 horse and 40,000 infantry, 100 guns and mortars, with their equipments and artillery men, with the French force. Provisions, carriage, conveyance, and military stores, shall be furnished by the Khoodadaud Sirkar. This article was not brought forward.

That we should forward as great a number of Europeans as we can, together with 20 or 30,000 men of colour, who know their exercise well, and accompanied by experienced officers.

That the generals who may be sent on their part *(the French)* be masters of their profession, such as General Mangalon; and, as our king is better versed in the systems of India, the French generals must consult with him, and carry on operations against the enemy in concert with him.

Whatever may be taken in this war from the enemies of our king and the republic, such as towns, forts, factories, effects, ships and vessels, money, &c. or whatever cash or treasure be taken from nations in subjection to them; all these must be divided into two *(equal)* parts, one half for our king, and the other for the republic; excepting the country of the Khoodadaud Sirkar, which the English formerly wrested from it by force of arms; such country will be retained by the Sirkar, and they *(the French)* shall have no share in it.

Should the French republic be desirous of making peace with the English, they are not to conclude such peace without our king being comprehended therein; because, after the treaty of alliance, the enemies of the republic will be still the enemies of our king, and it would not be consistent with friendship and justice, not to include him in the peace.

Should any one in the service of the Khoodadaud Sirkar enter the French camp and commit any outrage, let him be apprehended and sent to the Presence, in order that he may be punished according to the forms of the Khoodadaud Sirkar; and in the same manner, should any one of the French army enter the camp of our king, and be guilty of any outrage and irregularity, he shall be immediately apprehended, and sent to the general of the French army, in order that he may punish him agreeably to his own customs. This article was not brought forward.

Should these propositions be approved by the republic, we request the leaders of the Mother Republic, to transmit speedy intelligence thereof to our king, by a small vessel, in order that his highness, in person, may set on foot a formidable and victorious army to meet that of the French in the neighbourhood of Mirjaun, which place is close to Goa. Oh, French nation! with a view to the mutual interests of the parties, our king intended to send several letters under his august seal and signature, with four sirdars of high rank, for the purpose of negotiating, upon a ship belonging to the Khoodadaud Sirkar, to the chiefs of the mother country: but the apprehension of the enemy, and the unfavourableness of the season, prevented the measure. A standard of the republic was, however, quickly prepared, and set up in the camp of Lally; *(his majesty)* caused it to be saluted with three thousand guns.* Ripaud and Mons. de Bay can bear testimony to this fact: and whereas our king has declared, that he thus

* Here follow the names of various implements of war, probably meaning ordnance, muskets, and rockets; but, the usual appellations being changed according to Tippoo Sultaun's system, it is not known what species are here designated. This alludes to the ceremony of consecrating the national flag, of which a detailed account is given in the Journal of the Sittings of a Jacobin Club, which had been established at Seringapatam under the auspices of M. Ripaud. This curious paper, in which the Sultaun is stiled Le Citoyen Tippou, was found in the palace at Seringapatam.

will support the standard of the republic: oh, French nation! if ye will but consent to these propositions, you need not hereafter fear your enemies. Turn your thoughts only to the protection of your island, for our king will keep the English so employed and embarrassed, that they will be unable to turn their attention towards you; further, Zemaun Shah, King of the Afghauns, and the greater part of the powers of India, are united with our king for this purpose, and will not cease until they shall have driven the English out of India.

OH PROTECTOR!*
Supporter of the World—Health!

The Particulars of our Proceedings from our first leaving Jemaul-abaud, until our arrival (return) at the port of Cowriaul *(Mangalore)* in the Khoodadaud Sirkar, are as follow:

On Sunday the 17th of Zaukree, 1225 of the birth of Mohummed (*5th December*, 1797), we embarked. Ripaud occasioned the delay of a day or two in adjusting the equipments of the vessel, &c. On the 19th, we weighed anchor. After proceeding five or six coss† to sea, Ripaud, accompanied by five or six persons, came up to us in a very disorderly manner, desiring us to shew them the letters which had been entrusted to us for the sirdars *(or chiefs)* at the Mauritius; we observed, that our orders from the Presence were, not to open the dispatches until our arrival there, and that it was not becoming in him *(Ripaud)* who had laid the foundation of the present expedition, and who was acquainted with all circumstances, to take such step. All our persuasions were of no avail; he took the dispatches from us by force, and tearing open the leathern envelope, wanted to open the khereetahs‡ also; we told him that he would be disgraced, and his improper proceedings be exposed among his whole nation, *(adding)* that it was highly unbecoming in him to be guilty of such a degree of

* An invocation to the Deity.

† A coss is usually reckoned equal to about two miles English.

‡ Khereetahs are the bags or cases of tissue or silk, in which letters addressed to persons of rank are usually enclosed.

treachery and misconduct: that until our arrival at the Mauritius, we respected these khereetahs as our own lives, and that we would sacrifice our lives, but we would do with these khereetahs as we had been directed by the Presence. Upon this, he restored them to us. The next day he came to us, and desired that we would make over to him the money which had been given to us by the Presence, for him and his French associates, else *(said he)* I will go to Umba'ee *(meaning perhaps towards Bombay)* and other quarters, for plunder, and will coast it for five or six months. We answered, "You know very well, that the money which his highness "assigned for our expences was entrusted to us in your presence, by Shaik "Ahmud, Mullik-oo-Toojar; knowing and seeing this, it is very unbe-"coming in you to make this request." Refuge of the World, Health! He assigned for our accommodation, the place where the Lascars are; there was no place for us to sleep or to sit in; our inconveniences increased daily; at last we desired Ripaud to allot some place for us to remain in until our arrival at the Mauritius; upon which, he gave us a small doney *(boat)* which was on the vessel, to sleep and eat in, until our arrival at the island. From the day of our leaving Mangalore until our arrival at Mauritius, he allowed us not more *(water)* than what he allowed the Lascars, and which only sufficed for drinking, it was not enough for cooking. In the course of the voyage he took two vessels; after taking the cargo out he released them. After ten or twelve days we steered directly for the Mauritius. Ripaud sent a message to me,* proposing to recite to us the commands which your highness had entrusted to him, respecting the negotiations with the sirdars of the Mauritius; that we should take down a translation of them, and make our representations accordingly at the island. We replied, that the Shaik Ahmud, Mullik-oo-Toojar, had communicated to us in his *(Ripaud's)* presence, orders to this effect, that whatever he *(Ripaud)* should dictate to us or tell us, we should make our representations accordingly to the sirdars above-mentioned, through the

* The vakeels are designated throughout this paper by the term ghoolaum, or slaves. Here the word is in the singular number, and is, perhaps, intended to apply to the writer only.

medium of Monsieur de Bay. Ripaud brought several papers to us, and dictating to de Bay, caused him to write several articles; which being done, he said, that they were in conformity to the orders of the Presence, and desired that we would regulate our negotiations accordingly. It is impossible to describe the distress we suffered from the rain, and the motion of the waves of the sea. However, by the favour of God and your majesty's auspices, we survived, and on Thursday the 3d of the month Rawzee (19*th January*, 1798), being arrived within two coss of the Mauritius, a pilot came off in a boat to learn the circumstances of the ship. He came on board, and Ripaud received him with a great deal of cordiality; he told him that we were ambassadors sent by your highness to the sirdars of the Mauritius, and desired that he would send some one *(on shore)* to give notice. The pilot immediately sent a Lascar with a verbal message to the general; and in two or three hours* after, a physician came to ascertain the people's health on board the ship. He sent for all the men who were on board the vessel, and inquired into the state of every man's health; he then came up to us, and made a salam *(or obeisance)* and told us, that he would immediately send notice to the general of our arrival: we desired him to allot some place for our accommodation on shore, and enable us to disembark, adding, that in a day or two after, we would commence our interviews with the sirdars; requesting that our arrival might not be made known to any one *(else)*. The physician, after remaining an hour, returned to the sirdars, and before two hours had elapsed, sent four persons of rank with a verbal message, stating, that he was extremely happy at our arrival, and that he would send for us the next day; we replied, by requesting that he would send for us clandestinely, so that it should be known to no one; they replied, that it was very well, they would report accordingly to the general, and act agreeably to such orders as he might give; after this they went away. In the mean time Ripaud carried the ship near to the land, and dropping the anchor in the mouth of the river, immediately went to the general. At twelve o'clock at night he came on

* The *hours* in this paper must be understood to mean the Hindostany ghurry, consisting of about 23 or 24 minutes.

board again, and told us that he had represented every thing to the general: before his return, however, five or six sirdars, and two aids-de-camp of general Malartic's, came to us on board the vessel, and told us that they must conform to the custom of their nation, and that if they did not receive your highness's ambassadors with due respect and attention, they would be censured from home. We used every argument in our power to dissuade them, but to no purpose. The next day, the soldiers were drawn up in two lines, from the bank of the river to General Malartic's house, by General Malartic's directions, who sent several officers in his own boat to meet us, and conduct us to his house; accordingly we went on shore in the boat; and immediately upon our landing, near a hundred and fifty guns were fired, and we were conducted with the utmost degree of respect to the sirdars: when arrived at General Malartic's house, the general himself, General Sercey, the members of council,* and other sirdars, met us at the door of the house. The general seated us upon chairs close at his right hand. We presented your highness's compliments to all the sirdars, and told them, that the object of our coming was to inquire after the health of your majesty's friends, as no news of them had reached the Presence for several years, and therefore your majesty had deputed us to all the sirdars, that we might ascertain and return with an account of the welfare of your majesty's friends. I then took the khereetahs, containing your majesty's letters, in my hands, rose from my seat, and addressing the sirdars, told them that they must take the royal letters with respect. Upon this, General Malartic arose, and taking off his hat, received the letters from my hands. In the same manner General Sercey rose from his place, and came up to me, and then I delivered to him his letter also. General Mangalon was not then present, but General Malartic told us that if we would deliver to him your highness's letter to General Mangalon, he would take care to convey it to him, and obtain his receipt for it: we accordingly delivered the august letter into the hands of General Malartic. I afterwards inquired who was the president of the council: Malartic desired Monsieur des Combres to rise and take the letters. At the time of

* The colonial assembly must be supposed to be here meant.

our landing we desired Ripaud to accompany us, which, however, he did not, but, in about one hour after our arrival, he came to the assembly, and holding his hat under his arm, stood at a distance. We told General Malartic that Monsieur de Bay had been sent from the Presence to be the interpreter between him *(Malartic)* and us, in any negotiations which might take place between us; in consequence of which, he called de Bay to him, and observed to him, that in your highness's letter, Yoosuf Alli was mentioned *(as the person deputed)*, whereas our names were Hussun Alli and Shaik Ibrahim, and desired to know the reason of this? This being explained to us by de Bay, I answered, that Meer Yoosuf Alli had been originally appointed, but being laid up with illness, he had been set aside, and your highness had deputed us instead: we then told General Malartic that we had several points of a secret nature to communicate to him, and therefore, if he would send for us in private, we would communicate to him what your highness had directed. General Malartic answered, "At 3 o'clock we *two* sirdars* will visit you at your place of "residence;" we then took leave. General Malartic provided us both with palanquins, and directed the bearers to remain with us as long as we continued on the island, and he gave us a garden close to the city to reside in. At 3 o'clock all the sirdars above-mentioned visited us: we went to meet them as far as the garden gate, and conducted them into the house with all due ceremony and respect. We seated them upon chairs, and addressed them to this effect: "The object of our king, in desiring to "form an alliance with the French republic, is to crush our already half-"expiring enemy—what do you wait for? his majesty is ready to afford "you succours; shew yourselves in India. The unbounded violence and "oppression of the English have rendered all the princes of India their "enemies: they are enfeebled on every side, and from the great extent of "territory, which they have acquired by artifice, they are dispersed in all "quarters. Look upon the present time as a most fortunate opportunity; "send a large army and an extensive train of artillery, to the assistance "of our sovereign, and effectually chastizing our mutual enemies, drive

* It does not appear who the other was.

" them out of India. The English tremble at the very name of our sove-
" reign and of the French, and will not be able to withstand the power of
" our sovereign, supported by the aid of the French republic, but will be
" defeated in every quarter. It is well known to the republic, that both
" his late majesty and our present sovereign, have at all times been the
" friends and well-wishers of the French nation, have always sought their
" assistance and support, and made common cause in their wars against
" their enemies. The wish of our sovereign is this, that by affording
" assistance to the republic, the French name may become as honoured
" and exalted in India, as it is through Europe and among the Mus-
" sulmen."

The sirdars asked, if an auxiliary force should be furnished from Europe, would your highness supply them with provisions, military stores, conveyance, and carriage? We answered, that from the day of the landing of the French army in India, your highness would supply them with provisions; that is to say, rice, meat of every kind, and ghee (excepting, however, European liquors), military stores, conveyance, and carriage. They then told us, that for the purpose of procuring a large military force, they would fit out two ships of war, and dispatch them with letters from themselves, together with your highness's letters addressed to them four, in charge of two confidential persons of rank, to France; and they desired that we would give them a memorandum of the provisions and carriage which we had promised them, in order that they might forward it to Europe, and speedily obtain the military succours required. We replied, that we would the next day furnish them with the memorandum accordingly. They then rose and went home. In the morning they sent the head aid-de-camp and* . . . . . Dewan,† to us; who said that General Malartic sent his compliments, and desired him to mention, that he and the other three sirdars were about to write letters to the government in Europe, and therefore he requested, that we would furnish him with the memorandum which we had promised, with respect to

* No probable name can be conjectured from the original.

† Superintendant of the revenue or finance.

provisions and carriage. Having accordingly drawn up a memorandum with regard to provisions and carriage, we sent it by Mons. de Bay to General Malartic. Cherisher of the World, Health!—These four sirdars have each written separate letters to different people, to procure a large force for the assistance of the Sirkar, and have deputed two confidential persons, one Mons.*——— the head aid-de-camp, the other Mons. Magon, a captain, in order to represent the excess of your highness's friendship and attachment, and charged with your highness's letters addressed to General Malartic, &c. And accordingly on the 7th of Rauzee, 1225 of the birth of Mahommed, (*23d January*, 1798) they were dispatched to Europe, on two ships of war, with the utmost caution. After two or three days, with a view to strengthen the foundations of friendship and attachment, we caused a paper to be drawn up, by Monsieur de Bay, to the following purpose, and sent it to General Malartic; viz. that in order to cement the basis of friendship and alliance, it was necessary that both parties should bind themselves by oaths, in order that the system of harmony and friendship, subsisting between your majesty and the French nation, might be confirmed, and that while the moon should keep its course, this alliance should remain unimpaired and unviolated. General Malartic returned for answer, that the ratification of the alliance by oath depended upon government in Europe; that the friendship between the Khoodadaud Sirkar and the French nation was fully established; that there would never be any diminution of that friendship and union, as long as the moon retained her course; that the enemies of their state were the enemies of the French nation; that your highness would soon have an opportunity of seeing what the devotion and friendship of the French nation would effect, with the view of crushing the enemy; and that he was from his heart the devoted servant of your Sirkar.

Refuge of the World! In consequence of the severity of a sea voyage, and unfavourableness of the climate, I was so much indisposed that * General Malartic's dewan remarked it, and told the general, that I was extremely ill; in consequence of which, he immediately sent two of the

* * Names illegible.

first physicians to attend me, with a message, that on the next day, at three o'clock, he would come himself to visit me. The following day General Malartic came accordingly; and after making inquiries respecting my health, he said, that Ripaud had made an erroneous representation to your highness, which occasioned us to be deputed, *that had we arrived four months before, he could have sent us back with one thousand Europeans, until the arrival of the army from Europe, but that those troops had now been dispatched to Batavia, to the assistance of the Dutch:* still however he would manifest his devotion in the best manner he could, and that he would not send us away empty-handed. He then asked in what places your highness had factories established, and what was the practice of the Sirkar with respect to the establishment of factories? and desired us to send a memorandum upon the subject. The next day we caused de Bay to draw up a reply to the following effect, which we sent to General Malartic; viz. "That your "highness had established factories at *Muscat*, at *Kutch*, at *Bussora*, and "in other principal cities; that two confidential persons were kept at "each factory to buy and sell: and that if he *(Malartic)* were willing "that a factory, on the part of your highness, should be established at the "Mauritius, we would represent it to your highness, and that if you "approved, a factory should be established accordingly." Some days after, General Malartic sent for us, and told us, that he readily agreed to the establishment of the Sirkar's factory at the Mauritius; adding, that he would appoint a dewan to superintend it, who would provide such articles as your highness required at a favourable rate, and also that he would assign a house belonging to the company for the purpose. After two or three days I sent a note by Monsieur de Bay to General Malartic, requesting that he would procure some plants of the nutmeg and cloves, some European fruit trees, fine-coloured and sweet-scented flowers, and filling some wooden boxes with earth, plant them therein, and send them carefully back with us, to be presented to your highness. The general immediately sent for the gardener, and directed him to prepare the plants in the boxes with the utmost expedition. At three o'clock we received a visit from General Sercy. We advanced to meet him, conducted him into the house,

and seated him on a chair. General Sercy said to us, that, please God, some large succours would very soon arrive from Europe, and that it was his intention to accompany the troops to your highness. After that, we told him, that it would be very desirable if he could send back with us five or six experienced navigators, several ship builders, and iron cannon founders, to which General Sercy agreed, promising to send them with us on our return. After sitting two hours, he rose. After this, General Malartic sent a message by his dewan, inviting us the following morning to see the powder mills, gardens, and mortar firing, adding, that he should be at the powder works before us. Early in the morning, accompanied by de Bay, we went to the powder works, and immediately on our alighting from our palanquins at the gate, we were saluted with twenty-one guns. The soldiers were drawn out in two ranks, while several officers came out to meet us, and conducted us to General Malartic and General Sercy, who met us at the head of the stairs, and taking our hands, seated us upon chairs, and then offered, if we chose, to go with us and shew us the works: we answered, that it was just as they pleased; their pleasure was ours. They immediately rose, and shewed us all the works. We then went without the gates, where they directed the artillery-men to fire the mortars at the targets, which they did fifteen times. They then requested that we would go and see the garden, with the plants of nutmegs and cloves, &c. On our leaving the powder works, we were again saluted with twenty-one guns. We then proceeded to the garden, where we remained four hours, and then returned home. The next day General Malartic sent to invite us to go and see some fire-works to be exhibited that night; accordingly an hour before the close of the day we went to the place where the fire-works were to be exhibited. The second aid-de-camp and five sirdars came out to meet us, and conducted us to the upper story; at that time both the generals were not present. Having sat till nine o'clock at night, and seen the fire-works, we returned home. Two or three days afterwards they invited us to go and see the armoury, the moody-khauna,* and the iron manufactory, desiring that we would come for that purpose at four hours after daylight. We accordingly set out, and on our

* Granary.

arrival at the gate of the armoury, the sirdars belonging to the establishment came out to meet us; they shewed us the whole of the establishment of muskets, implements of war, balls, &c. &c. after which we took our leave. The next day General Malartic sent a verbal message by . . . . . dewan, inviting us to go, at three o'clock in the afternoon, to see the batteries and ordnance. The person in command of them received directions to shew them to us; and we accordingly set out, accompanied by Monsieur de Bay, and when arrived at the batteries, the sirdars of that department came forward, and shewed us the batteries and ordnance: they caused several shots to be fired. After seeing them all, we took leave of those sirdars and returned home. The next day we were informed by des Combres and the dewan, that General Malartic had sent a ship to Bourbon, to fetch men for the service of the Sirkar; and that the general said he would not suffer us to take leave until the return of the ship: we told them, that we were not come to carry away with us men to be enlisted for the service of the Sirkar (in other words *recruits*), nor were such the orders we received from the Presence. Five or six days after, General Malartic sent a man to call us: he told us, that he had appointed some men for the service of the Sirkar, whom he was about to send accordingly; and desired us to give it under our hands, that we would represent to the Presence, and procure their entertainment at the rate of pay which he should fix. We informed him, that we could not venture to make any such representation to the Presence. General Malartic replied, "Were I to write to the "Presence, would it not be agreed to?" We answered, that if he chose to write, it would be at your highness's option to agree to it or not. After this we took leave. Being arrived at home, we wrote and sent a letter to General Malartic by Monsieur de Bay, to this purport: "It is very well "known to you, Sir, that the object of our coming hither was to carry "with us the succour of a large and effective body of troops. Persons of "your nation represented to the Presence, that a considerable body of "troops was actually ready at the Mauritius for the assistance of the Sirkar, "and that so soon as ambassadors should be sent to the sirdars of the Mau-"ritius, on the part of the Khoodadaud Sirkar, an efficient body of men

" should be sent back with them, whereby the common enemy would be " chastised. Had his highness been pleased to give us orders for raising " French recruits, his highness would not have sent us without settling " their rate of pay and establishment, agreeably to the custom of the Sirkar. " From a regard to the ancient union and established friendship subsist- " ing between the two states, you deem it improper to send away the " ambassadors of the Khoodadaud Sirkar empty handed, and therefore " propose to send a few men, whom you yourself have engaged for the " service of the Sirkar; but the object of the Sirkar will not be answered " by so small a body of men: neither are we instructed to carry with us " recruits from the Mauritius, nor indeed can this be done without money. " Men of your nation come to us every day (*meaning for the purpose of* " *being engaged*), and require to be furnished with money; but suppos- " ing they waved their demand for money here, and voluntarily repaired " to the Presence with us, under your orders, their pay must be fixed by " the Presence; else, suspending this business until his highness can be " informed, depute two vakeels of your own with us, to negociate the " matter. As soon as such vakeels shall have arrived at the Presence, and " his highness shall have stated to them the rate of pay and establishment, " as allowed to Lally's force in the service of the Sirkar, should his " highness be disposed to entertain them agreeably to the accustomed " rate of our Sirkar, his highness will send money with his ambassadors; " and then you may enlist men and send them accordingly: in the mean " time, do us the favour to give us our leave to return to the Presence."— General Malartic wrote in answer, and also sent word by Monsieur des Combres and . . . . . the dewan, that he proposed sending Messrs. Chapuis and Dubuc, with several other sirdars, to your highness, with this view; that until the arrival of the French succours from Europe, the former should reside at the Presence in quality of plenipotentiary, that the other Frenchmen might not, by telling falsities, like Ripaud, deceive your highness; and that Monsieur Dubuc might be deputed to France, together with your highness's ambassadors, at the opening of the season, to negociate on the part of your highness: as by his going, many points of great

importance would be effected. For these reasons, he said, he proposed sending these persons to the Presence, that hereafter should your highness approve of engaging Frenchmen for your service, they should be entertained at the rate and according to the customs of the Sirkar, and sent accordingly. Refuge of the World!—After the lapse of 18 days, the ship which had been sent to Bourbon returned empty. It appeared that a great many men wished to come, but were prevented by the want of means. On being informed of this, General Malartic sent word to us, that he proposed, in the course of five or six days, to send us to Bourbon; that as many men as were willing to accompany us, we might carry to your highness. General Mangalon paying us a visit, we stated to him, that it would be very desirable if he would accompany the troops destined for the service of the state; to which he replied, that when a considerable force should arrive from Europe for the purpose of subduing the enemy, he would accompany it to the Presence, and he desired that we would represent so to your highness. After sitting two hours, he took leave. Four days after, General Malartic sent for us to his house, at three o'clock in the afternoon, and then proposed to us to embark the following morning at nine o'clock, adding, that he himself would accompany us on board of ship to take leave. Accordingly the next day, being Thursday the 21st of Rubbaunee, 1225 (*8th March*, 1798), of the birth of Mohummud, we set out. Arrived at the bank of the river's mouth, several sirdars accompanied us in the boat, and escorted us on board the ship, where they took leave. An hour after, General Malartic, Monsieur Chapuis, and Monsieur Dubuc, came on board; and General Malartic delivered to us the khereetahs containing the arzees to your highness's address, desiring that we would present his humble respects. He then gave orders for weighing anchor, and returned as soon as General Malartic had got on board the boat: the captain of the ship ordered the anchor to be hove; and in one day and a night we arrived at Bourbon, where we anchored. Monsieur Chapuis and Dubuc got into the boat, and visited the governor of Bourbon; and returned, bringing with them four persons, who were desirous of proceeding to the Presence. The captain continued here the whole

day, and then weighing anchor, shaped his course for Mangalore. Near the line we met with a storm, in which one of the masts of the ship was sprung (or *carried away)*, and during the whole of the night the people despaired of their lives; but through the favour of God and the royal auspices, in the morning the storm ceased.

Prior to this, I had the honour to write to your highness a full and accurate account of the engagement which took place off Tellicherry,* together with the disembarkment of the Europeans, and their demands. Whence your highness will have been informed of those particulars.

Dated 8th of Tuckee, of the year Shadaub, 1226 of the birth of Mohummud (*23d May*, 1798).

A true Translation,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to Government.

* This alludes to the capture of the Raymond and Woodcott Indiamen in Tellicherry Road.

No. IV.

The Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.

Written the 14th June, 1798.

IMMEDIATELY on my arrival in Bengal, Sir Alured Clarke communicated to me your friendly letter to him, stating, that some people of the Coorga country having descended from the woods and mountains, had fixed their residence in the villages of Kauntamungle and Coloorbajee, &c.

(Recapitulate the contents of the letter).

Sir Alured Clarke has also communicated to me your answer to the letter from the late Governor-general Sir John Shore, respecting the claims of the company and of your highness to the district of Wynaad, bordering on Tambercherry.

Being anxious to afford you every proof in my power of my sincere desire to maintain the good understanding which had so long subsisted between your highness and the company, I made it one of the first objects of my attention to examine all the papers existing on the company's records, as well respecting Wynaad as the district of Souleah, in which it appears that Kauntamungle and Coloorbajee are situated.

From these papers I find that not only the right to the districts of Wynaad and Souleah has remained in doubt, but also to the district of Amerah and Ersawaraseemy, and to some other inconsiderable territories on the side of Malabar.

Your highness is well aware that it is a maxim among states, who are sincerely disposed to maintain the relations of amity and peace, to bring all contested points of this nature to a speedy determination.

A seasonable and temperate discussion of those differences of opinion, which must occasionally arise between powers of the most pacific disposition, tends to prevent quarrels between their subordinate officers, and to

obviate the misrepresentations which each party is apt, in such cases, to make to the respective governments. This is the most friendly as well as the most prudent course, and will always defeat the views of interested and designing persons who may wish to foment jealousy and to disturb the blessing of peace.

For this object Lord Cornwallis, the Nawab Nizam Alli Khaun, and the Paishwah Pundit Perd'haun, wisely provided, in the treaty of peace concluded with your highness at Seringapatam, by establishing a regular mode of bringing to an amicable adjustment, with the knowledge and approbation of all parties, any questions which might hereafter arise, between your highness and any of the allies, respecting the boundaries of your adjacent territories.

I am persuaded that it is your highness's disposition to maintain faithfully your public engagements with the company. On my part, you will always meet with a religious adherence to every article of the treaties subsisting between us. On this occasion, therefore, it is my intention to depute a respectable and discreet person to meet upon your frontier such of your officers as your highness may please to name for the purpose of conferring together, of discussing the grounds of the respective claims, and of satisfying each other on all points, respecting which any doubts may be entertained on either side.

It would not be consistent with your highness's high reputation for justice and good faith, to refuse to enter into this candid investigation; I therefore entertain no doubt, that as soon as you shall have fully understood the nature of this representation, you will afford every facility to the conduct of the necessary inquiries, and will use your endeavours to bring them to a speedy determination; and for this purpose that you will, without delay, direct your officers at Korial Bunder (or Mangalore) to enter into conference with those deputed by the managers of the honourable company's affairs on the coast of Malabar. The result of the conferences will be communicated to me by the government of Bombay, with all practicable dispatch; and you may rely upon it, that after a regular discussion shall have taken place, according to the established law of nations and to the

practice uniformly observed on every occasion of disputed boundary which has arisen between your highness and the allies since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, I will not suspend for one moment the full acknowledgment of whatever shall appear to be your just right.

In the mean time, as the districts of Amerah and Souleah have been in the possession of the Coorgah Rajah for several years, your highness will, no doubt, see the propriety and justice of recalling the troops sent into the neighbourhood of Souleah. Your highness must be sensible that until I have been satisfied of the justice of your claims in a regular and amicable manner, I will never suffer any of the company's allies or dependents, whose country and interests I consider to be in every respect the same as those of the company, to be forcibly deprived of territories, of which they have so long held possession: with the most cordial disposition to maintain the intercourse of friendship with your highness, I trust that I shall always meet an equal return on your part; and therefore I cannot but lament, that your highness did not immediately resort to the established channels of peaceable negociation in place of stationing a military force upon the frontiers of the territory possessed by an ally of the company.

Confident, however, that your highness, upon a full review of all the circumstances of the case, will be equally inclined with myself to conform to the dictates of justice, I am satisfied that after our respective officers shall have conferred together, and explained to each other all matters that remain in doubt, we shall have no difficulty in terminating these long depending questions to our mutual satisfaction.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true Copy,

N. B. Edmonstone,

P. T. to the Government.

No. V.

Tippoo Sultaun to Sir John Shore.

Received 26th April, 1798.*

I HAVE been favoured with your letter, notifying your intention of returning to Europe, and the nomination of Lord Mornington, who is of rank, to the office of Governor-general, in whom the same disposition would be manifested with yourself to cultivate and improve the friendship and good understanding subsisting between the two states, and an inviolable adherence to the engagements by which they are connected, &c. It is very well; you must impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between us, and constantly favour me with letters communicating your health and welfare.

A true Translation,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

From Tippoo Sultaun.

Received 26th April, 1798.

I HAVE been highly gratified by the receipt of your letter (vide that written 7th of March), and have understood its friendly contents.

Wynaad (spelt Wynaur) is the name of a kurreea† in my territory in

* On this day Tippoo Sultaun's ambassadors landed at Mangalore on their return from the Isle of France.

† The same as Mozah. The term village does not answer to the word Kurreea or Mozah, which signifies not only the village itself, but the lands belonging to it.

the midst of a forest of trees, with an inconsiderable number of habitations upon it; the inhabitants of which have ever been remarkable for their turbulence, for which reason, a small fort was long ago erected there, which is garrisoned by my troops. They have always been disorderly and turbulent, and there has been constant occasion to chastise them. The said kurreea is situated on the Table land near Tambacherry. All the talooks ceded to the company were particularly specified in the treaty of peace, in order to prevent repeated altercations: I did not cede a single talook to the company on the Table land, nor has the company any concern there: I have no doubt but that, in consequence of the representation of some interested person, you have written with a view to have such designing representations exposed, and therefore I write thus particularly. Just now no one in that kurreea has excited any disturbance or commotion; my subjects do not frequent the country below the Table land, which has long constituted a barrier to both parties: the plain and all below the Table land belongs to the company; above it are my subjects: there are mountains situated between. This matter does not require investigation and deliberation.

Believing my friendly heart disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord established between the two states, I hope you will always gratify me by letters notifying your welfare.

A true Translation,

N. B. Edmonstone,

P. T. to the Government.

No. VI.

Extract of a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to the Governor General, in Council, of Bengal; dated 18th June, 1798.

We take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you, that we have received information from his majesty's ministers that a very large armament of ships, troops, military stores, &c. &c. has been lately fitted out at Toulon, and that it sailed from thence on the 19th ult. Although the ultimate object of this armament has not been ascertained, it is not improbable, from many circumstances that have transpired, and from the spirit of daring adventure, by which the French have been actuated during the present war, that its destination may be for India, either (having first taken possession of Egypt) by way of the Red Sea, down the coast of that sea, or even perhaps by the Black Sea, or by Bussora; his majesty's ministers have therefore informed us, that immediate measures will be taken for a considerable augmentation of the European force in the East Indies; you may therefore expect that not less than four thousand seasoned and disciplined troops, and perhaps a larger number, may be sent to the company's settlements with all possible expedition; part of which will, we trust, reach India not many months after the receipt of this dispatch.

Should the expedition, notwithstanding the measures taken by his majesty's government to intercept and defeat it in the Mediterranean, reach Egypt, and be destined for India by either of the routes we have mentioned, a part of his majesty's fleet, consisting of two men of war, and probably a sloop, now under dispatch for India, will be ordered to be stationed in the straits of Babelmandel, and in the gulph of Persia, for the purpose of intercepting any force that may be proceeding to India that way.

A copy of a proclamation, issued at the Mauritius in the month of March last, has been already transmitted to our several presidencies by

Mr. Pringle, the company's agent at the Cape of Good Hope. We are unable to judge whether this proclamation be in reality what its import declares it to be, and Tippoo has really conceived any hostile designs against the British empire in India, or intended merely as a feint, with a view to embroil us with that prince. Our respective governments will of course have taken such precautionary measures in consequence as appeared to them necessary, and applicable to existing circumstances.

Our empire in the east has ever been an object of jealousy to the French, and we know that their former government entertained sanguine hopes of being able to reach India by a shorter passage than round the Cape of Good Hope; and we have no doubt that the present government would risk a great deal, and even adopt measures of a most enterprizing and uncommon nature, for the chance of reducing, if not annihilating, the British power and consequence in that quarter of the world. To effect this, without the aid and previous concert of one of the Indian powers, seems almost impossible, and would scarcely be attempted. In the present situation of India, Tippoo appears the fittest instrument to be employed in the furtherance of such ambitious projects.

It is highly improbable that Tippoo should have entered into any league with the French without some apparent preparation on his part of an hostile nature in furtherance of their design. If such, therefore, shall have been the case, it would be neither prudent nor politic to wait for actual hostilities on his part. We therefore recommend, that if you shall not have adopted the necessary measures for bringing Tippoo to a satisfactory explanation before the receipt of this dispatch, that you should immediately take the proper steps for so doing, accompanying this inquiry with such a disposition of your force as may give effect to it: and should you judge, either from his answers, or from the steps he is taking, that his designs are such as the French proclamation represents, and that he is making preparations to act hostilely against us; we think it will be more adviseable not to wait for such an attack, but to take the most immediate and most decisive measures to carry our arms into our enemy's country, not failing at the same time to make known to the powers in alliance with

us, the necessity of such measures, and that we have not in view a wanton attack upon our inveterate enemy, with a design to augment our own power, but a necessary and justifiable defence of our own possessions, and calling upon them for the assistance they are under engagements to furnish us.

But although we have thus recommended energy, firmness, and decision, in your conduct towards Tippoo, we rely upon your using the latitude allowed you in the preceding paragraph with the utmost discretion, that we may not be involved in a war in India without the most inevitable necessity, of which necessity we leave you to be the sole judges. And as it is impossible for us to conjecture, should either the proclamation circulated at the Mauritius be founded, or the force now in the Mediterranean be really destined for India, what measures the implacable revenge and rash enterprize of the French, may induce them to undertake against the British power in India; we can only exhort our several governments to be constantly upon their guard, and watchful against surprise, by not only keeping the troops in perfect order for action, and our forts and garrisons in constant preparation of defence, but if it shall appear necessary, by encouraging military associations amongst our civil servants and others, as in this country, which may be prepared to act on any emergency; and in carefully keeping in view every channel through which it may be possible for France to get an European force out to India, and taking precautionary measures to prevent it.

We have transmitted copies of this dispatch to our governments of Madras and Bombay.

Circular.

Copy of a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Governments in India; dated the 26th November, 1798.

Our letter to you of the 18th June last, inclosed a copy of our orders to the Governor-general in council of the same date, relative to the expedition from Toulon under General Bonaparte, and directing your obedience thereto, so far as should respect your presidency.

Our subsequent advices of July and August will have informed you of the appointment of Mr. Jones to reside at the court of the Pacha of Bagdat, as well as of the objects of his mission, and of the reinforcements already sent and now sending out to India.

Since the date of our letter of June last, above alluded to, the landing of Bonaparte in Egypt has been fully confirmed; and although, by the glorious victory of Admiral Nelson over the French fleet near Alexandria, and the opposition made to their progress through Egypt by the Arabs under the authority of the Porte, the designs of the French have been considerably impeded, yet if, contrary to our hopes and expectations, he should be able to establish himself in Egypt, we cannot but still be under apprehensions for the safety of our Indian possessions. These apprehensions are considerably increased in consequence of some hints lately suggested by the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, that, if the French should be able to subdue Egypt, and to establish their authority in that country, it is likely their next progressive measure would be to secure the communication of the Red Sea with the gulph of Cambay, at the narrow straits of Babelmandel; and, if in their power, to detach a sufficient force to take possession of the island of Perim, situate between the two points which include those straits.

The possession of this station will be of the greatest importance to the French, in securing the advantages they propose to themselves in the

conquest of Egypt, and consequently it is well deserving of the utmost vigilance and exertion on the part of Great Britain, to defeat any plan they may entertain to get it into their hands. If we should succeed in making ourselves masters of that island, it would be impossible, in the first instance, for any ships to pass the straits against a superior naval force stationed there. It may then be secured and fortified, by the application of such materials as its situation may afford, for completing its permanent defence, and for effectually commanding the channels through which ships must pass to the Indian ocean.

We understand that the island of Perim is a low rocky substance, about five miles in length and two in breadth; that it possesses a good harbour; that the channel, which divides it from the African coast, though fourteen or fifteen miles across, is but little frequented, on account of the numerous rocks and shoals which obstruct it, insomuch as to render it necessary for vessels that do attempt it, to steer close under the western point of the island, and that the extreme breadth of the other channel is less than two leagues; and that this space cannot be navigable, nor the deep water every where at so great a distance from the island as to be out of the reach of its batteries, whether erected on the shore, or on artificial projections within the sea, if such should be found necessary to the entire command of the passage.

We have entered thus fully into detail, to shew the importance of taking possession of the island of Perim without delay; nor is dispatch alone necessary, but secrecy is equally indispensable, as it is not improbable that provisional measures have been taken by the French to assemble some vessels of burthen at the port of Suez, to co-operate in whatever way their services may be wanted, with the primary expedition; and if the design were known, they would detach a force, at all hazards, to secure the first possession of it.

Mr. Secretary Dundas has further informed us, that although the commanders of his majesty's fleets in India have already been directed to use every effort in their power to frustrate the designs of the French in the expedition under Bonaparte, yet special orders will be sent out to the

commander in chief of his majesty's naval force in the Indian seas as soon as possible, to detach to the straits of Babelmandel such a force, as, according to the information he shall have received, he may judge sufficient for the service, in the instructions to take possession of the island of Perim, by whatever power it may be occupied at the time.

The importance of the measure we have thus pointed out, will insure your most cordial endeavours in promoting the same by every means within your power. The security of our most valuable possessions in India, if not our very existence there, depends upon defeating the present formidable and inveterate design of the French against those possessions.

No. VII.

The Originals of the following Translations from General Bonaparte were communicated to Captain Wilson at Mocha; and the Translations were by him transmitted to the Governor in Council at Bombay.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Liberty. *Equality.*

BONAPARTE, Member of the National Convention, General in Chief, to the most Magnificent SULTAUN, our greatest Friend, TIPPOO SAIB.

Head-Quarters at Cairo, 7th Pluviose, 7th Year of the Republic, One and Indivisible.

You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England.

I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

I would even wish you could send some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer.

May the Almighty increase your power and destroy your enemies.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

(Seal). True Translate from the French,

(Signed) *Francis Woppers*, Translator.

Translate of a Letter from General Bonaparte to the Sheriff of Mecca, written in Arabic, without Date, and received at Judda the 17*th February*, 1799.

You will be fully informed by the Nocqueda of this Dow, how tranquil and quiet every thing is at Cairo and Suez, and between those places, and of the tranquillity which is established among the inhabitants. Not a single Mameluke oppressor remains in the country, and the inhabitants, without dread or fear, employ themselves in weaving, cultivating the ground, and in other trades, as formerly; and, by the blessing of God, this will be daily increasing, and the duties on merchandise and the taxes will be lessened. The duties on merchandise are now the same as they were prior to their being raised by the Mamalukes; the merchants have every assistance granted them, and the road between Suez and Cairo is open and safe, therefore do you assure the merchants of your country, that they may bring their goods to Suez, and sell them, without dread or apprehension, and may purchase in exchange for them such articles as they may wish.

I now send you a letter for our friend Tippoo Sultaun; oblige me by forwarding it to his countries.

A true Translation,

(Signed) S. Wilson.

Copies of the above letters were given to my Monshee for me, by Shaik Soliman and Mahomed Ameen, the sheriffes first vizier and first secretary.

(Signed) S. WILSON.

A true Copy,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. VIII.

To Tippoo Sultaun.

Written 8th November, 1798.

I HAVE received your letter informing me (recite the substance of the letter received on the 24th October).

It affords me sincere satisfaction to learn that you have nominated two persons of integrity and honour, to meet and confer with the deputies appointed, under my orders, by Mr. Duncan (the Governor of Bombay), for the purpose of investigating the question regarding the talooks of Ameera and Soulea. It is only by means of regular inquiry, and amicable discussion, that such questions can be adjusted among independent powers. My determination in the case of Wynaad was dictated by those principles of justice and moderation which always direct the company's government; nor shall my scrupulous adherence to the same principles be less manifest in my decision on your claim to the district at present in question; the possession of which shall not be withholden from you for an instant, if, after full investigation, I shall be satisfied of the justice of your title to them.

It is a well known truth, that they who are the most ready to respect the just rights of others, are the most vigilant and resolute to maintain their own.

I have understood your sentiments concerning the "turbulent disposi-" tion of interested men, who, by nature, are ever seeking opportunities of "sowing the seeds of dissension." For the happiness of mankind it is to be lamented, that these authors of confusion are too numerous, assiduous, and successful, in all parts of the world. In no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue ever cultivated with such success, as they are at present by the French nation. I sincerely wish that no impression had been produced on your discerning mind by that dangerous people; but my situation enables me to know that they have reached your presence, and have endeavoured to pervert the wisdom of your councils, and to instigate you to war against those who have given you no provocation.

It is impossible that you should suppose me to be ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear necessary, or proper, that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connexion, which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects, and to destroy the religion which you revere.

Immediately after my arrival in Bengal I read your correspondence with the late Governor-general Sir John Shore, and with the acting Governor-general Sir Alured Clarke, and I perceived with great satisfaction, that in all your letters you constantly professed a disposition to strengthen the bonds of sincere attachment, and the foundations of harmony and concord, established between you and the honourable company. I received parti-

cular pleasure from reading your last letter to Sir John Shore, in which you signified your amicable desire that he should impress me with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so long subsisting between the two states. Your subsequent letters to me have abounded with professions of the same friendly nature.

Combining these professions of amity on your part, with the proofs which the company's government have constantly given of their sincere disposition to maintain the relations of friendship and peace with you; and adverting, at the same time, to your reputation for wisdom and discernment, it was natural for me to be extremely slow to believe the various accounts transmitted to me of your negotiations with the French, and of your military preparations. But whatever my reluctance to credit such reports might be, prudence required both of me and of the company's allies, that we should adopt certain measures of precaution and self defence; and these have accordingly been taken, as you will no doubt have observed. The British government and the allies wishing nevertheless to live in peace and friendship with all their neighbours; entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the least incompatible with their respective engagements, and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, will always be ready, as they now are, to afford you every demonstration of these pacific dispositions.

The Paishwah, and his highness the Nizam, concur with me in the observations which I have offered to you in this letter, and which, in the name of the company and of the allies, I recommend to your most serious consideration. But as I am also desirous of communicating to you, on the behalf of the company and of their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties, I propose to depute to you, for this purpose, Major Doveton, who is well known to you, and who will explain to you more fully and particularly the sole means, which appear to myself and to the allies of the company, to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations.

You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient to you to receive Major Doveton, and as soon as your friendly letter shall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your presence.

I shall expect your answer to this letter with an earnest hope that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies; and that you may be convinced that you cannot in any manner better consult your true interests than by meeting with cordiality the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points, on which any doubts or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true Copy,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. IX.

To Tippoo Sultaun.

Written December 10th, 1798.

I HAD the honour of addressing a friendly letter to your highness on the 8th of November last, in which I stated a variety of important points, to which your highness would no doubt perceive the propriety and necessity of giving your earliest and most serious consideration.—I particularly hope that your highness will have been sensible of the advantages likely to result, to all parties, from the conciliatory measure of my deputing Major Doveton to you, which I proposed in that letter.

I expect to have the pleasure of finding your answer to that letter on my

arrival at Madras, for which place I am on the point of setting out from Calcutta.—I hope to arrive at Madras about the same time that this letter reaches you, and should any circumstances hitherto have prevented your answering my last letter of the 8th November, I assure myself that you will immediately on your receipt of this, dispatch a satisfactory reply to it, addressed to me at Madras.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true Copy,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. X.

From Tippoo Sultaun.

Dated 11th Jemaudy cossaunee (or 20th November, 1798).
Received 15th December, 1798.

It has lately come to my ears from report, that in consequence of the talk of interested persons, military preparations are on foot. Report is equally subject to the likelihood of being true or false. I have the fullest confidence that the present is without foundation. By the favour of God, the conditions (or obligations) of peace established (between us) have obtained the utmost degree of strength and firmness; under the circumstances of their having been firmly observed and adhered to, of the daily increasing union and friendship, and of the constant intercourse of correspondence, it (the report) cannot possibly be entitled to credit; but the promulgation of such reports excites my surprise—my friendly pen writes this—I hope your lordship will be pleased to gratify me by writing of it.—From a desire to maintain the obligations of treaty and engagement, I have no

other intention (or thought) than to give increase to friendship—and my friendly heart is to the last degree bent on endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of harmony and union.

Let your lordship always continue to gratify me by gladdening letters, notifying your welfare.

A true Translation,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

From Tippoo Sultaun.

Received at Fort St. George, 25th Dec. 1798.

I HAVE been made happy by the receipt of your lordship's two friendly letters, the contents of which I clearly comprehend (vide those written 4th* and 8th November).

The particulars which your lordship has communicated to me, relative to the victory obtained by the English fleet over that of the French, near the shores of Egypt, nine of their ships having been captured, and two burned, on one of which of the latter was their Admiral, have given me more pleasure than can possibly be conveyed by writing. Indeed I possess the firmest hope that the leaders of the English and the company Bahauder, who ever adhere to the paths of sincerity, friendship, and good faith, and are the well-wishers of mankind, will at all times be successful and victorious—and that the French, who are of a crooked disposition, faithless, and the enemies of mankind, may be ever depressed and ruined. —Your lordship has written to me with the pen of friendship, "that in "no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue ever "cultivated with such success as they are at present by the French nation—

* This letter is omitted: the purport of it was to inform the Sultaun of Lord Nelson's victory.

" Would to God that no impression had been produced on my mind by " that dangerous people! but, that your lordship's situation enables you to " know, that they have reached my presence, and have endeavouced to " pervert the wisdom of my councils, and to instigate me to war against " those who have given me no provocation."

" That it is impossible that I should suppose your lordship ignorant of " the intercourse which subsists between me and the French, whom I " know to be the inveterate enemies of the company, and to be now en- " gaged in an unjust war with the British nation, and that I cannot " imagine your lordship indifferent to the transactions, which have passed " between me and the enemies of the English."

In this Sircar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe who employ themselves in trading by sea and land; their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and, having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic.—It happened that she went to the Mauritius, from whence forty persons, French and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment; such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar (the gift of God), and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars.

It is the wish of my heart, and my constant endeavour, to observe and maintain the articles of the agreement of peace, and to perpetuate and strengthen the basis of friendship and union with the Sircar of the company Bahauder, and with the Sircars of the Maha Raja Saheb Sreemunt, Peshwah Bahauder, and his highness the Nabob Asuph Jah Bahauder, and I am resident at home, at times taking the air, and at others amusing myself with hunting, at a spot which is used as a pleasure ground.—In this case the allusion to " war," in your friendly letter, and the following passage, namely,—" prudence required that both the company and their " allies should adopt certain measures of precaution and self-defence," have given me the greatest surprise.

It was further written by your friendly pen, that " as your lordship is " desirous of communicating to me, on the behalf of the company and their " allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of " all parties, your lordship proposes to depute to me for this purpose, " Major Doveton, who formerly waited upon me, and who will explain " to me more fully and particularly the sole means which appear to your " lordship and the allies to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing " all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good " understanding on the most durable foundations: that therefore your " lordship trusts I will let you know at what time and place it will be " convenient to me to receive Major Doveton." It has been understood, by the blessing of the Almighty, at the conclusion of the peace, the treaties and engagements entered into among the four Sircars, were so firmly established and confirmed as ever to remain fixed and durable, and be an example to the rulers of the age; nor are they, nor will they ever be liable to interruption. I cannot imagine, that means more effectual than these can be adopted for giving stability to the foundations of friendship and harmony, promoting the security of states, or the welfare and advantage of all parties.

In the view of those who inspect narrowly into the nature of friendship, peace and amity are the first of all objects, as indeed your lordship has yourself written to me, that the allied Sircars look to no other object than the security and tranquillity of their own dominions, and the ease and comfort of their subjects; praise be to God that the sum of my views and the wish of my heart are limited to these same points. On such grounds then a just and permanent observance of existing treaties is necessary, and these, under the favour of God, daily acquire new strength and improvement, by means of amicable correspondence.—Your lordship is a great sirdar, a firm friend, and the rectifier of all things; and you possess an enlightened judgment.—I have the strongest hope that the minds of the wise and intelligent, but particularly of the four states, will not be sullied by doubts and jealousies, but will consider me from my heart desirous of harmony and friendship.

Continue to allow me the pleasure of your correspondence, making me happy by accounts of your health.

What more shall be written?

Dated the 9th of Rejib,
1213 of the Hegirah (18th Dec.)

A true Translation,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XI.

To Tippoo Sultaun.

Written 9th January, 1799.

In pursuance of the intention which I had the honour of communicating to you in my letter of the 10th December, I embarked at Calcutta on the 25th of the same month, and on the 31st following arrived at this place.

Previously to my departure from Calcutta, I had the honour to receive your highness's letter of the 11th Jamaudy oossaunee (20th November).

(Recapitulate it.)

My letter to your highness, of the 8th November, will have explained to your highness the object of the military preparations, which have been advancing in every part of the dominions of the allies ever since the beginning of the month of July.

On my arrival at Madras I had the honour to receive your letter of the 9th Rejib (or 18th of December) in answer to my two letters, addressed to your highness on the 4th and 8th of November.

I am happy to find that, in this letter, your highness has been pleased to admit "that the English nation and the honourable company ever "adhere to the paths of sincerity, friendship, and good faith; and that they

" are the well-wishers of mankind." This declaration is peculiarly satisfactory to me in the present moment, because I am persuaded that a prince of your highness's discernment would not express such sentiments without full deliberation. I therefore accept with pleasure this declaration, as affording not only an unequivocal testimony, on the part of your highness, to the justice of that cause in which the English nation and the company are engaged, but an unqualified admission, that you have no ground of complaint against the English government.

In answer to that part of my letter of the 8th of November, in which I lamented the unhappy connection which you have formed with the French nation, your highness is pleased to mention " that in the Sircar (the gift of " God) there is a mercantile tribe, who employ themselves in trading by " sea and land: that their agents purchased a two-masted vessel; and, " having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic: that it hap- " pened that she went to the Mauritius, from whence forty persons, French " and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest " servants, paying the hire of the ship, came to your country in search of " employment; that such as chose to take service were entertained; and " the remainder departed beyond the confines of that Sircar (the gift of " God): and that the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have per- " haps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports, " with the view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars."

I had no knowledge of the transaction which your highness has thus described, until I had the honour to receive your highness's letter. Nor was it to this transaction I adverted, when I expressed my concern at the intercourse which your highness had established with the French. The facts to which I referred were of a nature entirely different from those which your highness has related. If the transaction of which I complained had not indisputably proved the existence of a connection between your highness and the French, entirely incompatible with your engagements to the honourable company and to its allies, neither the allies nor I would have resorted to those measures of precaution and defence which have attracted your highness's attention.

I will now fully and explicitly state to your highness the circumstances to which I referred in my letter of the 8th of November, wherein I remonstrated against the tendency of your intercourse with the French.

Although I had been, for some time past, apprized that your highness had engaged with several powers of Asia in various negotiations of the most hostile tendency towards the interests of the company, and of its allies; and although your continued military preparations corresponded with the spirit of your negotiations; I still hoped that a sense of your own interests, and a regard to the acknowledged maxims of prudence and good faith, would have induced you to relinquish any projects of aggression, so inconsistent with your own professions, with your real interests, and with the character of your wisdom and discretion. But I had scarcely formed that decision on your highness's claims to Wynaad (by which I had afforded an unquestionable testimony of my disposition to render impartial and ample justice to your rights, and to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace with your highness) when I received from the Isle of France an authentic copy of the proclamation, a Persian translation of which accompanies this letter.

In addition to this proclamation, I possess full and accurate information of all the proceedings of your highness's ambassadors during their residence in the Isle of France; of the whole of their conduct in exercising the powers delegated to them by your highness; and of your highness's conduct, since the return of your ambassadors.

From the whole evidence in my possession the following facts are incontestably proved. Your highness dispatched two ambassadors from your presence, who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived there at the close of the month of January, 1798. The ship on which the ambassadors were embarked hoisted your highness's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord Ouest, in the Isle of France; your ambassadors were received publicly and formally by the French government, under a salute of cannon, and with every circumstance of distinction and respect; and they were entertained, during their continuance on the island, by the French government, at the public expence.

Previously to the arrival of your ambassadors on the island, no idea or rumour existed there of any aid to be furnished to your highness by the French, or of any prospect of a war between your highness and the company. But within two days after the arrival of your ambassadors, the proclamation, of which I now forward to you a translation, was fixed up in the most public places, and circulated through the town of Port Nord Ouest.

Your ambassadors, far from protesting against the matter or style of the proclamation, held, without reserve, in the most public manner, the same language which it contains with respect to the offensive war to be commenced by your highness against the British possessions in India; and they even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distributed at their own houses.

In consequence of these circumstances, an universal belief prevailed in the island that your highness would make an immediate attack upon the British possessions in India.

Your ambassadors were present in the island when the French government proceeded to act under the proclamation in question; and your ambassadors aided and assisted the execution of the proclamation, by making promises, in the name of your highness, for the purpose of inducing recruits to enlist in your service; your ambassadors proposed to levy men to any practicable extent, stating their powers to be unlimited, with respect to the numbers of the forces to be raised in your highness's name, for the purpose of making war on the company.

The ambassadors entered into certain stipulations and engagements, in the name of your highness, according to the tenor of the proclamation (see the note*), with several Frenchmen, and others who entered into your service, particularly with Monsieur Du Buc, whom the ambassadors engaged, in your highness's name, for the express purpose of assisting in the war to be commenced by your highness against the English in India.

* Nous pouvons assurer tous les citoyens, qui se seront inscrire, que Tippoo leur fera des traitements avantageux qui seront fixès avec ses ambassadeurs, qui s'éngageront en outre au nom de leur souverain, à ce que les François qui auront pris parti dans ses armées, ne puissent jamais y être retenus quand ils voudront rentrer dans leur patrie.

The proclamation therefore is proved to have been the act of your ambassadors. It originated in their arrival at the Isle of France, it was distributed by their agents, it was avowed in every part by their own public declarations, and finally, it was executed, according to its tenor, by their personal assistance and co-operation.

On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassadors embarked at Port Nord Ouest, on board the French frigate La Preneuse, together with the force thus raised in your highness's name.

This French frigate, with your ambassadors, and with the troops raised in the enemy's country for your service, arrived at Mangalore about the 26th of April, 1798. Your highness permitted this force to land in your dominions, and, far from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of the conduct of your ambassadors, in any part of this transaction, you formally received them and the French officers, and principal persons who accompanied them, with public marks of honour and distinction, and you now entertain in your service a large part of the force thus raised for the purpose of making war upon the honourable company.

From these several facts the following conclusions result.

First. That the ambassadors, dispatched by your highness to the Isle of France, did propose, and actually did conclude, an offensive alliance with the French, for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the company, and consequently against the allies, the Paishwah and the Nizam.

Secondly. That your highness's ambassadors demanded military succours from the French, for the purpose of prosecuting the said war; and declared that your highness had already completed your hostile preparations against the company (and consequently against the allies), and that you only waited the arrival of effectual aid from the French to break out into open hostilities.

Thirdly. That your highness's ambassadors levied a military force in the Isle of France, under the conditions of the proclamation, and for the avowed purpose of carrying into effect the offensive alliance, contracted in

the name of your highness, with the enemy of the company, and of the allies.

Fourthly. That your highness approved the conduct of your ambassadors, suffered the French force, raised for the purpose of making war upon the company and the allies, to be landed in your country; and finally, admitted the said force into your army.

Fifthly. That your highness, by these several personal and unequivocal acts, has ratified the engagements contained in the proclamation published in the Isle of France, and has taken the preliminary steps for fulfilling those engagements according to the tenor of that proclamation; and that you have thereby precluded whatever hope might otherwise have been entertained, that the proceedings of your highness's ambassadors were unauthorized by your orders.

Sixthly. That your highness has, for some time past, been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hostile spirit of your engagements contracted with the enemy of the company and of the allies.

Seventhly. That your highness was prepared to make an unprovoked attack upon the company's possessions, if you had obtained from the French the effectual succour which you had solicited through your ambassadors.

Eighthly. That your highness, by these several acts, has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between your highness and the allies.

Such are the grounds on which I founded my complaint in my letter of the 8th of November, and such are the motives which now compel the allies to seek relief from that ambiguous and anxious state in which they have been placed for some years past by the conduct of your highness. The allies complain that your frequent preparations for war, together with your hostile negotiations and offensive alliances with the enemy, continually expose the allies, during a period of supposed peace, to all the solicitude and hazard, and much of the expence, of war.

Even under all these circumstances of provocation, the allies entertain

the most earnest desire to establish with your highness a real and substantial peace, accompanied by the intercourse and good offices usual among friendly and contiguous states: we are therefore ready to renew and confirm the bonds of amity with your highness, on such conditions as shall preclude the continuance of those jealousies which must subsist so long as a final and satisfactory adjustment of all causes of suspicion shall be delayed.

Your highness is pleased to say, "That you cannot imagine how "means more effectual than the existing treaties can be adopted, for "giving stability to the foundations of friendship and harmony, or for "promoting the security of the states, and the welfare and advantage of "all parties."

In this sentiment I entirely concur with your highness, and if your highness's wisdom had not been perverted by evil counsels, from a due observance of your engagements with the allies, no new or more effectual means would now be necessary "for giving stability to the foundations "of friendship and harmony, or for promoting the security of the states, "and the welfare and advantage of all parties." But a new arrangement is become indispensable, in consequence of your highness's new engagements with the common enemy of the allies, and I again entreat your highness to meet, with cordiality, the friendly and moderate advance of the allies towards an amicable settlement of every ground of jealousy and danger.

Had your highness received Major Doveton, that gentleman would have explained to your highness, on the part of the company and of the allies, how this advantageous arrangement is to be obtained.

The allies being always anxious to enter into this friendly explanation with your highness, I once more call upon your highness, in the most serious and solemn manner, to assent to the admission of Major Doveton, as a measure, which I am confident, would be productive of the most lasting advantages to all parties.

I trust that your highness will favour me with a friendly letter in reply to this; and I most earnestly request that your reply may not be deferred

for more than one day after this letter shall reach your presence. dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true Copy,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

To Tippoo Sultaun.

Written 9th January, 1799.

In addition to my letter of this date, it has occurred to me, to transmit for your highness's notice, a Persian translation of the Manifesto, which accompanied the declaration of war made by the Ottoman Porte against the French, in consequence of their unprovoked invasion of Egypt, as being a paper of importance, in as much as it developes with truth and accuracy, the atrocious views and faithless conduct of the French, not only towards other nations in general, but even, when it serves their own ambitious purposes, towards those with whom they are connected by the strongest ties of friendship and alliance, and as it shews the grounds upon which the Ottoman Porte has been compelled to declare war against them. I shall only add, that the original of the paper in question has been circulated throughout Europe, and published in all the Gazettes both there and in India.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true Copy,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XII.

From Tippoo Sultaun.

Dated 24th Rejib, 1213, or 2d January, 1799.
Received 11th January, 1799.

THE agreeable arrival of your lordship's two letters,* denoting your welfare, rejoiced and gratified me. A khereeta, in reply to your lordship's former friendly letter, has been written and dispatched. It will, no doubt, by this time have been received, and the sincerity of my friendship and regard, together with proofs of my solicitude for tranquillity and peace (my friendly heart being bent upon their increase), will have been made apparent. Continue to rejoice me with happy letters.

A true Translation,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XIII.

The Sircar Coudadad to the Executive Directory, representing the French Republic, One and Indivisible, at Paris.

IN the name of that friendship which the Sircar Coudadad, and the subjects of the Sircar, vow to the French republic, which friendship and

* Original and duplicate of that written 10th December, 1798.

alliance shall endure as long as the sun and moon shine in the heavens, and which shall be so solid that the most extraordinary events shall neither break nor disunite them.

The English, jealous of the connection and friendship which, for so long a time, has subsisted between my Sircar and France, some years ago united against me with the Marhattas, the Nizam Ally Khan, and my other enemies; and declared a war as odious as unjust, which lasted several years, and of which the result was so fatal, that it cost me three crores and thirty lacks of rupees in money, and my finest provinces.

The republic is certainly not ignorant of any of these unfortunate circumstances, nor of the many efforts I made to dispute, inch by inch, the possession of that country, which at last I was obliged to relinquish to our common enemy. I should not have been driven to such cruel sacrifices had I been aided by my ancient allies the French, who were deceived by the perfidious machinations of Conway, the Governor-general of Pondicherry, who was then plotting with Campbell, the Governor of Madras, for the evacuation of the place commanded by the former. No doubt the republic will now repair the fault of their former government, by driving the English from their rich possessions in India.

These sentiments, with which I have long been animated, I have made known to the government of the Isle of France, through the organ of two ambassadors, from whom I have had the great satisfaction of receiving such an answer as I desired, together with the republican flag, by the hands of Chapuis, chief of a brigade, and Dubuc, a captain of a ship, who also brought with them the inconsiderable succour of officers and men, with which, circumstances permitted General Malartic and Rear-admiral Sercey to supply me.

I retain with me the first of these officers, and send the second to you as my ambassador, who, in requesting your alliance, offensive and defensive, will, I trust, obtain such a reinforcement of troops as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack, and annihilate for ever, our common enemies in Asia.

I send you my standard (which, united with that of the republic, will

serve as a basis for the alliance into which our respective nations are about to contract), and with it the particular articles which I have charged Captain Dubuc to communicate to you.

I join with him my subjects Sheik Abdoulraim and Mahomet Bismilla, who are equally authorized to represent me with your government.

Whatever may be the future state of our two nations, whether blended or separate, into whatever engagements they may respectively enter, may the prosperity, the glory, and the success of both, be still the common object of each; may the sentiments which they feel for each other be guaranteed by mutual assurances of fidelity, and by oaths of reciprocal obligation; and may the heavens and the earth meet and unite, ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest alteration.

In my palace at Seringapatam, 20th July, 1798.

(Signed) ———

A true Translation,
G. G. Keble, French Translator.

A Note of the Proposals to be made by my Ambassadors to the Executive Directory at Paris.

Article 1.

For ten or fifteen thousand troops, of every description, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Article 2.

A naval force to act on the coast where our armies may be, to favour, and to reinforce them, in case of necessity.

Article 3.

The Sircar will furnish all military stores and provisions for the army

of the republic, as well as horses, bullocks, carts, and tents, together with every other necessary; excepting European liquors, which his country does not afford.

Article 4.

On all marches and military operations, the king's orders are to be observed.

Article 5.

The expedition shall be directed to some point of the Coromandel coast, and in preference, to Porto Novo, where the disembarkation of the troops shall take place, and where the king, with his whole army, will appear, either before the arrival of the French army, or at any time appointed, it being his intention to commence operations in the heart of the enemy's country.

Article 6.

The king desires that the republic will inform him, by dispatching to Mangalore two corvettes from Europe, within twenty days of each other, of the number of ships and troops which are to be sent from France, in order that he may take the field immediately, and be master of the Coromandel coast, before the arrival of the republican forces, and thus be enabled to provide for all their wants.

Article 7.

All the conquests which may be made from the enemy, excepting those provinces which the king has been obliged to cede to the English, to the Marhattas, and to the Nizam Ally Khan, shall be equally divided between the two nations, and according to their respective convenience. The same division shall also be made of the enemies ships, and of the Portugueze colonies, in order to indemnify the king for the expences of the war.

Article 8.

Should any difficulty arise between the allied armies, each shall observe justice, according to their own laws and customs; and every discussion relating to them shall be conducted in writing between the two nations.

Article 9.

Whatever may be the desire of the republic, whether to give peace to England, or to continue the war, the king trusts the republic will always have the kindness to consider him as a friend and faithful ally, and accordingly comprehend him in all its treaties, and apprize him of all its intentions.

Article 10.

All French whatever, who now are or may hereafter come within the territories of the king, shall be treated as friends and allies; they shall have the liberty of passing and repassing, and of trading, without any molestation or hindrance; on the contrary, they shall receive every assistance and succour which they may want.

Article 11.

To procure for my service four founders of brass, and four founders of iron cannon, four paper makers, twelve manufacturers of glass, in different branches of the manufacture, two naval engineers, and two good ship-builders.

Given in my palace of Seringapatam, under my signature, and that of my prime minister, with the seal of state affixed, the 20th July, 1798.

(Signed) ———

A true Translation,
G. G. Keble, French Translator.

To the French Republic, One and Indivisible.

PLACING entire confidence in the patriotic zeal and fidelity manifested by Citizen Dubuc, captain in the navy of the French republic, one and indivisible, and commander in chief of my marine, I have appointed, and do hereby appoint him one of my ambassadors to the Executive Directory at Paris, there to fulfil with punctuality the orders which I have given him. For that purpose, I give him all the most extensive powers necessary to the success of the mission which I have intrusted to him, promising and binding myself to the French republic, one and indivisible, to ratify the engagements which Citizen Dubuc may enter into in my name, with the National Convention, and the Executive Directory at Paris, as well as with the artists and workmen, whom I have directed him to engage for my service.

Given in my palace of Seringapatam, under my signature and that of my prime minister, with the seal of state affixed, the 20th July, 1798.

A true Translation,
G. G. Keble, French Translator.

Letter of Credit from the Sircar Coudadad for Citizen Dubuc, Captain in the Navy of the French Republic, One and Indivisible, and Commander in Chief of my Marine.

PLACING entire confidence in the fidelity of Citizen Dubuc, captain in the navy of the French republic, one and indivisible, and commander in

chief of my marine, I authorize him, by this present letter of credit, to procure, either from the French republic, or from individuals, such sums as he may require, to fulfil the orders I have given him for different purchases, or to defray expences which he may think urgent or necessary, for the advantage of his mission. Being desirous that the said letter of credit should have full power and value, I hereby bind myself to pay, or cause to be paid, all the bills of exchange which Citizen Dubuc may draw upon my Sircar.

Given in my palace of Seringapatam, under my signature, and that of my prime minister, with the seal of state affixed, the 20th July, 1798.

A true Translation,
G. G. *Keble*, French Translator.

Copy of a Letter from Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 16th December, 1798, O. S.

TO THE SIRCAR COUDADAD.

Tranquebar, the 16th December, 1798, O. S.

Great Pacha, Health and Respect,

THE men are arrived safe, but their letters, the articles most essential, are still wanting, having been left on the road; I hope, however, to get them in a few days. The men were so much afraid that they have been four months on their journey; you may judge of their diligence and punctuality for your service; for my own part, I believe they must have tied their legs for three months and a half. Hircarrahs, which I sent you on the 11th of last month, have returned with your majesty's reply, dated the 29th of the same month; I hasten to send them back, as they are faithful

men, and I should wish them to be liberally recompensed. The person who is to furnish the money does not appear, nor do I hear any thing of him. I apprehend that there will be much trouble in obtaining payment. I consider it as indispensably necessary that you should send me an order to take up immediately all the money in the hands of Mercier, and accompany it with a letter of credit on the republic, as requested by me. The importance of my mission is such, and the result promises to be so advantageous to your majesty, that I cannot too often repeat that money ought to be considered as nothing, when matters of such consequence are in agitation. I must set off; but to do this, money is necessary. In all countries money is the sinew of intrigue and of war: if your majesty does not wish to be ruined by the English, and to lose the assistance of your good and faithful friends the French, shew me a sufficient mark of your confidence, in supplying me with the means; they will not stop Soucars on the road with specie, especially if it be in star pagodas. Send me a supply with all expedition, and I will set off immediately. The cloths are not arrived, and I am about to send persons in search of them. I request your majesty will authorize me to take up a year's advance of pay, according to your promise, to enable me to secure to my family the means of subsistence during my absence; as the six months for which I received an advance, will expire on the 8th of next month. I have been obliged to expend all I had, and have now nothing remaining, the English having taken both my vessel and money; you will find my request reasonable, when you consider that my family is in a strange country, and destitute of resources. I again solicit from your majesty full powers to that effect, and that the means may be immediately furnished me. As the hircarrahs assure me of their return in thirty days, I can get away in forty. It will be advisable that you should station here, with your vakeel, eight hircarrahs, that you may receive intelligence every eight days, which I have the means of arranging. I recommend the vakeel to you, his pay is insufficient, and it is now eight months that the cuchery has given him nothing; he should have besides a palankeen: the ambassador of so noble and generous a prince as yourself, ought not to go on foot like a cooly.

Are you satisfied with me? tell me in a word; you know my attachment to your person, and you shall have sincere proofs of my fidelity. I beg your majesty to continue your goodness and friendship to my true friend and colleague, General Chapuis: see him often; the more you know him, the more you will be satisfied that he merits your confidence: he is a man of the purest honour, faithful, and a sound adviser.

I have been informed that your majesty has written to the government of Madras, and to Lord Mornington. What will be the issue of their reply? be on your guard against them; be ready to defend or to attack. The preparations for war continue to be carried on with great rapidity; the Nizam's troops must by this time be on their march; they must be checked. The English attempted to carry off your vakeel, Sada Chidevaran, but I discovered the plot, and it has not succeeded.

Your majesty should write instantly to the government of Tranquebar, by a camel courier, requesting its immediate protection for your General in Chief Dubuc, your Major Fillietaz, the interpreter Debay, and your vakeel. Lord Mornington, the Governor-general of Bengal, and General Clarke, are expected on the coast at the end of this month, for the purpose of entering upon a negotiation with your majesty, which, should it not be successful, will be followed by a declaration of war; the object of which will be to take away your country, and to dethrone you; substituting in your place, and that of the allies of your crown, a nabob of their own creation: your majesty must perceive that nothing less than your kingdom is at stake. You must exert yourself, and in particular endeavour to preserve it by negotiation, till the moment when I flatter myself I shall secure it to you, and to your august children, for ever.

By means of the intrigues carried on by the English in all the durbars of India, it is easy for them to excite commotions, and they may detach from you, perhaps, all your allies. It is very probable, that by division and negotiation, in the event of their succeeding in a new war against your majesty, they may accomplish the destruction of the Marhatta power, and seize, with impunity, every thing which may have been ceded to them under a new treaty of peace; it is evidently then their interest to enter into

a joint treaty with you, that by the means of a powerful league you may establish a firm security for each other; and in this league, each ought to co-operate in defending the acquisitions or cessions that either may have made at the peace concluded at your capital, with the several contracting parties. The English threaten you: the Marhattas ought to support you, and not allow you to be exposed to destruction; the barrier that separates you from the former ought to be preserved, so that nothing may be able to break or destroy it. You may place a dependence on your allies while your interests are the same; but you will be abandoned if those interests should cease to be mutual, or more certainly still, if they should be absolutely at variance, or if your allies should begin to fear you. Your time is short and precious, you must convince them of your good intentions; anticipate the English by your activity, and throw impediments in their way, which shall retard their negotiations at Poonah, or render them ineffectual. Under such circumstances the Marhattas ought to insist on the faith of treaties; to remind the English of the assistance they afforded them against your majesty, and to urge the gratitude which they have a right to expect. They may reconcile the different interests of the parties with the delicate situation in which they are placed, and avoid the reproach of a breach of faith, either in regard to the execution of the treaty of peace generally, or any particular article of it. If these means of conciliation fail, they must immediately arm, and menace the nation which shall have infringed the treaty; the mere outcry will perhaps put a stop to all the military and hostile proceedings against your majesty; if otherwise, the sword must be drawn, the scabbard must be cast away where it may never again be found, and the fortune of war must decide the event.

We have not yet received any interesting news from Europe: the republic continues victorious over all her enemies, and refuses peace to England. Scindeah has already taken Delhi, and I think he must have completed the conquest of Agra. Your majesty will do well to dispatch couriers to inform him immediately of the situation you are in.

I beg your majesty will read attentively my letter, which has been solely dictated by candour, truth, and a regard for your real interests.

I pray to God that every thing may succeed according to the wishes of your majesty. I have the honour to be with respect,

(Signed) DUBUC,

The Commander in Chief, Captain in the Navy of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

Major Filletaz begs to offer the homage of his respect and attachment to your majesty.

A true Translation,
G. G. Keble, French Translator.

Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to M. Dubuc.

Seringapatam, the 2d January, 1799.

THE hircarrahs, who were the bearers of your letter of the 16th ultimo, arrived on the 30th. They have been paid, as a present, ten rupees. You must make every exertion to depart with all possible expedition, for it is urgently necessary. The cloths which you mention as not being arrived, have been brought back without orders. I have caused them to be returned again without delay; but should they not arrive immediately, let not this prevent your departure. The letter of credit for France which you desire, is in the packet. I hope that you will find the person who ought to pay you the money: we consider him as entirely to be depended upon; but if he should fail, you will endeavour, by means of your letter of credit, to arrange matters, and depart as soon as possible. You need not doubt that you possess my entire confidence, and that I consider you as one of my very good friends. We have settled together every thing which you have to do. It is useless, and even dangerous, to write again, because letters may be lost, and what I am most anxious about, is, that you should

depart as quickly as possible. Your dispatches have already been once intercepted, and have furnished information of your destination, which is much to be regretted. If you should write again, mention no names; we shall always understand each other: I have always written to you in that manner.

You ask me to send money from hence: how can this be done, when letters pass with so much difficulty? I authorize you to take up, by means of the letter of credit upon Europe, whatever you may require for yourself, as well as for other purposes. After the departure of this dispatch, I will send the necessary persons to carry on the correspondence. I rely solely on Providence, expecting that I shall be alone and unsupported; but God and my courage will accomplish every thing. I have sent to Poonah, but it is your departure which most interests me, and which is most pressing. Overcome all obstacles, and depart with speed.

(Signed)

A true Translation,
G. G. Keble, French Translator.

No. XIV.

From Tippoo Sultaun.

Received 13th February, 1799.

I HAVE been much gratified by the agreeable receipt of your lordship's two friendly letters, the first brought by a camel-man, the last by hircarrahs, and understood their contents. The letter of the prince, in station like Jumsheid, with angels as his guards, with troops numerous as the stars, the sun illuminating the world, the heaven of empire and dominion, the luminary giving splendour to the universe, the firmament of glory and

power, the Sultaun of the sea and the land, the King of Room (i. e. the Grand Seignior,) be his empire and his power perpetual! addressed to me, which reached you through the British envoy, and which you transmitted, has arrived.—Being *frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am* accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion.—You will be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) slightly attended.

Always continue to gratify me by friendly letters, notifying your welfare.

A true Translation,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XV.

To Tippoo Sultaun.

Written 22d February, 1799.

I HAD the honour, on the 15th instant, to receive your letter, acknowledging your receipt of my two letters of the 9th and 16th of January, informing me of your intention to proceed on a hunting excursion, and desiring me to dispatch Major Doveton, unattended, to you.

I lament most sincerely that the friendly intimation contained in my letter of the 9th of January, regarding the dangers of delay, produced no effect on your discerning mind; and that you deferred your reply to that letter to so late a period of the season. Your long silence on this important and pressing occasion, compelled me to adopt the resolution of ordering the British forces to advance in concert with the armies of the

allied powers. You are not ignorant that the period of the season rendered the advance of the army absolutely necessary to the common security of the allies. This movement of the army is to be imputed entirely to your repeated rejection of my amicable proposal of sending an ambassador to your presence.

Under the present circumstances, to send Major Doveton to you could not be attended with those advantages which would have resulted from his mission at a proper season.

The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with you, Lieutenant-general Harris, commander of the British troops, has been empowered to receive any embassy which you shall dispatch to him. Lieutenant-general Harris will also authorize such persons as he may think proper, to concert, in communication with your ambassadors, a new treaty of friendship with your highness, founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true Copy,
N. B. Edmonstone,
P. T. to the Government.

No. XVI.

Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in the East Indies, on behalf of the Honourable the East India Company, and the Allies of the said Company, their Highnesses the Nizam and the Paishwah.

A SOLEMN treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Seringapatam between the honourable company, and the Nabob Asoph Jah, and the Paishwah, on the one part, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun, on the other part, and from that day all commotion and hostility ceased. Since that day, the three allied states have invariably manifested a sacred regard for the obligations, contracted under that treaty with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun. Of this uniform disposition abundant proofs have been afforded by each of the allies; whatever differences have arisen, with regard to the limits of the territory of Mysore, have been amicably adjusted without difficulty, and with the most exact attention to the principles of equity, and to the stipulations of treaty. Such has been the solicitude of the allies for the preservation of tranquillity, that they have viewed with forbearance, for some years past, various embassies and military preparations on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, of a tendency so evidently hostile to the interests of the allies, as would have justified them, not only in the most serious remonstrances, but even in an appeal to arms. On the part of the British government every endeavour has been employed to conciliate the confidence of the Sultaun, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit, by the most unequivocal acknowledgment and confirmation of his just rights, and by the removal of every cause of jealousy which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace. These pacific sentiments have been most particularly manifested in the Governor-general's recent decision on Tippoo Sultaun's claim to the district of Wynaad, and in the negotiation, opened by his

lordship, with regard to the districts of Amerah and Souleah. In every instance the conduct of the British government in India towards Tippoo Sultaun has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith, which the legislature of Great Britain and the honourable the East India Company have firmly established as the unalterable rule of their intercourse with the native princes and states of India.

The exemplary good faith, and the pacific disposition of the allies, since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, have never been disputed even by Tippoo Sultaun. Far from having attempted to allege even the pretext of a complaint against their conduct, he has constantly acknowledged their justice, sincerity, and good faith, and has professed, in the most cordial terms, his desire to maintain and strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord with them.

In the midst of these amicable professions on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and at the moment when the British government had issued orders for the confirmation of his claim to Wynaad, it was with astonishment and indignation that the allies discovered the engagements which he had contracted with the French nation, in direct violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own most solemn and recent protestations of friendship towards the allies.

Under the mask of these specious professions, and of a pretended veneration for the obligations of treaty, Tippoo Sultaun dispatched ambassadors to the Isle of France, who, in a period of profound peace in India, proposed and concluded, in his name, an offensive alliance with the French, for the avowed purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the company, and consequently against the Paishwah, and the Nizam, the allies of the company.

The ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, demanded military succours from the French, and actually levied a military force in the Isle of France, with the declared view of prosecuting the intended war.

When the ambassadors returned, in a French ship of war, from the Isle of France, Tippoo Sultaun suffered the military force, which they had levied for the avowed purpose of making war upon the allies, to land in

his country, and finally he admitted it into his army; by these personal acts ratifying and confirming the proceedings of his ambassadors.

This military force, however, was not sufficiently powerful to enable him immediately to attempt his declared purpose of attacking the company's possessions; but in the mean while he advanced his hostile preparations, conformably to his engagements with the French, and he was ready to move his army into the company's territories, whenever he might obtain from France the effectual succours, which he had assiduously solicited from that nation.

But the providence of God, and the victorious arms of the British nation, frustrated his vain hopes, and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar.

The British government, the Nizam, and the Paishwah, had not omitted the necessary precaution of assembling their forces, for the joint protection of their respective dominions. The strict principles of self-defence would have justified the allies, at that period of time, in making an immediate attack upon the territories of Tippoo Sultaun; but even the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet at the mouth of the Nile, did not abate the anxious desire of the allies to maintain the relations of amity and peace with Tippoo Sultaun,—they attempted, by a moderate representation, to recall him to a sense of his obligations, and of the genuine principles of prudence and policy; and they employed every effort to open the channels of negotiation, and to facilitate the means of amicable accommodation. With these salutary views, the Governor-general, on the 8th of November, 1798, in the name of the allies, proposed to dispatch an ambassador to Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of renewing the bonds of friendship, and of concluding such an arrangement as might afford effectual security against any future interruption of the public tranquillity; and his lordship repeated the same proposal on the 10th December, 1798.

Tippoo Sultaun declined, by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies; and he manifested

an evident disposition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by suddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with respect to the districts of Amerah and Souleah, and by interrupting the intercourse between his subjects and those of the company on their respective frontiers. On the 9th of January, 1799, the Governor-general, being arrived at Fort St. George, (notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances in the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun) renewed, with increased earnestness, the expression of his lordship's anxious desire to dispatch an ambassador to the Sultaun.

The Governor-general expressly solicited the Sultaun to return an answer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no proposition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honour of the Sultaun, in any degree novel or complicated either in form or substance, it could not require a longer consideration. The Governor-general waited with the utmost solicitude for an answer to the reasonable and distinct proposition contained in his letter of the 9th January, 1799. Tippoo Sultaun, however, who must have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained silent, although the Governor-general had plainly apprized that prince, that dangerous consequences would result from delay. In the mean while, the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the allies: under these circumstances, on the 3d of February (eight days having elapsed from the period when an answer might have been received from Seringapatam to the Governor-general's letter of the 9th of January) his lordship declared to the allies that the necessary measures must now be adopted, without delay, for securing such advantages as should place the common safety of the allies, beyond the reach of the insincerity of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the violence of the French. With this view, the Governor-general on the 3d of February issued orders to the British armies to march, and signified to the commander of his Majesty's squadron, that the obstinate silence of the Sultaun must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negotiation.

At length, on the 13th of February, a letter from Tippoo Sultaun

reached the Governor-general; in which the Sultaun signifies to his lordship, "that being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, he was "accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion;" adding, "that the "Governor-general would be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton to him, "unattended."

The allies will not dwell on the peculiar phrases of this letter; but it must be evident to all the states of India that the answer of the Sultaun has been deferred to this late period of the season with no other view than to preclude the allies, by insidious delays, from the benefit of those advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to secure. On those advantages alone (under the recent experience of Tippoo Sultaun's violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, and under the peculiar circumstances of that prince's offensive alliance with the French) can the allies now venture to rely for the faithful execution of any treaty of peace concluded with Tippoo Sultaun.

The allies cannot suffer Tippoo Sultaun to profit by his own studied and systematic delay, nor to impede such a disposition of their military and naval force, as shall appear best calculated to give effect to their just views.

Bound by the sacred obligations of public faith, professing the most amicable disposition, and undisturbed in the possession of those dominions secured to him by treaty, Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace, and compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honour.

For a period of three months he obstinately rejected every pacific overture, in the hourly expectation of receiving that succour which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favourite purposes of ambition and revenge. Disappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, he now resorts to subterfuge and procrastination, and by a tardy, reluctant, and insidious acquiescence, in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, he endeavours to frustrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation, until some change of circumstances and of season shall revive his expectations of disturbing the tranquillity of India, by favouring the irruption of a French army.

The allies are equally prepared to repel his violence, and to counteract his artifices and delays.

The allies are therefore resolved to place their army in such a position as shall afford adequate protection against any artifice or insincerity, and shall preclude the return of that danger which has so lately menaced their possessions. The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tippoo Sultaun, Lieutenant-general Harris, commander in chief of his Majesty's and the honourable company's forces on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, is authorized to receive any embassy which Tippoo Sultaun may dispatch to the head quarters of the British army, and to concert a treaty on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary for the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

Dated Fort St. George, 22d February, 1799.

(By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general)

N. B. Edmonstone,

P. T. to the Government.

No. XVII.

General Return of the Troops belonging to the Presidency of Bombay, composing the Army assembled for Field Service; Lieutenant-general James Stuart, Commander in Chief, Head Quarters, Cananore, 11th February, 1799.

CORPS.		Commanded by	Rank and File, Europeans.	Rank and File, Natives.	Total Fighting Men, Europeans.	Total Fighting Men, Natives.	TOTAL Fighting Men.
Detachment of Artillery, and Lascars attached		Lieut. Col. Lawnan	137	314	166	344	
Detachment of Engineers		Col. Sartorius	—	—	7		
Right Native Brigade, commanded by Lieut. Col. Montresor	1st Battalion, 2d Regiment, N. S.	Major Lawrence	—	584	—	653	
	1st - - 4th - - -	Major Disney	—	600	—	672	
	1st - - 3d - - -	Lieut. Col. Inignam	—	599	—	663	
Centre, or European Brigade, commanded by Lieut. Col. Dunlop	His Majesty's 75th Regiment Foot	Major Forties	200	—	223		
	Honourable Company's E. Regiment Foot - - -	Major Fyfe	467	—	528		
	His Majesty's 77th Regiment Foot	Major Spry	618	—	693		
Left Native Brigade, commanded by Lieut. Col. Wiseman	2d Battalion, 3d Regiment, N. I. with Detachment of 1st or 9th Battalion - - -	Lieut. Col. Home	—	639	—	717	
	1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, N. I.	Major Paterson	—	593	—	663	
	2d Battalion, 2d Regiment, N. I.	Lieut. Col. Marshall	—	597	—	675	
Pioneer Corps		Capt. B. Moncriff	—	390	—	416	
		TOTAL	1,422	4,316	1,617	4,803	6,420

(Signed) ROBERT GORDON,
Adjutant General.

No. XVIII.

Abstract Return of the Troops that marched for the Mysore Country from the Coromandal Coast; taken from the Monthly Returns of the Corps in the Adjutant-general's Office, for the Month of February, 1799.

CORPS.	Non-commissioned, Drums, Rank, and File.	TOTAL.
19th Regiment Light Dragoons	430	
25th	454	884
1st Native Cavalry	439	
2d	422	
3d	437	
4th	453	1,751
Total Cavalry		2,635
Two Companies Bengal Artillery	139	
1st Battalion Artillery	148	
2d	321	
Total Artillery		608
12th Regiment Foot	693	
33d	879	
73d	746	
74th	789	
Scotch Brigade	559	
Swiss Regiment	715	
Total European Infantry		4,381

CORPS.	Non-commissioned, Drums, Rank, and File.	TOTAL.
1st Battalion, 1st Regiment Native Infantry -	963	
2d - 3d - - - - -	1,023	
2d - 5th - - - - -	1,080	
1st - 6th - - - - -	1,012	
1st - 8th - - - - -	910	
2d - 9th - - - - -	821	
1st - 12th - - - - -	795	
2d - 12th - - - - -	1,034	
Three Battalions, Bengal Volunteers - -	3,057	
Total Native Infantry -		10,695
Gun Lascars - - - -	1,483	
Pioneers - - - - -	1,000	
Total Gun Lascars and Pioneers -		2,483

ABSTRACT.	Non-commissioned, Drums, Rank, and File.
Cavalry - - -	2,635
Artillery - - - -	608
European Infantry - - -	4,381
Native Infantry - - -	10,695
Total Fighting Men - -	18,319
Lascars and Pioneers -	2,483
Grand Total -	20,802

Detachment under the Command of Colonel Roberts.

CORPS.	Non-commissioned, Drums, Rank, and File.	TOTAL.
1 Company Bengal Artillery - - -	57	
1 - Coast - - - -	85	
		142
1st Battalion, 10th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry	993	
2d - 10th - - - -	1,008	
2d - 2d - Coast Native Infantry	1,051	
2d - 4th - - - -	998	
1st - 11th - - - -	989	
2d - 11th - - - -	1,037	
		6,076
Companies of Gun Lascars - - -		318
Total - -		6,536

(Signed) JOHN BRATHWAITE,
Major-general.

GENERAL ABSTRACT.

Grand Total, main Army - -	20,802
Detachment serving with the Nizam - -	6,536
Nizam's Infantry (formerly French Corps) -	3,621
Grand Total -	30,959

Abstract State of the Departments of the Army at Kelamungalum, 9th March, 1799.

ORDNANCE.

Battering guns, with Stores complete - - -	40
Field ordnance - - - - -	57
Howitzers - - - - - -	7

N. B. The Field Train, with the contingent of his highness' the Nizam, not included.

PROVISION DEPARTMENT.

Arrack, for European troops, for - -	67 days
Salt for ditto - - - -	40
Sheep and slaughter cattle - - -	28
Biscuit - - - -	10

GRAIN DEPARTMENT.

Full allowance to 5,800 Europeans, and 13,900 Natives, for 40 days.

CAVALRY GRAM AGENCY.

Sufficient for the whole corps, at full allowance, for 20 days.

TREASURY.

	Star Pagodas.
In various coins - - - -	5,00,000
In bank notes - - - - -	90,000
Star Pagodas -	5,90,000

(Signed) P. A. AGNEW,
Military Secretary.

No. XIX.

An Account of Rice and Gram, collected in the Coorga Country, for the Use of the Army.

Rice.

	lbs.
Contract Rice, provided by Choakara Mousa, and deliverable at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, by the 25th of February, 30,000 morahs of 40 pucka seers, or 80 lbs. each	2,400,000
Rice collected by the Raja, and stored at Ver Rajunder-Pet 1st March, 33,000 batties of 60 pucka seers, or 120 lbs. each - - - - -	3,960,000
lbs.	6,360,000

Being at 1 lb. per man per day equal to the subsistance of 40,000 men for 159 days.

Gram.

	lbs.
Deliverable at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, by the 25th February, 1,000 candies of 560 lbs. each, or - -	560,000

Being at 10 lbs. per day per horse, Gram for 2,800 horses for 20 days.

No. XX.

Report of Supplies furnished by means of Lieutenant-colonel Read, and his Assistants, March 9th, 1799.

Hired bullocks, loaded with rice, 72 seers upon each, total 312,954 seers	4,347
With rice for the Provision department of Colonel Read's detachment	52
Employed in the Bullock Agent's department, from his not being able to furnish them,	14
Employed in carrying cacharee, tents, and treasure	30
Loaded with 12 lb. shot	563
Spare	706
Total	5,712
Deduct the number employed in the Revenue and Commissary's departments	96
Number left for the army	5,616
Of the number furnished by Captain Macleod, probably have arrived in camp	2,000
Job bullocks, or loads of 100 seers each, total 208,500 seers	2,085
Total	9,601

The total quantity of rice, exclusive of Captain Macleod's 2000 bullocks, being 521,484 seers, or 100 garce, which will last 30,000 men, at half a seer per day, 34 days, or deducting for wastage, one month.

If Captain Macleod's bullocks are all loaded with rice, at 72 seers each, that will be 160,000, which, at the above rate, would serve a week.

The Benjarries arrived in camp are said to have brought 15,000 loads of different articles, which, at 80 seers each, make 1,200,000; at 1 seer per man, that would last 100,000 men 12 days, and 40,000 men a *month*.

ALEXANDER READ.

A true Copy,
(Signed) *P. A. Agnew*,
Military Secretary.

N. B. Captain Macleod's bullocks have arrived.
(Signed) *P. A. Agnew.*

No. XXI.

Letter from the Coorga Rajah to the Governor-general.

Received 12th April, 1799.

THE letter which your lordship did me the favour of writing to me, I received on the 4th of March. In that letter your lordship writes, that as the most intimate friendship subsists between me and the English company's Sircar, your lordship would place a great value upon my assistance, which myself and my people might be able to render to the company, or their allies; and that the future intentions of your lordship would have been communicated to me by Captain Mahony.

Captain Mahony has accordingly explained to me the views and intentions of the English Sircar, and has made me acquainted with them

according to your lordship's directions; and has, for this purpose, explained to me the contents of the Persian letter addressed to me by your lordship. In that letter, your lordship has furnished me with orders to assist the English Sircar, which has given me great pleasure. Any little efforts which I may have made for the service of the company, are well known to Captain Mahony, who will probably have communicated them, by letter, to your lordship. Captain Mahony has been with me in the capacity of the vakeel of the English Sircar; and I have the utmost confidence in him: I have therefore made known to him the most secret thoughts of my mind. He has listened to all that I have said, and has witnessed all that I have done in the service of the company. As he will in consequence have communicated to your lordship every circumstance from time to time, what remains for me to communicate for your information?

On Tuesday, Mag Bohd Amawasy, in the year Ka Gust, about forty-one days ago, myself, Captain Mahony, and some other English sirdars, went to the hill of Sedaseer, which is within my territories. This mountain, which is exceedingly lofty, the English sirdars and myself ascended; and we remained there. Having from thence reconnoitred, we observed nothing for the first four or five hours (Malabar hours): after this we observed one large tent in the direction of Periapatam, which is within the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, and continued to see some other white tents rising; a large green tent then appeared, and then another tent which was red, and after that five or six hundred tents. Upon this, the English sirdars and myself were satisfied that it was the army of Tippoo Sultaun; we then returned to the English army at Sedapoor, and acquainted the general that Tippoo's army was at Periapatam. The army was accordingly prepared, as were also the two battalions at Sedaseer under the command of Colonel Montresor. The enemy being apprized of the English post at Sedaseer, and that it would therefore be impossible to advance by the Sedapoor road, were advancing by the high road of Balala through the talook of Kigatnaad, three coss to the right of Sedapoor, the same road by which Hyder Naik formerly invaded the Coorga country. Upon receiving a report that

they were approaching by the Balala road, and were near to Veer-rajah-indra-pettah, we all considered and determined, that four or five thousand Coorgs should be stationed on that road. They were accordingly posted there, with orders to cut off Tippoo if he should advance. About one hundred, or one hundred and fifty Coorgs, were attached to myself: arrangements were also made in the different paths which communicate between the two frontiers. Things being in this state, we again reconnoitred from the hill of Sedaseer, and General Hartley went in the morning to Sedapoor. On the same day Tippoo, with his whole force, began his march by the Sedaseer road. General Hartley was prepared at this time. Tippoo's army advanced close to the two battalions under the command of Colonel Montresor, and there was a severe action. After the battle commenced, the two battalions put a great many of Tippoo's people to death. Tippoo, unable to sustain the fire of the battalions, and having no road by which to advance, divided his army into two divisions, with the intention of getting into the rear of Colonel Montresor's battalions by a secret path. The colonel having received intelligence of this division, made a disposition of his force so as to sustain both attacks; and maintained the fight from the morning, uninterrupted, till two o'clock. The enemy were beaten and unable to shew their faces. When this information reached the main body, General Stuart, in order to assist the force at Sedaseer, marched with two regiments of Europeans, keeping the remainder of the army in the plain of Karrydygood. Upon this occasion I accompanied General Stuart. Tippoo, in order to prevent the two regiments from advancing to the relief of the troops at Sedaseer, was posted in the road between. General Stuart, upon approaching, ordered the two regiments to attack the enemy. A severe action then ensued, in which I was present. To describe the battle which General Stuart fought with these two regiments of Europeans, the discipline, valour, strength, and magnanimity of the troops, the courageous attack upon the army of Tippoo, surpasses all example in this world. In our Shasters and Purranas, the battles fought by Allered and Maharut have been much celebrated, but they are unequal to this battle: it exceeds my ability to describe this action at length to your lordship. In this

manner Tippoo's army was beaten. The action with the two regiments lasted about three hours and a half. A sirdar of high rank, with Tippoo, the Benky Nabob, fell in this action; the first and second buckshies of a body of 6000 men, being wounded with musket balls, were taken prisoners: I have also heard that five or six other officers of rank with the enemy have fallen: many of the enemy were slain and many wounded; the remainder having thrown away their muskets, and swords, and their turbans, and thinking it sufficient to save their lives, fled in the greatest confusion. Tippoo having collected the remains of his troops, returned to Periapatam.

It was not known to us that Tippoo was advancing in this manner to attack our army. He had marched with his whole force from Seringapatam to the eastward as far as Madoor, and, having stationed a small detachment there, had marched night and day with full preparation to attack the Bombay army of English Sircar in the hope of victory. He marched in three days from Madoor to Periapatam. On that night of his arrival, he prepared his troops, and, in the confident expectation of attacking the Bombay army with success, employed all his strength and skill, and courage and fierceness, and fell with his whole force, in person, upon the English army. Upon his return, chop-fallen, and having exhausted all his courage in one action, full of shame, and having humbled his head, and having exhausted all the skill and courage with which he had advanced to the attack, distracted, a fugitive, he halted at Periapatam, from whence he had set out. In this manner having advanced, and having brought disgrace upon himself, he has employed, no doubt, all his art and knowledge to recover his lost reputation. Having in this manner considered for five days, but not having taken up resolution to attack the Bombay army again, he marched on the sixth day (Saturday) back to Seringapatam. In this manner General Stuart, before my eyes, while I was looking on, having chastized my enemy, has provided great happiness for me, and all the subjects of my country. General Stuart has in this manner achieved a glorious deed.

My continual prayer to the Almighty is, that the English Sircar may

continue as my parent; that I may remain as their child; that all their enemies may be defeated; and that their territories, measures, and prosperity, may increase without end; that I may be included in the English Sircar, and enjoy tranquillity; that the army of the English Sircar may be perpetual; that I may enjoy peace under their protection. In this manner I approach the Sovereign Ruler with my constant prayer, night and day, and all times in humble supplication. Having taken these sentiments into your lordship's consideration, continue to favour me with your orders upon my future actions, relying on my attachment and friendship.

VEERA RAJA INDRA WUDDIAR.

A true Copy of a Translation.

No. XXII.

Translation of a Memorandum in the Hand-writing of the late Tippoo Sultaun.

On Wednesday the 30th, or last day of the month Razy of the year Shadeb, 4226 from the birth of Mahommed, corresponding with the 29th of Ramzan (when the moon is not visible), 1213 Hegira, or 6th of March, 1799; the victorious army (of the Sultaun) having left their baggage at Periapatam, and formed themselves into three divisions, or detachments, entered the woods of Coorg, by three different roads, where the army of the Christians had taken post, and advancing, gave battle, fighting with firelocks and spears, and the whole army of the infidels was routed; some of the Christians taking to flight. (It is literally so in the original.)

In that battle Mohummed Rezah, and Mohummed Meeran (Meer

Meeran) devoted themselves, and drank the cup of martyrdom; Mirzah Bakir Bukshy and Mohummed Ichangeer Bukshy, Asiff of Cucherry, became martyrs; and Moazim Khan Bukshy was wounded, and taken prisoner by the Christians; and Golam Mohee ud Deen devoted himself a martyr.

No. XXIII.

Translation of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris.

Received the 9th April.

THE Governor-general, Lord Mornington Bahauder, sent me a letter, copy of which is inclosed: you will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties; what then is the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me.

What need I say more?

No. XXIV.

From General Harris to Tippoo Sultaun.

YOUR letter, inclosing copies of the Governor-general's letter, has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, and for the occurrence of hostilities, I refer you to the several letters of the Governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory on the subject.

What need I say more?

10th April, 1799.

No. XXV.

Translation of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Lieutenant-general Harris, bearing no Date, but received in Camp before Seringapatam, on the Evening of the 20th April, 1799.

In the letter of Lord Mornington it is written, that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, and that therefore you having been empowered for the purpose, will appoint such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference, and renewing the business of a treaty. You are the well-wisher of both Sircars. In this matter, what is your pleasure? Inform me, that a conference may take place.

What can I say more?

A true Translation,
(Signed) B. Close.

No. XXVI.

General Harris to Tippoo Sultaun, with Draft of Preliminaries as sent in by the General to Tippoo Sultaun.

Copy of a Letter to Tippoo Sultaun from Lieutenant-general Harris, dated and dispatched from Camp before Seringapatam, by Noon of the 22d April, 1799.

Your highness's friendly letter has been received, and its contents understood.

The Governor-general, Lord Mornington Bahauder, informed you, in

his letter of the 8th of November, that the British government and the allies, wishing to live in peace with all their neighbours, entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the least incompatible with their respective engagements, and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, will always be ready, as they now are, to afford you every demonstration of these pacific dispositions. The Governor-general, in that letter, expressed his desire of communicating to your highness a plan, calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties, and proposed to depute Major Doveton to you for that purpose. You rejected the pacific advances of the Governor-general and of the allies, and you refused to receive Major Doveton, until the lateness of the season had compelled the Governor-general to order the armies to advance; but since you now express a desire to know my pleasure upon the adjustment of the business at issue, and as I hope this request is made with sincerity, and from a regard to your true interests, I have to inform you, in reply, that being vested by the Governor-general with full powers of treating and concluding a treaty, the demands contained in the inclosed draft of a preliminary treaty, are those alone on which any negotiation can be founded; and I have further to inform you, that unless these demands are agreed to, and your acquiescence signified to me, under your seal and signature, within twenty-four hours from the moment of your receiving them, and the hostages and specie delivered to me within twenty-four hours more, the allies reserve to themselves the right of extending these demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, till a definitive treaty can be arranged, and its stipulations carried into effect.

The four sons demanded of your highness as hostages are, Sultaun Padshaw, Futteh Hyder, Moyer ud Deen, and Abdul Khalick. The four sirdars are, Meer Kummer ud Deen, Meer Mahomed Sadick, Syed Goffar, and Purneah.

What need I say more?

Preliminary Articles for the Establishment of the ancient Friendship, and for the Adjustment of existing Differences between the Honourable English Company, the Nawab Asoph Jah, Row Pundit Purdam, and Tippoo Sultaun; settled by Lieutenant-general George Harris, &c. &c. &c. in virtue of the Powers delegated to him by the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-general; by Meer Allum Bahauder, on the Part of the Nawab Asoph Jah; by ———— on the Part of the Paishwah; and by ————, on the Part of Tippoo Sultaun.

☞ The words printed in italics mark the difference between the articles sent to General Harris by the Governor-general, and those actually offered to Tippoo by the General.

Article 1.

Tippoo Sultaun to receive and honourably entertain an ambassador from each of the allies, and for as long a period of time as any of the said allies shall require; the allies, on their part, severally consenting to receive and entertain, in the same manner and on the same terms, an ambassador from Tippoo Sultaun.

Article 2.

Tippoo Sultaun to dismiss, without delay, from his service, and to remove from his dominions, not only all Frenchmen, or natives of the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, or of any other countries now subject to France, but also all Europeans, natives or subjects of countries now at war with Great Britain, *to which end they shall be sent to the British camp, in the course of forty-eight hours, where (with the exception of deserters) they will be treated as prisoners of war, and sent, at the expence of the British government, by convenient opportunities, to their respective countries.*

Article 3.

Tippoo Sultaun to renounce all connexion with the French nation; and

to engage, that none of the subjects of that nation shall ever hereafter be entertained in his service, or be allowed to reside within his dominions.

Article 4.

One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultaun was in possession before the war to be ceded to the allies, from the countries adjacent to their respective boundaries, and agreeably to their selection: and it is hereby agreed and determined, with a view to the prevention of delay, that the several districts to be ceded by Tippoo Sultaun shall be taken at the valuation at which they were respectively rated, in the accounts delivered in by his vakeels during the negotiation of the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792.

Article 5.

Tippoo Sultaun to relinquish, for ever, all claim to the lately disputed districts of Ameera and Soulea, and Ersawaraseemy, to any part of the territory possessed by the Rajah of Coorga at the commencement of the war, to the whole of the Tambacherry pass, and generally to all places in the present frontiers of any of the allies which may at this time be in dispute.

Article 6.

Two crores of sicca rupees shall be paid by Tippoo Sultaun to the allies, agreeably to the following particulars.

1st. One crore shall be paid immediately in pagodas, or gold mohurs, or rupees of full weight and standard, or in gold or silver bullion.

2d. The remaining crore shall be paid within six months from the date of the present treaty.

Article 7.

All prisoners in the hands of the several powers to be fairly and unequivocally released.

Article 8.

Until the due performance of the articles of this present treaty, *four sons* of Tippoo Sultaun, *to be selected by Lieutenant-general Harris*, shall be delivered as hostages into the general's hands. And, as a further security for Tippoo's faithful execution of the same, *four of his principal officers, to be named by Lieutenant-general Harris, shall also be delivered into the general's hands*. On the arrival of the said sons *and officers* in camp, and on the payment of the first moiety of the money agreed to be paid by the sixth article, a cessation of the hostilities shall take place, but the army of the allies shall not quit their position before Seringapatam (unless they deem it expedient) until the forts and districts, *to be ceded under the fourth article*, shall actually be in possession of the troops of the *allies*.

Article 9.

The allied armies shall be entitled to a free and uninterrupted communication with the Malabar coast and the Carnatic, on both sides of the river Cavary, until the allies are put in possession of the forts and districts to be ceded under the fourth article, in which event Tippoo shall be entitled to require their departure from his territories.

Article 10.

Tippoo Sultaun shall signify his assent or rejection of the above articles within twenty-four hours after receiving them, and in twenty-four hours more, the hostages and money must arrive in camp.

Article 11.

When an agreement containing the articles above written shall arrive, bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultaun, counter agreements shall be sent to Tippoo Sultaun from the allies; and, after the cessation of hostilities, a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship shall be settled and entered into by the several powers.

No. XXVII.

Draft of Preliminaries, as sent to General Harris by the Governor-general.

Draft of Preliminary Articles for the Establishment of the ancient Friendship, and for the Adjustment of existing Differences between the Honourable English Company, the Nawab Asoph Jah, Row Pundit Purdam, and Tippoo Sultaun; settled by Lieutenant-general George Harris, &c. &c. &c. in virtue of Powers delegated to him by the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-general; by Meer Allum Bahauder, on the Part of the Nawab Asoph Jah; by ————————, on the Part of the Paishwah; and by ————————, on the Part of Tippoo Sultaun.

Article 1.

TIPPOO Sultaun to receive and honourably entertain an ambassador from each of the allies, as often and for as long a period of time as any of the said allies shall require; the allies, on their part, severally consenting to receive and entertain, in the same manner, and on the same terms, an ambassador from Tippoo Sultaun.

Article 2.

Tippoo Sultaun to dismiss, without delay, from his service, and to remove from his dominions, not only all Frenchmen, or natives of the Islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, or of any other countries now subject to France, but also all Europeans, natives or subjects of countries now at war with Great Britain.

Article 3.

Tippoo Sultaun to renounce all connection with the French nation; and to engage, that none of the subjects of that nation shall ever hereafter be entertained in his service, or be allowed to reside within his dominions.

Article 4.

One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultaun was in possession before the war to be ceded to the allies, from the countries adjacent to their present respective boundaries, and agreeably to their selection: and it is hereby agreed and determined, with a view to the prevention of delays, that the several districts to be ceded by Tippoo Sultaun shall be taken at the valuation at which they were respectively rated, in the accounts delivered in by his vakeels, during the negotiation of the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792.

Article 5.

Tippoo Sultaun to relinquish, for ever, all claims to the lately disputed districts of Ameera and Soulea, and Esawaraseemy, to any part of the territory possessed by the Rajah of Coorga at the commencement of the war, to the whole of the Tambacherry pass, and generally to all places on the present borders of any of the allies, which may at this time be in dispute.

Article 6.

Two crores of sicca rupees to be paid by Tippoo Sultaun to the allies, agreeably to the following particulars.

1st. One crore shall be paid immediately, in pagodas, or gold mohurs, or rupees of full weight and standard, or in gold or silver bullion.

2d. The remaining crore shall be paid within six months from the date of the present treaty.

Article 7.

All prisoners in the hands of the several powers to be fairly and unequivocally released.

Article 8.

Until the due performance of the articles of the present treaty, two of the three eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun shall be delivered into the hands of

Lieutenant-general Harris, as hostages; and, as a further security for Tippoo's faithful execution of the same, the fortress (or fortresses) of ————* shall also be delivered up to the company. On the arrival of the said sons of Tippoo Sultaun in camp, and on the payment of the first moiety of the money agreed to be paid by the 6th article, a cessation of hostilities shall take place; but the army of the allies shall not quit their position before Seringapatam until the fortress (or fortresses) of ———— above mentioned, shall be actually in the possession of the company's troops: and whereas the territory to be ceded to the allies will contain several forts, it is hereby further agreed, that of the said forts the allies shall be at liberty to require (if they judge proper) to be put in actual possession of any three of them which they may think fit to select, before Tippoo Sultaun shall be entitled to require the departure of the allied armies from the vicinity of Seringapatam.

Article 9.

When an agreement, containing the articles above written, shall arrive, bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultaun, counter agreements shall be sent to Tippoo Sultaun from the allies, and after the cessation of hostilities a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship shall be settled and entered into by the several powers.

* This blank to be filled up by the Commander in Chief; but it must be observed, that it is not to be filled up by the word (Seringapatam).

N. B. The fortress or fortresses here to be specified are to be exclusive of those within the districts to be ceded (see the conclusion of this article). Espaul Droog was in contemplation in this passage.

No. XXVIII.

Translate of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Lieutenant-general Harris, having no Date, but received in Camp before Seringapatam, on the 28th April, 1799.

I HAVE the pleasure of your friendly letter, and understand its contents. The points in question are weighty, and without the intervention of ambassadors, cannot be brought to a conclusion. I am therefore about to send two gentlemen to you, and have no doubt but a conference will take place. They will personally explain themselves to you. What more can I write?

A true Translation,
(Signed) BARRY CLOSE.

No. XXIX.

Copy of a Letter to Tippoo Sultaun from Lieutenant-general George Harris, dispatched from Camp before Seringapatam, on the Evening of the 28th April, 1799.

YOUR highness's letter (here recite the letter) has been received, and its contents understood.

You were informed " that the demands contained in the draft of a " preliminary treaty transmitted to you on the 22d instant, were those

" alone on which any negotiation can be founded, and that unless those " demands were agreed to, and your acquiescence signified to me, under " your seal and signature, within twenty-four hours from the moment of " your receiving them, and the hostages and specie delivered to me within " twenty-four hours more, the allies reserve to themselves the right of ex- " tending these demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of " Seringapatam, until a definitive treaty can be arranged, and its stipula- " tions carried into effect."

Those demands were in conformity with my instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-general, Lord Mornington. The instructions forbid me to receive any vakeels from your highness, after having communicated my demands, unless I know them to be charged with your formal assent to them, and unless they bring with them the hostages and the money required under the 8th article.

However much your non-compliance justifies an extension of demands, and notwithstanding the change of circumstances since my letter of the 22d, I have to inform your highness that the British nation, and the allies, actuated by no projects of ambition, but looking solely to an adequate security for future tranquillity, and a reasonable indemnification for the heavy expences which your violation of subsisting treaties had compelled them to incur, wave, in this instance, the right of increasing their demands, and are still willing to grant you the terms contained in my letter and inclosures of the 22d instant, provided that the preliminary articles, under your seal and signature, reach me before 3 o'clock, P. M. to-morrow, and the hostages and money before noon the next day.

What need I say more?

A true Copy,

(Signed) C. Macaulay, Secretary.

No. XXX.

Return of the Strength and Disposition of Tippoo Sultaun's Forces on the 4th of May, 1799.

				Total
Within the fort.	Regular Infantry, or Piada Askur.	Zumra	6400	13,739
		Fouge	4839	
		Garrison Troops	2500	
Without the fort, in the intrenchments, &c.		Piada Askur	4200	8100
		Geesh, or armed militia, &c. &c.	2400	
		Ashaam Matchlocks	1500	
		Total fighting Men		21,839
With Futtah Hyder.		Sawar Askur, or Stable Horse	2164	3066
		Silladar ditto	902	
With Cummer-ud-dien Khan.		Sawar Askur	612	6342
		Kuzak (Looties)	1773	
		Geesh, Rocket Boys, Infantry, &c.	120	
		Silladar Horse	3683	
		Meer Saduck's Horse	154	
With Purneah.		Sawar Askur	530	4884
		Silladar Horse	591	
		Kuzak	1856	
		Geesh, Rockets, &c.	131	
		Purneah's own Horse	70	
		Marhatta Cuchery of Silladar Horse	1170	
		* Hussein Aly Cawn's Troops	536	
				36,131

* Killed on the 6th of April at Sultaunpettah.

Besides, there was a detachment at Sedaseaghur of 2500 men, under Syed Meeran; one at Anagoondy of 1200; another on its march from Periapatam, by the Tippoor Road, of 700; a third of 500 at Cajuncottah; and several parties at Chuckloor, Cunagall, and different places. These, with the loss during the siege, at Mallavelly and Sedaseer, and desertions, will make the total number of fighting men amount pretty nearly to the detailed account from the state registers (48,000 men). This statement is made out by Khan Jehan Cawn, one of the most respectable of the Sultaun's officers. He was a Meer Meeran, was wounded during the assault, and is now at Mysore, in the enjoyment of an annual pension of 500 pagodas per annum for life, from the honourable company.

No. XXXI.

List of Principal Officers killed and wounded in the Service of Tippoo Sultaun, from the 6th of March to the 4th of May, 1799, inclusive.

	NAMES	Names of the Cutcherry to which each belonged	Remarks.
Jageerdars.	Hussein Ally Cawn, son of Cootoob ud Deen		Killed on 6th of April, in the defence of the tope of Sultaunpett. He was a young man, remarkable for his handsome person, accomplishments, and valour.
	Syed Saheb		Wounded in the assault, and since dead.
Meer Meerans, Principal Lords.	Mahomed Reza (Binky Nabob)	Zumioo	Killed 6th of March, at Sedaseer.
	Khan Jehan Cawn	Ditto	Wounded on 4th of May. Present.
	Syed Achruff	Ditto	Killed ditto.
	Abdal Wahab	Ditto	Wounded ditto. Present.
	Mahomed Hussein Bintoumie	Ditto	Killed ditto.
	Meer Golum Hussein	Fouge	Wounded ditto. Present fifteen days ago.
	Syed Ghoffar	Ditto	Killed ditto
	Mahomed Meeran	Ditto	Killed on 6th of March, at Sedaseer.
	Hussein Ally Cawn	Ditto	Wounded on 20th of April, in defence of the Powder Mill
Meer Asiffs, Chiefs of Revenue.	Meer Mahomed Saduck		Killed on 4th of May, by the Sultaun's people.
	Syed Mahomed Cawn		Ditto ditto.
	Sheer Cawn		Ditto ditto.
Meer Kazims, Lords of the Treasury.	Syed Boodun	Tosha Khana	Ditto ditto.
	Syed Amcen	Ditto	Wounded on 4th of May. Present.
Buckshies.	Gleolam Khodadad	Pedul Cutcherry Zumroo	Killed on 4th of May, with Tippoo Sultaun.
	Shaik Ismael	Ditto	Ditto, at the West Angle.
	Syed Abdul Bhamar	Allay Cutcherry	Ditto on 4th of May.
	Syed Abdul Ghumeer	Ditto	Ditto ditto.
	Sheer Beg		Killed on 20th of April in defence of the Powder Mill.
	Subder Cawn	Pedul Cutcherry Zumroo	Wounded ditto, ditto. Gone off to Argulcode.
	Boodun Beg, son of Sheer Beg		Killed on 4th of May.

	NAMES.	Name of the Cutcherry to which each belonged.	Remarks.
Buckshies.	Hussein Hulleel	Futtah Cutcherry Fouge	Wounded at Mallavelly on 27th March, and since dead.
	Mauzzum Khan	Musjid Cutcherry Ditto	Wounded and taken Prisoner on 6th of March, at Sedaseer.
	* Bakur Beg	Ditto ditto	Since returned to Seringapatam.
	Abdul Cadur	Kurreem Cutcherry	Wounded on 4th of May. Present.
	Syed Mahodeen	Nasir Cutcherry	Ditto ditto ditto.
Sepahdars, or Colonels, or Commander of Cushoons.	Abdul Khan Ghoru	Ahmudy Cutcherry	Killed on 4th of May, 1799.
	Syed Mahomed	Ditto	Ditto.
	Syed Shallie	Ally Cutcherry	Ditto.
	Meer Boodun	Nazir Cutcherry	Ditto.
	Shad Mahomed Suneen	Ditto	Ditto.
	Mahomed Daoud	Ditto	Ditto.
	Syed Mahomed	Ditto	Ditto.
	Abdul Cauder	Goffoor Cutcherry	Ditto.
	Mahomed Imaum	Ditto	Ditto. Wounded at Sedaseer.
	Mahomed Cassim	Ditto	Ditto.
	Syed Mahomed	Ditto	Ditto.
	Gholam Mahadeen	Ditto	Killed at Sedaseer on 6th of March.
	Shaik Mahomed	Ditto	Wounded ditto ditto.
	Hubbeeb Cawn	Kurnum Cutcherry	Ditto on 26th of April, at the attack of the Nullah, Wallaces, and Skelly's posts.
	Imaum u Deen	Ditto	Ditto ditto. Gone off.
	Mahomed Cawn	Futtah Cutcherry	Wounded at Sedaseer and Mallavelly. Present.
	Mahomed Bakur	Mokuddum Cutcherry	Ditto on 4th of May. Present.
Mokuldars Stable horse. Mokundar, Col. of Reg. of Cavalry.	Shaik Mahomed	Moize Cutcherry	Killed at Mallavelly.
	Hyder Malik	Kaeem Cutcherry	
	Daoud Begelee	Ally Cutcherry	Wounded at ditto. Present.

N. B. Several persons of distinction, not holding offices of government, fell in the assault; amongst these were three kinsmen of Ali Reza killed, and one wounded, who afterwards died.

Mahommed Darwaish, one of the embassadors who went to France in 1788, also lost his life on this occasion.

* Supposed to have been killed. Vid. Tippoo's Memorandum

ABSTRACT.

	RANKS.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
	Jageerdars - - -	2	—	2
Principal Lords - -	Meer Meerans - -	5	4	9
Lords of the Treasury	Meer Khazims - -	1	1	2
Barons of Exchequer -	Meer Asiffs - -	3	—	3
Brigadiers* - - - -	Bukshies - - -	7	6	13
Colonels - - - -	Sepahdars - - -	12	5	17
Colonels of Horse - -	Mookuldars - - -	2	1	3
		31	17	49

(Signed) WILLIAM MACLEOD,
Acting Collector.

Seringapatam, 14th June, 1799.

* The difference in the detailed and abstract account of the Bukshies arises from having omitted to mention another Bakur Beg appointed to the musical Cutcherry, on the first Bakur Beg being taken prisoner at Sedaseer, and killed at Mallavelly on the 27th of March.

No. XXXII.

Fort St. George, 24th May, 1799.

G. O. BY GOVERNMENT.

THE Right Honourable the Governor-general in Council is pleased to publish in General Orders the following copy of a Letter from the Commander in Chief.

MY LORD,

I HAVE forwarded to your lordship, by various hircarrahs, an account of the success of the army in the assault of Seringapatam, with copies of the orders issued on that occasion: in those orders I expressed my approbation of the conduct of the troops in general, and my sense of the merits of those officers whose behaviour had attracted particular notice.

It remains for me to state what is in justice due to others, whom, for obvious reasons, I could not present in the same manner to your lordship's notice; these are officers on the general staff, in my family, and others whose zeal induced them to forward the public service by the exertion of their abilities in aid of departments to which they were not officially attached.

In every point of view I must call your lordship's particular attention to the adjutant-general of the army. His general character as an officer is too well established, by a long and distinguished course of the most meritorious service, to require my testimony; but the particular exertion of his talents on the present service, in directing, regulating, and assisting the progress of our departments, when embarrassed by all the difficulties attending a deficiency of conveyance for an uncommonly extensive equipment, during the advance of the army; and the ability, zeal, and energy, displayed by him in superintending the various operations of an arduous siege, where he was ever present, stimulating the exertions of others, or

assisting their judgment and labour with his own, claim from me to be stated to your lordship in the most forcible terms. It is my earnest wish that my sentiments on this subject may be publicly recorded, and it is my firm opinion, that if the success of this army has been of importance to the British interests, that success is to be attributed, in a very considerable degree, to Lieutenant-colonel Close.

From the officers more immediately in my family I have derived all the assistance in the conduct of the public service, which I had reason to expect from their experience; and I am highly indebted to your lordship for the indulgence with which you attended to my wishes in the selection of Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Macaulay as my confidential staff.

Major Dallas has strong claims to be particularly recommended to your lordship's notice: the readiness with which he came forward to exert his personal influence with the principal natives in the bullock department, at a period when it seemed scarcely possible to move forward the public stores; the effectual aid which he gave to the store department, by his personal assistance in its arrangements, and the duty, equally important and laborious, which he voluntarily took upon himself, of seeking and securing forage for the public cattle during the marches of the army, are amongst the many instances in which his zeal has been distinguished, and which entitle him to the attention of government.

In the department of the quarter-master-general, the conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Richardson and Major Allan has been very satisfactory to me: Captain Turing has ably assisted Lieutenant-colonel Close in the adjutant-general's office; and Captain Orr of the guides has merited great praise, by his judgment, diligence, and activity in conducting the marches of the army, and of all the detachments of importance, which, since our encampment here, it has been necessary to make under Major-general Floyd.

Captain Macleod, of the intelligence department, has been employed in the management of the bazars of the army, in the arrangement of the banjarries, and on a variety of services not specially the duty of any regularly established office, but which required a perfect knowledge of the customs

of India, and the strictest integrity in the person charged with their execution.—I have on all such occasions given my full confidence to Captain Macleod, and his conduct has shewn him deserving of the trust.

I have thought it a necessary part of my public duty to make this report to your lordship, for the information of government, and have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HARRIS.

Seringapatam, May 13th, 1799.

The Right Honourable the Governor-general in council directs the commander in chief of the allied army in the field to assure the officers on the general staff of the army, those composing the confidential staff of the commander in chief. and those whose zeal, ability, and exertion, have been distinguished in aid of the departments to which they were not officially attached, that his lordship entertains the highest sense of their several eminent services during the late glorious campaign in Mysore.

The conduct of the adjutant-general, Lieutenant-colonel Close, has amply justified the implicit confidence reposed by the Governor-general in council in his extensive knowledge, approved experience, superior talents, ardent valour, and indefatigable activity.

The uniform zeal, perseverance, and fortitude, with which Lieutenant-colonel Close has exerted all these great qualities, in every trial of difficulty and danger, entitle him to the praise, respect, and esteem of the Governor-general in council. His lordship feels himself bound by every obligation of justice and public duty to recommend the extraordinary merits of Lieutenant-colonel Close to the particular approbation of the honourable the Court of Directors, and to the applause and gratitude of his country.

The selection which the commander in chief had so judiciously made of Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Macaulay, for his confidential staff, was confirmed by the Governor-general in council, with a just expec-

tation that his Excellency would derive considerable advantage to the public service from their able assistance.

The Governor-general in council is happy to record a public acknowledgment of the distinguished conduct of Major Dallas, and to assure that officer that his lordship has a just sense of the important services which he has rendered in his successful superintendence of the laborious departments under his charge.

It is very satisfactory to his lordship to remark, that the conduct of the quarter-master-general's department under Lieutenant-colonel Richardson and Major Allan, and that of the department of the guides under Captain Orr, has met with the approbation of the commander in chief; his lordship desires that his public thanks may be conveyed to those officers, and on this occasion his lordship thinks it proper to publish to the army the particular thanks which he had already directed the commander in chief to convey to Major Allan and Captain Orr, for the essential services rendered by them on the 22d March last, after the battle of Mallavelly.

His lordship is also happy to concur in the honourable testimony borne by the commander in chief to the merits of Captain Turing and of Captain Macleod, and directs that his thanks may be conveyed to those meritorious officers.

In all ranks and departments of the allied army, his lordship has observed, with sincere pleasure, a general spirit of harmony and concord, which (under the happy auspices of the commander in chief) has united every heart, head, and hand, in the common cause, signalized each progressive operation of the campaign, with a peculiar character of alacrity and ardour, and crowned its early conclusion with victory, triumph, and renown.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in Council,

J. Webbe,

Secretary to Government.

No. XXXIII.

Several Particulars relating to the Conduct of Tippoo Sultaun on the 4th of May, 1799; collected chiefly from the relation of the Killadar of Seringapatam, and from Accounts given by some of his own Servants, &c.

WHEN the Sultaun left his palace he was dressed in a light-coloured jacket, wide trowsers of fine flowered chintz, a sash of a dark red silky stuff, and a turban, with one or two distinguishing ornaments; he had on his sword, in a rich belt, slung over his right shoulder, and a small cartridge box, hung to an embroidered belt, thrown over his left shoulder: his tawuz, or talisman, was fastened under the jacket, on his right arm, a little below the shoulder. He went out early in the forenoon, as was his custom daily, to one of the cavaliers on the outer rampart of the north face, whence he could observe what was doing on both sides, and remained there till about noon, when he took his usual repast under a pandal. It would appear he had then no suspicion of the intended attack, for when reports were made to him from the west face that our parallels and approaches were unusually crowded with Europeans, and a number of Doolies behind, he expressed not the least apprehension, nor took any other precaution but desiring the messenger to return with orders to Meer Goffar, with the troops on duty near the breach, to keep on their guard. A moment after, word was brought that Meer Goffar had fallen near the breach by a cannon shot. At this intelligence the Sultaun appeared greatly agitated, ordered the troops that were near him under arms, and his servants to load the *carbines*, or short fuzees, which they carried for his own use. He then, after receiving another report, which was delivered privately, hastened along the rampart towards the breach, followed by servants, slaves, and a select guard, under several chiefs, till he met the fugitives, and perceived that the head of the Europeans had already mounted and gained the rampart: he endeavoured to

stop his flying troops, and joining many of these to his own ground, encouraged them by his voice and example to make a determined stand: he repeatedly fired on our troops himself; and one of his servants declares he saw him bring down several Europeans near the top of the breach. Notwithstanding these exertions, when the front of the European flank companies of the left attack approached the spot where the Sultaun stood, he found himself almost alone, and was forced to retire to the traverses of the north rampart; these he defended one after another with the bravest of his men and officers, and, assisted by the fire of his people on the inner wall, two or three times brought the head of our flank companies, who were pushing on with their usual ardour, to a stand. The loss here would have been much greater on our part, had not the light infantry, and part of the battalion companies of the 12th regiment, crossing the inner ditch, and mounting the rampart, driven the enemy from thence, and taken in reverse those who, with the Sultaun, were defending the traverses of the outer rampart. While any of his troops remained with him, the Sultaun continued to dispute the ground, till he approached the passage across the ditch to the gate of the inner fort; here he complained of pain and weakness in one of his legs, which had been badly wounded when very young, and, desiring his mare might be brought, he mounted, and seeing the Europeans still advancing on both ramparts, he made for the gate, followed by his palankeen, and a number of officers, troops, and servants. It was then probably either his intention to have entered and shut the gate, in order to attack the small body of our troops which had got into the inner fort, and, if successful in driving these out, to have attempted to maintain it against us, or to endeavour to make his way to the palace, and there make his last stand. But it was the will of Heaven to frustrate these attempts, as it had done his ambitious plans, and that he should never again enter his palace alive. As he was crossing to the gate by the communication from the outer rampart, he received a musket ball in his right side, nearly in a line with the breast; he, however, passed on until he was stopped about half through the arch of the gateway by the fire of the 12th light infantry from within, when he received a second ball in the right side, close to the

other; the mare he rode being wounded at the same time, sunk under him, and his turban fell on the ground. Many of his people fell about the same time on every side of him, by musketry, from both sides of the gate. The fallen Sultaun was immediately raised by some of his faithful adherents, and placed upon his palankeen under the arch, and on one side of the gateway, where he lay or sat for some moments faint and exhausted, until some European soldiers entered the gateway. A servant who has survived relates, that one of the soldiers seized the Sultaun's sword-belt, and attempted to pull it off; that the Sultaun, who still held his sword in his hand, made a cut at the soldier with all his remaining strength, and wounded him about the knee; on which the soldier put his piece to his shoulder, and shot the Sultaun through the temple, who instantly expired. Not less than three hundred men were killed, and numbers wounded, under the arch of this gateway, which soon became impassible except over the bodies of the dead and dying. About dusk, Major-general Baird, in consequence of information he had received at the palace, came with lights to this gate, accompanied by the late killadar of the fort, and others, to search for the body of the Sultaun; and after much labour it was found and brought from under a heap of others to the inside of the gate. The countenance was no way distorted, but had an expression of stern composure. The turban, jacket, sword, and belt, were gone; but the body was recognised by several of his people who were there, to be the Padshah, and an officer who was present, with the leave of Major-general Baird, took from off the right arm the talisman, which contained, sewed up in pieces of fine flowered silk, an amulet of a brittle metalic substance, of the colour of silver, and some manuscripts in magic, Arabic, and Persian characters, the purport of which, had there been any doubt, would have fully ascertained the identity of the Sultaun's body. It was placed on his own palankeen, and by General Baird's orders conveyed to the court of the palace, where it remained during the night; furnishing a remarkable instance, to those who are given to reflection, of the uncertainty of human affairs. He who had left the palace in the morning a powerful imperious Sultaun, full of vast ambitious projects, was brought

back a lump of clay, abandoned by the whole world, his kingdom overthrown, his capital taken, and his palace occupied by the very man, Major-general Baird,* who, about fifteen years before, had been, with other victims of his cruelty and tyranny, released from near four years' of rigid confinement, in irons, in a prison scarce three hundred yards from the spot where the corpse of the Sultaun now lay.

Thus ended the life and the power of Tippoo Sultaun. It will require an able pen to delineate a character apparently so inconsistent; but he who attempts it must not decide hastily. Those who have served this campaign, victorious and brilliant as it has proved, will however, I believe, agree that the infantry of the Sultaun were not inferior to our sepoys; and that, had he been joined three or four months ago by four or five thousand French troops, which he had every reason to expect, the event might have been very different. What infinite credit then is due to the man who planned and saw the fit moment to execute measures which, perhaps, have saved us from ruin!

No. XXXIV.

Address from the Inhabitants of Fort St. George to the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-general, &c. &c.

My Lord,

We the undersigned inhabitants of Madras, impressed with a deep sense of the glory and advantage derived to the British empire from your lord-

* Major general Baird, when captain of the light infantry of the late 73d regiment, (now 71st) was severely wounded and taken prisoner on the 10th of September, 1780. After being kept in Hyder's camp five or six weeks, with Colonel Baillie and six other officers, he and three others were sent to Seringapatam, and confined in a small Malabar house, subject to every insult the guard chose to offer. The number of prisoners gradually increased to forty-two or three. The whole were kept in irons, and allowed only one fanam (about *two-pence*) each per day, to furnish every article of life. Major-general Baird suffered this confinement until the peace of Mangalore, in March, 1784; a period of three years and six months.

ship's administration, beg leave to approach your lordship with our sincere congratulations on the successful termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The dawn of your lordship's government opened to us the early prospect of restoring the national interests in India, to that security and elevation which had been acquired by the victories, justice, and wisdom of the Marquis Cornwallis; the removal of a power, festering in the centre of our possessions, and corroding one of our most important alliances, evinced, as well your lordship's foresight of the dangerous cloud, which was collecting, under the councils of France, as the decision and energy with which your lordship prepared to meet the impending storm,

A prudence less penetrating, or a vigour less active, might have been appalled at the difficulties of supporting a war against the kingdom of Mysore; but it was the peculiar energy of your lordship's mind, to anticipate the growth and maturity of those difficulties, to estimate the true extent of our own power, to seize the critical period of action, and to create resources, by inspiring a confidence and energy, correspondent to the extent and importance of your lordship's measures.

The result of those measures we now view with triumph and exultation, in the complete subversion of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, of whose enmity the determined inveteracy rendered peace undesirable; and whose infatuated attachment to the implacable enemy of England, rendered war unavoidable. The rapidity with which this great event has, under Providence, your lordship's wisdom, and the gallantry of the army, been achieved, has left on our minds impressions of admiration, at a conquest unequalled in its importance, in the annals of British India.

The brilliancy of this conquest has spread a blaze of glory over the meridian of your lordship's government; and from the extensive influence of its effects, we have a just confidence that your lordship's career in India will close by diffusing throughout Hindostan, the calm of genuine peace, and undisturbed tranquillity.

Feeling in our immediate situation the first consequences of your lordship's success, we beg leave to offer your lordship our warmest acknow-

ledgments, and, while we contemplate the benefits we now enjoy, we are unable to express our gratitude in terms adequate to our sense of the decisive termination with which the brilliant achievements of the Marquis Cornwallis and the victory of Admiral Lord Nelson have been crowned by the Earl of Mornington.

Madras, 26th June, 1799.

To which the Right Honourable the Governor-general was pleased to return the following answer.

GENTLEMEN,

THE zeal which distinguishes your congratulations on the prosperous termination of the late campaign in Mysore, is suitable to the character of British subjects, animated by the glorious success of a just and necessary war, and by the happy prospect of an honourable and secure peace.

It would not become me either to depreciate the efforts which have been made for your defence, or to disclaim the share which my public duty required me to take in them.

It would have been criminal in me to have neglected any precaution, or to have declined any exertion which, in my judgment and conscience, appeared necessary to the important object of frustrating the avowed designs of the enemy, and of providing for the safety of the valuable interests committed to my charge.

In the discharge of this duty I am happy to declare, that I have received the most cordial assistance from every class and description of the inhabitants of this settlement.

My acknowledgments of the honourable, generous, and disinterested support of Lord Clive, and of the zealous co-operation of the members of the council, are not perhaps introduced with strict propriety on this occasion; but his lordship will pardon my eagerness to offer to him a public tribute of my sincere gratitude, respect, and esteem.

In all the principal civil and military officers throughout every branch and department of this government, I have found an unanimous spirit of

alacrity and diligence, equalled only by their eminent abilities and extensive knowledge. The same spirit has marked the conduct of the commercial houses, and of the banks established in this settlement: by their seasonable assistance I was enabled, in the most critical period of our military preparations, to avail myself of the resources of this presidency, to an extent unexampled in its history.

By these aids, and by the extraordinary exertions of the governments of Bengal and Bombay, I was empowered to call forth that gallant army, whose transcendant achievements have delivered the Carnatic from the perpetual alarm of invasion, and converted the strength of our implacable enemy into a new source of security and power to us, and to our allies.

It is therefore in your energy and zeal, and in the co-operation of all the British governments of India, that I trace the primary causes of our recent victories, and anticipate the settlement of a peace as propitious to our interests, and honourable to our national character, as the events of the war have been glorious to your military reputation.

Concord, unanimity, and prompt obedience, combined with a faithful and assiduous discharge of public duty, and a high sense of public honour, will render the supreme government of these extensive possessions a grateful task, in the severest trials of difficulty and danger.

With such an union of loyalty and public spirit, we may confidently expect to counteract every device and machination of our enemies; to detect their intrigues, to disappoint their treachery, to repel their violence, and to perpetuate the British empire in India on the solid foundations of humanity and valour, justice and power.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

Madras, 26th June, 1799.

No. XXXV

Account of an Apparition communicated to Tippoo Sultaun; extracted from the Manuscript referred to in a Paragraph of Colonel Kirkpatrick's Letter to the Earl of Mornington, dated 6th August, 1799.

Meer Nasin Ally, and Abdul Kudoos Meer Meeran, on the 21st of the month of Zâkery of the year Shedab, 1226 from the birth of Mahommed, corresponding with the 28th December, 1798, represented, that a person of the Mahommedan religion, who had formerly been adjutant of a battalion in the service of the Christians, came with his family to this place, namely, Kourial (or Mangalore), and stated in the following manner the reason of his having quitted that service.

That being one day at Calicut, at the house of the venerable Shiekh Syud, and several persons of the Mahommedan religion being assembled there, he related to us, that two Hindoos and two Mahommedans, leaving their houses with an intention of proceeding to Chinaputtun (Madras) had arrived at the place where Baillie, the European, was defeated; when on a sudden a voice exclaimed, "Stand! ye unknown!"

They asked repeatedly who it was; but the Mahommedans of the party not being able to distinguish, the voice again exclaimed—"In the name "of God, stand!"

They thereon stopped on the spot; and a person, covered with a veil, came, and standing before them, asked where they were going; they replied, that they were proceeding to Madras.

The apparition then said, "My sons, of such and such names, are at "such a place; urge them to avoid, as much as may be in their power, the "service of the Christians; they have a sum of money in their house; "let them engage in commerce or in agriculture, or in the service of a

" Mahommedan prince; or otherwise, like me, they will be involved in " every species of calamity."

They asked what calamity had befallen him: the apparition then removed the veil from his face, when it appeared he bore the countenance of a hog. He carried them forward some paces, and then assumed another figure: he gave the word of command in the European language, and drawing out (a regiment of) hogs in line, he put them through their manual exercise.

After this, he again covered his face with the veil as formerly, and coming before them he related his whole story as follows:

" That he was a commander under Baillie, the European; and during " the battle he fired upon the Mahommedans; and loading a second time, he " was giving the word of command in the language of the Christians, to " fire. when at the very moment he was struck on the head by a sword; " and instead of repeating the Kulmeh Shehadut (or ejaculations, profes- " sing the belief in the unity of God, and the mission of the Prophet), the " same word of command still remained upon his tongue.

" On this account," said he, " I bear the countenance of a hog, and " these other hogs are the persons who fired upon the Mahommedans."

Having said this, he vanished. And these persons proceeded on, and upon their arrival at Madras, by means of the names and description which had been given them, they found out the sons, and related the whole of the above story, upon which the sons abandoned the service of the Christians.

Translation of Tippoo Sultaun's Dreams.

No. 1.

On the 12th of the month Behauree of the year Herausut, 1124 from the birth of Mahommed (answering to about the 19th of May, 1796), on the night of Thursday, the following day of which was Friday, and towards the morning, this servant of God had a dream.—Methought it was

represented to the presence that a Frenchman of rank was arrived. I sent for him, and he came; and when he came into the presence I was absorbed in business; and when he came near unto the Musnud, I perceived him, and I rose up and embraced him; I caused him to sit down, and inquired after his health; and methought the Christian said, "I am "come with ten thousand men for the service of the Khooda-daud Sircar.* "I have disembarked them all on the shore of the sea; they are all men of "bold aspect, of robust form, and young. Having disembarked them all "on the shore of the sea, I am come to present myself." And methought I said unto him, "It is well done; by the favour of God, all the pre-"parations of war are here in readiness, and all the followers of Islaum "are, tribe by tribe, ready to prosecute the holy war." At this moment the morning dawned, and I awoke.

No. 2. *Another Dream.*

At the capital on the night of Sunday, the following morning of which was Monday, the 2d of the month Zaukree, of the year of Sauz, 1225 from the birth of Mahommed, answering to the 3d of Jemaudee oosauny (corresponding with about the 21st November, 1797), I had a dream.—Methought that they brought and placed before me three silver trays of fresh dates, of the species called *moist*. The dates were each in size of the length of a span; they were fresh, and full of juice; and it was reported to me that they had been reared in the garden. At that moment I awoke; it was morning.

Thus did the servant of God interpret the dream; That by the grace of the merciful God the dominion of the three kaufers (infidels) shall fall into my hands.

On the 3d of the above month news arrived that Nizam Alli was dead.

* God-given Sircar.

No. 3. *Another Dream.*

On the 21st of Hydery, &c. (the date cannot at present be ascertained, but probably was about the year 1786, when Tippoo was engaged in a war against the Marhattas and the Nizam), at the place where I had halted, on the farther side of Tungbuddra, I had a dream.

Methought it was the day of judgment, when no one is interested in the concerns of another. At that time a stranger of a commanding aspect, with eyes of brightness, and a blooming countenance, with a beard and mustachoes, came to me, and taking my hand, said to me, "Do you know who "I am?" I told him I did not. He then said unto me, "I am Mor-"teza Alli (son-in-law of Mahommed). The prophet of God hath said, "and still sayeth, I will not place my foot in Paradise without thee.* "I will wait for thee, and will enter Paradise with thee." I was rejoiced, and awoke.

God is all powerful, and the prophet is the intercessor. It sufficeth.

No. 4. *Another Dream.*

Prior to the night attack upon the Marhattas at Shanoor, when the army was encamped at (name illegible), on the 6th of the month Khoosravee (* date unknown, but probably about the year 1786), the night of Thursday of the year——, I had a dream.—Methought a young man of a beautiful countenance, a stranger, came and sat down; and methought I jested with him, in the manner that a person playfully talks with a woman; at the same time I say in my heart, "It is not my custom to enter into playful "discourse with any one." In the instant the youth rose, and, walking a few paces, returned, when he loosened his hair from beneath his turban, and opening the fastening of his robe, displayed his bosom, and I saw it was a woman: I immediately called and seated her, and said unto her,

* This is understood as applied to Tippoo.

" Whereas I before looked upon you as a woman, and jested with you, it " now appears that you are a woman, in the dress of a man. My conjecture " has well succeeded" In the midst of this discourse the morning dawned, and I awoke. I imparted my dream to the people (about me), and interpreted it thus: That please God these Marhattas have put on the clothing of men, but in fact are in character of women. By the favour of God, and the aid of his apostle, on the 8th of the month and year abovementioned, on the morning of Saturday, I attacked the army of the infidels by surprise. I myself advancing with two or three hundred men, penetrated the camp of the infidels, crushing them as I went, as far as the tent of Hurry Punt Pharkiah, and they all fled like women.

No. 5. *Another Dream.*

On the 8th of the month Jaufiee, of the year Shuttah, 1218 from the birth of Mahommed, (the precise date is difficult to ascertain, but it must have been about July or August, 1791), at the capital of Puttun, in the Durreah Baug, I had a dream.—Methought a battle had taken place near a wood with the Christians, and all the army of the Christians dispersed and fled away, and by the favour of God, the army of the Ahmedy Sircar was victorious. The Nau-Sirdar of the infidels, with a few Christians, retreated into a large house, and closing the door remained; and methought I asked my people what should be done; they advised me to break open the door, in order that the house, which was ornamented, might suffer no damage; and I said unto them, that the house was of brick and cement, and therefore we should set fire to and burn down the gates, and destroy all the Christians with our muskets. At this time the morning appeared, and I awoke. By the favour of God thus shall it happen.

No. 6. *Another Dream.*

On the 7th of the month Jaufree, of the year Shaudaub, 1217 from the birth of Mahommed, (answering to about August, 1790), when encamped

at Sulaumabad, before the attack upon the intrenchments of Ram Nayer, and after evening prayers, I made invocation to the deity in these terms.—"Oh God, the damned infidels of the hills forbid fasting and prayer (as "practised by the Mussulmen); convert them at once unto the faith, so "that the religion of thy prophet may acquire strength!" In the course of the night, and towards the morning I had a dream.—Methought that the army of the Ahmedy Sircar, after traversing the forests and passes, encamped. In the road, and near the place of encampment, I saw a cow with its calf, in semblance like a large striped tiger; its countenance, teeth, &c. were in the manner of a tiger: its fore legs were as those of a cow; its hinder legs were wanting: its fore legs had a little motion, and it was greatly destructive. Having well reconnoitered it, I repaired to the camp, and directed several persons to prepare themselves, and come with me; meaning, please God, to approach this cow with a tiger's form, and, with my own hand, cut it and its calf in pieces. Having reviewed my household stud, I gave orders for two grey horses to be quickly saddled and brought. At this moment the morning appeared, and I awoke. The interpretation of this dream, at the instant, suggested itself to my mind;—that the hill christians, resembling cows with their calves, have the appearance of tigers; and, by the favour of God, and through the auspices and aid of the holy messenger (Mahommed), the place beforementioned will be reduced with facility, and all the irreligious Christians will be slain. The slight motion of the fore legs thus interpreted—that they will make some slight attempts at resistance. The want of the hinder legs is thus explained—that none will afford them assistance, and that no Mussulman shall receive injury at their hands. Through the aid of God be it so.

Translations from Tippoo Sultaun's Pocket Book.

☞ The originals are in Persian, and in the Sultaun's hand-writing.

Oh my soul! be thy devotion that of the heart, if thou wouldst seek God; for otherwise the *kaaba** and the idol-house are both of stone.†

Great and small are at a loss to recount thy praises.
The service of thy altar is preferable to both worlds.
Thou takest away sickness; thou restorest health.
Oh father, out of thy goodness take (from me) sickness, and grant (me) health!‡

I am full of sin; thou art a sea of mercy.
Where thy mercy is, what became of my sin? §

* Black stone at Mecka.

† Meaning, that it is true devotion alone that makes the difference between them.

‡ These are ejaculatory lines for persons labouring under sickness.

§ i. e. Great as are my sins, they are nothing in comparison to the extent of divine mercy.

No. XXXVI.

Return of the Honourable Company's Draught and Carriage Cattle and Calves, received from the Mysore Sircar. Camp, 14th June, 1799.

	Mutteudies.	Darogahs.	Choudries.	Duffadars.	Drivers.	Total.	Bullocks. Draught	Carriage	Forage	Calves
Present, attached to draught Cattle -	7	34	68	132	998	1239	2783	—	419	—
Ditto ditto to Carriage ditto -	1	3	8	15	128	155	—	652	—	—
Ditto ditto to Calves - -	1	1	2	4	37	45	—	—	20	655
Total	9	38	78	151	1163	1439	2783	652	439	655

(Signed) Thomas Dallas, P. Agent.

N. B. 82 draught bullocks, 36 carriages, and 35 calves, were received on the 17th of June. The carriage bullocks are all in weak condition.

(Signed) P. A. Agnew.
Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

A true Copy, G. Buchan, Sub. Secretary.

N. B. Besides, there were about 3500 stable horses, about 100 elephants, and 200 camels, belonging to the Sircar, delivered up, a few days after the capture of Seringapatam.

No. XXXVII.

Abstract from the Return for March, 1799, *of the Detachment under the Command of Colonel Brown.*

	European Commissioned Officers.	European, Non-commissioned Drums, Rank, and File.	Native Non-commissioned Drums, Rank, and File.	Total Europeans and Natives, including Officers.
Staff of the Detachment	9	7	—	16
Artillery - - - -	7	91	—	98
European Infantry - -	28	882	—	910
Native Cavalry - -	—	—	33	33
Native Infantry - - -	32	5	2859	2896
Gun Lascars - - -	—	—	238	238
Native Pioneers - - -	1	1	106	108
Total - -	77	986	3236	4299

(Signed) A. BROWN,
Lieutenant-colonel.

No. XXXVIII.

Abstract Return of the Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Read.

CORPS.		Total Non-commissioned Rank and File.
European Artillery	36	
Gun Lascars attached to ditto	72	
Nizam's Native Artillery	84	
Gun Lascars attached to ditto	55	
		247
The Honourable Company's European Infantry	69	
Recovered men of his Majesty's regiments	40	
		109
Native Infantry, 12 companies	1123	
Three Battalions of the Nizam's Infantry under Major Grant	1973	
Infantry attached to the Nizam's Cavalry	300	
		3396
Pioneers		24
A Troop of Cavalry, Commanded by Captain Montague Gosby		47
Nizam's Horse		1584
Total		5407

(Signed) ALEXANDER READ,
Lieutenant-colonel.

Kistnagheri, 12th April, 1799.

No. XXXIX.

Report of Brinjarries engaged by Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Read, 1st of March, 1799.

Brinjarries, entertained	- - -	19,550
Baipauries, ditto	- - - -	22,550
Buljewars	- - - -	3,100
Wurdy Bullocks	- - - -	5,557
Kerya ditto	- - - -	1,620
	Total -	52,377
Bandies, or small carts	- - -	227

(Signed) ALEXANDER READ,
Lieutenant-colonel.

No. XL.

Abstract of the Returns of the Army commanded by Lieutenant-general Harris, shewing its Strength at various Periods of the Campaign; with an Abstract of Ordnance and principal Stores conveyed with the Army, and remaining at the Conclusion of the Siege of Seringapatam.

PERIODS OF RETURNS.	EUROPEANS. For Duty, including Officers. Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Total.	Horses.	EUROPEANS. Sick Present, including Officers. Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Total.	Horses.	NATIVES. For Duty, including Officers. Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Pioneers.	Total.	Horses.	NATIVES. Sick Present, including Officers. Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Pioneers.	Total.	Horses.	Grand Total. Europeans.	Natives.	Horses.
Strength of the Army in the Field on marching from the Carnatic, exclusive of his Highness the Nizam's Cavalry and Infantry - - -	925	683	4462	6070	859	33	25	206	264	6	1727	1697	14327	1028	18779	1697	60	63	800	—	923	56	6334	19702	2618
Strength of the Army before Seringapatam after the march of Major-general Floyd to Periapatam, exclusive of his Highness the Nizam's Cav. and Inf.	404	521	3304	4299	446	38	26	339	403	4	430	1396	10455	891	13172	406	10	86	684	60	840	34	4632	14012	890
Strength of the Army on the return of Major-general Floyd, and junction of the Bombay Army - - - -	925	736	6101	7762	859	33	25	206	264	6	1727	2015	17781	1346	22869	1697	60	63	956	—	1079	56	8026	23948	2618
Strength of the Army on the return of Major-general Floyd from Covriporam, with the Detachments of Lieut.-colonels Brown and Read - - -	735	785	6247	7767	803	37	64	836	937	3	1858	2206	19754	1395	25213	1471	43	112	1413	70	1638	74	8704	26851	2351

N. B. 23 Engineers, 3621 of his Highness the Nizam's Infantry, and about 6000 Cavalry, not included.

Abstract of Ordnance and principal Stores.

	24 pounders, Iron Gun.	18 ditto ditto.	12 ditto ditto.	18 ditto Brass.	12 ditto ditto.	6 ditto ditto.	3 ditto ditto.	8 Inch Howitzers, Brass.	5½ ditto ditto.	Shot 24 pounders.	Ditto 18 ditto.	Ditto 12 ditto.	Ditto 6 ditto.	Ditto 3 ditto.	Shells 8 Inches.	Shells 5½ Inches.	Powder 60lb. Barrels.
Battering Train conveyed with the Army - - -	2	30	8	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Field ditto ditto ditto	—	—	—	2	8	38	8	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Principal Stores conveyed with the Army - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2800	36395	8399	3600	1200	1000	2000	5987
Principal Stores remaining at the conclusion of the Siege - -	2	29	8	2	8	38	8	3	4	1176	10150	2821	1214	656	708	1158	2255

The Field Ordnance and Stores with the Bombay Army, and the Detachments under Lieutenant-colonels Brown and Read, not included above.

P. A. AGNEW,
Military Secretary.

General Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of Corps composing the Army before Seringapatam, from the 4th of April to the 4th of May, 1799, *both Days inclusive.*

Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

CORPS.	EUROPEANS.			NATIVES.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
The Corps of Madras Engineers,	0	1	0	0	0	0
of Bombay Ditto,	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Detachment of Bengal Artillery	4	12	0	2	10	0
1st Battalion of Coast Ditto	6	6	0	0	5	0
2d Ditto of Ditto	8	15	1	9	27	8
Detachment of Bombay Artillery	4	6	0	5	4	0
His Majesty's 12th Regiment	17	49	1	0	0	0
33d Ditto	6	28	12	0	0	0
73d Ditto	21	99	1	0	0	0
74th Ditto	45	111	0	0	0	0
75th Ditto	16	64	3	0	0	0
77th Ditto	10	51	1	0	0	0
Scotch Brigade	14	86	1	0	0	0
Regiment de Meuron	16	60	1	0	0	0
The Bombay Regiment European Infantry	9	23	1	0	0	0
The 1st Battalion 10th Bengal Regiment Native Infantry	0	0	0	3	3	0
2d Ditto Ditto Ditto	0	0	0	5	5	0
The 1st Battalion Bengal Volunteers	0	0	0	3	3	12
2d Ditto Ditto	0	0	0	6	30	9
3d Ditto Ditto	0	0	0	2	8	5
The 1st Battalion 1st Regiment Madras Native Infantry	1	0	0	3	14	0
" 2d Do. 2d Do. Ditto	0	0	0	4	10	0
" 2d Do. 3d Do. Ditto	1	2	0	12	47	15
" 2d Do. 5th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	11	33	0
" 1st Do. 6th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	0	0	0
" 2d Do. 7th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	4	16	0
" 1st Do. 8th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	5	13	0
" 2d Do. 9th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	4	7	5
" 1st Do. 11th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	3	11	0
" 2d Do. 11th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	1	4	0
" 1st Do. 12th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	1	0	0
" 2d Do. 12th Do. Ditto	1	3	0	7	46	51
The Pioneer Corps	1	0	0	8	37	0
The 1st Battalion 2d Regiment Bombay Native Infantry	1	1	0	4	10	0
" 2d Do. 2d Do. Ditto	0	2	0	2	10	0
" 1st Do. 3d Do. Ditto	0	1	0	4	15	0
" 2d Do. 3d Do. Ditto	0	0	0	2	6	0
" 1st Do. 4th Do. Ditto	0	0	0	3	14	0
" 1st Do. 5th Do. Ditto	0	1	0	4	7	0
The Pioneer Corps, Do. Ditto	0	1	0	2	25	0
Total	181	622	22	119	420	100

N. B. Two conductors of Ordnance, wounded on the 2d and 4th instant, *not included* in the above.

Officers Killed and Wounded, included in the General Return.

Major C. Campbell,	1st Bat. 1st Regt. Nat. Infantry.	Killed 5th April, 1799.
Lieut. G. Nixon,	H. M. 12th Regiment,	Ditto ditto.
—— T. Falla,	Ditto ditto ditto.	Ditto 6th ditto.
—— Fitzgerald,	Ditto 33d ditto.	Ditto 5th ditto.
Lieut. Fireworker A. Brooke,	Bengal Artillery,	Wounded 5th ditto.
Lieut. R Nixon,	H. M. 12th Regiment,	Ditto ditto.
—— King,	Ditto ditto,	Ditto 6th ditto.
Ensign Nevill,	Ditto ditto,	Ditto 17th ditto.
Captain J. Munro,	2d Bat. 12th Regt. Madras N. I.	Ditto 18th ditto.
Lieut J. Vernon,	Ditto ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Moore,	Ditto ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Macintosh,	2d Bat. 3d Madras Regt. N. I.	Ditto 17th ditto.
Captain Alexander Torriano,	Bombay Artillery,	Killed 18th ditto.
Lieut. William M'Redie.	Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— William Taylor,	Staff,	Wounded ditto.
—— Jeremiah Lock,	2d Bat. 2d Bombay Regt. N. I.	Ditto ditto.
—— John Barnard,	Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
Assistant Surgeon Glasser,	Regiment de Meuron,	Killed 19th ditto.
Lieut. J. Fish,	2d Bat. 3d Madras Regt. N. I.	Ditto 20th ditto.
—— S. Smith,	Ditto,	Wounded ditto.
—— Fletcher,	H. M. 74th Regiment	Ditto ditto.
Captain J. C. Meares,	1st Bat. 2d Bombay Regt. N. I.	Killed 21st ditto.
——— John Gordon,	H. M. 75th Regiment.	Wounded ditto.
——— Marshall,	1st Bat. 5th Bombay Regt. N. I.	Ditto ditto.
——— William Browne,	1st Bat. 3d ditto,	Ditto ditto.
Lieut. Todd,	H. M. 73d Regiment,	Ditto 26th ditto.
Captain Hay,	——— Scotch Brigade,	Killed ditto.
Lieut. M'Beath,	Ditto,	Wounded ditto.
—— Innes,	Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— M'Lean,	Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Blair,	1st Bat. Madras Artillery,	Ditto 25th ditto.
—— Irvine,	H. M. 74th Regiment,	Killed 26th ditto.
Captain Aytone,	Ditto,	Wounded ditto.
Lieut. Maxwell,	Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Carrington,	Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— M'Lean Junior,	H. M. 73d Regiment,	Ditto 27th ditto.
Captain Moll,	H. M. Scotch Brigade.	Ditto ditto.
——— Piauchaud,	Regiment de Meuron,	Ditto ditto.
Lieut. Fagen,	3d Bat. Bengal Volunteers,	Ditto ditto.
Lieut. Colonel Montague,	Bengal Artillery,	Wounded 2d May (since dead.)
—— Cookesley,	1st Bat. Madras Artillery,	Killed ditto.
Captain Cosby,	Staff.	Ditto ditto.
Captain Lieut Caldwell,	Madras Engineers,	Wounded 4th ditto.
Major Mandeville,	2d Bat. Madras Artillery,	Ditto ditto,
Captain Jourdan,	Ditto ditto,	Killed ditto.
Captain Lieut. Prescott,	1st ditto,	Wounded ditto.
Lieut Shaw,	H. M. 12th Regiment,	Ditto ditto.
Captain Macleod,	——— 73d ditto,	Ditto ditto.

Lieut. Lalor,	H. M. 73d Regiment,	Killed 4th May, 1799.
—— Thomas,	——— Ditto,	Wounded ditto.
Ensign Antil,	——— Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
——— Guthrie,	——— Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
Lieut. Farquhar,	——— 74th Ditto,	Killed ditto.
—— Prendergast,	——— Ditto,	Wounded ditto (since dead.)
—— Hill,	——— Ditto,	Killed ditto.
—— Shaw,	——— Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Mather,	——— 75th Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Turner,	——— Ditto,	Wounded ditto.
—— Broughton,	——— Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
—— Skelton,	——— Ditto,	Ditto ditto.
Lieut. Colonel Dunlop,	——— 77th Ditto.	Ditto ditto.
Captain Owen,	——— Ditto,	Killed ditto.
Lieutenant Lawrence,	——— Ditto,	Wounded dittto.
Captain Lardy,	Regiment de Meuron,	Ditto ditto.
Lieut. Mathey,	Ditto,	Ditto ditto (since dead.)
—— R. Webbe,	Bombay European Regiment,	Ditto ditto.
—— Cormick.	Madras Pioneers,	Killed ditto.

Abstract of Officers Killed and Wounded.

CORPS.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total Killed & Wounded
Engineers, Madras	0	1	1
Ditto, Bombay	0	0	0
Artillery, Bengal	0	2	2
Ditto, Madras	2	3	5
Ditto, Bombay	2	0	2
Infantry, Bengal	0	1	1
Ditto, Madras	14	26	40
Ditto, Bombay	3	12	15
Pioneers, Madras	1	0	1
Ditto, Bombay	0	0	0
Total	22	45	67

(Signed) B. CLOSE,
Adjutant General of the Army.

A True Copy,
P. A. AGNEW, Military Secretary.

No. XLI.

To the Citizen Sultaun Tippoo, the Victorious, at Puttun (Seringapatam).

To Tippoo Sultaun, the Victorious, the Ally of the French Republic, and the well-beloved of the Republicans, his Children; Health.

From the Republican Camp, the 3d day of the 1st Decad of Prairial, the 5th Year (May 23d, 1797).

Citizen Sultaun,

I have received the letter which you have done me the friendship to write to me, and I take the liberty of replying to it article by article.

With respect of that which relates to Monsieur Raymond; I have read the letter written by him to Citizen Dompars: M. Raymond, more subtle than him, has the air of a man who would be a Frenchman, or who would at least wish to be thought so, and this with a view to discover your intentions, and those of the Republic, your sister; he expresses a wish to be informed of our means, and of our force, alleging that he has sacrificed the greater part of his property, to prove his attachment to the French, and to support the French and their name in India, that his party is called the French, and that he has always borne the French colours.

He is known to you, excellent prince, and still better to France. He has made war—on whom?—on you, the ally of my nation: it is thus that he would prove to you his sincerity. He has erected the ancient standard of France: this was only to disengage you from the French, who acted under your orders; he is in the service of a prince who is both your enemy and ours, and has formed an unworthy alliance with the English, with whom he is in constant habits of intercourse. But, my prince, in dealing with traitors, we must make use of their own arms. You must not let him perceive that you have unmasked him. If you will permit me to write to him, I will manage matters in such a manner as to draw him

over, and induce him to enter entirely into your wishes. In politics, we should avail ourselves of the arms of those whose hands we should be glad to see cut off, and put it out of the power of our enemy to hurt us, either by word or deed.

I repeat to you, that your interests are as dear to me as those of my own nation, and you may rely on the frankness of my heart; but Raymond appears to make advances to you; do you appear to accept and return this confidence, and allow me to act a part with him. Be assured that he will submit himself to your pleasure; subtle as he is, I will outwit him, and you shall be satisfied.

With respect to the men who are in irons, had they deserved death, be persuaded that they should have received no mercy: I do not love either cowards or traitors, and you may rest assured that your camp shall be ordered with all the dignity and respect which is due to you. I do not command it, but I am a republican; and I will make them know that you do not pay them either for their debauchery or their vices, and that they must earn the money which you give them; that every where, and at all times, they must be ready to maintain your precious name and glory. They begin to listen to me. I will render them worthy of this honour, and this is no trifling attempt, after their late disorderly behaviour. An order from you to Citizen Dompars, conceived in the terms of the writing inclosed, would have the best effect. Your will shall be complied with; on Monday afternoon I will take out, with your permission, the citizen gunners to your place of exercise, that they may fire at the mark. I make them practice daily firing at the mark. But as it is the custom among the republicans to attach a small piece of artillery to each company of infantry, for the purpose of manœuvering, and to favour attacks or retreats, or the skirmishes of cavalry, I request of you merely to lend me one of your smallest field pieces; these pieces, in time of action, are drawn with traces. Your wishes are laws; I wish you all the happiness you deserve.

Your Citizen,

(Signed) RIPAUD.

I desire the Citizen Dompars, as commandant, to qualify himself, that he may be able to command in person, the French republicans who are under his orders. That he will, in the same manner, require his officers to qualify themselves to command, as well as his inferior officers. I give you all one month to enable you to practise, and I shall judge myself of the military evolutions which you may be able to perform at that period. To be republicans, it is necessary to be well informed, to possess a degree of pride, and to merit the esteem of those whose pay we receive.

Hitherto you have neglected these duties of honourable men; repair your former errors, and merit my esteem. You will daily make the citizens whom you command, without any distinction, except that of age, practise with the musquet and great guns. Those who perform their exercise well, with the musquet and cannon, will practise only every Monday on my parade; those who will not make the most of their time shall be formed, according to their respective aequirements, into second and third classes; those of the second class shall exercise three times a week; those of the third daily, until all your citizens becomes qualified for the first class, both with respect to the management of the musquet and of the artillery; they must all be equally expert at the musquet and the artillery.

Be careful that this order be carried into execution; you will be answerable to me for it. Issue orders also to your cavalry to instruct themselves. It is proper that all should be perfect. Such is my will.

A true Translation,
G. G. Keble, French Translator.

*** This letter establishes the fact, that M. Raymond, commander of the French army at Hyderabad, had opened a correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun. With regard to the standard under which M. Raymond's corps served, they were delivered up at Hyderabad on the 22d October, 1798; they consisted of the three-coloured flag, surmounted by an emblem, representing the Ottoman crescent transfixed by a dagger, on the point of which was placed the French cap of liberty.

No. XLII.

Major Allan's Account of his Interview with the Princes in the Palace of Seringapatam, and of finding the Body of the late Tippoo Sultaun.

A SHORT time after the troops were in possession of the works, Major Beatson and I observed, from the south rampart, several persons assembled in the palace; many of whom, from their dress and appearance, we judged to be of distinction. I particularly remarked, that one person prostrated himself before he sat down; from which circumstance I was led to conclude, that Tippoo, with such of his officers who had escaped from the assault, had taken shelter in the palace.

Before any attempt could be made to secure the palace (where it was thought the enemy, in defence of their sovereign and his family, would make a serious resistance) it became necessary to refresh the troops, who were greatly exhausted by the heat of the day, and the fatigue which they had already undergone. In the mean time Major Beatson and I hastened to apprise General Baird of the circumstances we had seen: on our way, we passed Major Craigie and Captain Whitlie, with the grenadiers, and some battalion companies of the 12th regiment. As soon as we reached General Baird, we proposed to him to bring these troops to him, to which he assented. On my return, General Baird directed me to proceed to the palace with the detachment of the 12th, and part of Major Gibbings's battalion of sepoys: he directed me to inform the enemy that their lives should be spared, on condition of their immediate surrender, but that the least resistance would prove fatal to every person within the palace walls. Having fastened a white cloth on a serjeant's pike, I proceeded to the palace, where I found Major Shee, and part of the 33d regiment, drawn up opposite the gate: several of Tippoo's people were in a balcony, apparently in the greatest consternation. I informed them

that I was deputed by the General, who commanded the troops in the fort, to offer them their lives, provided they did not make resistance; of which I desired them to give immediate intimation to their Sultaun. In a short time the killedar, another officer of consequence, and a confidential servant, came over the terrace of the front building, and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They were greatly embarrassed, and appeared inclined to create delays; probably with a view of effecting their escape as soon as the darkness of the night should afford them an opportunity. I pointed out the danger of their situation, and the necessity of coming to an immediate determination, pledging myself for their protection, and proposing that they should allow me to go into the palace, that I might in person give these assurances to Tippoo. They were very averse to this proposal, but I positively insisted on returning with them. I desired Captain Scohey, who speaks the native languages with great fluency, to accompany me, and Captain Hastings Fraser. We ascended by the broken wall, and lowered ourselves down on a terrace, where a large body of armed men were assembled. I explained to them, that the flag which I held in my hand was a pledge of security, provided no resistance was made; and the stronger to impress them with this belief, I took off my sword, which I insisted upon their receiving. The killeder, and many others affirmed, that the princes and the family of Tippoo were in the palace, but not the Sultaun. They appeared greatly alarmed, and averse to coming to any decision. I told them, that delay might be attended with fatal consequences; and that I could not answer for the conduct of our troops, by whom they were surrounded, and whose fury was with difficulty restrained. They then left me, and shortly after I observed people moving hastily backwards and forwards in the interior of the palace; and, as there were many hundreds of Tippoo's troops within the the walls, I began to think our situation rather critical- I was advised to take back my sword; but such an act, on my part, might, by exciting their distrust, have kindled a flame, which, in the present temper of the troops, might have been attended with the most dreadful consequences; probably the massacre of every soul within the palace walls. The people on the terrace

begged me to hold the flag in a conspicuous position, in order to give confidence to those in the palace, and prevent our troops from forcing the gates. Growing impatient at these delays, I sent another message to the princes, warning them of their critical situation, and that my time was limited. They answered, they would receive me as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose; and soon after the killedar came to conduct me.

I found two of the princes seated on the carpet, surrounded by a great many attendants. They desired me to sit down, which I did in front of them. The recollection of Moiza-deen, who, on a former occasion, I had seen delivered up with his brother, hostages to Marquis Cornwallis, the sad reverse of their fortunes, their fear, which, notwithstanding their struggles to conceal, was but too evident, excited the strongest emotions of compassion in my mind. I took Moiza-deen (to whom the killedar, &c. principally directed their attention) by the hand, and endeavoured, by every mode in my power, to remove his fears, and to persuade him that no violence should be offered to him or his brother, nor to any person in the palace. I then intreated him, as the only means to preserve his father's life, whose escape was impracticable, to inform me of the spot where he was concealed. Moiza deen, after some conversation apart with his attendants, assured me that the Padshaw was not in the palace. I requested him to allow the gates to be opened. All were alarmed at this proposal; and the princes were reluctant to take such a step but by the authority of their father, to whom they desired to send. At length, however, having promised that I would post a guard of their own sepoys within, and a party of Europeans on the outside, and having given them the strongest assurances that no person should enter the palace but by my authority, and that I would return, and remain with them until General Baird arrived, I convinced them of the necessity of compliance; and I was happy to observe that the princes, as well as their attendants, appeared to rely with confidence on the assurances I had given them.

On opening the gate, I found General Baird and several officers, with a large body of troops assembled. I returned with Lieutenant-colonel Close

into the palace, for the purpose of bringing the princes to the General. We had some difficulty in conquering the alarm and the objections which they raised to quitting the palace; but they at length permitted us to conduct them to the gate. The indignation of General Baird was justly excited by a report, which had reached him soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege: this was heightened probably by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings, during more than three years imprisonment in that very place; he was, nevertheless, sensibly affected by the sight of the princes; and his gallantry, on the assault, was not more conspicuous, than the moderation and humanity which he displayed on this occasion. He received the princes with every mark of regard, repeatedly assured them that no violence or insult should be offered to them, and he gave them in charge to Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Marriott, by whom they were conducted to head-quarters in camp, escorted by the light company of the 33d regiment. As they passed, the troops were ordered to pay them the compliment of presented arms.

General Baird now determined to search the most retired parts of the palace, in the hope of finding Tippoo. He ordered the light company of the 74th regiment, followed by others, to enter the palace-yard. Tippoo's troops were immediately disarmed, and we proceeded to make the search through many of the apartments. Having intreated the killedar, if he had any regard for his own life, or that of his Sultaun, to inform us where he was concealed, he put his hands upon the hilt of my sword, and, in the most solemn manner, protested that the Sultaun was not in the palace, but that he had been wounded during the storm, and lay in a gateway on the north face of the fort, whither he offered to conduct us; and if it was found that he had deceived us, said, the General might inflict on him what punishment he pleased. General Baird, on hearing the report of the killedar, proceeded to the gateway, which was covered with many hundreds of the slain. The number of the dead, and the darkness of the place, made it difficult to distinguish one person from another, and the scene was altogether shocking; but, aware of the great political importance of

ascertaining, beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the bodies were ordered to be dragged out, and the killedar, and the other two persons, were desired to examine them one after another. This, however, appeared endless; and, as it now was becoming dark, a light was procured, and I accompanied the killedar into the gateway. During the search we discovered a wounded person laying under the Sultaun's palankeen: this man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah Cawn, one of Tippoo's most confidential servants; he had attended his master during the whole of the day, and, on being made acquainted with the object of our search, he pointed out the spot where the Sultaun had fallen. By a faint glimmering light it was difficult for the killedar to recognize the features; but the body being brought out, and satisfactorily proved to be that of the Sultaun, was conveyed in a palankeen to the palace, where it was again recognized by the eunuchs and other servants of the family.

When Tippoo was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were open, and the body was so warm, that for a few moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive: on feeling his pulse and heart, that doubt was removed. He had four wounds, three in the body, and one in the temple; the ball having entered a little above the right ear, and lodged in the cheek. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, with a crimson cloth of silk and cotton, round his waist: a handsome pouch with a red and green silk belt, hung across his shoulder: his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of his fall: he had an amulet on his arm, but no ornament whatever.

Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders, and a short thick neck, but his feet and hands were remarkably small; his complexion was rather dark; his eyes large and prominent, with small arched eyebrows, and his nose aquiline: he had an appearance of dignity, or perhaps of sternness, in his countenance, which distinguished him above the common order people.

No. XLIII.

Commission for Mysore; dated 4th June, 1799.

Richard, Earl of Mornington, &c. &c. &c. Governor-general for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in India, to all whom these Presents shall come, greeting:

WHEREAS the glorious success of the British and allied arms in Mysore, under the favour of Providence, has reduced the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun to the joint power and authority of the Honourable the English East India Company, and of his highness the Soubah of the Deccan, their friend and ally; and whereas his said highness has given full power and authority to the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-general for all the forces and affairs of the British nation in India, to conduct and order the interests of his highness in the said possessions, and to conclude such an arrangement thereof as shall appear to his lordship to be most expedient for the security and welfare of the country, and for the common benefit of the allies; now know ye, that for the more speedy conclusion of such a salutary arrangement, and for the restoration of order and tranquillity, by the settlement of the said conquered territories, I, the said Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-general, as aforesaid, do hereby constitute, nominate, and appoint, Lieutenant-general George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, Lieutenant colonel Barry Close, or any three or more of them, to be commissioners for the settlement of the territories so recently conquered from the said Tippoo Sultaun, and to be, and be styled commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, with full powers to negotiate and conclude, in my name, all such treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional regulations, for the ordering and management of the civil and military govern-

ment, and of the revenues of the said territories, as may be necessary for the immediate administration and settlement thereof: the said commissioners to be, nevertheless, subject to such orders and instructions as they shall from time to time receive from me, and regularly to report their proceedings to me, keeping an exact diary, or daily record thereof, under the signature of one of their secretaries. And I do hereby empower the said commissioners to hold their meetings at such places, either within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, or elsewhere, as they shall judge most convenient, and to adjourn, from time to time, and to change the place of their meeting according to the exigency of the public service. And I authorize and direct the said commissioners to communicate, from time to time, with Meer Allum Bahauder, touching the objects of this commission. And I nominate and appoint Captain Malcolm and Captain Munro to be secretaries, and Mr. Edward Golding to be assistant secretary to the said commission, during my pleasure. And before the said commissioners, or any of them, shall proceed to act in the execution of any of the powers or trusts vested in them by this commission, save only the power of administering the oath herein-after mentioned, he or they shall severally take and subscribe the following oath; that is to say:

I, *A. B.* do faithfully promise and swear, that as a commissioner for the affairs of Mysore, I will execute the several powers and trusts reposed in me, according to the best of my skill and judgment, without favour or affection, prejudice or malice, to any person whatever. I will not disclose or make known any of the orders or instructions which shall be transmitted to me, or to the said commissioners, by the Governor-general, or by his order, or any of the proceedings of the said commissioners, save only to the other members of this commission, or to the person or persons who shall be duly nominated and employed in transcribing or preparing the same, respectively, or in recording the proceedings of the said commissioners, or unless I shall be authorized by the Governor-general to disclose or make known the same. I do further promise and swear, that I will not demand, take, or accept, directly or indirectly, by myself, or by any other person, for my use or on my behalf, or on the behalf or for the

use of any other person, any sum of money, or other valuable thing by way of gift, present, or otherwise; and that to the Governor-general in council I will justly and truly account for, answer, and pay, all the rents, duties, and other revenues, and sums of money, which shall come to my hands, or to the hands of any person or persons in trust for, or employed by me, in execution of the powers and authorities vested in the said commissioners by the said Governor-general.

So help me God.

Which oath, any two of the said commissioners shall, and are hereby empowered to administer to the others of them. And the said oath shall be entered by one of the secretaries to the commission amongst the acts of the board, and be duly subscribed and attested by the said commissioners, at the time of their taking and administering the same to each other, respectively; and the several secretaries, and other officers of the said board of commissioners, shall also take and subscribe, before the said board, such oath of secrecy, and for the execution of the duties of their respective stations, and the integrity of their conduct therein, as the said board shall direct. And when any three of the said commissioners shall have taken the oath, they shall immediately constitute a board, and proceed to act under the commission. And I do hereby empower and direct the said commissioners to take charge and render an exact account to me, of all such public property as has been, or shall be found, within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and also to collect and bring to account, all such arrears of revenue, and all such sums of money, as were due to the Sircar on the 4th of May, 1799, or have, or shall become due to the government of the allies, from and after that day. Provided always that this order shall not be construed to prevent or impede the distribution among the allied army, of the prize taken in the fort of Seringapatam on the 4th of May, according to the general order issued by the Governor-general in council, under date the : and provided also, that nothing contained in this commission shall be deemed to preclude the right of the captors of any fort or place, taken on or before the said 4th day of May, 1799, to obtain from the commissioners an attested account of the

public property contained therein, in order that the claims of all such captors may be heard and determined by the Governor-general in council, or by the honourable the Court of Directors, or by his Majesty in council, according to the nature of the case. And I do hereby authorise and direct the said commissioners, immediately upon entering on their duties under this commission, to issue a proclamation, notifying the restoration of tranquillity, and promising to all the inhabitants of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, security of person and of private property, encouraging them to resume their ordinary occupations, under the protection of the allies. And I further direct, that the said proclamation shall contain the strictest injunctions, under the most severe penalties, to all persons within the said territories, to abstain from acts of violence, outrage, and plunder.

No. XLIV.

Instructions to the Commissioners of Mysore; dated 4th of June, 1799.

(Secret)

To the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

GENTLEMEN,

1. THE commission which accompanies this letter, will apprize you of the nature and extent of the powers which I have deemed it advisable to intrust to you. These powers necessarily supercede those which I had delegated, during the campaign, to the commission appointed to assist Lieutenant-general Harris, in all matters relating to political negotiation. The favourable situation of affairs in Mysore appearing to render my presence at Seringapatam quite unnecessary, I have again taken the resolution of remaining at Madras; and I therefore propose to confide to you such a portion of my authority as may enable you, under my orders, to effect a settlement of the country without my presence. Whatever three members

of the commission shall be present at Seringapatam, on the arrival of this dispatch, will proceed immediately to act under the commission, and to execute the instructions contained in this letter.

2. The restoration of the representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory between the allies, in which the interests of the Marhattas should be conciliated, appearing to me, under all circumstances of the case, to be the most advisable basis on which any new settlement of the country can be rested, I have resolved to frame, without delay, a plan founded on these principles, and I hope in the course of to-morrow, to be able to forward to you the articles of a treaty, with proper instructions annexed, for the purpose of carrying the above mentioned plan into effect.

3. In the meanwhile it is absolutely necessary that certain measures of precaution should be immediately adopted, in order to facilitate the intended arrangement. These measures relate, first, to the satisfaction of the principal Mussulmen sirdars, and of the killedars of the several forts; secondly, to the mode of removing the family of Tippoo Sultaun from Mysore, with the least practicable injury to their feelings. With regard to the first object, I have already forwarded to the Honourable Mr. Henry Wellesley, a letter to Meer Allum, and a copy of a letter from the Nizam to me, which I trust will enable you to give complete satisfaction to Kummeer ud Deen; and unless you expect any considerable advantage from his influence at Seringapatam, in conciliating others of his religion, I desire that you will take the earliest measures to induce him to repair to Gurrumcondah. With the other leading Musselmen you should immediately enter into such specific engagements as shall preclude the possibility of any alarm in their minds, with respect to their situation and prospects, under any new arrangement of the country.

4. I rely on your discretion to conclude such an arrangement with as little burthen to the finances of the company as circumstances will admit. The whole body of Tippoo's sirdars ought not to become an exclusive charge upon the company. They must be employed and provided for by the allies, and by the Rajah of Mysore, collectively; the families of the

sirdars slain during the campaign must also be provided for in the same manner.

5. The killedars who have surrendered, and those who still hold forts in their possession, should be paid their arrears for the month of April at least, with their pay for the month of May, and for as long a time as we may leave them in charge of their forts. On dismissing any of them, liberal gratuities should be given them, for the purpose of conciliation. All these charges may hereafter be adjusted between the allies.

6. As soon as you shall judge that your arrangements with the remnant of the Mussulmen interest are in sufficient forwardness, you will proceed to take the necessary measures for removing the family of the Sultaun. The details of this painful, but indispensable measure, cannot be intrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion, activity and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the commission. I have appointed Lieutenant-colonel Doveton to take the command of the fortress of Vellore, which is destined for the future residence of the Sultaun's family. Colonel Doveton is also appointed pay-master of stipends to the family: and he has been directed to make every possible preparation for their accommodation at Vellore. After their arrival, no reasonable expense will be spared to render their habitation suitable to their former rank and expectations; and it is my intention to give them a liberal pecuniary allowance. Colonel Wellesley will judge whether it may be necessary to give either to the whole or to any branch of the family, any specific assurance of the exact amount of the sums to be allotted to them, respectively. If any such particular explanation should appear necessary for their satisfaction, I authorize you to make the allotment of stipend to each of them, as well for the establishment of the Zenana, provided that the total sum for the maintenance of the whole family be not stated at more than three, or at the utmost four lacs of pagodas. The sons of the late Sultaun may be accompanied by such attendants as they may select, provided the number be not so great as to

endanger the public tranquillity, or to form a point of union for the adherents of the late Sultaun. It might be desirable, that Ali Reza should accompany the princes, as he appears to be attached to the interests of the company, and at the same time to entertain considerable affection for the princes. The females and children of the several families must follow the princes as speedily as possible. Colonel Wellesley, in my name, will give the most unequivocal assurances of protection and indulgence to every branch of the family; and at a proper time he will deliver the letters for the four eldest sons of Tippoo, forwarded by the Persian translator to Mr. Henry Wellesley. If General Harris should be at Seringapatam, or within reach of it, I am persuaded that his humanity will induce him to exert every effort to mitigate all the rigorous parts of this revolution in Mysore, which I feel myself bound, by every principle of duty towards the British interests in India, to accomplish without delay.

7. I have learned, with the utmost degree of surprize and concern, that the Zenana in the palace of the Sultaun was searched for treasure,* some time after the capture of the place: I could have wished, for the honour of the British name, that the apartments of the women had not been disturbed. In the heat and confusion of an assault, such excesses are frequently unavoidable; but I shall for ever lament, that this scene should have been acted long after the contest had subsided, and when the whole place had submitted to the superiority of our victorious arms. If any personal ornaments, or other articles of value, were taken from the women in that unfortunate moment, I trust that the Commander in Chief will make it his business to vindicate the humanity of the British character, by using the most zealous exertions to obtain a full restitution of the property in question.

8. After this observation, it is superfluous to add my most anxious expectation, that the utmost degree of care will be taken to secure the

* "We feel great satisfaction in being able to assure your Lordship, that before the Zenana was searched for treasure, separate apartments were prepared for the ladies, and no precaution omitted to secure them from the possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. No treasure was found in the Zenana, nor was any article whatever conveyed from thence."

Extract. Letter from the Commissioners to the Governor-general, dated 8th June, 1799.

personal property of the princes and of the women, when the period of their removal shall arrive.

9. You will of course apply to the Commander in Chief for such an escort as may be necessary to convey the family of Tippoo to the place of their destination; and you will arrange the time and mode of their departure, so as to preclude the possibility of any commotion or escape. It is desirable, that some officer, conversant in the language, manners, and customs of the natives, and of approved humanity, should accompany the princes until Lieutenant-colonel Doveton can meet them. His qualifications for the trust which I have reposed in him, are too well known to require any illustration.

10. In exercising the general powers vested in you by the accompanying commission, I desire that you will not interfere in the management of the province of Canara, until you shall receive further instructions from me. I have directed General Stuart to make a temporary arrangement for the government of that province; and until I shall have received his report, I cannot decide the system of measures most eligible to be adopted in that quarter. You will apprize the commissioners, whose power is superceded by this new commission, of my entire approbation of their services; and you will return them my thanks accordingly.

11. The present regulation is founded on an opinion that the Commander in Chief may not always be at liberty to act in a political capacity, and that he may not be able to spare more than one of his confidential staff from about his person. My selection of Lieutenant-colonel Close has been directed, not only by my knowledge of his extraordinary talents, proficiency in the native languages, and experience in the native manners and customs, but my determination to establish him in the important office of Resident with the Rajah of Mysore, as soon as that prince shall be placed on the Musnud. You will observe, that the commission enjoins all the commissioners, and persons employed under them, to take an oath of secrecy, previously to their entering upon their functions; you will therefore communicate a copy of the commission to any member who may happen to be absent from Seringapatam when the dispatch shall arrive; but the contents of this dispatch must not be communicated by the person to whom it is

addressed, to any person who shall not have taken the oath of secrecy prescribed in the commission, excepting Meer Allum.

12. It has occurred to me, that the removal of your meetings to Bangalore might have an useful effect in drawing the multitude of Mussulmen from Seringapatam. This would enable the commandant of the fort to commence the repair or improvement of the fortification, and to proceed in clearing the place, and making it strictly a military station. I recommend the earliest possible attention to this measure, as being of essential importance to our security in Mysore.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

Fort St. George, 4th June, 1799.

No. XLV.

Partition Treaty of Mysore.

Treaty for strengthening the Alliance and Friendship subsisting between the English East India Company Behauder, his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, and for effecting a settlement of the Dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun,

WHEREAS the deceased Tippoo Sultaun, unprovoked by any act of aggression on the part of the allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and admitted a French force into his army, for the purpose of commencing war against the Honourable English Company Behauder, and its allies, Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder; and the said Tippoo Sultaun having attempted to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security made by the Honourable English Company Behauder and its allies, for

their defence and protection against the joint designs of the said Sultaun, and of the French, the allied armies of the Honourable English Company Behauder, and of his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, proceeded to hostilities, in vindication of their rights, and for the preservation of their respective dominions from the perils of foreign invasion, and from the ravages of a cruel and relentless enemy.

And whereas it has pleased Almighty God to prosper the just cause of the said allies, the Honourable English Company Behauder and his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahauder, with a continued course of victory and success, and finally to crown their arms, by the reduction of the capital of Mysore, the fall of Tippoo Sultaun, the utter extinction of his power, and the unconditional submission of his people; and whereas the said allies, being disposed to exercise the right of conquest with the the same moderation and forbearance which they have observed from the commencement to the conclusion of the late successful war, have resolved to use the power which it hath pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing permanent security, and genuine tranquillity, for themselves and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions: wherefore a treaty, for the adjustment of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, between the English East India Company Behauder and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, is now concluded by Lieutenant-general George Harris, Commander in Chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty and of the English East India Company Behauder in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-general for all affairs, civil or military, of the British nation in India; and by the Nabob Meer Allum Behauder, on the part and in the name of his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, according to the under-mentioned articles, which by the blessing of God shall

be binding on the heirs and successors of the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and of which the conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.

Article 1.

It being reasonable and just that the allies, by this treaty, should accomplish the original objects of the war (viz. a due indemnification for the expenses incurred in their own defence, and effectual security for their respective possessions against the future designs of their enemies, it is stipulated and agreed, that the districts specified in schedule A, hereunto annexed, together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Behauder, of its allies or tributaries, situated below the Ghauts on either coast, and all forts situated near to and commanding the said passes, shall be subjected to the authority, and be for ever incorporated with, the dominions of the English East India Company Behauder, the said Company Behauder engaging to provide effectually, out of the revenues of the said districts, for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Ally Khan, and of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and to apply to this purpose, with the reservation herein after stated, an annual sum of not less than two lacks of star pagodas, making the company's share as follows:

Estimated value of district enumerated in the schedule A, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultaun in 1792.

Canteria pagodas - - - -	7,77,170
Deduct provision for the families of Hyder Ally Khan and Tippoo Sultaun two lacks of star pagodas, in Canteria pagodas	2,40,000
Remains to the East-India Company - -	5,37,170

Article 2.

For the same reason stated in the preceding article, the districts specified in the schedule B, annexed hereunto, shall be jubject to the authority, and

for ever united with, the dominions of the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, the said Nabob having engaged to provide liberally, from the revenues of the said districts, for the support of Meer Kummer ud Deen Behauder, and of his family and relations, and to grant him for this purpose a personal jaghire in the district of Gurrumcondah, equal to the annual sum of rupees 2,10,000, or of Canteria pagodas 70,000, over and above, and exclusive of a jaghire, which the said Nabob has also agreed to assign to the said Meer Kummer ud Deen Khan, for the pay and maintenance of a proportionate number of troops, to be employed in the service of his said highness, making the share of his highness as follows:

Estimated value of the territory specified in schedule B, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultaun in 1792, -	6,07,332
Deduct personal jaghire to Meer Kummer ud Deen Khan, rupees 2,10,000, or Canteria pagodas - -	70,000
Remains to the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder	5,37,332

Article 3.

It being further expedient, for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security on the foundations now established by the contracting parties, that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subjected to the said Company Behauder, it is stipulated and agreed that the said fortress, and the island on which it is situated (including the small tract of land, or island, lying to the westward of the main island, and bounded on the west by a nullah called the Mysore Nullah, which falls into the Cavery, near Chungal Ghaut) shall become part of the dominions of the said Company, in full right and sovereignty for ever.

Article 4.

A separate government shall be established in Mysore; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed, that Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter-described, upon the conditions hereinafter-mentioned.

Article 5.

The contracting powers mutually and severally agree, that the districts specified in schedule C, hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maha Rajah Mysore, upon the conditions hereinafter-mentioned.

Article 6.

The English East India Company Behauder, shall be at liberty to make such deduction, from time to time, from the sums allotted by the first article of the present treaty, for the maintenance of the family of Hyder Ally Khan and Tippoo Sultaun, as may be proper; in consequence of the decease of any member of the said families, and in the event of any hostile attempt, on the part of the said family, from any member of it, against the authority of the contracting parties, or against the peace of their respective dominions, or the territory of the Rajah of Mysore, then the said English East India Company Behauder shall be at liberty to limit, or suspend entirely the payment of the whole, or any part of the stipend, hereinbefore stipulated to be applied to the maintenance and support of the said families.

Article 7.

His Highness the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, shall be invited to accede to the present treaty; and although the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any part of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties, (namely, the English East India Company Behauder, and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder) yet for the maintenance of the relations of friendship and alliance between the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, the English East India Company Behauder, his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Bahauder, it is stipulated and agreed, that certain districts, specified in schedule D, hereunto annexed, shall be reserved for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan

Behauder in full right and sovereignty, in the same manner as if he had been a contracting party to this treaty: provided, however, that the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall accede to the present treaty, in its full extent, within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties; and provided also, that he shall give satisfaction to the English East India Company Behauder and to his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, with regard to certain points now depending between him the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, and the said Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder; and also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said Paishwa, on the part of the English East India Company Behauder by the Governor-general, or the English Resident at the Court of Poonah.

Article 8.

If, contrary to the amicable expectation of the contracting parties, the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall refuse to accede to this treaty, or to give satisfaction upon the points to which the seventh article refers, then the right to and sovereignty of the several districts herein-before reserved for eventual cession to the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, shall rest jointly in the said English East India Company Behauder, and the said Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, who will either exchange them with the Rajah of Mysore for other districts of equal value more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange and settle respecting them, as they shall judge proper.

Article 9.

It being expedient, for the effectual establishment of Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah in the Government of Mysore, that his highness should be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, it is stipulated and agreed, that the whole of the said force shall be furnished by the English East India Company Behauder, according to the terms of a separate treaty to be immediately concluded between the said English East India Company

Behauder and his Highness the Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder.

Article 10.

This treaty, consisting of ten articles, being settled and concluded, this day, the 22d of June, 1799 (corresponding with the 17th of Mohurrum, 1214 anno Higeree) by Lieutenant-general Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-general aforesaid, and by Meer Allum Behauder, on the part, and in the name of his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, the said Lieutenant-general Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, have delivered to Meer Allum Behauder one copy of the same, signed and sealed by themselves; and Meer Allum Behauder has delivered to Lieutenant-general George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, another copy of the same, signed and sealed by himself; and Lieutenant-general George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, and Meer Allum Behauder, severally and mutually engage, that the said treaty shall be respectively ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-general, under his seal and signature, within eight days from the date hereof, and by his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, within twenty-five days from the date hereof.

(L. S.) Meer Allum.

Witnessed, by order of the Commissioners,

(Signed) J. Malcolm, *Secretary.*

Separate Articles of the Treaty between the Company and the Nizam.

1. With a view to the prevention of future altercations, it is agreed between his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder and the Honourable English East India Company Behauder, that to whatever amount the stipends appropriated to the maintenance of the sons, relatives, and dependants of the late Hyder Ally Khan and Tippoo Sultaun, or the personal jaghire of Meer Kummer ud Deen Khan shall hereafter be diminished, in consequence of any of the stipulations of the treaty of Mysore, the contracting parties shall not be accountable to each other on this head.

2. And it is further agreed between the contracting parties, that in the event provided for in the eighth article of the treaty of Mysore, two-thirds of the share reserved for Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall fall to his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the remaining third to the Honourable English East India Company Behauder.

Schedule A.

1. The Company's Share.

The following districts from Nuggur or Bednore:

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.	
Korial (Mangalore) Bekul and Neleseram	1,33,662	7¼	
Karcul	11,393	2¼	
Barkoo	48,389	8½	
Khoosaulpore	26,361	7½	
Bulkull	9,177	0¼	
Garsopa	9,192	0½	
Hunawur (Onore)	17,842	9½	
Mirjaun	8,953	4¾	
Ancola, Punchmahl and Shedasheoghur (or Soonda Payen Ghaut)	28,332	2	
Bilghuy	18,929	4¼	
Carried forward		3,11,874	6¾

Coimbatore, *viz.*

	Cant. Pagodas. Fanams.		
Brought forward		3,11,874	6¾
Coimbatore - -	80,000 o		
Danaigincottah -	35,000 o		
Cheoor - -	27,000 o		
Chinjerry - -	27,000 o		
Darapoor Chuckergary -	64,000 o		
Settimungalum - -	30,000 o		
Undoor - - -	8,000 o		
Peroondora - -	14,000 o		
Vizimungul or Aravacoorchy	20,000 o		
Erroade - -	20,000 o		
Garoor - - -	41,000 o		
Coodgully - -	15,000 o		
Caveryporam - -	4,000 o		
		3,85,000	o

Wynaad (from Amudnugur Chickloor) from Talooks belonging to Seringapatam.

Punganoor - -	15,000 o		
Sutticul, Alumbaddy, Koodahully - -	15,200 o		
Oussore - -	18,096 o		
Decani Cottah, and Ruttungherry -	14,000 o		
Vencatigeri-cottah -	6,000 o		
Ankusgeery and Sooligeery -	4,000 o		
		72,296	o
Carried forward		7,69,170	6¾

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.
Brought forward			7,69,170	6¾
Banglore	3,000	0		
Talamulla and Talwaddy, half Talooks of Hundaluelly	5,000	0		
			8,000	0
Total			7,77,170	6¾
Deduct provision for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Alli Khan and of Tippoo Sultaun, Star pagodas 2,00,000 or Canterai pagodas			2,40,000	0
Remains to the company — Canterai Pagodas			5,37,170	6¾

Schedule B.

2. The Nizam's share.

	Gooty.	
Fuze Huzzoor Kubal	15,568	0
Kona Koomlah	7,500	0
Pamri	11,000	0
Wunjur Kurroor	8,998	1
Yursutty Muracherroo	5,902	0
Beem Rapah	4,800	0
Muttoor	2,700	0
Pravallie Mumnimong	9,426	3
Chunumpilly	8,951	8
Mulkainva Kotoo	22,251	8¾
Kurtooni	8,800	0
Yarky	22,673	1
Carried forward	1,28,571	1¾

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.
Brought forward			1,28,571	1¾
Pennacoonda - -	60,000	0		
Munug Seera - - -	8,000	0		
Hundytenaatpoor - -	16,000	0		
Koorgoor, remainder of - -	11,629	0		
Kunchindgoondy, ditto of -	10,000	0		
Of Gurrumcondah.				
All the districts not added in 1792	1,85,810	0		
Puttungeery, from Seringapatam	10,000	0		
Rydroog (6 Talooks) -	1,02,856	0		
Kunnool Peshcush - -	66,666	0		
From Chittledroog,				
Jerymullah (1 Talook) -	7,800	0		
			4,78,761	0
		Total	6,07,332	1¾
Deduct for a personal jaghire to Cumeer ud Deen Khan and relations - -			70,000	0
Remains to the Nizam -		Canterai Pagodas	5,37,332	1¾

Schedule C.

District ceded to Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder.

Talooks belonging to Seringapatam.

Puttun Attacran -	11,000	0	0
Mysore Attacran or Rechmut			
Nuzzur - -	11,500	0	0
Nuzzur Bar - -	14,000	0	0
Hardunhelly - -	15,000	0	0
Periapatam - -	6,200	0	0
Muddoor - -	13,200	0	0
Hetghur Deivan Cottah -	8,000	0	0
Betudapoor - - -	7,000	0	0
Tyour - - -	8,000	0	0
Carried forward	93,900	0	0

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.
Brought forward	93,900	0 0
Yelandoor - -	10,000	0 0
Mallivelly Gullinabad -	9,000	0 0
Tulkar Sosilah - -	8,100	0 0
Nurzipore - -	10,200	0 0
Yestonah - -	7,200	0 0
Bailoor - -	15,700	0 0
Astrulgoor - -	4,300	0 0
Chenapatam - -	12,100	0 0
Bullum Mungirabad -	10,000	0 0
Hussin - -	7,900	0 0
Honavelly - -	9,400	0 0
Nagmungul - -	4,700	0 0
Bellore - -	3,100	0 0
Mahorage Droog - -	10,000	0 0
Gram - - -	3,500	0 0
Ramgherry - -	7,400	0 0
Turkanemb - -	7,400	0 0
Ahmud Nuggur Chickloor	10,000	0 0
Kurp - -	12,000	0 0
Toory Khaira - -	9,000	0 0
Coonydghul - -	5,008	9 0
Hoolioordroog - -	4,000	0 0
Kirkairy - - -	4,065	0 0
Chennyputtun - -	9,138	0 0
Noogairly - -	3,000	0 0
Mairlabah or Kishmaghessoor	6,100	0 0
Sucknyputtun - -	6,200	0 0
Banorawar, Gurradungilly, Harrunhilly -	10,000	0 0
Carried forward	3,12,412	9 0

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.		Fanams.		
Brought forward				3,12,412	9	0
Boodihall - -	7,000	0	0			
Nidgul - -	6,000	0	0			
Posgur - - -	10,000	0	0			
Hagulwary - -	12,000	0	0			
Goomairpollam - -	10,000	0	0			
Bangalore - -	55,000	0	0			
Maugry - -	8,400	0	0			
Mudgherry - -	36,000	0	0			
Coorghurry - -	4,000	0	0			
				1,48,400	0	0
Cankanelly - -	8,900	0	0			
Nalwungle and Doorbilla -	16,000	0	0			
Anikul - -	10,300	0	0			
Byroodroog - -	4,000	0	0			
Hyboor - - -	7,000	0	0			
Dewanhully - -	20,045	0	0			
Ootradroog - -	5,000	0	0			
Chinroydroog - -	8,000	0	0			
Toomkoor and Deoroy -	18,000	0	0			
Nidgegul and Maclydroog	16,000	0	0			
Kundakeera and Chellnaighelly	16,000	0	0			
Chota Balapoor - -	80,000	0	0			
Colar - -	80,000	0	0			
Jungum Cottah - -	13,000	0	0			
Chuckmogalam -	8,134	4	0			
Kudoor - - -	7,129	7	4			
				3,17,509	1	4
Sera, remainder of						
Sera and Amerapoor -	55,000	0	0			
Ooscotah - -	50,754	0	0			
Burra Balapoor - -	44,000	0	0			
				1,49,754	0	0
Carried forward				9,28,076	0	4

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.		Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.	
Brought forward				9,28,076	0	4
Nuggur above Ghaut.						
Kusbah	29,145	4¾	2			
Coolydroog	28,818	0¾	2			
Koompsee	8,094	2½	0			
Kope	22,864	5¼	2			
Wastara	6,818	9	0			
Eekairy and Sagur	39,411	0½	2			
Gooty (Hoobly)	11,006	8	¾			
Surbtonanundy	10,458	0¼	2			
Terryanwitty	17,424	0	0			
Shikarpor	11,774	0¾	0			
Annuntapoor	10,191	0½	9			
Lakooley Dannass	11,629	6¾	1			
Oodgunny	13,614	1¾	0			
Simoga	16,883	5	0			
Hooly Honore	6,583	5¾	1			
Biddary	10,835	5	2			
Chingeery, Beswapattam	22,091	1¾	3			
Turrykeera	14,076	4¼	2			
Azeimpoor	10,696	2¾	3			
				3,02,417	6	6
Chittledroog, remainder of 12 Talooks.						
Kusbah	20,874	7¾	1			
Beemsumunder	12,148	4	2			
Dideary	12,984	9½	0			
Husdroog	11,936	2¾	3			
Multoor	10,392	3½	2			
Murkal Moroo	12,662	9¼	3			
Tullick	11,854	0¾	0			
				92,853	7¼	11
Carried forward				13,23,347	4¼	5

	Cant. Pagodas.	Fanams.			
Brought forward				13,23,347	4¼ 5
Burnm Sagur -	10,163	6¼	0		
Kunkopa - -	12,542	0½	2		
				22,705	6¾ 2
				13,46,053	1 7
Bilchoor - -	10,683	1	2		
Hinoor - -	10,010	0	5		
Goody Cottah - -	11,330	5	3		
				33,023	6 10
				13,79,076	8 1
Deduct two Purgunnahs of Hurdenhally, viz. Talmale and Talwaddy, included in the company's share - - -				5,000	0 0
				13,74,076	8 1

Schedule D.

The Peishwah's share.

Harpoonelly (6 Talooks) - -				1,10,030	8¾ 0
Soonda (above the Ghauts) - -				59,377	0 0
Annagoondy - - - -				60,101	0 0
From Chittledroog 2 Talooks, viz.					
Holul Kaira - -	11,425	6	0		
Mycomdo - -	12,226	9	0		
				23,652	5 0
From Bednore 1 Talook, viz.					
Hurryhur - - - -				10,796	0 0
Total Canteria pagodas				2,63,957	3¾ 0

Ratified at Hyderabad by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, anno domini 1799.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK, *Resident.*

No. XLVI.

Memorial, explanatory of the Partition Treaty of Mysore.

1. THE principle of partition between the Nizam and the company, assumed in the first and second articles, is that each party should retain in direct sovereignty, an equal share of unincumbered territorial revenue, deduction being made from both sides, of the amount of the pensions for jaghires, of which each party has agreed to bear the charge.

2. The allowances made by Tippoo Sultaun to his family, and that of Hyder, including the whole expenses of the maintenance of every branch of the families, did not exceed 1,12,116 Canteria pagodas.

3. It was however thought advisable to allot a larger sum for this purpose, as well with a view to meet the first expenses of settling the families in the Carnatic, as the increased charge of maintaining the younger sons of the late Sultaun (nine in number) as they shall advance in years. The youngest of the four princes, now at Velloie, is about fifteen years of age. It is not intended to make the nine younger sons now at Seringapatam, the eldest of whom is about eleven years of age, so large an allowance as that enjoyed by each of the four elder now at Vellore. The four elder sons have been accustomed to a degree of state, of which it would be indelicate to deprive them: the same reasons do not apply to the younger sons, who have scarcely ever been suffered to pass beyond the limits of the Zenana.

4. The estimate of the revenues of Tippoo Sultaun, on which the partition has been founded, is the same as that admitted by the allies at Seringapatam in 1792, deducting the sum of nine lacks of pagodas, which had been added by the allies to the estimate given in by the vakeels of Tippoo Sultaun on that occasion. There is every reason to suppose, that this estimate is much below the real produce of the revenues of the

country, especially in its valuation of the company's share. Tippoo Sultaun had made a fictitious increase of his revenues, by an arbitrary addition to the nominal value of his coin, and by other capricious and extravagant operations, the nature of which is explained in the papers annexed to this dispatch: by this contrivance he had raised the apparent amount of his revenues to the sum of Canteria; pagodas 83,67,549: this sum certainly much exceeded their real amount. In No. 3,* a comparison is instituted between the extravagant statements lately found at Seringapatam, and the depreciation of Tippoo's remaining revenue imposed upon the allies in 1792. By this comparison it appears that, at the lowest valuation, the company's share of the present partition may be expected, within a short period of time, to produce not less than 14,78,698 star pagodas,† provided the revenues be ably and honestly administered.

5. A map, constructed by Captain Marriott, will be found in No. It is recommended to the attention of your Honourable Court, as exhibiting a curious and interesting view of the new and capricious division of territory introduced by Tippoo Sultaun, by which he had changed many of the names, and all the divisions of every part of his kingdom, loading his establishments with innumerable Mahomedan officers of revenue, and entirely subverting the wise and economical system established by Hyder Ally. In No. 4,* will also be found a note, relating to the produce and commercial powers of Mysore. Having already stated, in paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of this dispatch, the principles which have regulated the selection of the particular districts allotted to each of the contracting parties, it is unnecessary to add any thing on that subject to this memorial.

6. The third article does not appear to require any explanation. The small tract of land retained in addition to the island of Seringapatam is necessary to the effectual strength of the place, and to its constant supply with water. By the next dispatch it is hoped, that an accurate report of the value of the acquisitions made under this article may be forwarded to your Honourable Court.

* Appendix XLIX. Captain Macleod's Statement of Revenue, &c.

† N. B. This is the gross amount; about twelve lacks net revenue.

7. Articles 4 and 5. These articles are so expressed as to exclude any claim of right to the throne on the part of the Rajah, and also to prevent many of the Polygars descended from the ancient possessors of various parts of the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, from preferring obsolete pretensions, founded on alleged rights of inheritance.

8. Article 6,—Requires no explanation. The first separate article refers to this, and will hereafter be explained.

9. Article 7,—Refers to an intended treaty with the Marhatta empire, the negotiation of which is now depending at Poonah, with every prospect of a favourable issue.

10. The 8th article requires no particular comment: it is connected with the second separate article, which will be hereafter explained.

11. The 9th article is founded upon the equitable right of the company, arising from a superior share in the expences and dangers of the war, to the principal benefit of any collateral arrangements to be made with the new government of Mysore. It is evident that his Highness the Nizam, the existence of whose throne has confessedly been saved, and is now protected by the British power, will derive a considerable additional security from the establishment of the British influence in Mysore. On the other hand, the pensions to be made to the Marhattas will be employed to purchase certain immunities of the most valuable kind for his Highness; or if the Marhatta power should decline such an accommodation, the second separate article (as hereafter explained) will place his Highness's interests, under the operations of this treaty, on a level with those of the company.

Separate Articles.

Article 1.

This article was inserted with a view to exclude the Nizam from any interference in the affairs of the families of Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sultaun: its operation is reciprocal, as it renounces the company's right of interference between Nizam Ally and Kummer ud Deen.

Article 2.

If the Paishwah should accede to the terms to be proposed to him under the seventh article of the treaty, it has already been remarked, that the Nizam will derive considerable benefit from that arrangement. The precise nature of the benefit which his Highness may expect, is now a matter of negotiation at Poonah. If Nizam Ally should be disappointed in his expectation at Poonah, he will be amply indemnified by receiving two-thirds of the territory now reserved for eventual cession to the Paishwah, while the company shall receive only one-third.

No. XLVII.

Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam.

A TREATY of perpetual friendship and alliance concluded, on the one part, by his Excellency Lieutenant-general George Harris, Commander in Chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty and of the English East India Company Behauder, in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, on behalf and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-general for all affairs, civil and military, of the British nation in India, by virtue of full powers vested in them for this purpose, by the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-general; and, on the other part, by Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, Rajah of Mysore.

Whereas it is stipulated in the treaty concluded on the 22d of June, 1799, between the Honourable English East India Company Behauder, and the

Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company Behauder, his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, and for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, that a separate government shall be established in Mysore, and that his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder shall possses certain territories, specified in schedule C, annexed to the said treaty, and that for the effectual establishment of the government of Mysore, his Highness shall be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, to be furnished by the English East India Company Behauder;

Wherefore, in order to carry the said stipulations into effect, and to increase and strengthen the friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company and the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, this treaty is concluded by Lieutenant-general George Harris, Commander in Chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the said English East India Company Behauder, in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-general aforesaid, and by his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, which shall be binding upon the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

Article 1.

The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties shall be considered as the friends and enemies of both.

Article 2.

The Honourable the East India Company Behauder agrees to maintain, and his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder agrees to receive a military force for the defence and security of his High-

ness's dominions; in consideration of which protection, his Highness engages to pay the annual sum of seven lacks of star pagodas to the said East India Company; the said sum to be paid in equal monthly instalments, commencing from the 1st of July, Anno Domini, 1799. And his Highness further agrees that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops to be maintained by it, shall be left entirely to the company.

Article 3.

If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or of either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken, or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any state or power, his said Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expence, incurred by the augmentation of the military force, and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as shall appear to the Governor-general in council of Fort William, on an attentive consideration of the means of his said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his said Highness.

Article 4.

And whereas it is indispensably necessary, that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray, either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the third article of the present treaty, it is hereby stipulated and agreed, between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-general in council of Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-general in council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right, either to introduce such regulations and ordinances, as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the

direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, as shall appear to him, the said Governor-general in council, necessary to render the funds efficient and available, either in time of peace or war.

Article 5.

And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor-general in council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provision of the fourth article, his said Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver shall immediately issue orders to his aumils, or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, according to the tenor of the fourth article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the English Company Behauder. And in case his Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor-general in council shall be at liberty to issue orders, by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations or ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient, for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country, and the welfare of the people. Provided always, that whenever and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed, and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the said East India Company, the Governor-general in council shall render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed. Provided also, that in no case whatever, shall his Highness's actual receipt of annual income, arising out of his territorial revenue, be less than the sum of one lack of star pagodas, together with one-fifth part of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him by the fifth acticle of the treaty of Mysore; which sum of one lack of star

pagodas, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said net revenues, the East-India Company engages, at all times, and in every possible case, to secure, and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

Article 6.

His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder engages, that he will be guided by a sincere and cordial attention to the relations of peace and amity now established between the English Company Behauder and their allies; and that he will carefully abstain from any interference in the affairs of any State in alliance with the said English Company Behauder, or of any State whatever. And for securing the object of this stipulation, it is further stipulated and agreed, that no communication or correspondence, with any foreign State whatever, shall be holden by his said Highness, without the previous knowledge and sanction of the said English Company Behauder.

Article 7.

His Highness stipulates and agrees, that he will not admit any European foreigners into his service, without the concurrence of the English Company Behauder; and that he will apprehend and deliver to the Company's government, all Europeans, of whatever description, who shall be found within the territories of his said Highness, without regular passports from the English government, it being his Highness's determined resolution, not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the said Company.

Article 8.

Whereas the complete protection of his Highness's said territories requires that various fortresses and strong places, situated within the territorities of his Highness, should be garrisoned and commanded, as well in time of peace as of war, by British troops and officers, his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder engages, that the said English Company Behauder shall, at all times, be at liberty to

garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper, such fortresses and strong places, within his said Highness's territories, as it shall appear to them advisable to take charge of.

Article 9.

And whereas, in consequence of the system of defence which it may be expedient to adopt for the security of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, it may be necessary that certain forts and strong places within his Highness's territories, should be dismantled or destroyed, and that other forts and strong places should be strengthened and repaired, it is stipulated and agreed, that the English East India Company shall be the sole judges of the necessity of any such alterations in the fortresses. And it is further agreed, that such expences as may be incurred on this account, shall be borne and defrayed, in equal proportion, by the contracting parties.

Article 10.

In case it shall become necessary for enforcing and maintaining the authority and government of his Highness in the territories now subjected to his power, that the regular troops of the English East India Company Behauder should be employed, it is stipulated and agreed, that upon formal application being made for the service of the said troops, they shall be employed in such manner as to the said Company shall seem fit; but it is expressly understood by the contracting parties, that this stipulation shall not subject the troops of the English East India Company Behauder to be employed in the ordinary transactions of revenue.

Article 11.

It being expedient, for the restoration and permanent establishment of tranquillity in the territories now subjected to the authority of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, that suitable provision should be made for certain officers of rank in the service of the late Tippoo Sultaun, his said Highness agrees to enter into the immediate

discussion of this point, and to fix the amount of the funds (as soon as the necessary information can be obtained) to be granted for this purpose, in a separate article to be hereafter added to this treaty.

Article 12.

Lest the garrison of Seringapatam should, at any time, be subject to inconvenience from the high price of provisions and other necessaries, his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder agrees, that such quantities of provisions, and other necessaries, as may be required for the use and consumption of the troops composing the said garrison, shall be allowed to enter the place, from all and every part of his dominions, free of any duty, tax, or impediment, whatever.

Article 13.

The contracting parties hereby agree to take into their early consideration the best means of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their respective dominions, as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both governments, and to conclude a commercial treaty, for this purpose, with as little delay as possible.

Article 14.

His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, hereby promises to pay, at all times, the utmost attention to such advice as the English government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States.

Article 15.

Whereas it may hereafter appear, that some of the districts declared by the treaty of Mysore to belong, respectively, to the English Company

Behauder and to his Highness are inconveniently situated, with a view to the proper connection of their respective lines of frontier, it is hereby stipulated between the contracting parties, that in all such cases they will proceed to such an adjustment, by means of an exchange or otherwise, as shall be best suited to the occasion.

Article 16.

This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, being this day, the 8th of July, anno domini 1799, corresponding the 3d of Suffer, anno Higeree 1214, and to the 7th of the month Hassar, of the 1721 year of the Salwant æra, settled and concluded at the fort of Nuzzerbah, near Seringapatam, by his Excellency Lieutenant-general George Harris, Commander in Chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the Honourable English East-India Company in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-colonel Barry Close, with the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, the aforesaid gentlemen have delivered to the said Maha Rajah one copy of the same in English and Persian, sealed and signed by them, and his Highness the Maha Rajah has delivered to the gentlemen aforesaid another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his seal, and signed by Luchuma, widow of the late Kistna Rajah, and sealed and signed by Purnea, dewan to the Maha Rajah Kistna Rajah Oodiaver.

And the aforesaid gentlemen have engaged to procure and deliver to the said Maha Rajah, without delay, a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of the Right Honourable the Governor-general, on the receipt of which by the said Maha Rajah, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding, on the Honourable the English East-India Company, and on the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, and the copy of it now delivered to the said Maha Rajah shall be returned.

No. XLVIII.

Memorial explanatory of the Subsidary Treaty of Seringapatam.

Article 1—requires no explanation.

Article 2. The amount of the subsidy was fixed after full communication with Purnea. It may, perhaps, be necessary to indulge the Rajah with the payment of a less sum, for the first year of the new government; but no doubt exists, that after that period, the full subsidy may be realized without any inconvenience to the Rajah's affairs, or any pressure upon the the country. It was thought more advisable to undertake the defence of the country, without any specification of the force to be employed, than to bind the Company to maintain a specified number of troops in Mysore.

Article 3. The principle established in this article, connected with the fourth and fifth articles, will enable the Company to command the whole resources of Mysore, in the event of actual or approaching war.

Articles 4 and 5. These articles secure to the Company the power, not only of assuming the management of the Rajah's revenues, either in time of peace or war, whenever such a measure may appear necessary, but also of introducing any improvement into any or each of the Rajah's administration, which the Governor-general in council may deem adviseable; it may therefore be hoped, that it will not be necessary to resort to the extreme measure of assuming the Rajah's country. The powers, both of regulation and assumption, are secured in the most unqualified manner, for the purpose of avoiding the embarrassments which have occasioned so much inconvenience in Oude, Tanjore, and the Carnatic. The sum of one lack of star pagodas, in addition to one-fifth of the net revenue, is reserved for the Rajah, lest in time of war, such a defalcation of revenue should take place, as should reduce his income below the amount of his necessary expences. It is not intended that the Rajah, in time of peace,

should ever be required to pay to the company a larger sum than the amount of the subsidy; namely, seven lacks of star pagodas, excepting only in the case of preparation for hostilities.

Articles 6 to 10—require no explanation.

Article 11. It is intended by this article, to reserve the right of charging the Rajah with the provision to be made for the principal sirdars and killedars in the service of the late Tippoo Sultaun. The measures which have already been taken, with a view to the execution of this article, will appear in the letter from the commissioners in the Mysore, under date 12th June.* The total amount of the annual charge already incurred on this head is 23,000 star pagodas. Some addition must certainly be made to this sum; but it is not probable that they will increase the annual charge beyond the amount of 40,000 pagodas.† This sum cannot be deemed a considerable sacrifice to the important object of conciliating the good will of the principal surviving officers of the late Sultaun. It must, however, be observed, that the whole of this sum is not to be stated as a permanent charge, several pensions having been granted conditionally, during the good behaviour of the pensioner, or until he shall be employed by the Company or its allies. The provisions which have been made for the families of those who have fallen during the campaign, are included in this calculation, and amount to a sum which bears no proportion to the credit which has resulted to the character of the Company from this transaction.

Article 12—requires no explanation.

Article 13. The subject of this article has already occupied the attention of the commissioners; some time, however, will necessarily be required, before a plan can be thoroughly digested for this important subject.

Articles 14 and 15—require no explanation.

* Chapter XV.

† Tippoo's allowances to his officers, civil and military, were framed on the most parsimonious scale, although the number of his subordinate officers of revenue was extravagant.

No. XLIX.

Captain Macleod to the Mysore Commissioners; dated 8th July, 1799.

To the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

GENTLEMEN,

IN compliance with the desire of the Right Honourable the Governor-general, conveyed in his letter to you, dated the 21st June, extract of which was forwarded to me by your directions, I have the honour to transmit to you a statement of the revenues of the territories lately acquired for the Honourable Company, in which you will please to observe the grounds on which I am led to believe that those acquisitions are capable to yield a gross revenue, equal to the sums in column 4.

The late Tippoo Sultaun raised his Jummabundy, in the year 1796, by augmenting his land-rent three Cantaria fanams on each pagoda (ten fanams) supposing the country to be capable of bearing this augmentation. He also charged his Jummabundy with half a fanam, as a tax on shroffs, and a quarter of a fanam as a duty on tobacco. The two last articles were absurdly added to the land-rent, as well as the first, the whole amounting to $3\frac{3}{4}$ fanams on every ten fanams; so that by this increase every ten by the preceding Jummabundy became $13\frac{3}{4}$ for the new Jummabundy, or 40 was raised to 55.

There were, however, some inconsiderable articles of the revenue excluded from contributing towards this augmentation; such as the rents of land farmed for portions of the produce, and also the road duties; but as I could not procure an exact account of the amount of items left out in forming the increase, I have supposed, for the convenience of calculation, that the increase of 1796 extended to the whole gross revenue, and by following this mode, I have estimated the increase in column 2 of the

statement greater than it really was; consequently column 3 or 4 is estimated lower than it otherwise should be, if the detail of the whole increase had been accurately ascertained.

The sums in Canteria pagodas in the third column, or in star pagodas in the fourth, may, in my opinion, be considered as nearly the fair Jummabundy which may hereafter be expected; though I cannot take upon myself to assert, that the several districts ought to yield revenue equal to this valuation of them.

If some of the districts should be over rated in this estimate, it is probable that others are undervalued. I think it is not unreasonable to expect that in the aggregate the whole may, in the course of three or four years, produce a revenue equal to the amount of column 4; and if from this sum one-fifth be deducted, for the several heads of enaums to [illegible] and for defraying all charges of collection, there would remain to the company a clear revenue of near twelve lacks of star pagodas.

Should this estimate of the new acquisitions be hereafter, from better information, to be materially erroneous, I hope it will be remembered that I followed the truest scale which can at present be had. Much will always depend on the skill and talents of persons in the management of revenue.

I have an account of the amount of the rent of each district, supposing the Jumma in the first column; and I have other information sufficient to prove, that the schedule of the districts assigned to the confederates in 1792, was a false statement of [illegible]

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W[illegible]

Seringapatam, 8th July, 1799.

From Captain Macleod to General Harris, dated Seringapatam, 22d May, 1799, inclosing Abstract of Tippoo Sultaun's Jummabundy.

SIR,

I have the pleasure to lay before you an abstract of the Jummabundy, and a list of the several forts of the late Tippoo Sultaun. As he had given [illegible] names to all forts, and the residence of his asophs, the proper, or [illegible]r name, is affixed to each division and fort, for the convenience of [illegible]hical information.

[illegible]ultaun's mistaken system of revenue collection operated in a great [illegible]ds reducing his receipts, by his having increased the number [illegible]ies to ten times as many as had usually been the proportion [illegible]mer governments of the Mysore dominions.

[illegible]un raised his Jummabundy in the year 1795, by adding about [illegible] lacks of Canteria pagodas to his former Jumma. but this increase [illegible]y ideal; as I am informed by men, of whose veracity I have a hi[illegible]on, that since the year 1792, his receipts were annually from twen[illegible] thirty-five lacks of Canteria pagodas. His actual annual disburseme[illegible]estimated at forty lacks of Canteria pag[illegible]s, since the treaty of 17[illegible]hat it appears a considerable portion of his expenses must have b[illegible]n from the treasure collected by his father.

All the aso[illegible]a and aumildars under his government were moormen, who were seldom[illegible]n for any other reason than their being Mahomadans; and althou[illegible]hole of them had an oath of fidelity administered to them, the emb[illegible]nt of public revenue, by the several classes of servants, is suppos[illegible]ve amounted annually to fifteen or twenty lacks of Canteria pagodas[illegible]gheers for the support of troops, which amount to about five lacks o[illegible]ia pagodas, do not appear in the statement: the valuation of them [illegible]ded in the revenue.

I hav[illegible]nour to be, &c. &c. &c.

WILLIAM MACLEOD.

Acting Superintendant of Revenue.

Statement of Revenue, &c. &c. inclosed in Captain Macleod's Letter to the Mysore Commissioners. Dated 8th July, 1799.

Statement shewing that Column 3 or 4 contains an Estimate of the Resources of the Districts lately acquired for the Honourable Company.

Situation.	Districts, alluding to former Names, and to the Arrangement of them in the Schedule of 1792.	1 Tippoo's Jummabundy of the Year 1796, including his ideal Increase of 3¾ Fanams on each Pag	2 The Increase of 3¾ on every 13¾ Fanam included in the first Column.	3 Remaining Jummabundy, after deducting the Increase of 1796.	No of Aumullaries by Tippoo's last Arrangement.	4 Equivalent of Col. 3 in Star Pagodas, at 6 Cant. Pagodas to 5 Star Pagodas.	5 Equivalent in Star Pagodas, by the Schedule of 1792, at 6 Cant. Pagodas to 5 Star Pagodas.	
		C P. F. A.	C P. F. A.	C P. F. A		Star Pag.	Star Pag.	
Above the Ghauts. South of the Cavery.	Sattigal - - Coligal, &c. -	65,189 0 0	17,778 7 12	47,410 2 4	11	39,508 8	12,668 11	
	Tulmullah - -	14,899 0 0	4,063 3 10	10,835 6 6	4	9,029 11	4,166 10½	The proportion included in Hurdenhully by the schedule of 1792.
	Chuckloor - Wynaad, or Beinar	10,000 0 0	2,727 2 12	7,272 7 4	none	6,060 9½	4,166 10½	This district has been deserted since the year 1792. Half this district remains in Rajah's share.
North of the Cavery.	Punganoor - -	62,335 0 0	17,000 4 8	45,334 5 8	6	37,778 12½	12,500 0	This district has been totally ruined by disturbances.
	Vanketygherrycotta	18,243 0 0	4,975 3 10	13,267 6 6	2	11,056 6	5,000 0	
	Baugloor - -	13,625 0 0	3,715 8 0	9,909 2 0	2	8,257 11	2,500 0	
	Soolageery -	14,907 0 0	4,065 5 8	10,841 4 8	2	9,034 9	3,333 5¼	This district has not recovered from the effects of being in the hands of the Mahrattas in 1791 and 1792.
	Dinkenicottah -	39,929 0 0	10,889 7 4	29,039 2 12	6	24,199 6½	11,666 10¾	
	Ossore - - -	27,131 0 0	7,399 3 10	19,731 6 6	4	16,443 ½	15,080 0	
	Total	2,66,258 0 0	72,615 6 10	1,93,642 3 6	35	1,61,368 10	71,080 0	

Below the Ghts.	Coimbatoor	2,37,708 3 14	64,829 8 14	1,72,878 5 0	28	1,44,065 6¾	66,666 10¾	
	Daniancottah	83,016 7 7	22,640 9 7	60,375 8 0	12	50,313 2½	29,166 10½	
	Cheoor	1,28,562 3 11	35,062 4 9	93,499 9 2	18	77,916 9½	22,500 0	
	Chingerie	78,954 3 12	21,533 0 0	57,421 3 12	10	47,851 2½	22,500 0	
	Darapoor and							
	Sattimungle	91,523 5 3	24,409 9 11	66,562 5 8	14	55,468 12½	25,000 0	
	Andoor	34,973 0 0	9,538 1 5	25,434 9 0	5	21,195 12	6,666 10¾	
	Perindorah	39,907 0 0	10,883 7 4	29,023 2 12	6	24,186 1	11,666 10¾	
	Herroad	55,988 0 0	15,269 4 8	40,718 5 8	7	33,932 2	16,666 10¾	
	Viziemungle	39,795 0 0	10,858 1 14	28,941 8 2	6	24,118 2¾	16,666 10¾	
	Cangam	54,440 0 0	13,756 3 10	36,683 6 6	8	30,569 11	16,666 10¾	
	Carroor	83,455 0 0	22,760 4 8	60,694 5 8	12	50,578 12½	37,500 0	
	Uttungooly	32,076 0 0	8,748 0 0	23,328 0 0	4	19,440 0	12,500 0	
	Caveripoor	10,068 0 0	2,745 8 3	7,322 1 13	2	6,101 13	2,166 10½	
	Total	11,40,302 3 15	3,10,991 9 0	8,29,310 4 15	155	6,91,092 1	3,39,666 10¾	
Canara. Mangalore.	Bilgee	43,110 0 0	11,484 5 8	30,625 4 8	6	33,177 9	15,773 11	The sums of those districts shewn in the first three columns is expressed in Bahaderee Pagodas, and the equivalent in Canteria Pagodas is noted below the first Total.
	Corial (Mangalore)	3,40,041 0 0	92,738 4 8	2,47,302 5 8	42	2,67,911 1½	1,11,368 15¾	
	Caricul	31,280 0 0	8,514 5 8	22,705 4 8	2	24,597 9	[illegible]	
	Barkoor	1,36,747 6 0	37,294 8 0	99,452 8 0	11	1,02,[illegible] 0	40,324 14	
	Khooshalpoor	83,790 0 0	22,851 8 4	60,938 1 [illegible]	[illegible]	66,016 6	21,968 4	
	Butcul	25,178 0 0	6,866 7 4	18,311 2 12	4	19,837 3½	7,646 11¼	
	Gersapah	26,753 0 0	7,296 2 12	19,456 7 4	4	21,078 2	7,660 1	
	Honawor (Onore)	41,156 0 0	11,224 3 10	29,931 6 6	6	32,425 15	14,569 2	
	Mirjan	22,988 0 0	6,269 4 8	16,718 5 8	4	18,111 12	7,461 3½	
	Bah. Pag.	7,49,983 6 0	2,04,540 9 4	5,45,442 6 2	92	5,90,896 2½	2,36,267 1¾	
	Canteria Pag.	9,74,978 6 13	2,65,903 2 14	7,09,075 3 15	—	—	—	
	Ancola and Siddasheeghur	58,313 0 0	15,903 5 8	42,409 4 8	8	35,341 3	23,610 3	
	Total	10,33,291 6 13	2,81,806 8 6	7,51,484 8 7	100	6,27,237 5½	2,59,877 4¾	
	Grand Total	24,39,852 0 12	6,65,414 1 0	17,74,437 6 12	290	14,78,698 ½	6,70,623 15½	

Tippoo's Jammabundy had not suffered any other change since the year 1786, excepting the increase shewn in Column 2, consequently the Schedule he gave the Allies in 1792, must have been less than his Jammabundy, in nearly the same proportion that the sums in Column 5 are less than those of Column 4.

Seringapatam, 8th July, 1799.

(Signed) WILLIAM MACLEOD.

N. B From the total there should probably be deducted two-thirds of Punganoor, for an equivalent taken from the Rajah's share for the Nizam.